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




**THE  
ART OF FIGHTING**







Besieging a City in Ancient Times

# THE UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA ART OF FIGHTING

ITS EVOLUTION AND PROGRESS  
WITH ILLUSTRATIONS FROM  
CAMPAIGNS OF GREAT COMMANDERS

BY

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## PREFACE

The evils of war are so heart-rending that every friend of the human race would greet with joy the coming of permanent peace, and would aid every movement tending to ensure it.

Nevertheless until it is certain that war has actually been banished from the earth, armies and navies must be maintained. In order to give their country the protection needed, each army and navy must be correctly designed, prepared, and operated.

To know whether this is being done, the people need a general knowledge of the principles of the art of fighting, especially of strategy.

To impart this knowledge in simple language is the object of this book.

BRADLEY A. FISKE.





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**PART I**  
**FIGHTING AND WAR, IN GENERAL**



# THE ART OF FIGHTING

## CHAPTER I

### FIGHTING BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS

**M**AN'S earliest method of fighting was with his fists. The use he made of his fists was to strike blows upon the body of his antagonist, with the intention of injuring him, and especially of decreasing his ability to inflict blows in return. In practically all cases, a fight was waged to accomplish some purpose; and this purpose was either offensive or defensive. This means that the intention was either to further some purpose, or to prevent an antagonist from carrying out some purpose of his own. Fighting with the fists is in vogue even at the present day, not only among savage tribes, but in the most civilized communities; and it is the prototype of the most complicated and extensive wars ever waged, even among nations the most highly civilized and numerous.

Looked at from the standpoint of a war between two nations, a fist fight between two men seems a very simple matter. But it does not seem a simple matter if one considers all the elements involved. Superficially regarded, such a fight seems simple, for the reason that we take no account whatever of the wonderfully complicated activities going on inside the skin of each contestant. If we knew all that was going on inside of each skin, we would realize that in no army and no navy has there ever been such a perfect adaptation of means to ends, such a thorough system of coördination among all the various parts, such an ability to concentrate them all on one object,



such a speedy supply of reinforcements to threatened points, such an admirable system of reconnoitering, and such a complete power to move as a unit in the desired direction, and to the indicated spot.

If two untrained men fight each other with their fists, we do not see the same quickness of attack and parry as in the case of two men who are highly trained; but even in the case of two untrained men, or even of two small boys, we see such wonderful efficiency of the body for the purpose of fighting as almost to suggest the idea that the primary intention of the Almighty in designing the body of a man was that he should fight. This would be a very extreme position to assume; but, at the same time, it may be pointed out that in no other activity in which a man engages is he called upon to exert his powers so strenuously; in nothing else that a man does is there a demand for such a wide range of effort; by no other activity is a man's strength—physical, mental, and moral—taxed so heavily; after no other exercise is a man so exhausted. These things need not surprise us: why should it surprise us that the utmost of a man's possible endeavor should be called upon to save his life? On the issue of many a fight has depended the life of each man who is fighting; and, in many cases where life itself has not depended on the issue, something has depended on it of such importance that, because of it, the risking of life has been undergone.

If we watch two men, even unskilful men, when fighting, we see that each one keeps his eye eagerly on the other, looking first for an opportunity to strike, and second for a blow that must be parried. In some cases we see this condition reversed, and note that at least one of the men is more intent on parrying than on striking. If we see one man intent on striking and the other man intent on parrying, we realize that one man is acting offensively and the other defensively; and we realize also that, unless there is a marked disproportion in strength or skill, the man who is acting offensively will probably be the victor.

But we realize also that he may not necessarily be the victor. We realize that the one who is acting defensively may be merely waiting for an opportunity to strike effectively; and that the man who is acting offensively may be merely using strength and effort, with but little guidance from reason, and may exhaust himself in ill-directed effort. We realize that the man who is acting defensively may finally see an opportunity to break through the guard of his adversary and inflict a decisive blow. We realize all these things because from boyhood we have been accustomed to this kind of fighting, and because a knowledge of its fundamental principles is so much a part of our heredity as to be almost an instinct.

We realize also that, unless the defendant does at some time act offensively, he will surely be vanquished. No fighting in the history of the world, no matter how defensively conducted, has ever obtained a victory without offensive action of some sort, as by delivering a blow. In the simple case of two men in a fist fight, we cannot imagine either of the men becoming the victor without a blow, or a successful grapple, or a throw-down, or the inflicting of an injury of some kind. We shall see hereafter that these facts are the fundamental principles underlying all wars; and that it has been by forgetting them that much misunderstanding as to the nature of war and the purposes of strategy has been created.

While the two contestants are watching each other for chances to strike, and for the necessities for parrying, there are going on inside of each man things that we cannot see. We cannot see that system of independent and yet dependent parts by which all the members of the body act independently of each other, and yet coöperatively, and in obedience to the will that directs all toward a common object. The mind is informed by its reconnoitering agency, the eye, of the rapid movements of the adversary, not only of his body as a unit, but of his arms and his legs and his eyes: that is, the mind takes note of the direction and speed of movement of the enemy main body and of its supports and reconnoitering

parties. Apprehending these, the mind telegraphs orders by the nerves to the muscles, and thus immediately disposes of its own main body and its supports and reconnoitering parties—sometimes to parry, sometimes to retreat, sometimes to advance, and sometimes to launch a blow.

Each contestant by means of his reconnoitering parties (his eyes) watches for any uncovering of the enemy main body, in order that he may strike it, and also for any opportunity of reaching some weak spot. Each contestant realizes that the most effective blow would be one delivered with the full power of the arm on the front, but that such a blow entails a risk, because it uncovers one's self to attack; and therefore he delivers many comparatively ineffective blows without uncovering himself, in the hope of gradually wearing down the fighting power of his adversary to a point at which he may launch a blow with his full power, without undue risk.

This, of course, presupposes that the two contestants are fairly matched. If they are not fairly matched, one of the contestants may be able to deal a series of heavy blows without serious risk to himself and bring the fight to a speedy end. Where such a disproportion of power exists, however, the matter is not interesting to the student of the art of fighting, for the reason that it is impracticable to learn the possibilities of that art from occasions in which the disproportion of material forces is so great as to give strategy no opportunity to exert its powers.

While the case of two unskilled men in fighting with their fists reveals to the student a marvelous display of the powers of the human body, it is only in the contest between highly trained pugilists that this is shown in its perfection. And when one considers how few men have been highly trained pugilists, and when he realizes the marvelous physical strength, the quickness of perception, the rapidity of inter-action between the nerves and the muscles, and the amount of training required, he must conclude that, although he may consider such things very brutal and demoralizing, and though they

may decrease the refinement of the community, yet nevertheless they do develop more highly than does anything else the powers of the human body. We see in the trained pianist a superb coördination between the eyes and the fingers. This coördination is as great as that between the eye and the fists of the pugilist; but it is no greater. The pianist produces beautiful chords and successions of chords to delight an audience, while the pugilist inflicts blows that cause physical pain and harm. Nevertheless, it can hardly be denied that, from the standpoint of the mechanics of the human body, the pianist or even the acrobat, is in a class inferior to that occupied by the pugilist. That the pugilist should devote his truly marvelous powers to a purpose that may be unworthy, or even bad, does not nullify the fact that he brings the physical activities of the human organism to a higher point than does anybody else.

The reason that the pugilist is able to accomplish so much, or the reason that any man is able to walk or talk or do anything else, is because the body of a man is an organism: that is, an organization composed of parts that are independent of each other, and yet interdependent, and that can all be made to act together for a definite purpose. What is ordinarily called a machine is man's imitation of the organism created by the Almighty. In a machine, a printing-press for instance, we see an enormous number of parts, each working apparently independently of every other; and yet we see all working together to print a paper. When one watches a printing-press, or when he watches any other of the great machines invented by man, he is filled with wonder at the genius of the inventor and the skill of the mechanics who embodied the inventor's invention in steel and brass; but no machine that man ever invented is other than an imitation of the mechanism of the human body. So far as men know, man is the most perfect machine that even the Almighty has invented.

There are three main elements that determine the effectiveness of a pugilist, and they are the same elements that deter-

mine the effectiveness of an army or a fleet: strength, skill, and courage. These qualities are natural in a man originally, but can be developed to a surprising degree.

The strength is of two kinds, defensive and offensive, and is evidenced by ability to endure injury and to inflict injury. In a man the size of his frame is a rough indication of his strength; and so in a fleet or an army is its size a rough indication. The indication is quite rough, however; for many a large man is not strong either defensively or offensively, and the same has always been true of an army or a fleet. The physical strength of a man depends not only on his size, but on the way in which his various elements are put together, on the strength of his individual muscles, and on the effectiveness with which they are combined. If a pugilist should have weak legs or a weak heart, even if he had exceedingly strong arms, he would not be a strong pugilist. Similarly, if an army or a fleet that is large is composed of men and weapons that are weak, or if it has weak parts, that army or fleet cannot be strong. Roughly speaking, the strength of a man, or of an army or a fleet, is the strength of its weakest part; because in a serious fight the weak part is liable to be detected, and so vigorously assaulted as to be broken down, and the integrity of the entire structure thereby destroyed.

The skill of a pugilist is both natural and acquired; and so is that of a fleet or an army. If a man has a quick mind, in the sense that he apprehends things quickly, every move of his adversary is quickly apprehended; whereas, if a man has a sluggish mind, the adversary's moves may not be seen quickly enough to permit of taking effective counter-measures. Similarly, in a fleet or an army, if the reconnoitering parties are not efficient the fleet or army may find itself attacked before it has had time to take proper measures of defense. And even if a man's faculties of apprehension are good, it may be that the coördination between his mind and his muscles is sluggish; so that, even if he sees an adversary's threat quickly, his muscles reply too slowly. This is more apt to be the case

with heavy men than with light men, because the mass to be moved is greater; but, as a rule, a man who is quick to apprehend is quick to act. Similarly, in a fleet or army, the gathering of information concerning the enemy may be effective, but the means for getting the information to the main body and of taking effective counter-measures may not be effective, especially if the fleet or army be very large. As a general rule, however, the same foresight that provides a good means of information provides also a good means for taking action in accordance with it.

Skill is more susceptible of development in a pugilist than is his physical strength; though, of course, strength is susceptible of great development also. The skill is developed by training; and it is an important fact that this training is gained mainly by actual contests with an adversary. The development of strength alone may be gained by mere physical exercises; but the eye cannot be trained by such means to see an enemy's moves quickly, nor can the arm be trained to make the parry or give the counter-blow. Similarly, in fleets and armies, mere strength (that is, the power to withstand blows and to deliver blows) can be developed in the laboratory and machine-shop, and in target practice and tactical drills; but it is only in contests more or less realistic that real training can be secured in apprehending the intentions of the enemy and in replying effectively.

It is not only for taking counter-measures, however, that skill is needed: it is needed even more for initiating offensive measures. The whole aim of the pugilist, or of the fleet or the army, is to inflict a crushing blow. In order to do this, the first requisite is to discern the opportunity; and the second is to act instantly with all the force possessed. The opportunity must be apprehended instantly; but there is little use in apprehending it, unless the appropriate action follows. A simple illustration is the sharpshooter with his musket. He eagerly watches his sights as they sway up and down and to the right and left across the target; and his skill consists, not

in keeping his sights invariably on the target, for no man can do that, but in seeing instantly when they are on and instantly pulling the trigger. Many a marksman has failed to hit the target because he was too slow in pulling the trigger.

Closely associated with skill is courage; because without courage the nervous, mental, and moral systems of a man are not at the correct degree of tension. Courage does not mean merely absence of fear; for absence of fear may be due to absence of a complete understanding of the situation, owing to sluggishness of mind. Courage is that intense and yet controlled will to win which seeks the objective so intently that all the powers of the body and mind are devoted to attaining it, in spite of danger, discomfort, and fatigue. Without courage, no pugilist could ever fight effectively, and neither could an army or a fleet. That it is a useful quality when devoted to the purposes of pugilism may be doubted; but the natural fighting of a man is seldom for the sake of mere pugilism, but for some purpose that may be very fine, such as the defense of his wife and children. I have used the example of pugilism merely because it affords the best illustration of the development of the power of fighting in a man.

But, whether we consider that the use of courage in mere fighting is laudable or not, we must admit that, for the purposes of fighting it is the highest personal quality, because without it strength vanishes and skill fails. Many a fight, especially against untrained men, has been won, not because the loser was dead or exhausted physically, but because his courage or morale had been reduced to such a point that he would not or could not fight any longer. He has said to himself, in effect: "I am already beaten; what is the use of fighting any longer? The longer I fight the worse condition I shall be in." For this reason, in the training of all fighters, both individual fighters and army and navy men, much of the training is devoted to developing the courage; and much of the art of the trainer in the one case, and of the high commanders in the other case, is devoted to *encouraging* the men.

In fighting with unaided fists and arms, it has seldom been possible, in the case of a fight that was carried on to attain some object, or to prevent an antagonist from attaining an object, to get a decisive result with arms and fists only. As long as this means only was employed, the antagonist retained his freedom of movement, and could always retreat, or move to the right or left, in such a way as to lessen the force of a blow or to evade it altogether. For this reason, one man or the other has endeavored to grapple his opponent and reduce his freedom of movement, so that blows could be neither softened nor evaded. At some stage of the fight, one man has usually grappled his opponent and endeavored to throw him to the ground and make him helpless to deliver further blows or to evade blows. An antagonist lying helpless on the ground, the victor has been able to administer blows of the utmost violence, until his victim was subdued; and in some cases to throttle him and kill him by choking him. We see the counterpart of this in many operations of fleets and armies, in which one side has been enabled to envelop or surround the other, or to force it into a position where its freedom of movement was so restricted that it became practically helpless.

In some cases, in a fight between two men, one seeks safety in flight, and the other pursues him. If the fugitive is fleetier than his pursuer he may escape; but if he is not so fleet he is doomed to destruction, because he will surely be attacked from behind, from a direction in which he cannot reply, and thus forced to receive blows without the power of inflicting appreciable damage in return. Similarly, in fights between armies or fleets, one party usually retreats. If it is able to retreat with a speed greater than that at which the enemy can advance, it will get away in safety; but if it is not able to retreat at such a speed, it is doomed to disaster, because the pursuing enemy can inflict great damage upon it with little danger to itself.

Another reason for the danger in retreating, which applies both to individual men and to fleets and armies, is that the



courage, or morale, which is so essential to effective fighting, is reduced enormously by the mere fact of retreating, and by a realization of the comparative helplessness engendered. For this reason, retreat must not be undertaken except for imperative reasons; and yet, if it is undertaken, it must be undertaken so promptly after the desirability of retreating is recognized that it can be carried out in an orderly and deliberate fashion.

*Weapons.*—As far back as history goes, we know that men supplemented their fists and arms with sticks and clubs; and it is inconceivable that, almost from the first, men should not have made crude clubs from branches wrenched from trees. The usefulness of the club was simply that it enabled a man to reach his antagonist from a greater distance than his arm could stretch, and also to administer a heavier blow. The reason that he could administer a heavier blow was twofold: first, the club was harder than his fist; and, second, it could be given a much greater velocity than could be given to his fist, by swinging it through a considerable arc.

Another means for supplementing the arm and the fist was the stone. The stone was either held in the hand and utilized to give a blow, the effectiveness of which was due to the hardness and sharpness of the stone, or it was used as a projectile. In the latter case, its effectiveness was due to four things: its hardness, its sharpness, the velocity that could be imparted to it, and the distance over which it could be thrown.

The development of the club and the stone has gone on for many centuries since men first used them; and, as civilization has advanced, these crude appliances have been developed into weapons much more powerful. But every weapon that the most scientific fleet or army uses now owes its effectiveness to the same four qualities that made the club and the stone effective: its hardness, its sharpness, the velocity that can be given to it, and the distance over which it can be used.<sup>1</sup> It will be noted, however, that the more highly these qualities

<sup>1</sup> Possible exceptions are poison gas and submarine torpedoes.

have been developed, the greater the difficulties and complexities that have arisen in the endeavor to make use of them. The complexity has become so great that to study them and apply them in practice two separate professions have been required—the military profession and the naval profession.

The fighting of primeval man, done with his fists and arms, and supplemented with sticks and stones, was followed by the use of implements less crude than sticks and stones, fashioned into definite shapes and used for definite purposes. These implements were first of stone, later of copper, and later still of other metals. In what is now called the paleolithic age (old stone age) some implements were made, however, from bones and horns and tusks. All were distinguished by the feature of a sharp point or a sharp edge, evidently for the purpose of effecting penetration, and were devoted to the main object of all men; that is, they were devoted mainly to procuring food and guarding what had been procured. We see here that, if used to guard or attack, an implement became a weapon—that a weapon is merely a tool for a warlike purpose.

In the old stone age the implements were rough and evidently made by hammering or chipping with a hard substance; but in the neolithic or new stone age, the implements were ground or polished, an evidence of an increase in mentality that we cannot measure correctly now. The smooth instruments were, of course, capable of greater penetration than were the rough instruments of the preceding age; and they were, therefore, more efficient for the purposes of both war and peace. In fact, in those days the intervals between war and peace were so brief that no very great distinction could have been made between them. This does not mean that there was more war in those times than now, but merely that conditions were such that war and peace succeeded each other more rapidly. It did not require ten years of strenuous preparation then to prepare for a war, or even one year to wage it.

It is noteworthy that the effect of a blow from a fist or a

club was to bruise or crush the external surface of the body, or to upset the equilibrium, or to give such a shock to the internal mechanism as to make it less capable of hostile action; while the effect of a blow from a sharp instrument was to penetrate the protective covering of the skin. We shall see later that the effects produced on fleets and armies by the most modern weapons are essentially the same.

*Weapons and Civilization.*—As one of the important accompaniments of the advance of early civilization was an improvement in the effectiveness of weapons, it would be interesting to determine how much the improvement in weapons was a cause of the advance, and how much it was an effect. It is impossible to determine this absolutely; but, inasmuch as the struggle to attain civilization has always been extremely bitter, and necessitated bloody fights against barbarians and also against wild beasts, the probability seems to be that the development of improved weapons was a cause of the advance of civilization to a greater degree than it was an effect of it, and that civilization could not have been achieved without it.

## CHAPTER II

### • FIGHTING BETWEEN TRIBES

**T**HE fact that weapons were gradually improved indicates that a considerable degree of coöperation developed among men, for the reason that several different kinds of skill were needed to improve the weapons; and if several different kinds of skill were devoted to that one purpose, several men must have worked in coöperation. The coöperation must have been caused by a community of interest among bands of men; and as the most urgent need then was to secure self-protection, it can hardly be doubted that this community of interest was in securing it. In order that a band of men should secure self-protection, the first necessary step was to form an organization.

The earliest organization was, of course, the family, at the head of which was the man, who was charged by nature with providing food and shelter for his wife and children, and with protecting the food and shelter afterward from the attacks of beasts and men. It seems probable that the first fights originated in the necessity for providing the food and shelter, and guarding them after they had been provided. A man's only ways of getting food were to kill animals, to climb trees for fruits and nuts, to till the ground, and to fish in the waters—or to steal from other people. That stealing was sometimes resorted to, the records of history show; and so do the doings of savages now. In fact, the doings of people in the most highly civilized Christian nations now indicate a similar tendency, if at any time, or in any place, the law can be evaded or defied.

This point is more important than it might at first sight

seem to be; because the only way in which we can study the tendencies of man *per se*, and therefore of tribes and nations, is to study man free from the influences of civilization and the restraints of law. Men have gradually come to realize that it is better for men to be governed by certain laws: even the most sinful man realizes that it is best for him that other men should be good; even a thief wants other men to be honest; and even a conscienceless debtor wants other men to pay him what they owe him. Municipal laws have resulted that restrain individuals by force; but there have never been international laws that could restrain nations and tribes by force.

If the earliest cause of fighting was to obtain and retain the means wherewith to support the women and children, it probably has been the fundamental cause ever since, even though this fundamental cause has been overgrown with others more apparent. Certain it is that the man has always done the fighting; certain it is that he has never needed much food and shelter for himself; certain it is that he has always been charged with getting the food and shelter for the women and children; certain it is that this charge has demanded all the industry and labor and ability that men could be induced and forced to employ. The wants of women and children have increased from age to age, and the labors of men have increased proportionately.

This does not mean that the wants of the men have not increased as well; but it does mean that they have not increased in so great a ratio as have those of the women and children. It also means that the wants of the men, if carefully analyzed, will be found to be so closely bound up with those of the women and children dependent on them that we cannot truthfully declare that what a man wants is wanted for himself alone. The wants of most men, in so far as the men alone are concerned, are exceedingly simple and easily provided for. Every man being charged with the feeding and protection of his family, it is easy to see how two men agreed together

to coöperate in providing food and protection, how three men so agreed, and how tribes came to be formed. These tribes must first have been made up of families related to each other, and therefore bound together by the powerful tie of hereditary hates and fears of hereditary foes. Even at the present day and in highly civilized countries, one hears at times of an hereditary family feud. A tribe having been formed for the advancement of the common interests, both in providing food and shelter and in guarding the food and shelter after they had been provided, it is easy to see that the methods by which the men of the tribe could act together the most effectively, both in attack and defense, should be eagerly discussed and tried. It is easy to see, also, how the desirability of securing some valuable fishing waters possessed by another tribe, or some desirable site for a village in a fertile valley, or some fine cattle, or some other possession, should lead to a determination to take them by force. In even a very primitive civilization, however, such as existed many centuries ago, and such as exists over a large surface of the earth to-day, an attack would not be made until certain plans of organization and operation had been settled, under some one man as leader. In other words, a campaign would first be laid out and strategic plans be made.

Similarly, as every tribe would realize that whatever possessions it had were always subject to attack by a neighboring tribe, it would make strategic plans as to what it would do in case it were attacked. Some tribes have done this far-sightedly, and some short-sightedly; and, for this reason, some tribes have prospered and retained their independence, while other tribes have not. Such differences in condition prevail in uncivilized countries now: in every savage land we see some dominant tribe, like the Tagalos in the Philippines, who have been more far-sighted and energetic than their neighbors. We see the same thing in the most civilized parts of the world as well, at the highest pitch of civilization that the world has

reached: we see a few dominant nations that owe their dominance to exactly the same personal attributes as those which, in a lesser degree, characterize the Tagalos.

≡ Now, imagine yourself the chief of a tribe that has decided to seize that village which lies so snugly at the foot of that mountain, at the bend of that river ten miles away, and to steal the cattle that look so fat and numerous. What would you decide to do? You would decide to attack the village at the point where it could be attacked with the greatest probability of success, at the point where it would be the most difficult to defend: that is, at its weakest point. You would also decide to attack it at a time when the men of the tribe would be the least able to defend it—if possible, when they were absent, or when they were asleep. That is, you would endeavor to attack the weakest point at the most favorable moment. So does the strategist of the greatest army or the greatest fleet, when planning an attack at the present day.

In order to ascertain the weakest point and the most favorable moment, you would send out spies who would keep you informed, as far as possible, of the movements of your victims, and you would not launch the attack until you felt assured on all the vital points. Meanwhile, you would drill your men secretly, taking precautions to prevent the enemy from getting knowledge of your intentions and your preparations; and when you were completely ready, you would advance to the attack, keeping your men concealed as long as possible, and maintaining spies and scouts, who would keep you continually informed of the doings and positions of the other tribe, and prevent them from getting information, through spies and scouts of their own, as to your doings and position. At the instant decided on, you would project an attack of the utmost violence of which your men were capable against the spot decided on.

If your plans had been made in the light of accurate information, and if they were carried out to the moment of attack without the knowledge of the enemy, the attack would

probably be successful. In this case, the enemy would suddenly be thrown into the utmost confusion, panic would result, and then a disorderly retreat. As you had planned the attack for the purpose of securing certain material possessions, you would take advantage of the helpless condition of your victims to do the utmost injury possible to the men of the tribe, and thereby prevent their re-securing their possessions.

Such has been the history of countless expeditions throughout the countless ages of the past. Sometimes an expedition has been undertaken on a small scale by a small tribe; sometimes on a grand scale by a grand nation; but usually on some intermediate scale by a tribe or nation neither very small nor very grand. In all cases, the method has been fundamentally the same.

Now, look at the other side of the picture, and imagine that you are the chief of a tribe possessing fine cattle and occupying a village in a fertile plain near water full of fish, and that you suddenly receive information that a neighboring tribe is making preparations to attack you, that the men of the tribe are dancing. What will you do?

If you are a chief of the kind that has always been the most common, you will fail to look the situation in the face: you will persuade yourself that what was told you is not true, or that the other tribe is not very strong, or that you are well prepared to receive their attack, or that there is no use in worrying. You will consequently take such dilatory measures that the enemy will strike a sudden blow at your weakest spot, break it in, put your whole tribe to rout, and destroy the fruits of their industry, accumulated by the work of many years.

But, if you are a chief worthy to occupy your responsible and honorable post, you will bestir yourself at once to take measures to defend the members of your tribe, their families and possessions. You will first endeavor to estimate the situation as a whole, and to divine the probable form the attack will take and the place at which the blow will fall. You will



call into consultation those leading men of the tribe whose advice is most worth having, and make up your mind as to what form your defense had best assume. You will, of course, look at once into the organization of the tribe, and their war-like equipments, and begin a series of drills of the most strenuous kind. In doing all this, you will take means to prevent the hostile tribe from getting any information as to what you are doing, and have a careful inspection made to discover whether there are any spies within your own village or lurking in its vicinity.

Having come to a decision as to the probable intentions of the enemy, your measures naturally will be such as will oppose them. Having come to an opinion that a certain part of your village or its defenses is the weakest, you will take measures to protect that part. Having come to an opinion that the enemy will probably launch his attack upon you from a certain direction, you will take measures of protection against an attack from that direction. You will probably find evidences of spies; and you will naturally direct your effort against these spies, employing spies of your own, of course. You will station some of these spies within your own boundaries, and direct them to meet any efforts of hostile spies within those boundaries; but you will also send out other spies through the territory between your tribe and the hostile tribe, and if practicable send some to carry on spy operations within their boundaries.

These efforts will be of the kind that we call strategical, but they will include measures for the actual handling of the men of the tribe in the impending battle; that is, they will include the "tactical" handling of those men. One of the first things you will realize will be that you must turn the front of your force toward the probable direction of the attack: that is, if you conclude that the attack will probably come from northeast, and you have a thousand men, you will prepare to arrange those thousand men on a line extending from northwest to southeast, so that the men will face northeast. One reason

for this would be that every man can fight best in the direction in which he faces, that he is weaker on the sides for both offense and defense, and that he is weakest in the rear. Another reason would be that a similar statement applies to a number of men more than it does to one man, because one man can change the direction in which he faces very quickly, whereas a line of men must change the direction in which it faces comparatively slowly, and to a degree that varies with the length of the line. While a man, however, is weakest from behind, a line of men is weakest on its side or flank. This is because a line of men can be faced to the rear by making each man face to the rear; whereas it can be faced to the right or to the left only by the long and comparatively difficult process of wheeling the whole line on a pivot.

Your first dispositions will naturally be purely defensive, and devoted to the purpose of preventing the success of the attack. Realizing, however, that a defeat is possible, you will take measures to lessen the dangers which retreat always entails, by deciding on the line of retreat you will adopt, and on what measures you will take to protect that line after retreat shall have been begun. You will also arrange that certain persons, such as women and children, and certain articles of value, such as cattle, shall be ready to start on the retreat in good season, so as to be out of the way of the fighting men, and in order not only to assure their safety, but also to simplify the operation after retreat shall have begun. You will also arrange that a rear guard shall follow the non-combatants and the main body in the retreat, in order to keep off the assaults of the enemy; and you will also provide guards for each side or flank, in order to prevent the enemy from pursuits on lines parallel to your retreat, from which lines they could attack your retreating forces from either side. That is, you will do exactly what every competent general of every army, large or small, has done, when threatened with an attack from an enemy that he knew to be dangerous.

If you receive your information in time, and make your dis-

positions with due energy and foresight, and are successful in keeping the fact of your preparations a secret from the enemy, the chances will be that when he finally makes his attack, it will be unsuccessful—for the reason that he will make his attack with an inaccurate estimate of the situation and on the assumption that you are unprepared.

This discussion assumes that the two tribes are fairly equal in power. Of course, if your tribe is greatly inferior in numbers, or in the position it holds, or in the skill and courage of the warriors, or if, while the tribes are equal in these factors, the enemy has better weapons, you cannot prevail in any case. Your only chance for safety will lie in undertaking a retreat in due time, or else in giving such concessions to the enemy that you will stay his hand. Instances of situations like these are frequent in history.

In case the tribes are fairly equal in power, the issue cannot be predicted in advance, but will have to be decided as such issues always have been decided—by actual fighting. When the time arrives, certain fast scouts of the enemy, armed with light weapons, will probably precede his main body, in order to ascertain the locality where your warriors are, and what they are doing; and in between these scouts and the main body will be other men, who will run back to the main body with whatever news the scouts may get, and take orders back to the scouts. The scouts will not need their weapons for scouting; in fact, the weight of those weapons would be a hindrance to their speed of movement, and therefore to their effectiveness as scouts; but the weapons will be needed in case the scouts meet some of your scouts, because without them your scouts might prevent their advance and even drive them back.

The scouts of the enemy will probably be thrown out, not only directly in front of his advance, but also laterally, and in a fan-shaped screen; because he will know that you might otherwise appear suddenly on his flank and attack him from a direction in which he would be almost helpless. Probably

the scouts of both sides will come into contact with each other, and a fight between the scouts result, in which case the side whose scouts are the strongest will be able to drive back the others and secure a distinct advantage. The main bodies continuing, however, will eventually come together, and a battle will ensue.

The result of this battle cannot be predicted in advance by either side, for the reason that neither side will have full knowledge of all the factors in the case. The result, however, could be predicted by any one who knew all the various values of all the various factors, and knew how to sum them up. In other words, the issue of the battle will really have been decided before the battle begins, although what the decision will be no mortal can foretell.

This declaration may seem vague and academic, but really it is definite and practical. As illustrating it, suppose two horses that seem to be evenly matched were to race; but suppose also that one of the horses had had administered to him before the race a depressing medicine, which would render him incapable of doing his best. This has often been done, and the fact of it having been done has decided the result of the race beforehand; although no one knew what the result would be except those people who had administered the medicine.

Similarly, in the supposititious fight between your tribe and another, the main factors that will decide the fight are the strength, skill, and courage of the opposing sides. Neither side can evaluate these factors; but nevertheless each of the factors has an actual and definite value, though no one knows what it is; and their combination, which will decide victory for one side or the other, has also an actual value, though that actual value is never ascertained, and though even the relative values of the strength, skill, and courage of the two sides are not known until the issue of the fight declares them in trumpet tones.

Our usual idea of a battle or a fight is that one side ad-

vances against the other until the two actually collide, and that then they begin to fight. Such an attack on the front is called a frontal attack; and if one side or the other believes that it has such an overwhelming advantage in strength that it can overpower the other, this is the quickest way in which to gain a decision. But frontal attacks are not usually attempted, unless one side has supreme confidence in its strength; because, unless that confidence is found to be justified, an enormous loss of men is apt to occur without achieving a decision. The attacker usually tries to get some advantage, either by striking on the side or by getting around the side and striking in the rear, or by concentrating on a given point of the enemy's line and trying to break through it.

One side or the other usually takes the offensive; that is, one side makes the attack, while the other assumes the defensive and awaits the attack. In the case that we are considering, your enemy will probably make the attack, because it is the rôle that he must play in order to attain his ends, and to defeat which you have prepared your plans. How far you will maintain the defensive is a matter that you must decide. The offensive and the defensive have each their peculiar advantages. The defensive has the advantages that the men, being comparatively stationary, can use their weapons with the greater accuracy, and can be the more protected by obstructions or defenses, natural or artificial; that is, the defenders can usually kill more of their opponents during an attack than the attackers can, who must of necessity expose themselves the more, and be unable to use their weapons with as great exactness.

On the other hand, the offensive has the tremendous advantages that it knows what it is going to do, that it has decided where it is going to strike, and that the mere act of initiating the movement gives a feeling of confidence and courage. The defender, on the other hand, not knowing where the enemy is going to strike, or when, must await the actions of the enemy, remain in a state of continual doubt, and be unable to decide

what to do until the last moment. Such conditions are unfavorable to the maintenance of a high morale.

In case the enemy has been kept in ignorance in regard to the adequacy of your preparations, you will probably defeat him; and, as in this case he will probably not have made adequate preparations for retreat, any victory over him that you may achieve you will probably be able to turn into a triumphant pursuit. In such a pursuit you will be able to inflict upon him a disastrous series of injuries, first, by killing the fighting men, and, second, by destroying certain of his possessions and capturing others. If, on the other hand, you are defeated, you, by reason of your preparations, will probably be able to retreat in good order; so that, though you will suffer a defeat, you will not suffer a disaster. Illustrations of all these cases, both with small forces and with large ones, are frequent throughout history.

During the battle waged between your tribe and the other, you will realize that by merely defending yourself you will only postpone disaster; because you know that it is only by diminishing the power of the enemy to injure you that you will secure safety from further injury. Therefore, whenever opportunity presents itself, you will strike back at him, even while your ultimate object is merely defensive. In other words, you will carry out what is now called an offensive defensive. No other defensive has ever had any success. An exception to this statement must be made in cases where peculiar conditions have existed, such as inability of the enemy to procure supplies.

But it may be that, after you receive the news of the impending attack, your studies of the situation will lead you to realize that the best thing for you to do is to make a vigorous attack on the enemy, that is, to "launch an offensive," while he is making his preparations to attack you. This has often proved to be not only the wisest course, but the only safe course. We see its analogue continually in the records of murder trials, in which the person accused of murder declares

that the man actually killed was about to attack him, and that he realized the necessity of forestalling him. So clearly is this situation recognized that the expressive slang phrase has come into use, "getting the drop" on a man. One man has "the drop" on another when he can bring his weapon to bear the more quickly.

So you have to decide whether or not the other tribe has the drop on you. If you conclude that the other tribe has the drop on you, your only good plan is to adopt defensive measures, such as have already been outlined; but if you conclude that he does not have the drop on you, and that you may be able to get the drop on him, your best plan is to assume the offensive. To do this you must do exactly what a man in daily life must do continually, in carrying out his undertakings; that is, you must make your preparations with the utmost celerity and secrecy, and launch your undertaking before your rival can prevent it. • If the other tribe is confident of its superiority, and if you can keep it in a state of ignorance as to the actual fact of your preparations, and if your tribe is equal to the other in strength and skill and courage, you will probably be able to attack him suddenly at his weakest point, before he expects it or before he is able to defend himself. If you can do this, you will throw him into a state of confusion, the degree of which will be proportional to the shortness of time that intervenes between the instant when he finally becomes aware of your intentions and the actual instant of attack. If you should be able to attack him before he has received any information as to your intentions, you will probably score a victory.

One of the greatest factors contributing to success is surprise; and this is due in a great measure to the mental effect produced on the individuals of the enemy; not only those in high command, but those even in the lowest ranks. The sudden transition from a state of confident tranquillity to a realization of suffering a dangerous attack tends to confusion, panic, and retreat.

In case you receive information in due time of the preparations of the enemy, but decide not to assume the offensive, you will undoubtedly take measures to protect your village, or home base, by fortifications of some kind, such as the trunks of trees and other obstructions; but you will not plan that your fighting men shall remain behind those obstructions, unless you are relatively extremely weak. You will realize that such an arrangement, while it might delay the advance of the enemy, will not end in his defeat; because you know that the only way in which to beat him is to inflict upon him positive injuries of some kind. You will not even draw up your men close outside of those obstructions; because you will realize that such an arrangement would enable the enemy to come close up to your home without having suffered any losses; and to inflict upon you a sudden blow from any quarter that he may select. You will also realize that such an arrangement would leave him free to work whatever havoc he wished against your fields and outlying possessions, without any cost whatever to himself. For these reasons, you will advance considerably toward his probable direction of approach, and endeavor to get into touch with him, as soon as practicable, by means of scouts sent out in advance.

Since your enemy will adopt similar tactics, there will soon be two forces operating in each other's presence, under conditions similar in essentials to those under which the greatest armies have operated in all the centuries of history.

You realize from your hereditary instincts that the severity of any blow that you can inflict will be proportional to the force with which you deliver it; and that this force will be somewhat like the force with which a fist or a club strikes its object. You know that the severity of a blow varies with the size of the fist or the club, or with the number of the warriors, and the velocity which the fist or the club or the warriors strike.

For these reasons, you will realize that, when the time comes for delivering the final blow, it would be best for you to hurl



your main body (which should be as many men as you can muster) against some predetermined point of the enemy's line, and that this main body should be given as much speed as practicable. In other words, you will realize that your final blow must take the form of a charge, in which your main body will advance with the utmost speed practicable against a predetermined point of the enemy's line.

You will also realize, however, that (just as in a fight with fists or clubs) not only must the blow be powerful, and not only must it be swiftly delivered in order to attain the greatest power, but it must be promptly delivered, in order not to give the enemy time to parry or evade the blow. In other words, you will realize that the two essential elements in the actual operations of forces are weight and speed. You will also realize that both the power of the blow and the speed with which it is delivered are dependent on the force of the will-power and courage behind the blow.

The value of speed is somewhat more obvious in the operations preliminary to an actual battle—that is, before the actual delivery of the blow—than in the absolute battle itself; because in the preliminary operations speed is the most important single factor. When one is making a feint at an enemy's communications, or threatening his flank, or when he is replying to a threat or a feint, one is much in the position of a boxer who is making feints, or who is replying to feints or threats of his antagonist. In such operations, while it is necessary that the boxer should have enough strength to parry, he does not need strength so much as he needs quickness. This quickness is indicated to the observer by the quickness of the muscular movements of the boxer; but, long before the arm or the body of the boxer moves in making a parry, his eye must see the preliminary movements of his antagonist, and telegraph the fact to the brain; then the brain must send out orders to the muscles, and then the muscles must obey.

Similarly, in the movement of two opposing forces, either of

little tribes or of enormous armies, the operations of each actual battle must be preceded by many operations of manœuver, for which great speed is necessary; not only in the movements of the bodies that execute the manœuvers, but previously in the apprehending of the movements of the enemy, and in taking proper measures to frustrate them. His movements may be offensive or defensive; but, in either case, you must realize the necessity of apprehending them as quickly as possible, and adopt swift measures of frustration.

We see this similarity of action on two opposing sides throughout all the operations of war. Generally speaking, each side is endeavoring to do the same thing as the other, modified only by practical conditions; because each side realizes that it is only by making attacks of some kind that success can be secured, and that the only advantage of the defensive is the negative one of preventing the enemy from making some success. Some writers seem to have carried this idea, however, to an undue extreme, and to have adopted the notion that one's tactics should be wholly offensive. One has simply to imagine what would happen to a boxer if he did not attempt to parry or evade the blows of his antagonist, to see how untenable this theory is. It may be pointed out, also, that in all combats, large and small, most of the time is occupied in what may be called defensive measures, which are carried on with the double object of preventing a decisive blow by one's antagonist, and of making the way clear for a decisive blow by one's self.

In making your plans of operation, you will doubtless take into account all the various parts of your little army, and realize that it would operate at a great disadvantage if its various parts, even when they were acting separately, were not linked together by a system of communications analogous to the nervous system of the human body. You will realize the necessity of a system whereby you will be able to send out orders to any part, and receive information from it, and not

only direct each part as to what that particular part is to do individually, but also to direct all the parts so that they can be made to act together toward a common object; and so that any part can render assistance to another part that may be placed in a dangerous position. You will instinctively realize, though you may not formulate the idea in words, that all your fighting force should be capable of being managed as a boxer manages his own body, all of its parts directable by a supreme intelligence, and mutually coöperating and assisting.

*Reserves.*—If the conditions of the situation are such as to make it difficult for you to apprehend exactly where the enemy will strike, you may keep a considerable force in reserve, a short distance to the rear, so placed that when your advance guard, or even the main body, receives an attack at any point, this reserve can be rushed to that point if necessary. Depending on the circumstances of the case, the reserve will bear a large or a small proportion to your total force. Whether it be large or small, however, it will have to have a great fighting value; because on it may depend the issue of the battle.

Of course, this does not mean that the reserve should be used for defensive purposes only, and in case that a part of your line is attacked; because it is obvious that, even in advancing to the attack, you might find your line too weak at one point with reference to the enemy to take advantage of an opportunity, in which case you would send your reserves to that point. Whether one attacks or is being attacked, reinforcements are occasionally needed at one point or another, to strengthen that point; in either case, more force is needed at a certain point than is immediately available, and reinforcements are therefore called for.

In the operations of the boxer, the capacity of the human body for sending reinforcements from one point to another is clearly evident. If strength is needed in the left arm for a parry, the left arm suddenly acquires a strength utterly lacking there only a second before: if the quick parry of the left arm throws off the antagonist's guard, the right arm suddenly

becomes endowed with tenfold strength, and automatically launches a blow in which seems to be momentarily concentrated the entire strength of the body.

*Discipline.*—But, no matter how perfect your apprehension of what ought to be done, and the means of communication you possess between yourself and the parts of your little army, you will be powerless to handle it effectively unless correct reports are sent to you, and unless your orders are obeyed. These two things are effected by what we call discipline, which ties all the various parts together somewhat as trusses tie the parts of an engineering structure, and transforms a number of separate parts into a strong and coherent body. Some people suppose that discipline is a harsh and cruel agency for meting out punishment to offenders. That meting out punishment is one of the functions of discipline is true, but it is not the only function. If this were the only function of discipline, discipline would be ineffective for the purpose that it actually serves—the purpose of rendering possible the handling of a large number of units; because, instead of drawing those units together, it would drive them apart. No man and no body of men could be made to endure that kind of discipline very long. What an organization requires primarily is not this kind of discipline, but the opposite kind—the kind that attracts men to each other and to the cause they fight for.

This kind of discipline endeavors to imbue all the men with a feeling of comradeship, with devotion to the cause, with loyalty to the organization that fights to gain the cause, and, therefore, not only with obedience to those superior in authority, but also with devotion, and with consequent unselfishness. Without this kind of discipline, no effective work of any kind can be done; but with it the most amazing deeds are possible. One of the best illustrations was given by the ragged, untrained, and half-fed forces that the young Republic of France hastily sent out to fight against the organized armies of Austria and Prussia in 1792. By sheer force of patriotic enthusiasm, those raw levies overcame the most forbidding obstacles

of weather, bad roads, and even hunger and lack of ammunition, and actually became the victors in two battles.

The same statement may be truly made concerning the French armies in all their wars in the Napoleonic times. True, they had a sublime genius to inspire and guide them and keep alive their courage; but before Napoleon took any part whatever in the struggle the French army had already shown its amazing spirit. It is true also that Napoleon was superbly powerful in appealing to that spirit; but he could not have been powerful if he himself had not been inspired by the same spirit as had the armies under him, and if he had not remained under its stimulating spell.

Looked at from this point of view, which history shows to be the true one, discipline, courage, and morale are seen to be much alike, and mutually to coöperate. In the difficult and dangerous times of war, the morale and discipline cannot be high unless the courage is high; the discipline and courage cannot be fine unless the morale is also; and the morale and courage must inevitably sink if the discipline be poor. But when all three are good, as they were in the armies of Napoleon, an army will fight gloriously and effectively, even though the conditions may not permit them to fight successfully. This is not only because of their direct effect in giving impetus to the army, but because it permits the higher officers to devote their time and efforts to the main object that they have in view, without being perpetually hampered by having to overcome the indifference and inertia of the people under them. An example of a great commander who had to struggle against these difficulties is that of George Washington in our Revolutionary War.

But if you were the chief of a savage tribe, that is, of one of the savage tribes of Europe from which the present great nations of the world are descended, and from which we get most of our ideas of strategy to-day, you would not have great difficulty in maintaining discipline. In savage tribes of the kind with whom questions of strategy are concerned, war has

ever been the main business of life, and the warlike qualities have been those most cultivated. The two principal warlike qualities are courage and loyalty. In savage nations of the softer type, which are not represented in questions where strategy is concerned, the qualities of courage and loyalty are not so important, and are not, therefore, so assiduously cultivated. In a savage tribe also, even of the sterner kind, these qualities are apt to diminish if the tribe advances in civilization, because other qualities have to be cultivated; and, while it might be an extreme statement to say that the cultivation of other qualities tends to the diminishment of courage and loyalty, it can be truthfully declared that they tend so to overgrow them that those qualities assert their existence in great emergencies only. In civilized peoples, where the rights and the privileges of the individual are matters of great concern, individual selfishness and the promotion of individual ease and comfort affect unfavorably the development of courage and loyalty; and, although it is true that in any one man who originally possessed them they will assert themselves in crises, nevertheless they are apt to assert themselves a little tardily, and sometimes too late.

The softening effect of civilization on most nations is evident all through history. Whether this effect, while injurious to the fighting qualities themselves, may not be beneficial to the individual as a human being, made in the image of the Almighty, it is not within the province of strategy to discuss. It is within its province, however, to point out that it does exist, and that it is very powerful; so powerful that it has brought about the destruction of many a nation at the hands of some other nation whose spirit had not been dulled by the effeminizing influence of wealth and ease.

*Doctrine.*—You should have reason to expect not only that your men would obey your instructions, but that, even should they become separated from you, they would endeavor to obey such instructions in the spirit in which you gave them; that is, the men separated from you should be capable of a consid-

erable latitude of action, and not dependent upon specific and detailed orders. The trouble about detailed orders is, of course, that when the time to obey them has arrived, the circumstances may be different from what it was expected they would be, and the obeying of them might be most unfortunate. To overcome this difficulty, discipline endeavors to bring about a community of understanding, sometimes called "doctrine," so that each person will know in a measure what he is to do without being told specifically in each case. When a number of men are thoroughly permeated with this doctrine, discipline is at its highest point of effectiveness; and it is possible for a commander-in-chief to give the commanders of separate detachments mere instructions as to what they are to do; that is, to assign them tasks and leave to them the execution of those tasks.

Subordinate commanders, however, no matter how free you may leave them as to their interpretation of orders, are nevertheless not free agents, except in the means they use to interpret and execute them. It is exceedingly difficult sometimes for a subordinate commander to know what to do, when confronted with a situation which he knows to be different from that expected by his chief. In such cases, the highest degree of clearness of instructions is required on the part of the commander, and the utmost of loyalty on the part of the subordinates. The commander-in-chief must be able to impress upon his subordinates a very clear idea of what his ultimate purpose is, and of how much latitude the subordinate is allowed; and the subordinate, on the other hand, must exert his mental powers to the utmost to apprehend what his chief would wish him to do under the actual circumstances—inclining toward strict obedience, however, rather than to the opposite extreme.

If the discipline in your tribe is good, as it probably would be, the result will be merely that your machine will be in good working order. You will not be assisted by this factor in making your plans of operation, nor will your personal burden of responsibility be lightened. On the contrary, the bet-

ter the discipline of your force, and the more loyally and intelligently your orders are carried out, the more the responsibility for the planning of the campaign will be thrown upon yourself.

*Retreat.*—If you have made your preparations so fully and carried on your operations so successfully as to force your enemy to retreat, and if he has shown a similar skill, you will force him back, but only gradually. In no military work can skill be better shown than in conducting a retreat. It is somewhat more difficult to conduct a successful retreat than a successful pursuit, largely on account of the effect of the act of retreating on the morale of the men: and the difficulties will, of course, be aggravated if the retreat is begun too tardily.

In no department of life is foresight so much needed as in conducting military operations, for the reason that in no other department of life is there an enemy waiting, with all his nerves in tension, night and day, to take advantage of any error that you may commit, or of any opportunity that you may lose. If your enemy has been living off the country, his retreat may be a comparatively simple matter; but if he has to be followed by a train of supplies, it may become extremely complicated, from the necessity under which he finds himself of sending those supplies ahead of him, lest they fall into your hands. In the operations of modern armies, which have to be followed by enormous trains of supplies and also of munitions, the problem sometimes becomes impossible of solution, and large quantities of supplies and munitions have to be abandoned, under the stern necessity that the fighting men escape from being captured. The capture of an army is, of course, the worst disaster it can suffer.

*Objective.*—As you are conducting operations that are essentially defensive, although you carry on offensive measures, you will realize that your objective is the fighting force of the enemy; and your subordinate commanders will realize that their objectives are those parts of the enemy's fighting force against which you direct their efforts. In the conditions here



considered, however, the chief of the enemy tribe will not regard your fighting force as his main objective; because his main objective is your village and other material possessions, and your fighting force merely an obstruction placed in his path. To him your fighting force is merely the immediate objective, which he must dispose of before he can turn his attention to his ultimate objective. The various commanders of his fighting force, however, regard your fighting force as their main objective. The difference between the points of view of the chief of the enemy tribe and of his subordinate officers is that their point of view is purely military, while his is essentially political.

*The State and the Army.*—This distinction in the case of two small tribes would not be important; but it is often extremely important in the case of large nations. In the case of small tribes, the head of the state is usually the head of the army, and the political and military commands are united in one man. In the case of great nations, however, this is usually not the case at the present day; because the duties of the political head are so great, and the knowledge required so extensive, that only a sublime genius, like Cæsar or Napoleon, could discharge the duties of the head of the state and of the head of the army also. The result has always been a considerable lack of coördination between the two. Since the time of Napoleon, no man has successfully discharged both duties. The closest approximation to it is in the case of William I of Prussia; but he was assisted by Bismarck as Chancellor and by Moltke as chief of staff. Such a combination as that of William, Bismarck, and Moltke has appeared but once in history.

## CHAPTER III

### GRADUAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ART OF FIGHTING

**T**HE first wars of which we have any connected accounts were those which the pharaoh, Thutmose III, waged against rebellious states in northern Palestine and Syria. Of all the wars and battles fought in the countless ages that preceded them we have but the vaguest records, though the monuments of Egypt, Chaldea, Assyria, and Persia show that many wars were waged. They also show that weapons and armor were in existence before the thirteenth century B.C.; while excavations made in numerous and widely separated regions of the world show weapons that were probably used some thousands of years before.

The invention and use of weapons have always proceeded on paths parallel with those of tools, because a weapon is a tool used for the purposes of war. The main reason why man was able to overcome the brute, and why men of intelligence and civilization have been able to overcome barbarians and men of lesser intelligence, is to be found in the use of weapons. Weapons were, of course, a product of their intelligence: so that it is true to say that it has been due to weapons, and to the wars in which they were used, that an intelligent civilization has been made possible against the resistance, first, of wild beasts and, second, of barbarians.

It may be pointed out here that, *while many people have suffered in war, yet they have been only a very small fraction of the human race, while the entire human race has benefited.* A comparatively few people have been sacrificed in war for the benefit of the race.

The earliest weapons and tools were of stone and wood and bone, principally of stone. In the old stone age, these were

rough and evidently chipped and hammered into shape; but in the new stone age they were smooth and polished. There is no fixed dividing line between the old and the new stone age, however, and for this reason we see a gradual transition from the rough weapons to the smooth. Tools and weapons later were made of copper, and later still of bronze, an alloy of copper with tin or some similar metal. Iron seems to have come into use before bronze among some nations and after bronze in others. It was more difficult at first to make weapons of iron; but, after the art of working it had been mastered, iron supplanted bronze for both weapons and armor, because it was harder and could take a keener edge or point.

- ✓ The people who seem to have been the foremost in developing effective weapons were the Assyrians, who used military equipments, both offensive and defensive, as early as the thirteenth century B.C. An infantry soldier of the regular army wore for defensive armor a helmet with a chin-strap, a round buckler, and sometimes a corselet made of plates of metal sewed on skins or woven stuffs. Some also had real coats of mail made of steel, while their legs were protected in front as high as the knee-joint by leggings. Their offensive weapons were the lance, sword, bow, and sling. The militia soldier wore a helmet, but without a chin-strap. Bas-reliefs show that the heads of Persian archers also were protected with helmets. The Assyrians employed cavalry, who carried lances and swords and were protected by armor not unlike that worn by the foot-soldiers, sometimes consisting of entire coats of mail, which protected them both in front and rear. The archers were sometimes mounted, and were protected in part by armor; and, in addition to carrying bows, arrows, and quivers, they carried swords. The Assyrians seem to have been the inventors of the war chariot, which carried cutting-scythes on the wheels; of the catapult, which threw heavy projectiles, such as stones and pieces of lead; and of the ballista, which hurled arrows. Besides these, they used the battering-ram for making breeches in the walls of forts and cities.

Thus we see that before the thirteenth century B.C. the gradually increasing civilization of the principal countries had advanced the fabrication and use of weapons to a degree not far behind that at which they were in Europe in the middle of the fourteenth century A.D., when guns using gunpowder were introduced into European warfare. Before inventing these weapons, the ancients must have realized the desirability of having such weapons to use; that is, they must have realized the value of such appliances for carrying out their plans of war. The act of inventing and fabricating them was not a warlike act, but an act in the practice of an art that in itself was peaceful. In other words, the production of those weapons was due, first, to a strategic conception, and, second, to a resulting mechanical invention and development. Since most of the appliances of the earlier civilization were such implements as knives and hammers and axes, and since the first necessity of man was to protect his life, the inference seems unavoidable that the first impetus to civilization was given by war. Demmin says: "Hence weapons, originally invented for destructive purposes, have become the most powerful means of civilization."

When we consider the difficulties in fabricating the weapons, whether in the old stone age in hammering and chipping hard pieces of flint into shape, or in the new stone age in smoothing and polishing them, or in the bronze age, or the iron age, in producing tools and weapons that were as well made as we now know them to have been, we can realize that an enormous amount of mental and physical work must have been done, and that back of this there must have been a stern necessity.

An important and interesting fact in the matter of arms and armor is that arms were invented first and armor afterward. A contrary situation could hardly be imagined, because armor would not have been invented except as a protection against arms. The first effort of war ever since has been offensive, and the second effort has been defensive, both in the making of weapons and armor and in the adoption of plans. For this

reason, the defense has always lagged behind the offense, even though eventually it may have overcome it: and this explains the enormous value of a new weapon, or a new method, when suddenly introduced into a war and used before the enemy has been able to devise and to develop into practical form a means or methods of defense against it. In innumerable cases where victory has gone to one side quickly and decisively, when the two sides were numerically and materially equal, it has been because the victorious side surprised the other with some unexpected weapon or operation. It is perplexing to note how little this historical fact has been taken into account by writers on strategy. That it was recognized originally, however, is suggested by the similarity of the two words—strategy and stratagem—which grew from the same Greek root.

It is interesting to note that after any new weapon had been introduced, or any new armor to protect against it, the strategic plans of the commanders did not have to be modified, except in detail; because the results that they were trying to achieve were absolutely unchanged. Whether two tribes were armed with clubs or with spears, the effort was the same, and the means of carrying it into effect identical. Whether the weapons were clubs or spears, the plan was always to strike the enemy in the most advantageous place as quickly as possible; and the desirability of attacking him on the flank, of shutting off his source of supplies, or of preventing his retreat, was the same in one case as in the other. The same is true if the weapons were bows and arrows, if the archers were mounted or unmounted, if cutting-scythe chariots were used, or if ballistas, battering-rams, and catapults were employed. The strategy of the operations was unchanged.

But the tactics and logistics of the operations were changed enormously. All the actual marching, all the actual arranging of supplies, all the actual computations of time and distance, had to be carried out to meet the new conditions that the new weapons and armor had imposed. Furthermore, the technical knowledge required by all the participants, from

the commanders down to the lowest privates, increased continuously with the increase in the number, size, and complexity of the weapons and the defensive armor. A chief of a savage tribe who was worthy to hold his position had all the knowledge necessary to plan and conduct operations, when the only weapons were clubs, when no armor was used, and when the men lived off the country. But a savage chief would be utterly incompetent to plan and carry on operations in which ballistas and battering-rams and scythe chariots had to be supplied, and food had to be provided for an army of 300,000 men. Such was the army of King Darius, that marched from Asia Minor into Greece, and battled on the plains of Marathon.

During the thousands of years that preceded the wars of Thutmose III, there must have been great progress made in devising and making new weapons and armor, and learning how to use them effectively. New weapons and new kinds of armor necessitated new methods of tactics and logistics; and as these had to be devised by strategy, it necessitated new methods of strategy, new methods by which the principles of strategy could be made applicable in succession to each new set of conditions brought about by the new appliances.

For instance, the mere addition of shields for defense against sharp-pointed weapons necessitated first the designing, then the construction, and then the providing of the shields, and then the drilling of the men in using the shields effectively. In other words, the use of shields necessitated the expansion of the arts of strategy, logistics, and tactics; for it brought about a condition in which, if two tribes were otherwise equal, but if one had shields and the other had not, the tribe with the shields would defeat the tribe without them. The same statement may be made concerning the introduction of bows and arrows. After any one tribe had begun to use them effectively, all the tribes in the vicinity would have to provide and use them, on pain of being brought into subjection.

Now, it must be apparent that the introduction of bows and

arrows brought about a change in warfare as great as any brought about since by any other invention, even gunpowder, and possibly a greater change. Previously, tribes had to fight close together, and with weapons that could be provided with comparative ease. Imagine yourself chief of a savage tribe, and suddenly confronted with the fact that a rival tribe was using new and unheard-of weapons, by which they could wound and kill men a hundred yards away. Under some circumstances you might have a considerable time in which to learn how to make those weapons, then actually to make them and provide your warriors with them, and then to drill your warriors so that they could use the weapons effectively. But if the rival tribe had kept the existence of those weapons a closely guarded secret until ready to attack you, you might not be able to get ready in time. Such a condition, it can hardly be doubted, confronted many tribes when bows and arrows were first introduced; for we know that not only savage tribes but highly civilized nations in recent years have been confronted with similar conditions, and suddenly attacked with weapons that they did not know existed.

The introduction of bows and arrows must have brought about conditions very difficult for some savage tribes to meet, not only in designing, making, and providing them, but in teaching individual men how to use them; even more in devising the best tactical methods for employing them; and still more in drilling large bodies of men in the methods decided on. And when we realize how much opposition every new weapon has had to overcome, even in modern times, and with men accustomed to new inventions and to changes of all kinds, we can hardly avoid the conviction that the coming of bows and arrows must have been strenuously resisted by many "conservative" savages. In fact, it was not until the battle of Cressy in 1346 A.D. that bows and arrows were realized by Europe to be as effective as they actually were; it was not until the trained knights of feudal France, clad in their heavy armor, were shot down helpless by the skilled archers of Eng-

land, from distances over which the long lances of the knights were powerless to reach.

Because of the introduction of bows and arrows, the technical knowledge of the savage chief had to be increased; for how could he plan to handle them well in battle, and how could he make good plans before battle for bringing them into battle in such a way that he could use them successfully, until he had learned the most important points connected with their weight, the length of flight of the arrows, and the ways in which the arrows were affected by the wind; and until he had also acquired a skill in measuring distances and in estimating the strength of the wind that he had not needed before? Clearly, the introduction of bows and arrows demanded of the strategist, not a clearer conception of the principles of strategy, but an increased technical knowledge and a more exact appreciation of quantitative matters; in order that he might apply the principles of strategy to practice.

The introduction of cavalry into warfare must have caused an increase in complexity and difficulty even greater than did that of bows and arrows; because horses were living animals whose food and water had to be provided as carefully as did those of men and in greater quantity, and whose training required almost as much thoroughness and care. Furthermore, although the actual handling of cavalry was, in some respects, like that of foot-soldiers, nevertheless it presented many points of difference, and was of greater variety and scope. For, besides being used, as foot-soldiers were, to make direct attack and direct defense, the speed of cavalry had to be utilized in operations independent of the infantry, and beyond the immediate presence of the infantry and that of the commander-in-chief.

The introduction of cavalry brought about the use of operations additional and auxiliary to the operations hitherto in vogue, and it therefore brought into existence a system of tactics (cavalry tactics) and a system of logistics (cavalry logistics) hitherto unthought of. In order to plan the suc-



cessful use of cavalry, the strategist had first to come to a clear understanding of the main characteristics and requirements of horses and of horsemen, in order that he might be able to get all the useful work out of them that was possible, and yet not place crushing tasks upon them. The strategist had to become in some measure a cavalryman himself, in order to do this correctly from logistical, tactical, and strategical points of view. Afterward, he had to devise his plans for war in such a way as to include cavalry manœuvres in them; and he had to plan to use those cavalry manœuvres, not as isolated performances, but as parts of a campaign, and so that they should bear the best relation practicable to all the operations as a whole, and do the utmost possible toward attaining the end in view.

The same declarations are true with respect to war chariots, battering-rams, ballistas, catapults, and other engines of war. That great difficulties had to be overcome to bring them into use cannot be doubted by anyone who realizes how grievously those engines taxed the engineering resources of those days, and how vague was the knowledge of mechanics in the minds of the men who lived when they were introduced. The exact date when this happened is not known; but it is known that the Assyrians used war chariots with scythes on the wheels, and that ballistas and catapults were invented and employed by the Assyrians, all before the thirteenth century B.C., and that battering-rams were used by the Babylonians to batter down the walls of Jerusalem in the sixth century B.C.

It is impossible for us, living in the days when the sciences of mathematics and mechanics are taught in public schools, and when we are surrounded with mechanisms of a thousand kinds, to realize how difficult it must have been to invent those ancient appliances of war, and afterward to get them into use. To us, a wheel seems almost a work of nature; and yet, it is not a work of nature, but one of man's devising, and one of the most brilliant inventions ever conceived by the human mind. The strategist was not concerned as a strategist in in-

venting the engines of war, but he was deeply concerned in utilizing them to the best advantage; and, while it must be admitted that it did not require so high an order of intellect to do this as to invent them, it required greater industry and a longer time. Not only did all the technical difficulties attending their use have to be understood and taken into account, in order that the war engines might be used successfully in the actual tactical operations of battle; not only did the plans have to arrange that the war engines should be supplied in the proper proportions relatively to the other appliances of war; but methods had to be devised whereby they should be so used in coöperation with the other appliances and agencies that all the appliances and agencies should work together with the maximum effectiveness to the attainment of the end in view. In other words, each new appliance and each new method had to be added to the war machine, and made to work for it and in it and with it. It had to be made an actual part of the war machine that already existed, and to be incorporated with it in such a way that, though the war machine became larger and more complex, it remained equally smooth working, efficient, and effective.

A still greater addition to warfare was that of boats. When boats were first introduced, history does not tell us; and it was not until the battle of Salamis in 480 B.C. that we have any connected account of their use in actual battle. As we know, however, that the earliest settlements of men were on the banks of rivers, bays, gulfs, and seas, and as we know that primitive man used boats for fishing and for going from one shore to another, it is inconceivable that boats were not used for war far back in the ages of the past. We know that in the campaigns of Thutmose III in Syria vessels were employed in coöperation with his armies; though we have no clear record that they were actually used in battle.

The use of mere boats propelled by paddles or oars did not introduce as great a complexity, possibly, as did the use of horses and of such engines of war as the catapult and the

ballista; because the boats were very simple in construction and easy to manage, and because they were probably not used in great numbers or in important operations. But as the boats increased in size, and as they ventured farther and farther from the land, and as various appliances were introduced, such as sails, the compass, and other navigational instruments, the attendant complexity increased, a training more special than that in any other branch of warfare was required, and a new profession—the naval profession—was created.

All warlike watercraft have one peculiarity that differentiates them in fighting from organizations of men that war on land. This peculiarity is that, as the resistance due to their passage through water is less in proportion as the vessels are long, the vessels are made longer than they are wide, more weapons can be utilized along their sides than elsewhere, and the greatest offensive power can be exerted in directions approximately perpendicular to the directions in which they move; whereas men exert their greatest offensive power directly to the front. The line of battle for troops, therefore, is a line perpendicular to that in which they move; whereas the line of battle for watercraft is in the direction in which they move. In both cases, of course, the line of battle is the direction in which the lines are weakest; that is, a line of men drawn up for battle is weakest on the side or flank, whereas a line of warships drawn up for battle is weakest from ahead or astern.

An exception to this statement must be made in the case in which watercraft are used for ramming; and this was one of the principal ways of using them in the early days of Greece and Rome, when galleys pulled by rowers charged on the enemy. In this case, the tactics of a fleet of galleys was not very different from that of an army; and for this reason we find that generals commanded fleets in battles on the sea. Furthermore, the fighting men of the galleys were soldiers, armed with spears and other weapons, provided with shields, and often covered with armor.

When sailing vessels came to be used for the purpose of war, the amount of maritime knowledge and skill required made it impossible for generals and soldiers to be the fighting factors on the sea; and the fact that the wind compelled the vessels to head on courses that bore a rigid relation to the direction of the wind, added to the fact that the wind varied greatly, and sometimes suddenly, both in direction and in strength, made the tactics of ships bear little relation to the tactics of armies, and introduced such uncertainties, especially in regard to the times at which certain fleet operations might be expected, that armies and fleets could not act together, except loosely. This condition was most obvious and important during the period from the fourteenth century to the nineteenth, beginning, generally speaking, with the attempted invasion of England by the Spanish Invincible Armada in 1588. Fleets were used in this period to support the policies of their respective governments, but mostly in auxiliary and secondary ways. The only nation that can be said to have utilized them successfully was Great Britain. Partly by accident, partly by foresight, and partly by a wise opportunism, Great Britain developed both her merchant service and her navy, not only in size but in skill, to such a degree that she gradually secured possession of islands and seacoasts and barbarian countries that cover one quarter of the surface of the earth.

Our earliest records of war come from Egypt, Chaldea, Assyria, Media, and Babylon, and show that wars were carried on on a scale greater than that of many modern wars, as far back as the thirteenth century B.C. From that time until the introduction into Europe of the gun, the weapons of war did not increase greatly either in the number of kinds or in effectiveness; and for this reason the methods of war did not vary greatly. But the introduction of the gun brought this condition to a close, and inaugurated a new condition—that of perpetual change, first in weapons and afterward in methods. After the introduction of the gun, and the changes in tactics and logistics that were required, with

the consequent changes in the methods of strategy that were needed in order that the new methods might be taken into account in the original plans of war, no very great change occurred until the introduction of the railroad and the telegraph, which were first utilized in warfare in the American Civil War; but both parties to this war, especially the Northern, went into the war so suddenly, and were so unprepared, that the use of the railroad and telegraph simply grew in a haphazard fashion with the progress of the war. In 1870, however, when Prussia went to war with France, her original plans of campaign took careful account of the railroad and the telegraph, as well as of all other new methods and means of warfare; and it was largely for this reason that she was able to overwhelm France so quickly and completely.

A number of wars of great importance have occurred since then, and each war has shown an increased and increasing use of new weapons, and therefore of new methods; but it was not until Germany went to war in August, 1914, that the world had an illustration of a nation going to war seriously prepared to use successfully all the appliances that a rapidly increasing mechanical and scientific knowledge, and a rapidly growing industrial world, had made it possible to employ.

During the half century between the American Civil War and the recent great European war, the addition of scientific instruments, the invention of electrical and mechanical appliances, and the development of these into actual weapons of war, went on at such a rate as to perplex and almost overwhelm the logistician, the tactician, and the strategist. The logistician realized that the principles of his art were in no way changed, but that the necessity of applying those ancient principles to the new conditions was imperative and the difficulty great; while the difficulties of successfully adapting the instruments and weapons to the uses of logistics were possibly even greater. The tactician realized that the principles of his art were in no way changed, but that the necessity of applying those principles to the new conditions was imperative

and the difficulty great; while the difficulties in arranging that the weapons and other instruments should be made as perfectly adaptable to his art as possible were enormous. The strategist also realized that the principles of his art were in no way changed, but that the necessity of applying those principles to the new conditions was imperative and the difficulties great; while the difficulties in the way of utilizing the new conditions with the maximum effectiveness for the furtherance of his strategic purposes were almost overwhelming.

How great all the difficulties were may be realized from the fact that none of the nations that went into the last great war had really overcome them. Of all the nations, the nation that had come the nearest to overcoming them was Germany; but it seems to be the fact that she had failed to take due advantage of the possibilities of *aéronautics*, and that if she had done so she would easily have won the war.

If either side had taken advantage at the start of the possibilities of *aéronautics*, it would easily have won the war.

## CHAPTER IV

### PRINCIPLES OF THE ART OF FIGHTING

IT may be thought that we have assumed more intelligence and a clearer perception of the end and the means of warfare to exist in the mind of a savage chief than would be justified by the facts. The facts are, however, that the wars of savage tribes indicate as clear a perception of the principles of strategy, in many cases, as do wars between highly civilized nations. In point of courage, energy, and appreciation of the important things to do, savages have often shown an instinct surprisingly correct. No better illustration of this can be found than in the wars that went on for so many years between the Indians and the white men in North America. In many cases—such, for instance, as in the fight between General Braddock and the Indians in 1755—the Indians showed a better perception of strategy under the conditions existing than did the British general. The reason why the savage has gone down before the white man is that the white man has had better weapons, and has in the end been able to bring a greater number of fighters to the field of battle. Furthermore, the white man has been capable of longer periods of mental work, and therefore has been capable of preparing more elaborate plans and of working them out with greater care. The savage is not capable of long-continued mental effort. This fact explains his non-success in war, and in a great degree his failure to advance in civilization.

On the other hand, the savage's almost continual contact with warfare, and the necessity of concentrating most of his attention on thoughts connected with war, has kept alive a certain warlike spirit, and a certain instinct in regard to the

main principles of war, that the civilized man has partly lost. Very few men have ever been capable of attaining excellence in more than one line of endeavor; and the result has been that, in highly civilized countries, the greater part of the population have become so out of touch with warlike matters, and their mental muscles have become so unaccustomed to exercise on warlike problems, that the jar of a sudden threat of war is needed to arouse the warlike instinct that exists in every living thing. This instinct being aroused, however, a nation suddenly finds itself as closely bound together, and as permeated by the instinct of war, as the most primitive tribe. The important difference exists, however, that the individuals of the savage tribe are ready to fight immediately, whereas the individuals of a civilized nation are not ready in the least. After being roused, the civilized man becomes ready very quickly in point of determination to fight, but not in point of decision as to how to fight.

This indecision as to how to fight is because of his having forgotten or never having learned the elementary principles of fighting, and it results commonly in the formation of some kind of public opinion as to what ought to be done that is usually erroneous. That it should be erroneous is, of course, to be expected: because there is usually only one line of work, or at best a very few lines, that ought to be followed, while there are a very great number of lines that ought not to be followed. *A person ignorant of any situation is almost sure not to adopt the proper course of conduct, for the same reason that an inexperienced marksman is almost sure not to hit the target.*

This matter of public opinion, in the case of a national war, is a matter of the utmost possible importance, because public opinion guides in a great measure the officials of the government, and handicaps the operations of the fleets and armies. An important instance was the effect of public opinion in the Union States in the early part of the Civil War. This public opinion, acting through the government, had a most harmful influence on the operations of the generals, espe-



cially of McClellan. Whether McClellan was a great general or not we cannot ascertain, because he was not given a fair opportunity of showing. Certain it is that Julius Cæsar or Napoleon Bonaparte could not have been successful if restricted as McClellan was.

• If, before our Civil War, the people of the country had learned as much about the elementary principles of strategy as they had about arithmetic or geography, this load of erroneous public opinion would not have had to be borne, and the war would have ended much sooner than it did. Now, a sufficient knowledge of the elements of strategy could have been gained in very much less time and with very much less effort than were expended on arithmetic and geography. In fact, the principles are so simple that a mere authoritative statement of them would have been sufficient; because a perception of them really exists within every human being, overgrown though it is with the knowledge and the ambitions of a commercial and industrial civilization.

The first difficulties caused by the unreadiness of the people in 1861 were in organizing the warlike forces needed, getting the necessary munitions and supplies, and drilling the various officers in their various posts. Naturally, it was more difficult to give efficient drill and training to the higher officers than to the lower, while at the same time it was more important. Even the regular army and navy found themselves pitifully unprepared—not only by reason of the necessity for hastily expanding the organizations, and thereby producing new organizations that must be inefficient for a while simply because they were new, but also because the immense complexity of the machinery of modern warfare, even at that time, forced the minds of all to concentrate so strenuously on learning the necessary details of weapons and methods as to blunt their perception as to what was the purpose of those weapons and methods. Now, the savage has no such difficulty: nothing stands in the way of his applying the full force of his hereditary instinct directly to the actual problem in hand. The

object that he wishes to attain stands out brightly before him, unconfused by any details, except of the simplest kind.

The operations between two tribes that we have discussed in\* outline illustrate the simplest case of operations between contending forces, because they leave out all the difficult and complicated questions that are connected with the supply of food and ammunition, and all other questions of a comparatively minor character, such as the care of the sick and wounded and the maintenance of communication between the fighting force and the base it started from. Campaigns of this simple character, however, illustrate many of the important points of strategy; and some of them have been conducted by even modern armies. In Napoleon's first campaign in Italy, for instance, his armies lived on the country they passed through; and as the country was fertile, filled with numerous towns, and traversed with many roads, his problems of supply were comparatively simple. At the present day, however, when enormous armies are manœuvering, it is impossible for them to subsist upon the country, and the supply of food and ammunition is one of the utmost difficulty of attainment; while the maintenance of inter-communication and of inter-support among all the numerous organizations and sub-organizations presents problems almost as difficult to master.

In the case of two hostile tribes in the situation just discussed, difficulties would present themselves, however, if the homes of the hostile tribes were far apart and the intervening land offered little in the way of food. Such situations have been frequent, especially in northern climates, and in sterile sections even in the tropics. Now, imagine yourself under the same conditions as those discussed, except that a long stretch of unfertile country, with few towns or roads, lies between your base or village and that of your enemy. In this case, his problem as the aggressor will be difficult in proportion to the distance and the unfavorable nature of the country; and your problem, therefore, will be rendered easier to solve. You will be no safer, however, unless you take prompt and

intelligent advantage of the difficulties that your enemy has to surmount, and are able to render them more troublesome. If you simply realize his difficulties, but not your own advantages, you will permit him to advance unhindered to the attack; with the result that he will attack you as successfully as in the previous case, though his attack will come more tardily. If you do not take advantage of the danger to which he is exposed of having his food supply cut off, he will have a string of supplies coming to him continually from his home base and will operate just as successfully as before.

If you are worthy of holding your position, however, you will employ such a system of scouts that they will keep you informed of the nature and localities of his lines of supply; and you will realize that he will be so conscious of his dependence on these lines of supply, that a mere threat against them will force him to detach part of his force to protect them, and perhaps even to halt his main body. For every army, large or small, is dependent on food; and every commander knows that if his food supply is shut off his men will starve, unless they can succeed in retreating to some spot where they can obtain supplies, or unless, indeed, they actually surrender. It has happened in history that armies have had to surrender simply because their lines of supplies had been cut. A notable instance of this is the surrender of Lee at Appomattox Court House, that ended our Civil War.

While maneuvering against the main body in the endeavor to prevent its advance, or to defeat it altogether, you will doubtless arrange a system of attacks or feints against your enemy's lines of supply. Such feints and attacks form a large part of the operations of strategy. They may or may not entail much actual fighting, but their successful prosecution is a matter of paramount importance. When one reads of the operations of armies against each other, he finds himself frequently noting with surprise how little of the time is consumed in actual and decisive engagements, and how much is consumed in making attacks or feints at the lines of supply.

This is somewhat analogous to the conditions of a fight between two pugilists in which most of the time is taken up with "sparring," in trying to disconcert the adversary, meanwhile watching for an opportunity to launch the decisive blow. The decisive blow itself may not consume a quarter of a second.

Since your enemy wishes to advance against you, it is obviously your duty to do everything you can to prevent him from advancing; unless, indeed, there is some spot into which you wish to have him advance, knowing that you would have him there at a great disadvantage. For instance, if there is between him and you a defile in the mountains, your best plan might be to put no obstructions whatever in the way of his getting there, but rather to lure him on; knowing that if he takes his men into that defile, especially if he takes them there without a knowledge of your presence, you may be able to station your men on both sides of the defile and attack him on both flanks, under circumstances of the utmost possible advantage to yourself. Or, even if it would not be practicable for you to attack him within the defile itself, you would realize the advantage of attacking him just as he was endeavoring to emerge from the defile; that is, if the defile were narrow enough to prevent him from deploying his men in line, facing you. You would realize that, by attacking a column of men trying to emerge from a narrow defile, you could bring your whole force to bear upon the men at the head of his column, and that most of his men would be unable to join in the fight. You would realize this if you were a man fit for your post; because you would know that, if two bodies of men equal in fighting power array themselves against each other, the most advantageous position is one in which all the forces can be used together, while the most disadvantageous is one in which only a few can be used.

This is because of the principle of concentration, which can best be explained by reference to the following tables. A chief of a savage tribe would not understand these tables; but a life-long contact with fighting would make him act in ac-

cordance with the principle they illustrate. Similarly, a pugilist does not understand the physiological principles in accordance with which his arm strikes as soon as he sees his antagonist expose an unguarded spot—in fact, before he can mentally formulate the situation. He strikes automatically.

It is one of the old stories that, once upon a time, a man was attacked by three men, and, realizing that he could not overcome them all, he fled. The pursuers did not keep together, and one man outstripped the others. Noting this, the fleeing man permitted him to get near, and then suddenly turned and overwhelmed him, being the stronger. He then resumed his flight, and allowed himself to be overtaken by the second man, whom he overwhelmed in turn. He then turned upon the third man and overwhelmed him. Whether this particular incident ever happened may reasonably be questioned; but it cannot be questioned that the incident was entirely possible. And, whether the story be true or not, it illustrates one of the fundamental principles of strategy, usually spoken of as the "principle of concentration," though it seems to me that it should be called the "principle of isolation." It seems to me that the fundamental reason for the defeat of the three men was not so much that the final victor concentrated on one man and then on another as that he isolated each of the three men, so that the others could not assist him. If the three men had not been isolated, but together, it would not have advantaged their one antagonist to concentrate on one man, because the other two would have concentrated equally on him.

The fundamental reason why it is better to do as the final victor in the old story did is that, if one man is more powerful than another, he can do him more injury in a given length of time than the other man can do him; so that at the end of that period of time their original inequality will be increased. Suppose, for instance, that one man can exert a blow of a force that we will call 1,000, and that his antagonist can exert a blow of a force that we will call 500. In this case their relative powers would be as 1,000 to 500. Now, the man who

can exert a blow of the force of 1,000 can evidently do an injury to his opponent greater than that which his opponent can do to him, in the proportion of 1,000 to 500. For the sake of simplicity, let us suppose that each can, in a given length of time can inflict an amount of injury equal to  $1/10$  of his total strength; that is, that one man can inflict an injury denoted by 100 and the other an injury denoted by 50. At the end of some length of time, the first man will have had his strength reduced from 1,000 to 950; while the other man will have had his strength reduced from 500 to 400. Therefore, at the end of this time the disproportion of strength, instead of being 2 to 1, will be 950 to 400—that is, nearly  $2\frac{1}{2}$  to 1.

In the following table, the results between two forces fighting are indicated in the various columns. In the first column the forces are supposed to be equal, and each represented at first by a strength of 1,000. In column 2 the forces are 1,000 to 900; in column 3 they are 1,000 and 800, etc. In each case, it is assumed that a force can inflict an injury equal to  $1/10$  of its total force; that 1,000 men, for instance, can inflict in a given time an injury equal to 100, while 900 men in the same time can inflict an injury of only 90. It is evident that at the end of the first period the first force will have 910 units left, while the other force will have only 800 left (column 2).

It will be noted that in column 1 the values of the two opposing forces continue equal throughout; that in column 2 they become reduced unequally, so that at the end of the twelfth period the disproportion, instead of being as 10 to 9, is about 4 to 1; that in column 3 the larger force has a value of 569 when the smaller force has become reduced to zero; and that the other columns show that the greater the disproportion of force is originally, the more rapidly the disproportion increases. Column 10 shows that, if the original disproportion is as 1,000 to 100, the smaller force is reduced to zero in the first period, while the larger force loses only one per cent. of its strength.

TABLE I

		Col. 1	Col. 2	Col. 3	Col. 4	Col. 5	Col. 6	Col. 7	Col. 8	Col. 9	Col. 10
Value of offensive power at beginning .....	A	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000
	B	1000	900	800	700	600	500	400	300	200	100
Damage done in first period by .....	A	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	B	100	90	80	70	60	50	40	30	20	10
Value of offensive power at end first period.....	A	900	910	920	930	940	950	960	970	980	990
	B	900	800	700	600	500	400	300	200	100	0
Damage done in second period by .....	A	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	....
	B	90	80	70	60	50	40	30	20	10	....
Value of offensive power at end second period...	A	810	830	850	870	890	910	930	950	970	....
	B	810	709	608	507	406	305	204	103	2	....
Damage done in third period by .....	A	81	83	85	87	89	91	93	95	....	....
	B	81	71	61	51	41	31	20	10	....	....
Value of offensive power at end third period...	A	729	759	789	819	849	879	910	940	....	....
	B	729	626	523	420	317	214	111	8	....	....
Damage done in fourth period by .....	A	73	76	79	82	85	88	91	....	....	....
	B	73	63	52	42	32	21	11	....	....	....
Value of offensive power at end fourth period...	A	656	696	737	777	817	858	899	....	....	....
	B	656	550	444	338	232	126	20	....	....	....
Damage done in fifth period by .....	A	65	70	74	78	82	86	....	....	....	....
	B	65	55	44	34	23	13	....	....	....	....
Value of offensive power at end fifth period...	A	591	641	693	743	794	845	....	....	....	....
	B	591	480	370	260	150	40	....	....	....	....
Damage done in sixth period by .....	A	59	64	69	74	79	85	....	....	....	....
	B	59	48	37	26	15	4	....	....	....	....
Value of offensive power at end sixth period...	A	532	593	656	717	779	841	....	....	....	....
	B	532	416	301	186	71	0	....	....	....	....
Damage done in seventh period by .....	A	53	59	66	72	78	....	....	....	....	....
	B	53	42	30	19	7	....	....	....	....	....
Value of offensive power at end seventh period...	A	479	551	626	698	772	....	....	....	....	....
	B	479	357	235	114	0	....	....	....	....	....
Damage done in eighth period by .....	A	48	55	63	70	....	....	....	....	....	....
	B	48	36	24	11	....	....	....	....	....	....
Value of offensive power at end eighth period...	A	431	515	602	687	....	....	....	....	....	....
	B	431	302	172	44	....	....	....	....	....	....
Damage done in ninth period by .....	A	43	52	60	69	....	....	....	....	....	....
	B	43	30	17	4	....	....	....	....	....	....
Value of offensive power at end ninth period...	A	388	485	585	683	....	....	....	....	....	....
	B	388	250	112	0	....	....	....	....	....	....
Damage done in tenth period by .....	A	39	49	59	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
	B	39	25	11	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Value of offensive power at end tenth period...	A	349	460	574	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
	B	349	201	53	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Damage done in eleventh period by .....	A	35	46	57	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
	B	35	20	5	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Value of offensive power at end eleventh period	A	314	440	569	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
	B	314	155	0	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Damage done in twelfth period by .....	A	31	44	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
	B	31	16	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Value of offensive power at end twelfth period...	A	283	426	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
	B	283	111	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
			etc.								
Total damage done by .....	A	717	789	800	700	600	500	400	300	200	100
	B	717	574	431	317	228	159	....	....	....	....

Table I shows merely the conditions of a fight between two forces, A and B. It is supplemented, however, by Table II, which shows what would happen if a large force engaged two

smaller forces in succession. In column 1 a force that originally was 1,000 is supposed to have fought a force of 200, and therefore to have been reduced to a strength of 970, and then to engage a force of 800. (See Table I, column 9.) In column 2 the large force is supposed to have engaged 800 first, thereby becoming reduced to 569 (see Table I, column 3), and then to engage the force of 200. Columns 1 and 2 indicate that it makes no difference whether A engages the stronger or the weaker force first; that it makes no practical difference whether it engages 200 and then 800, or 800 and then 200.

Column 3 shows that a force of 841 (the part remaining after a force of 1,000 had annihilated a force of 500—see Table I) would have 653 left after annihilating a second force of 500. Taken in connection with columns 1 and 2, this indicates that it is easier to defeat two separated equal forces than two separated unequal forces of the same aggregate value. It shows that the weakest way in which to divide a force is into equal parts.

A savage chief would not understand all these arithmetical complexities; but if you were a savage chief worthy to hold your position, you would know the lesson that they teach by instinct. That is, you would know that your force would be the strongest when concentrated in one group, in which the units could help each other; and that if it were divided into two parts, the weakest arrangement would be that in which the parts would be equal. You would also know that the greater number of parts into which you divided your force, the weaker it would be.

That is, it would be weaker for fighting against a concentrated body that could attack its various separated parts in detail. This might lead to the notion that a force should never be divided. Such a notion, however, would be entirely erroneous; for there are other elements of weakness in a military force than those due to division into parts. One of the elements of weakness of a force is its flanks. If a force should



TABLE II

		Col. 1	Col. 2	Col. 3
Value of offensive power at beginning.....	A	970	569	841
	B	800	200	500
Damage done in first period by.....	A	97	57	84
	B	80	20	50
Value of offensive power at end first period.....	A	890	549	791
	B	703	143	416
Damage done in second period by.....	A	89	55	79
	B	70	14	43
Value of offensive power at end second period.....	A	820	535	749
	B	614	88	337
Damage done in third period by.....	A	82	54	75
	B	61	9	34
Value of offensive power at end third period.....	A	759	526	715
	B	532	32	262
Damage done in fourth period by.....	A	75	53	72
	B	53	3	26
Value of offensive power at end fourth period.....	A	706	523	689
	B	456	0	190
Damage done in fifth period by.....	A	71	.....	69
	B	45	.....	19
Value of offensive power at end fifth period.....	A	660	.....	670
	B	385	.....	121
Damage done in sixth period by.....	A	66	.....	67
	B	39	.....	12
Value of offensive power at end sixth period.....	A	621	.....	658
	B	319	.....	54
Damage done in seventh period by.....	A	62	.....	66
	B	32	.....	5
Value of offensive power at end seventh period.....	A	589	.....	653
	B	257	.....	0
Damage done in eighth period by.....	A	59	.....	.....
	B	26	.....	.....
Value of offensive power at end eighth period.....	A	563	.....	.....
	B	198	.....	.....
Damage done in ninth period by.....	A	56	.....	.....
	B	20	.....	.....
Value of offensive power at end ninth period.....	A	543	.....	.....
	B	142	.....	.....
Damage done in tenth period by.....	A	54	.....	.....
	B	14	.....	.....
Value of offensive power at end tenth period.....	A	529	.....	.....
	B	88	.....	.....
Damage done in eleventh period by.....	A	53	.....	.....
	B	9	.....	.....
Value of offensive power at end eleventh period.....	A	520	.....	.....
	B	35	.....	.....
Damage done in twelfth period by.....	A	52	.....	.....
	B	4	.....	.....
Value of offensive power at end twelfth period.....	A	516	.....	.....
	B	0	.....	.....

march in lines, one behind the other, it would present the strongest arrangement to an attack from the front; and if a chief knew that he would not have to fight except directly in front, he should march all his men in lines. But if, under normal conditions, he should march his whole force in lines, his enemy would undoubtedly detach a comparatively small part of his own force to strike one or both of the flanks. The whole force being in line, it would have no advance guard, no scouts,

no flank guards, and no rear guard, and be practically helpless, therefore, against any attack except one from directly in front. For this reason, as well as others, the actual fighting strength of a force must be reduced by the necessity of sending out detachments to get information concerning the enemy, and to guard against surprise of all kinds.

Besides, except in the case of very small bodies in a fertile country, an army cannot live on the country, and must detail a considerable number of men to carry supplies and ammunition and guard the lines of supply. Furthermore, it is the duty of the commander of every force in war to utilize his force as economically as possible in actual fighting; and this means to avoid frontal attacks with the main body except when confident of getting a favorable decision, and to devote a great deal of effort to securing advantages at small cost of men and effort, by striking at the communications of the enemy, or by threatening them, or by making flank attacks and feints.

For these reasons and others, it is impracticable and unwise to keep a force continuously concentrated; and the result is that the various parts of a large force become like the various pieces on a chessboard, or like the various players in a baseball game; and the operations between the forces take on some of the features of a game. They suggest, in fact, that warfare is the greatest game in the world, the oldest game and the most important. It is a serious mistake, however, to regard war as a game, though many people have spoken of it and written of it as such. To do this is to ignore the most important feature of war—the fact that warfare is fighting, and sometimes fighting to death, and always fighting to the death of some of the individuals. Another reason why warfare is not a game is that a real game is played for the sake of the game, and with the sole aim of winning the game. But warfare is not carried on for the sake of warfare, or even for the sake of winning. It is carried on to accomplish some purpose. Sometimes the purpose is good, sometimes it is bad. The purpose is usually

political, using the word political in its broad sense; that is, the purpose concerns some result which the tribes or nations waging war wish to accomplish or prevent.

*Strategy and Tactics.*—In making plans, you will find yourself constantly confronted with the necessity of looking ahead into the future; but in conducting actual operations in sight of your enemy, you will have merely to take prompt action, either to seize some opportunity or to ward off some threatened blow. In the one case, foresight and careful preparation are needed; in the other case, quick apprehension and prompt action. The two phases of war thus indicated are called the strategical and the tactical phases; in one, strategy directs operations; in the other tactics. There is no sharp dividing line between them, and they merge one into the other; nevertheless their provinces are distinct. The elementary principles governing them are the same; the main difference being that the strategist sees with the eye of the mind, while the tactician sees with the actual eye of the body. Whether conducting a strategical or a tactical operation, your endeavor will be to bring destructive force to some point before the enemy can do so, and to select the most advantageous point. In conducting strategical operations, your work will be mostly in making plans; while in directing tactical operations your work will be in conducting the troops or the ships to the point decided on, and manœvering them afterward in the face of the enemy.

*Logistics.*—No matter how simple may be your strategical plan of campaign, and the tactics, marches, and manœvers, you will have to arrange that your men shall be fed. No matter how simple may be the weapons of your warriors, you must see that the weapons shall be provided. This may or may not be an easy task. If the distances are short and the country fertile, and if the weapons are easy to obtain, it will be simple; but if the distances are long, the country sterile, and the weapons difficult to obtain, you may find it extremely hard. In the enormous armies of modern nations, which cannot live

off the country, which expend enormous amounts of ammunition, and which require millions of delicate and complicated weapons and warlike appliances of all kinds, the problems of logistics are of the highest order of difficulty.

We must not fall into the error of supposing that strategy, logistics, and tactics are three separate agencies that merely assist each other. If they were, the difficulties of conducting a military or naval campaign would be far greater than they are; they would be so great, in fact, that no consistent plan of operations could be devised. We can easily avoid falling into the error by reminding ourselves that the whole object of both tactics and logistics is to carry out the plans of strategy, and that they must, therefore, be subordinate to strategy. The dominant agency of war is strategy; tactics and logistics are its subordinates. Strategy points the way to battle, and arranges the conditions under which it shall begin, under which it shall be fought, and under which subsequent operations shall be carried on. Logistics arranges that the men and ships shall be supplied, and afterward that they shall be properly fed and armed; and tactics moves them to the battlefield and manœuvres them on the battlefield afterward. Before the battle, logistics is more important than tactics; but during the battle tactics is more important than logistics. As to which may be said to be the more important in the main, it would be merely wasting time to speculate. It must be borne in mind, however, that the ultimate actual result can be achieved by tactics only. To gain tactical victories should be the only aim in war.



**PART II**  
**HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS**



## CHAPTER V

### THUTMOSE III AND RAMSES II

**T**HE first great strategist about whom history tells us was Thutmose III, King of Egypt, who reigned from about 1501 to 1447 B.C. Though a younger son of the king he became a priest in the temple of Karnak. He married Hatshepsut, a princess of the old line of kings; and these two together became co-regents later. Until the time of her death, covering a period of more than twenty years, the queen's influence seems to have been greater than her husband's, because of a superior claim to the throne; and it was not until after her death that Thutmose III was able to display his energy and genius. This he did throughout thirty-two years thereafter, during which he carried on seventeen campaigns, and as the result of which he established his kingdom on such a firm basis and extended his boundaries so far, and increased its wealth so greatly, that he is worthy of the title "First Empire-Builder."

At the time when Thutmose III came into absolute power, the strength of Egypt had materially declined, mainly because the efforts of the queen had been devoted for the most part to erecting beautiful monuments and temples; with the result that the military spirit and skill of the people had dangerously decreased.

In a direction approximating northeast of Egypt, on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea, were Palestine and Syria, which contained many cities, like Tyre and Sidon, that had accumulated great wealth of many kinds, mostly manufactured products such as silks, glassware, jewelry, etc. The little nations of Palestine and Syria were supposed to be under the dominion of Egypt, but they had taken advantage of the



weakness of the kingdom, and many of them were more or less openly in revolt. At the head was the King of Kadesh.

Late in the twenty-second year of his reign, in 1479 B.C. Thutmose marched from Egypt through southern Palestine, which was still loyal, toward the army of the King of Kadesh, which advanced to meet him, and occupied the strong fortress of Megiddo. Not only was this place a powerful stronghold, but it occupied an important strategic position, commanding the road from Egypt, that lay between two mountain ranges. The fact that a fortress had been placed at that point proves that a clear conception of at least one principle of strategy existed among the semi-savage tribes of Syria in 1479 B.C.

Learning of the enemy's occupation of Megiddo, Thutmose found himself called upon to decide the important strategic question of whether he should march against it by a direct route that led him through a narrow pass, or march by a longer route that would not require him to go through the pass. Against the advice of his officers, who pointed out the dangers of being surprised on both sides in the pass, or of being met by the enemy while emerging from the pass, Thutmose determined to take the most direct route. To encourage his men, he led them personally. It seems probable that he would not have made this decision if he had not judged that the enemy was incompetent to take advantage of the danger to which he exposed himself. That he judged correctly is shown by the fact that he was not molested in going through the pass, and was able to bring his forces out into the plain of Megiddo without meeting any opposition.

This incident illustrates the difference between good strategy and bad strategy, between good judgment and bad judgment, between action and inertness.

Early the next morning Thutmose, in a glittering chariot of electrum, led his forces forward to a position in which his right rested on a hill southwest of Megiddo, while his left was northwest of Megiddo. The Asiatics, drawn up in a north-and-south line, confronted him. He immediately attacked them,

and with such vigor that the enemy gave way at the first charge and fled inside of the city. Thutmose at once instituted a siege, his army living in great comfort on the fertile fields of the plain until the city surrendered; an act caused mainly by the fact that the Syrians were so unprepared that there was not food enough for the defending soldiers. An indication of conditions in those days may be gathered from the fact that Thutmose captured in the city 924 chariots, 2,238 horses, 200 suits of armor, the gorgeous tent of the king of Kadesh, and prodigious quantities of gold and silver and precious stones.

Being a good strategist, Thutmose lost no time in carrying on further operations, until the close of the dry season forced him to return to Egypt. During these operations he captured three cities. Afterward, he reorganized the territory conquered.

Because of the military decadence of Egypt, Thutmose was not able to resume his task of subduing the revolt in Syria until two years later. Finally he marched through northern Palestine and Syria, establishing his power firmly in those regions. In the following year he carried on a campaign of the same nature, as he did also in the year ensuing.

But it had now become evident to Thutmose that he could not effectively subdue the revolt until he had captured the city of Kadesh and the regions to the north and east of it; and that he could not accomplish this while leaving his flank exposed to the unsubdued Phœnician cities on the coast of the Mediterranean. He, therefore, planned a series of campaigns, and laid the basis of them by organizing a fleet. Employing the new fleet, he transported his army by sea on his fifth campaign, and moved directly against the northern coast cities. Thence he moved his army southward and captured the powerful city of Arvad. He thus gained a secure footing on the coast, easily accessible by water from Egypt, and forming an admirable base for further operations. The strategic conception involved here is respectfully pointed out.

After making suitable preparations in the ensuing winter,

Thutmose started out on his sixth campaign in the following spring, disembarked his army from the fleet at Simyra and immediately marched upon Kadesh. The city lay on the west side of the Orontes River, surrounded by its waters and those



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of a tributary, at the north end of a high valley between the two ridges of the Lebanon mountains, and protected by an inner moat that reinforced the natural water defenses. It was the most formidable fortress in Syria, and commanded the valley of the Orontes River, the only route northward in that part of Syria. The locality and the character of the natural and artificial defenses show the existence of a clear conception of one of the first principles of strategy.

Thutmose captured Kadesh after a long and difficult siege, and spent the rest of the season and all of the following season in subduing the cities in the neighborhood, not only in the interior, but along the coast. In particular Thutmose exacted that the people of the interior should keep the coast towns liberally supplied with provisions for his next campaign.

The preparations for his next campaign occupied nearly two years; so that it was not until the thirty-third year of his reign, in 1469 B.C., that he was able to begin it. In that campaign Thutmose carried his armies to the northward and eastward of Syria to the Euphrates River. There he captured the city of Carchemish, which enabled him to do what he had

been fighting ten years to do—cross the Euphrates River and set his boundary tablet on its eastern side.

Thutmose had now achieved the great object of his life. He had extended the boundaries of his kingdom farther than any preceding king had done, and, as a natural consequence, he had established his power more firmly at home, brought about more efficient government, and placed his kingdom in all respects, both military and economic, on a firmer basis. It is a fact which one constantly meets in history, that a really competent ruler strengthens his country both externally and internally.

Thutmose carried out seventeen campaigns in all, starting in the spring, and returning to his capital about October. Immediately on his return, after each campaign, he made a tour of inspection throughout Egypt, mainly for the purpose of suppressing corruption and bringing about efficiency in local administration; but also for observing progress on temples and other works that he was either erecting, restoring, or adorning. His campaigning became regularly organized as part of a routine of his reign; and as soon as the spring rains in Syria and Palestine had ceased, he would embark his troops and sail for their coast.

The last of his campaigns, the seventeenth, was carried on in the year 1459 B.C., in which he chastised certain princes of Syria who had been incited by the King of Kadesh. Although Thutmose was now more than seventy years of age, he promptly started with his fleet on his seventeenth and last campaign, landed his army, and advanced against the city of Kadesh, which he first isolated and then recaptured. He lived twelve years after this; but so thoroughly had he subdued all parts of his kingdom that he had to make no more campaigns. He died in the year 1447 B.C., leaving a record as a strategist which stands the first upon the page of history, and which, taking into account the differences in conditions, has not greatly been surpassed by that of any strategist since. He seems to

have been the first strategist to recognize and utilize the advantages of sea power.

It is worthy of remark that the operations which Thutmose carried out were similar in their essentials to those which we have supposed, in previous chapters, that one aggressive chief of a savage tribe might carry out against another tribe, whose village or cattle or other material possessions he was determined to acquire. In both cases we see the same aggressive advance, the same endeavor to attack the weak point of the enemy, the same ardor in attacking, the same energy in following up the victory, the same endeavor to render the enemy incapable of further resistance, the same endeavor to make secure any positions or possessions which had been attained. In fact, if Thutmose had been acting as one man only, and if his enemy had been one man only, who possessed a hut or other thing that Thutmose wanted, he would have proceeded in a similar manner, though his operations would have covered shorter distances. We can even imagine that if his enemy had lived on the shores of some water common to both, Thutmose would have gone over the intervening distance in a canoe as he actually went over the intervening distance with a fleet. If we can imagine a series of moving pictures that showed the campaigns of Thutmose, or of any other strategist or leader, it is not hard to realize that, if the scale of the distances were changed, and if the number of men engaged were changed in a similar proportion, the series of moving pictures might represent in its essential features almost any campaign, no matter how large or how small.

Thutmose was succeeded by Amenhotep II, who seems to have been a worthy son of his father, though made on a smaller scale. He was succeeded by Thutmose IV, and he by Amenhotep III, sometimes called the Magnificent. Amenhotep reminds us in some ways of Solomon, son of David, and of many sons of men who had amassed great wealth; because his career consisted mainly in using the powers in his possession for ostentatious display and the construction of objects of art and

beauty. During his reign the empire of Egypt reached its greatest height in the refinements and superficial splendors of civilization; so great a height, indeed as to suggest that the civilization of Greece, which followed about one thousand years later, was more indebted to Egypt than is often realized.

Like the high civilization of Egypt, that of Greece immediately followed a series of successful wars. The high civilization, therefore, was based on successful war; and as the fundamental basis of the successful war was successful strategy, we see that the high civilization was based fundamentally on successful strategy. We shall see that this was true of Rome and of all the other countries that thus far have achieved a high civilization of their own making. That this was expectable is clear; because it has only been by successful strategy that large nations have been formed, large reservoirs of wealth created, large numbers of people enabled to live together in safety, and conditions favorable to the greatest good of the greatest number established and maintained.

The result of Amenhotep's rule was like that of Solomon and many sons of rich men in that, to use an old but very apt phrase, "It killed the goose that laid the golden egg"; and, unfortunately for Egypt's material greatness, he was succeeded by a king who, although one of the greatest men of history was far from a great statesman or a warrior. He began his reign as Amenhotep IV; but, as he had conceived of a religion more highly spiritual than the worship of Amon, and was determined to supplant the old religion with the new, which may be described as the worship of the god of the Sun, he changed his name to Ikhnaton, or spirit of the Sun. He reigned for seventeen years, during which he almost succeeded in his purpose; and he left a record showing a greater individuality than that of any other man in history up to that time. But he almost ruined Egypt, and was known afterwards as "the criminal of Akhetaton."

He was followed by three weak kings in succession, under whom Egypt descended farther and farther in the scale of

strength and order. Then Harmhab came to the throne in 1350 B.C. He was an able ruler and, like all able rulers, devoted his attention to both the internal and external strength and prosperity of the country. Under the conditions he was not able to accomplish much externally, except in the way of preparing the way for some able successor. His immediate successor was Ramses I, an old man who was soon succeeded by his son Seti I. Seti's career was somewhat like that of Thutmose III, though in a much smaller degree; for he made war in Palestine and Libya, and brought the little tribes and kingdoms there back to their allegiance. Like Thutmose also, he devoted his latter days to improving the internal condition of Egypt, and to the development of the various peaceful arts, especially architecture. He was succeeded about 1292 B.C. by Ramses II, who reigned sixty-seven years and was the last great king of Egypt.

When Ramses came to the throne the internal condition of the kingdom was good; but the warlike Hittites, under their king, Metella, had taken possession of some provinces in Syria that had belonged to Egypt, and these Ramses determined to get back. It is probable that Metella heard of this, for he set to work to collect a large army; so that when Ramses, with his army, entered Syria in 1288, the Hittites were ready to oppose him. Ramses, like Thutmose III, utilized a coast city of Palestine as a base, and from it marched toward the city of Kadesh, on the west side of the Orontes River.<sup>1</sup> His army was divided into four divisions, led by the division of Amon, which Ramses himself commanded. In May, Ramses found himself on the east side of the Orontes River about a day's march from Kadesh, which was on the west side. It seems probable that he had not taken the precaution to send an advance guard very far ahead, or else that Metella had taken unusual precautions to prevent any of his own forces from being seen, because when Ramses arrived at this point he had been unable to find any traces of the enemy.

<sup>1</sup> See sketch on p. 70.

At this juncture two Bedouins appeared, and declared that they had deserted from the Hittites, and that the Hittites had retreated far northward of Kadesh. Acting on this story as if he knew it to be true, which a more experienced strategist would not have done, Ramses crossed the river to the west side with the division of Amon, and marched on with that division only to the vicinity of Kadesh, leaving the other divisions to straggle on after him. Metella, being apprised doubtless of the success of his stratagem, crossed to the east side of the river and kept out of sight, while Ramses passed to the north on the opposite side. Metella thus secured a position on the flank of Ramses, so that when a favorable moment arrived he could cross the river and divide the Egyptian army in two. Ramses arrived in an apparently favorable position northwest of Kadesh in the afternoon, and camped there, in fancied security. Suddenly he learned that a number of Hittite chariots had issued from the south side of Kadesh and struck the division that was following his own division of Amon. This second division was quickly put to flight; some fleeing precipitately into the camp of Ramses, where they produced a consternation that can easily be imagined when it is realized that the chariots of the Hittites followed close behind them.

That Ramses had been guilty of great negligence in strategy cannot be denied; but he instantly realized the situation tactically, and, with the greatest possible decision and boldness, charged into the advancing Hittites as they poured into the west side of his camp. His first charge was repelled; but he instantly made another charge on the eastern side, and carried it out with such impetuosity that he drove his enemies before him. Fortunately for him, the discipline among the Hittites was very bad, so that the Hittites, instead of following up their advantage, had dismounted from their chariots and betaken themselves to plundering the camp. While in this helpless situation they were suddenly set upon by a body of Egyptian recruits, who probably had marched from the coast to join the army of Ramses. The successful charge of



Ramses and the sudden appearance of the recruits, together with the tactical skill and courage displayed by Ramses and his followers, carried the day, finally, to the extent of driving the Hittites behind the walls of Kadesh. Ramses immediately returned to Egypt, and made it appear to his people that he had accomplished a tremendous victory. The Hittites, however, were not deceived, nor were the small tribes and kingdoms of Syria; for revolts against Egypt soon began to spread.

The battle of Kadesh is the first battle of which there is any clear account in history. From the incomplete knowledge of it that we have, it would seem that the Hittites had the better understanding of strategy, but that the Egyptians were superior to them in tactics. They seem to have been so much superior that, although they began the battle in a very bad strategic situation, they were able to secure the final victory—the tactical victory, which was, of course, their ultimate end in view.

Ramses was never able to subdue the Hittites, but he was able finally to bring about a situation enabling him to make a treaty with them whereby each acknowledged the other virtually his equal. From that day, Ramses never went to war again; and though Egypt, under his reign, became very prosperous and very highly advanced in all the arts of civilization, she gradually but surely declined.

The Egyptians were never really a martial people, and it was only because of the energy and ability of a few of their kings that Egypt was able to maintain enough national strength to resist the encroachments of the barbarians who surrounded her on all sides. We cannot justly point the finger of scorn at Egypt, however; for she continued longer as a great nation than any other nation that has ever lived. Finally in 525 B.C., she was conquered by Cambyses, King of Persia. Besides Egypt, the other great empires of antiquity were Babylonia, Assyria, Chaldea, Media, and Persia.

About the early Babylonian empire little is known that bears upon our subject, except that the Babylonians built

great cities and formed a powerful nation by the same means that Egypt employed and that all great nations have employed since; that is, by developing the useful arts and sciences, including the art and science of government, and by giving strength to the national structure by developing the military arts and sciences as well. About 728 B.C. Babylonia was conquered by the King of Assyria, which had been a tributary, but which now wrested from Babylon the supremacy of the world. The Assyrians were a warlike people, and originally hardy; but they succumbed rapidly under the enervating influences of wealth and were conquered about 606 B.C. by the Chaldeans in alliance with the Medes. Ninevah, their capital, was then literally wiped off of the surface of the earth. The new Babylonian or Chaldean kingdom now took the place of the Assyrian, as the mistress of the world.

The career of the new Babylonian empire was splendid in all that pertained to the luxuries of life, and probably for that reason it rapidly deteriorated in military strength. In the year 538 B.C. Cyrus, the head of a new kingdom formed of the Medes and Persians, fought a battle with the King of Babylon in the plains outside the city, and defeated him. Strange as it may seem, the gates of Babylon, though it was a strongly fortified city, were then thrown open without further resistance to the Persians! An interesting fact resulted from this, in that the scepter of world power passed from the Semitic nations, which had always held it hitherto, to the Aryan nations. Since the capture of Babylon, the great nations of the world have always been Aryan. An exception must be made to this statement in favor of Japan; because in the past few years Japan, though not even of the Caucasian race but of the Turanian race, has fought her way to the front and become one of the great nations of the earth.

Until the year 553, fifteen years before the conquest of Babylon, the Medes had held supremacy over the Persians. After they had overthrown the Assyrian empire, acting in conjunction with the Babylonians, they extended their dominions

rapidly; but about 553 B.C. Cyrus, King of Anshan, east of Persia, overthrew their power, and united all the Medes and Persians under himself as king.

Cyrus was one of the great conquerors of history. After conquering Media, he conquered Lydia and Babylonia, Lydia being a rich and fertile country in the western part of Asia Minor, bordering on the Mediterranean. The King of Lydia at this time was Croesus, supposed to be the richest man in the world. Alarmed at the growth of Persia, Croesus had thrown down the gage of battle to Cyrus, who defeated him in the open field (in 546 B.C.) and captured Sardis, the greatest city.

Cyrus was succeeded by his son, Cambyses, who invaded Egypt with results unparalleled in one way. Having captured Memphis and ascended the Nile as far as Thebes, he sent from there an army of 50,000 men to take possession of the oasis of Amon. But of this host not a man ever returned, and history does not tell us why! By some it has been supposed that the army was overwhelmed in a tremendous sand-storm. Shortly afterwards Cambyses committed suicide.

He was succeeded by Darius I, who first devoted himself to bringing about prosperity in the interior of the country, and afterward to extending its boundaries. After bringing all the Punjab in northwestern India under his power, he turned his thoughts and ambitions to the westward, and resolved on the invasion of Europe.

## CHAPTER VI

### MILTIADES AND THEMISTOCLES

**D**ARIUS, King of Persia, made three expeditions to Europe, of which the second and third were directed ultimately at Athens. Great preparations were made for each expedition, and all precautions were taken that the provinces left behind in Asia Minor should be reduced to order and compelled to take their due part in the preparations. The King's son-in-law, Mardonius, had charge of the first. He was sent to re-assert Persian supremacy in Thrace and Macedonia, and then to march through Macedonia into Greece, while a fleet sailed along the coast in coöperation. Thrace and Macedonia were subdued, but the expedition had to be abandoned because the fleet was partially wrecked in a storm near the promontory of Mount Athos. Mardonius was compelled to return to Persia, after he had fulfilled an important preliminary part of the undertaking (492 B.C.).

Two years later, when the second expedition started out, it went straight across the Ægean Sea, instead of going by land through Thrace and Macedonia. The cities of the Asian seaboard were compelled to equip warships and transports for cavalry, and the command of the army was given to Datis. How great were the forces that he headed it is impossible to know; but there can be little question that both the land part and the naval part were much larger than anything that Greece could oppose. The expedition sailed across the Ægean Sea between Asia Minor and Greece, subduing the various islands, and then went up the channel between Eubœa and Attica, in which Athens was, and captured certain towns in the province of Eubœa. The army then crossed the narrow channel to Attica, landed on the shores of the Bay of Mara-



From Creasy's "Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World."  
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thon, about twenty-two miles northeast of Athens, and drew up their galleys on the beach.

The Athenians had had plenty of time in which to prepare for the attack. They had also had considerable experience in war, and the fruits of this experience showed in the strategical and tactical excellence of their operations. Their army numbered about 10,000 men, under the war-ruler Callimachus, and it was reinforced before the battle by about 1000 Plateans. The first decision the generals had to make was the very important one as to whether he should await the attack in Athens or advance to meet the enemy. It seems that there was considerable discussion, and that the final decision was to follow the campaign plan of Miltiades and meet the enemy in the plain of Marathon. This plain lay between two marshes at its northern and southern ends, and between the sea on its east side and a mountainous country on its west side. There were two roads by which the army could march, one of

which led to the field of Marathon along a narrow stretch of beach, while the other led through the mountains, and entered the plain somewhere near its middle. If the army had marched by the coast road, the Persians would have been able to attack the head of the column as it reached the plain. Naturally, the Athenians took the other road, and established themselves in a good position in the hills, where they could not be assaulted successfully from the plain. There they awaited the first move of the Persians.

The Athenians had so much the advantage of position that it was clearly to their interest to delay the engagement; and equally clearly was it to the advantage of the Persians that it should not be delayed too long. After waiting several days in the hope that the Greeks would make some false move, the Persians made ready to advance toward Athens, the land force to follow the narrow main road along the water-front and the naval force to go by sea. The Persians, who at first had occupied the northern part of the plain, crossed the river that separated them from the southern part, detaching a considerable portion to guard their right flank from any assault by the Greeks. Exactly what happened immediately afterward is not known; but it seems that the Greek and Persian forces soon found themselves drawn up in two opposing lines, the Persians with their backs to the sea, and the Greeks with their backs to the mountains. The Greek force was numerically inferior in number to the Persian, and composed mostly of hoplites, heavily armed infantry soldiers, clad in armor, and carrying spears, swords and shields.

The Greeks advanced at a run toward the enemy, in order to come to close quarters, where their heavy arms and armor would have a great advantage over the lighter equipment of the Persians, and also to escape the arrows that the Persians shot at them. The story is that Miltiades purposely made his center weak and his flanks strong, with the idea of permitting the Persians to break through the center and then of enveloping them with his flanks. This is exactly what hap-

pened, and the Athenian wings, closing in on the enemy's flanks as they rushed forward, threw them into confusion, and then drove them back upon the shore with slaughter. It seems probable that only a portion of the Persian army was engaged, and that those unengaged retreated to their ships in disorder as soon as the fact became evident that the Greeks were succeeding.

The Persian fleet then sailed for Athens; but, arriving within sight of the place and seeing that it was not undefended (for the victors of Marathon had immediately marched to Athens to defend it), they sailed away, and Datis abandoned the enterprise.

The battle of Marathon, like a few others in history in which great forces were not engaged, was nevertheless a super-important battle; because, if the issue had been decided in the contrary way, Greece would have come under the heel of Persia, and the world would now not have the benefits of the civilization that Greece afterward created. The battle is one illustration, among countless others in history, that the triumph of civilization over barbarism and semi-civilization has been brought about by force—that is, by force of war. This does not mean that the people on the side of civilization have been more warlike than those on the side of barbarism or of the less advanced civilization. It does mean, however, that the forces on the side of civilization have been directed with a greater intelligence and skill—that is, by better strategy. This means also that a great factor, and possibly the greatest single factor, in the triumph of civilization over barbarism and semi-civilization has been strategy.

The failure of the expedition roused the Persian king to a determination to repeat the attempt, and on a scale that should not only insure punishment, which had been the main intention of the second expedition, but accomplish conquest. As we shall see, the third expedition was also a failure, because of the defeat of the Persian fleet at the battle of Salamis.

The great victory at Salamis must, of course, be credited to


all the Greeks that took part in it directly or indirectly. One figure stands out, however, so clearly as to outshine all the others. This is the figure of Themistocles. If Thutmose III was the first great strategist of history, Themistocles was the second. Themistocles was gifted with the greatest attribute of the strategist, foresight; and in Themistocles this gift of foresight was reinforced (as it must be in every great strategist) with sufficient force and courage to impress his convictions on others, and with energy to carry the consequent policy into practice afterward.

Three years before the battle of Marathon, Themistocles had stood up alone before the admirals and generals (*strategoi*) and other public men of Athens, and declared that the greatness of Athens could be best assured, not by a great army, but by a great navy. He pointed out the long coastline of Greece, the fact that the fleet always coöperated with the Persian army in distant expeditions, that the Persian army was dependent on the fleet for assuring its supplies, that an Athenian fleet based on the shores of Greece near by would have a great advantage over a fleet coming from a distant place, that therefore the weak point in any attack on Greece by Persia was the Persian fleet, and that, as a consequence of all these facts, the main effort of Greek strategy should be naval.

Themistocles was able to convince the people of Athens and to commit them to a great increase of their navy. A rich bed of silver had recently been discovered and had brought a large sum into the treasury. It was proposed to distribute this among the people; but Themistocles persuaded the Assembly to apply it to the building of new ships, and even roused so much interest that special contributions were made afterward, and many ships were built. The result was that, before the battle of Salamis, Athens had nearly two hundred triremes in her navy.

After the return of his ill-fated expedition, King Darius began almost immediately to make preparations for a third; but a revolt in Egypt delayed them, and shortly afterward his






death occurred, in the year 485 B.C. He was succeeded by Xerxes, who debated with his councilors for a long while as to whether or not he should carry out the project of Darius. He was finally persuaded to do so, and definite preparations were undertaken in the year 483. The first act was the foolish one of digging a canal across the Isthmus of Mount Athos, in order that the fleet should not be compelled to go round the promontory where so large a part of the fleet of Mardonius had been wrecked. Another part of the preparations was laying bridges over the Strymon River, which the army would have to cross, and making preparations all along the line of route for the feeding of the soldiers. Another part was the building of two bridges across the Hellespont, which divided Asia Minor in Asia from Thrace in Europe, in order that the army might march across, instead of going by ship! The accounts show that the construction of these two unnecessary bridges was a work that taxed the energies and resources of the engineers and workmen to the utmost; and that the army did not cross them until April, 480 B.C. It is said that they crossed in two days; and that Xerxes watched their passage from a marble throne erected on the shore. What the number of the army was is not exactly known. The statements vary from 5,000,000 to 300,000. The latter figure is probably the more nearly correct.

The Persian army was joined by the fleet near the shores of Thrace, and both acted together thenceforward. They met with little resistance until the army reached the narrow pass of Thermopylæ, sometime in July; though a short time before the Persian fleet encountered three Greek vessels sent forward to reconnoiter, and destroyed two of them.

In the meantime, Greece had also been busy making preparations, to which she had been stimulated greatly by the cutting of the canal near Mount Athos. It was realized, of course, that the defense would have to be both military and naval. At that time Sparta was the strongest power in Greece, for Athens had not yet established herself even as a naval power.

The result was that the command of the army and navy were both given to Spartans, the command of the army to King Leonidas, and the command of the navy to Eurybiadas.

When Xerxes reached the Hellespont, the Thessalians real-



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Walker & Bentall sc.

ized with alarm the defenseless condition of northern Greece, and endeavored to have measures taken for its defense. In this they were unsuccessful, inasmuch as the final decision was made not to attempt any resistance until the Persians should reach the narrow pass of Thermopylae, which was the only direct road through the mountains toward the south. Leonidas went there, therefore, with his army, which comprised about 7000 men. In the month of July the Persian army arrived at Thermopylae and the Persian fleet at the southern extremity of the promontory of Magnesium, about fifty miles away. A great storm then arose and destroyed some hundreds of the Persian ships. Naturally, this heartened the Greeks exceedingly, for they believed that it proved that the gods were


fighting on their side. The Persians then secretly sent two hundred vessels to sail around Eubœa, to get between the mainland and the Greek fleet, then stationed near Artemisium, at the northern end of this island; but the gods again interfered, with the result that these two hundred ships, after having rounded the southern end of the island, were wrecked in a storm on the coast. Meanwhile Leonidas had taken up his post at Thermopylæ. The strategic and tactical situation would have been excellent for the Greeks, had there not been a by-road over the mountains, which, though longer than the length of the pass, afforded very few natural facilities for resistance. It was hoped that the Persians might not know of this road, but a force of Phocians was nevertheless sent to guard it.

Xerxes realized the danger of attempting to force the pass, and waited four days in the hope that the Greeks would be overawed by the sight of his great army, and retreat. Since they did not do so, he attacked on the fifth day and on the sixth, but with no result. He then decided to send a force of his best men by the mountain road into the plain beyond, under the guidance of a Greek named Ephialtes, and from there to attack the Greeks in the rear. The manœuver was successful; and, though the Greeks fought with the greatest gallantry, they could not, of course, prevail against a force so much greater, that attacked them from both sides.

The forcing of the pass of Thermopylæ left free the road to Greece. The Persians advanced rapidly and entered Athens without resistance. Meanwhile the Athenian fleet had returned to Athens, and there they found the Peloponnesians building a wall from sea to sea across the isthmus, in the selfish endeavor to protect Peloponnesus only, leaving Attica, including Athens, undefended. Themistocles and his colleagues made a proclamation that all Athenian citizens should embark in the triremes, and that all who could should convey their families and property across the water to places of safety. This was done; and therefore it was that when the Persians

reached Athens they found the city almost deserted, except for a small band of defenders who had intrenched themselves on the Acropolis. A conflict ensued which lasted two weeks, at the end of which time the Persians had secured possession of that natural fortress.

After the fall of the Acropolis, the danger of the situation



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was intensely realized, and the Greek *strategoi* held a council of war, at which it was decided that the Greeks would retreat to the isthmus south of Attica, and that the Greek fleet should there await the attack of the Persian fleet. Themistocles had been exerting his influence to have the decisive fight in the Bay of Salamis; but his colleagues, being men of inferior strategic genius and daring, were overimpressed by the fact that there would be greater safety from disaster near the isthmus, because they would be in close touch with their land forces, and also have the Peloponnesus to retreat to in case of defeat.

At this juncture, with patriotic intent, Themistocles secretly thwarted the execution of the decision of the *strategoi* by going privately to Eurybiadas and convincing him that it would be more advantageous to fight in the restricted waters of the Bay of Salamis than in the open bay; because in the narrow waters of Salamis the great number and speed of the Persian ships could not be utilized. A new council was then called, in which Themistocles was able to impress his views, though with great difficulty.

Meanwhile the Persians were not idle. They had placed their fleet across the entire southern exit from the Bay of Salamis, and had also landed troops on the island of Psyttalea, to rescue any Persians and to kill any Greeks who might swim ashore in the expected battle. These movements alarmed the Greeks to such extent that another council was called, at which so timorous a feeling was exhibited that Themistocles saw that all his work was about to be nullified. He then determined on a course of action that has no counterpart in recorded history; and if he had been detected in carrying it out he would probably have been declared a traitor, and his name would have gone down in history in infamy. What he did was to send a slave to the Persian camp, bearing a message from himself as a friend, to the effect that the Greeks purposed to sail away in the night; and saying that if they were prevented from doing this, a Persian victory was certain, owing to the disaffection among the Greeks; and, furthermore, that if the Persians should attack the Greek ships where they then were, the Athenians would revolt against their allies. Strange as it may seem, this message was believed, and Xerxes took measures to hinder the Greek fleet from escaping by the western straits, between the island of Salamis and Megaris, by placing two hundred ships south of the straits.

Meanwhile, the council of Greek *strategoi* was going on. Suddenly word was brought that the Greek fleet had thus been made prisoner. Themistocles had gained his point: the battle had to be fought at Salamis.

At daybreak on the following morning the Persians began their advance, passing on both sides of the island of Psyttalea into the Bay of Salamis. This, of course, put them at a great tactical disadvantage, because the Greek ships could attack the heads of the column as they came successively into the bay. The Greeks set upon them furiously; and so crowded were the waters that the great numbers of the Persian ships, instead of being an advantage to them, was an actual disadvantage, because it prevented their freedom of movement. The result was a perfect victory for the Greeks.

The battle of Salamis is one of the most instructive battles in the history of the world, in that it proves the overwhelming possibilities of the genius of the strategist; for by nothing else than the genius of Themistocles was the expedition of the Persians brought to naught and Greece saved from ruin.

The battle of Marathon has sometimes been declared to be the most important battle in the history of the world up to that time. Perhaps it was, but certainly it was not so important as the later battle of Salamis; for the battle of Marathon repelled what was comparatively a minor expedition, while the battle of Salamis repelled the most determined attack that Persia was capable of making.

The battle of Salamis is also a better illustration of the operations of strategy than is the battle of Marathon, though there was considerable strategic preparation before both battles; for the planning of the battle of Marathon was of a more commonplace order, made to meet a more usual situation, and more obviously suggested by the conditions than was the planning of the battle of Salamis by Themistocles. Though many of the campaigns that have followed Salamis in the succeeding centuries have employed the services of many more men, have extended over larger areas and required a longer time, there is no campaign that illustrates more brilliantly the victory-gaining power of good strategy.

The word *strategy*, it may be remarked, comes from the Greek word *strategoia*, which meant the art of the *strategos*.

Now, Themistocles was a *strategos*. It is true that he occupied other positions at different times; but it was his ability as a *strategos* that enabled him to see that Greece needed a navy more than an army; to realize the strategic advantage of the Bay of Salamis as the locality for the coming battle; to bring the Athenians to his point of view; and finally, when they failed him because of sheer lack of strategic genius themselves, it was the ability of Themistocles as a *strategos* that enabled him to have the battle fought at Salamis, in spite of them. All these things might have happened, of course, and the battle have been lost by the Greeks. In that case, Themistocles would have been like many another man who was just about to put his foot on the pinnacle of greatness, and then slipped off. But Themistocles did not slip off. The issue of the battle was exactly what Themistocles had foreseen; and the name of Themistocles is therefore enrolled among the names of the very few strategists who stand on the high plateau of greatness.

Many centuries later, after the weapons and methods of warfare in Europe had assumed, for the time being, a fairly definite type in all armies, before navies had yet emerged from their relative inferiority to armies because of the uncertainties of sail power and because of the difficulty of coöperation between armies and navies, the word strategy came gradually to be applied to military strategy only, and even to the mere operating of armies in the field, after war had begun. That this was a very narrow view of strategy can hardly be denied; and that it left out of consideration all strategic preparations preceding war is clear. Possibly this might not have been disadvantageous if another word had existed, or had been created, to bring before the minds of people the fact that the most important single factor in gaining victory in any war is the strategic preparation made before the war begins. But, as there is no such word, we must either recognize strategy as a continuing factor, existing before a war and extending through it, or else ignore all that strategists like Themistocles,



Philip of Macedon, Frederick the Great, and Moltke did before their wars, and imagine wars to start from a strategic zero! The Romans tell us, "*Ex nihilo, nihil fit.*"

The Persians retreated north after the battle of Salamis, the army by land and the fleet by sea. The army wintered in Thessaly, and advanced south in the following spring, whereupon the Athenians again abandoned their city. Under the conditions, one would presume that all the Greeks would rally zealously to repel their Asiatic foe; and yet, it was only by dint of the greatest exertions that the Athenians were able to induce the Spartans to come tardily to the assistance of Central Greece. The Persians and Greeks finally came to battle on rough ground near the town of Platea, though the Persians tried to bring on the battle on a level plain near by, which they selected because it would give them room for the movements of their cavalry. In the battle that ensued, the Greeks won, largely because of their heavier armor and weapons, and the greater skill and strength of the Spartan hoplites. About the same time the crews of Greek vessels landed at Mycale, and gained a victory over a superior force of Persians.

The victories of the Greeks over the Persians were due in a measure, of course, to the fact that they had the strategic advantage of position, in being near to their home base of supplies, while the Persians were dependent on a long line of communications; but they were due in at least equal measure to the fact that the Greeks were superior to the Persians mentally, spiritually, and physically. A contributory reason was that the battlefields of Greece, both on the water and on the land, were so small, owing to the numerous ranges of hills and mountains and the shape of the coastline, that the numerical superiority of the Persians could not be fully utilized. An army or a fleet is at a great disadvantage when it finds itself so placed that its freedom of movement is restricted. We can draw another analogy from the prize-ring, in which we see that one pugilist acquires a great advantage over the other if he can drive him into a corner against the ropes.

In the same year with the battle of Salamis, the Greeks won a decisive victory at Himera over the Carthaginians, who, doubtless instigated by Xerxes, attempted an invasion of Sicily. These great victories over two different peoples, followed by the victories of Platea and Mycale, filled the Greeks with extraordinary enthusiasm, and instilled in them what they had never had before, a national spirit. In a short time, however, the long-standing rivalry between Athens and Sparta, the great dissimilarity in the characters of their peoples, and the inherently jealous character of all, brought about a gradually increasing enmity. The main cause of this was the fact that Athens devoted herself to the beautifying of the city and the production of works of art, and assumed an attitude of superiority over Sparta and all other parts of Greece. Under Pericles, a sort of Athenian empire was established, which, though small, was more beautiful and elegant than any that has existed since.

War between Athens and Sparta finally broke out in 431 B.C. The resources of Athens and her allies were greater than those of Sparta and her allies; but the result was the same as in many similar wars, the side that possessed the greater material sources going down before the side that possessed the greater strategic skill and military strength. The war was not fought at all well by the Athenian side, and ended in 405 B.C. with what has been called the battle of Ægospotami, but which was not a battle at all, but a disgraceful incident. For the Athenians, not seeing the enemy near on one occasion, left their ships near the shore while they landed to gather food, and the enemy, coming up at this time with their fleet, simply attacked the vacated triremes. This scandalous event ended the war, and caused the imposition of degrading terms of peace on Athens. In only seventy-six years after the glorious battle of Salamis, the Athenians had degenerated so greatly that they were forced to demolish their long walls, give up all their warships except twelve, and follow Sparta in peace and in war. The Peloponnesians entered the Piræus with

their fleet, and began the destruction of the walls of Athens to the music of flutes.

Sparta had now become preëminent, wholly because of her warlike spirit; but she soon had to maintain her supremacy against the rising power of Thebes under her king, Epaminondas. A battle between them was fought at Leuctra in 371 B.C., which was won by Epaminondas by the exercise of an unexpected mode of attack now called the "attack *en echelon*," by which one wing (in this case the left) was advanced ahead of the center, and the center ahead of the right. As the left wing would be the first to strike the enemy, Epaminondas made it especially strong—made it, in fact, a column fifty men deep. The Spartans being drawn up in line, twelve men deep as usual, their right wing could not withstand the impact of the first charge, and was hurled back in confusion, which a prompt attack by the Theban cavalry increased. The Spartan center and left threw themselves on the right flank of the Theban column, but were held off by the reserves, the "Sacred Band" of three hundred hoplites, which Epaminondas had stationed in the rear for that purpose.

This attack, if it were new, showed a great deal of inventive, strategical, and tactical ability on the part of Epaminondas. And it probably was new to the Spartans; for otherwise they would not have been surprised, and would either have strengthened their right wing, and had reserves at hand there, or would have been prepared to take effective counter-measures, and attack more strongly the head of the Theban column and the Theban center and rear with their center and left wings. It will be noted that Epaminondas did not really isolate any part of the Spartan force from the rest of the force, and that all the parts of the Spartan force could have acted together. That they did not do so must be ascribed to defective tactical skill in the Spartan chief.

The battle of Leuctra enhanced the prestige of Thebes and prompted her to achieve the supremacy in Greece: but in the battle of Mantinea, in 362 B.C., though Epaminondas repeated

his tactics of Leuctra with distinct success, and cut through the opposing ranks of the enemy, he himself was mortally wounded, and there was no one able to take his place. The result was a victory for neither side, and a truce that practically restored the *status quo*.

From the dawn of history until the time we now have reached in this discussion, Greece had never become a nation, and had never, therefore, been able to exercise the influence in the world that might have been expected from the high intelligence and strong character of her various peoples; because no single state and no single man had been great enough to draw all together under one leadership and direct their energies to one purpose. Greece was never able to unite herself. She was finally united by Philip, king of a semi-barbarous state called Macedon.

## CHAPTER VII

### PHILIP OF MACEDON AND ALEXANDER HIS SON

**P**HILIP was a son of a strategist, Amyntas II, who was king of the lowlanders in Macedon, and who by adopting the military system and the arms and armor of the civilized Greeks was able to bring the barbarian highlanders into subjection and unite all of Macedon in one monarchy, under himself as king.

Amyntas died in 369 B.C. In 367 the Thebans interfered in Macedon, and carried away Philip as a hostage, Philip being then fifteen years old. Thebes was at the height of her glory. Her army was the best in the world, and her civilization, while not so cultured as that of Athens, was more virile. Philip was tremendously impressed with all he saw; and when, at the end of a three years' stay in Thebes, he returned to Macedon, he was filled with designs for glorifying himself and her. In 358 he deposed his nephew, had himself proclaimed king, and started on a career which evidenced a combination of far-sightedness, determination, courage, diplomatic skill, and strategic wisdom that has no superior in history. At this time Macedon was looked upon by the Greeks as almost barbarous; but Philip realized that Greece was a hopelessly and helplessly divided collection of little states, incapable of concerted action. For twenty-two years Philip carried on a program of diplomatic intrigue, statesmanship, and bullying that gradually brought Macedon to the front, and made it evident that if the Greek states did not combine against her, Philip would conquer them all and unite them under his crown, as his father had united the tribes of Macedon.

Among the many statesmanlike things that Philip accom-

plished, the most important single thing was the improvement he effected in the Macedonian army. In order fully to appreciate the importance of this, we must realize that Greece had been on the downward road ever since her great victories over Persia in 480 B.C.; that Persia, though effete, was still the most powerful empire in the world, and that she still threatened to smother the only civilization in the world—the civilization of Greece.

Philip combined those traits which we see in all men who have pushed their countries forward. If he had not, he would not have been able to achieve even his first success—that of making the Macedonian army the best in the world. But, by sheer force of character and ability, he was able, not to force the Macedonian people to build up their army, but to fire them with enthusiasm and to enlist all classes of people to take part gladly in the work. He was himself an incessant worker, a fighter, a drinker, and a man of the people in his sympathies and tastes. Demosthenes said of Philip: "In his struggle for power and empire he had an eye cut out, his collar-bone fractured, and a hand and leg mutilated, and was willing to sacrifice any part of his body which fortune might choose to take, provided he could live with the remainder in honor and glory." This being understood, we can readily see how he organized the rough highland huntsmen and the peasants of the lowlands in local regiments, and built up the Macedonia phalanx.

This phalanx was like the Greek phalanx, except that the spears were much longer and the armor lighter, and that the men were not massed so closely together, and had therefore greater freedom of movement. The nobles served in the cavalry as "companions" of the king; for a part of Philip's system was to give greater prominence to the cavalry. Gradually stirred by the example and enthusiasm of the king, and by the efficiency that the army was evidently gaining, the army became the pride of the people; and military distinction and military rank became the great prizes in the eyes of everyone.

The effect on the people was admirable in every way; for it instilled the virtues of courage, loyalty, patriotism, and healthful living, and gave to Macedon that quality which is more effective than any other in making a nation strong—solidarity.

Naturally, the states of Greece became alarmed at the progress of Philip, and several wars resulted; but the Greeks were too selfish and pleasure-loving to make much effective resistance. The most important single factor in arousing the Greeks against Philip was the Athenian orator Demosthenes. Gradually Demosthenes brought about an Hellenic League. A battle between the Hellenic League and Philip finally took place at Charonea in the year 338 B.C. On each side were about 30,000 men. The battle reminds us curiously of the battle of Leuctra, though reversed; that is, Philip used tactics against the Thebans and the Athenians like those which the Thebans had used against the Spartans. On the League side, the Thebans held the right wing, some of the smaller states the middle, and the Athenians the left; while on the Macedonian side, the left flank was made the strongest, and was supported by the cavalry, as had been the case with the Theban side at the battle of Leuctra. The subsequent tactics also were similar, for Philip directed the right wing to give way for a while before the Athenians, while his left wing forced back the Thebans and threw them into confusion; whereupon the cavalry under the king's son, Alexander, then eighteen years old, threw themselves upon the helpless mass. The issue was the same, also, in that the side pursuing these tactics gained a decisive victory.

Though Demosthenes had been able to bring about the Hellenic League, and though his motives doubtless were patriotic and not merely narrow, it is evident that it was well for the world that Philip triumphed and united Greece. Few Greeks held this point of view, however; and those who did were under the leadership of Isocrates, a man ninety years of age, a student and a statesman. But Isocrates, like most of the

sound statesmen and students of history, was not an orator; and his knowledge and wisdom could not contend successfully before a crowd against the picturesque and emotional harangues of Demosthenes. So it happened that, instead of joining with Philip and making common cause against the noxious influences of Persia, the Greeks were compelled to serve under him by force.

The battle of Chæronea was one of the most important battles of the world; not only because it united Greece and paved the way for the overthrow of Persia by Alexander, but because it shows better than any other battle in history, up to that time, the climax of a long-continued and persistent strategical effort, and because it also shows strategy in the rôle of the promoter of civilization against barbarism. Strategy has not always played this rôle; sometimes it has been employed by barbarians against civilization. But, inasmuch as strategy requires for its successful use a very considerable mentality, good strategy has more often been found on the side of civilization than on the side of barbarism. In fact, while there are many things that account for the gradual triumph of civilization over barbarism and semi-civilization, it can hardly be denied that, inasmuch as the triumph has been accomplished by actual force in the majority of cases, the main factor in effecting the triumph of civilization has been strategy.

Might does not make right, and right does not make might; but the history of the world seems to show that it is right for the human race to progress in civilization, and that civilization (up to the present time) has triumphed by means of force skilfully directed by strategy.

Philip was a great strategist, but his morals were not wholly above reproach; so, when he desired to marry a certain Cleopatra, he divorced his wife, the mother of Alexander, and arranged a wedding with Cleopatra. But the offended queen induced a man to murder him; with the result that Philip fell with a dagger in his breast on his wedding day.



Alexander succeeded to the throne, and found himself in a situation fraught with urgent difficulties and dangers of many kinds; but it is in meeting such situations that men like Alexander find the opportunities to exert their powers, and to show the difference between themselves and other men. The fact that Philip had died brought about a natural movement on the part of the states he had subdued to rise instantly in revolt. The most threatening revolt was that of Thessaly, just south of Macedon. Marching thither, Alexander soon found himself confronted at the entrance of a narrow defile by a force of Thessalians. These he succeeded in circumventing by adopting the ingenious scheme of cutting a new path up the steep side of a mountain, and thus making a road for his army. By this road he got behind the enemy, and threatened them from such a position of advantage in the rear that the Thessalians abandoned their hostile attitude at once. Alexander was shortly afterward made supreme general of the Greeks, and an invasion of Persia under his command was decided on.

But Macedon was threatened on the northeast by Thrace and on the northwest by Illyria. Passing into Thrace with great swiftness, Alexander reached a defile in the mountains which he had to pass, and found it defended by mountaineers who had hauled up a number of war chariots to the top, in order to roll them down upon the Macedonians. Alexander showed himself at once to be not only a man of daring, but an inventor; for he immediately ordered the infantry to advance up the path, opening the ranks when possible to let the chariots go through; but, when that was impossible, to fall on their knees and hold their shields together as a sort of roof on which the chariots would slide and from which they would roll off. This amazing story is supposed to be true; and the most amazing part of it is that the device succeeded perfectly. When the barbarians had expended all their chariots, they were easily forced back by the heavily armed and athletic Macedonians.

Shortly afterward Alexander had to cross the Danube with

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all his equipments and attack the barbarians on the other bank. This he saw he could not do except by some stratagem. Here his inventive faculty was called into play again, with the result that all the fishing-boats in the neighborhood were collected, and tent-skins filled with hay were tied firmly together and strung across the stream in the night-time; and, by the means of these as floats, he got his entire force and their equipments across before daybreak. The work after that was easy.

Alexander then marched toward Illyria, but found that the Illyrians were already at the frontier of Macedon and had captured Pelion, a fortress commanding a mountain pass. He marched rapidly to the vicinity of Pelion, and found the heights covered with Illyrians. Alexander intended to blockade them in their fastness; but, reinforcements reaching the enemy, he saw that it was necessary to retreat. This task was excessively difficult and dangerous, the route lying through mountainous defiles and across a river; but the skilful movements of the highly trained Macedonians enabled them to accomplish it, and to reach the opposite side of the river without losing a man. In this position his communications were safe, and Alexander therefore waited there, watching for an opportunity to strike. This soon came. For the enemy, being evidently exceedingly stupid in strategy, assumed that Alexander had retreated in fear, and so far neglected all precautions as to form a camp near Alexander's forces without taking due precautions to guard against surprise. Alexander promptly surprised them; and the subjugation of Illyria followed promptly in consequence.

But Alexander was not yet secure in Greece; for the Thebans and others had revolted and blockaded the citadel of Thebes called Cadmea, in which was a Macedonian garrison. Alexander, operating with incredible swiftness, appeared suddenly and unexpectedly before the walls of Thebes, and quickly captured it. Then, in accordance with a decision of the Confederacy of Corinth, the city was leveled, her land

divided among the Confederates, and the inhabitants sold into bondage.

With the fall of Thebes, Alexander's campaigns in Europe ended. He then took up with great carefulness the expedition into Asia which his father had projected. His greatest weakness lay in the lack of a good navy, for the Persians had an excellent navy. The Confederacy of Corinth should have helped him, but it did not do so on any adequate scale; nor did the Greeks at any time show any but the most languid interest in Alexander's expedition into Asia. Yet that expedition spread Greek civilization and prestige and extended Greek commerce to the utmost confines of the then known world.

Alexander finally collected an army of about 30,000 foot-soldiers and 5000 cavalry. Of the foot-soldiers there were six regiments of the phalanx which formed the center of his army in all engagements, and who were supported by Greek hoplites, some belonging to the Confederacy and some mercenary. There were, besides, the light infantry, who were stationed on the right of the phalanx, the heavy Macedonian cavalry on the extreme right, and the Thessalian cavalry on the extreme left. The fleet transported the army across the Hellespont to Abydos, and Alexander landed in Asia, never to return.

At this time the Persian empire had degenerated miserably in strength and spirit, though it covered substantially the same territory as when Cyrus, its founder, died. The great accession of wealth and the long-continued peace had wrought the same result which that combination of conditions has always wrought, and the whole structure of the rotten empire needed but a few strong blows to disintegrate for the benefit of mankind. Alexander had become informed, through a system of spies, of all the conditions before he determined to embark on the expedition; so that he was not starting on any rash or ill-considered project, but on a carefully calculated strategic enterprise.

Throughout the accounts of Alexander's invasion of Persia, we see on his side an amazing series of performances, charac-

terized by the highest order of energy, courage, and good judgment; while we see on the other side exactly the reverse. The Great King had formed an army of 40,000 men to defend Asia Minor, and he showed his bad strategic judgment at the very start by consigning the army, as a joint command, to several generals. These several generals showed equally bad judgment when they drew up their forces against Alexander on the banks of the little river Granicus; first by opposing a purely passive resistance, and second by making an incredibly bad disposition of their troops in placing the cavalry in a long line in front along the river-bank, with the Greek hoplites (mercenaries) on the slopes behind them! Alexander attacked with his usual force and good judgment, and routed the Persian cavalry, whom, it would seem, the rest of the Persian army did not assist at all. Alexander's phalanx then attacked the Greek hoplites, who seem to have been resting in the background, waiting to be attacked; and then his light and heavy cavalry attacked them on the flanks. The Persians fought with great courage, but the natural result of bad strategy was not thereby prevented.

Alexander then marched south along the west coast of Asia Minor, and met with no appreciable resistance until he reached Miletus, which consisted of two parts, an outer city and an inner city, the latter strongly fortified and surrounded with a wall and a fosse, or moat. Alexander occupied the outer city, and then stormed the inner city successfully with his siege engines. The Persian fleet was in the vicinity; but the Macedonian fleet had reached the harbor first, and prevented the Persian squadron from bringing help.


Alexander showed his good strategic judgment at this time by refusing to follow the advice of one of his generals to send his fleet against the Persians, which was greater in size; for Alexander realized that, while the superior individual excellence of his soldiers enabled him to encounter a greater force of Persian soldiers with success, he could not count on any such individual superiority with his ships. He even went

further, and took what undoubtedly was a most risky step—that of disbanding his fleet after the fall of Miletus. This action entailed the double disadvantage of giving up all the aid the fleet might give to him, and of abandoning any line of retreat from Asia into Europe, in case his operations in Asia should be unsuccessful. In a great majority of circumstances, an action like that of Alexander's would be strategically most unwise. But, like all the other vocations of men, strategy is not an exact science, but an art; and, like all arts, its practice in any set of conditions must depend on those conditions. In order to adapt the practice of any art successfully to conditions, one must be skilful in that art; and Alexander was skilful in his art, the art of strategy. He estimated the situation of Persia according to the information at his disposal, and came to the conclusion that he would be victorious on the land; that, therefore, he did not need a navy; and that, therefore, he should not waste any of his resources in maintaining one. Whether Alexander was right or not was to be shown by the result. The result showed that he was right.

Alexander continued his march down the west coast of Asia Minor, and met the next resistance at Halicarnassus, which was surrounded with a wall and encompassed with a moat. Alexander filled up the moat, and attacked the walls with his war towers and engines. In pursuance of his far-sighted policy of doing as little destruction as possible, Alexander permitted the garrison to withdraw, and then took possession of the city. As the cold season was now approaching, he permitted part of his army to go into winter quarters, while he advanced with the remainder into Lycia and Phrygia, where his operations were largely diplomatic, and were bent toward winning the satrapies to his side.

Meanwhile the Great King was advancing against him with a large army. This army and the Macedonian came together in October, 333 B.C., on the banks of the river Pinarus in the plain of Issus. The Persians, with amazingly bad strategy, had deliberately taken up a position there, though there was

not space enough for a large force to manœuvre! They made better tactical dispositions than they had made at the Granicus, but they again made the strategic error of adopting a purely defensive plan. Alexander had to advance toward the



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Persians across an open plain, and to cross the river and attack the Persians, who were drawn up on the high banks of the opposite side. The forces were arranged as in the accompanying diagram; and when one looks at this diagram, and realizes that the Persians had not only the advantage of great numerical superiority but of strategic position, one can hardly imagine the state of mind of Alexander when he determined to attack. But strategy includes many more factors than

numbers and positions, important as these are. If all the force of Darius had been Persian, the situation would have been better for Alexander than it actually was; for Darius had 30,000 highly trained Greek hoplite mercenaries.

Alexander charged at the head of this cavalry across the river, and at the part of the Persian force where the Great King stood in his war chariot. The Persians there opposed a furious resistance, in the course of which Alexander was wounded in the leg. Alexander's phalanx followed, assisted by the lighter infantry, the hypaspists, and were able to push back the enemy hoplites, who were practically their own countrymen. The contest there was for a while indecisive: but suddenly the Great King himself, in his war chariot, turned and fled!

This precipitated a general rout on the whole left of his line. On his right, the Persian cavalry had crossed the river and were carrying all before them, when suddenly they heard the news of their king's flight. Almost instantly they turned and fled also; so that in a short time the whole army was in a wild retreat, being cut down from behind and on the flanks by the pursuing Macedons. For their flight the Persians were hardly to be blamed; for were they not imitating as best they could the example of the commander-in-chief? The Great King was so desirous of vacating the premises that he left his own mother and wife in the hands of the conqueror. Alexander treated them with scrupulous courtesy.

It has often been said that Darius showed very bad strategic judgment in placing his forces in the narrow plain of Issus, where they could not be manœvered to advantage. This, of course, is true; and yet, it may be pointed out that the very narrowness of the plain, and the very fact that this necessitated that a great part of the Persian forces should be kept out of the fight at the beginning and had to act as reserves, made it impossible for the Macedonians to be victorious if the Persians held their ground with even a small measure of persistency. It may also be pointed out that the very depth of




the Persian formation gave support to the men in front; that the very fact that a large number of men were in the rear, and comparatively secure, tended to make those in the rear hold their ground; and that the men at the front could not possibly have retreated if the men in the rear had stood fast. But why should they stand fast, if the king fled? It is seldom that any man in command of a great military force has given such perfect examples of bad strategy as King Darius did.

It has sometimes been stated as one of the "principles" of strategy that when the enemy begins to retreat, he should be pursued with the utmost ardor. Alexander did pursue Darius until nightfall, but then he forbore; and then, letting Darius go where he willed in peace, Alexander turned his footsteps toward the south.

For Alexander was no academic strategist. He had been born and bred in the midst of war; and the first man whom he had known was the greatest strategist of his time. Alexander had determined on a perfectly definite objective before he left Macedon, and this objective was the conquest of Persia. To accomplish this, Alexander knew that he must proceed step by step, and that at every step he should leave no powerful enemy to harass him from behind. If he had started east from Issus in pursuit of Darius, he would have left behind him not only Syria and Egypt, but the great Phœnician fleet, which was the backbone of the Persian navy. He therefore persisted in his original intention, and advanced against the sea-coast towns of Syria.

The three principal cities were Aradus, Sidon, and Tyre, great commercial centers of Phœnicia, and bound together as a federation. They would have been a strong trio if they had been sufficiently unselfish to act together; but, like most commercial bodies, their aims were selfish, and as a result they accomplished less, even materially, than otherwise they would have done. As an illustration, it may be stated that some years before Sidon had revolted from Persia, and her two sister cities had promised to support her; but that Tyre and

Aradus had then agreed together to abandon Sidon and let her be crushed, so that they could profit by the trade that she would lose. In the present juncture, Aradus and Byblus,



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which had in a measure taken Sidon's place, submitted to Alexander.

When Alexander reached the vicinity of Tyre, he expressed his desire to visit the city; but the Tyrians, not knowing what would be the result of his war with Persia, feared to compromise themselves, and refused permission. Alexander realized

that to conquer Tyre was a necessity, because Tyre was the naval base not only of Phœnicia but of Persia; and that the only way in which he could nullify the power of the Persian fleet was to destroy its base. But to capture Tyre was no trivial undertaking for a general who had only hoplites and cavalry to work with; for Tyre was surrounded with an enormous wall, very thick and very high, and stood on an island separated from the shore by more than half a mile of deep water.

What would you have done if you had been Alexander?

Alexander built a causeway. The first part of the work was easy; but the farther out the causeway reached the more difficult the work became, because the water became deeper, the workmen came within the range of projectiles from the island, and Tyrian vessels issued from the two harbors of the island and threw projectiles also. To protect the men, Alexander erected two towers on the causeway, on which he mounted war engines for throwing projectiles, and to which he attached curtains of leather to act as shields. Then the Tyrians constructed a fire-ship and let it drift down on the causeway. The result was that they set fire to the towers and the engines, while the Tyrians in the vicinity discharged darts at the Macedonians who tried to put out the fire.

Alexander, being Alexander, was undismayed, and proceeded at once to widen the causeway, so that it could accommodate more towers and engines. He also went up to Sidon and got together some galleys with which to assist his operations. Then suddenly the squadrons of the Phœnician cities, Aradus and Byblus, which had been in the Ægean Sea, and had learned that their cities had submitted to Alexander, came to Sidon and submitted also. As these ships numbered eighty, and as various other ships came in soon after from other cities similarly placed, as well as from Cyprus, whose king submitted also, Alexander found himself ultimately in possession of about two hundred and fifty triremes, and therefore stronger on the water than the Tyrians themselves.

When ready, Alexander bore down upon Tyre with his whole fleet, of which he, like a good general of those days, commanded the right wing. The Tyrians would not accept the gage of battle; but they drew up their triremes across the mouths of their harbors and blocked any entrance to them. The causeway by this time had been carried up to the island, and the best engineers that Cyprus and Phœnicia could produce had constructed the necessary war engines. Some of these engines were placed on the causeway, while others were placed on old galleys and transport ships. But they could make little impression on the wall at the east side, which was one hundred and fifty feet high and enormously thick, and from behind which the besieged replied with fiery missiles hurled from war engines. Furthermore, Alexander's engine-carrying vessels could not get close enough to the wall, because of large boulders under the water.

Alexander placed galleys carrying windlasses near the boulders to try to drag them away; but the Tyrians sent out boats and cut the anchoring ropes of the galleys, so that they drifted away. Alexander answered by stationing boats close to the anchors; and then Tyrian divers came out and cut the cables under water. Finally chains were brought, by the use of which the galleys could be kept in position while the boulders were hauled away. The engine-bearing vessels then got close to the wall. Then the Tyrians made a large curtain of canvas, behind which they manned a number of triremes and smaller vessels with picked men, and from which they suddenly launched an attack on Alexander's vessels. Alexander immediately started a counter-movement of small vessels, which he led himself, against the Tyrian vessels, and with such perfect success that henceforth the Tyrians made no further attempts at offensive measures, but restricted themselves to a purely passive defense.

This passive defense ended as all purely passive defenses have ended—with an inglorious surrender—but after the walls had been breeched, and several thousands had been slain.

The fall of Tyre gave Alexander, with his new fleet, the command of the sea, and removed the last obstacle in Syria to his journey south. But at the lower end of Palestine, just before the shore turns toward the westward, towered the great stronghold of the Philistines, Gaza. It stood on high ground; and, since more than two miles of sand lay between it and the seashore, Alexander's fleet could not assist him. Alexander's engineers declared that the walls could never be stormed, on account of the great height of the hill on which they stood. Alexander replied by ordering that ramparts be thrown up around the city so high that war engines mounted on them would be on a level with the walls. Since the best chance seemed to be on the south side, the work there was pushed on rapidly. The engines that had been used at Tyre soon arrived, underground mines were placed beneath the walls, and finally, the walls being breeched in places, the Macedonians entered Gaza.

Egypt was now cut off from Persia; so that the Egyptians, having lost all their ancient spirit, yielded at once when Alexander marched within her boundaries and sent his fleet up the Nile to Memphis. In Egypt, Alexander showed his customary attitude toward the people of the countries that he conquered, treating with respect the native religion and customs, but making it clear that he intended to impress Greek civilization upon them, and to advance in every way the interests of Greek commerce. His principal act in this direction was in founding a new city where the Nile empties into the Mediterranean, to be called after himself, Alexandria. It is said that Alexander himself traced out the ground-plan of the new city. Alexandria became not only the seat of the greatest learning in the world, but the principal port in the eastern Mediterranean, diverting commerce from the Phœnician cities, as had been the intention of Alexander.

In order to make his position secure politically as well as strategically, Alexander undertook an expedition to the sanctuary of Ammon; and he succeeded in making it believed that

he was recognized there by the priests of Ammon, after communication with their god, as a descendant of Ammon and the rightful King of Egypt. After reorganizing its government he returned to Tyre. After establishing an efficient system of administration there, he started east toward Babylon.

Alexander left the sea far behind him and struck out into the midst of a hostile empire. But there was nothing reckless or thoughtless about his expedition. Every detail of logistics seems to have been attended to, the service of the transports and supplies well organized, and the intelligence department for securing and transmitting information concerning the movements of the enemy fairly comparable in essentials with that which any modern army has brought forth.

From this intelligence department Alexander learned that Darius, with a much larger army than that which fought at Issus, was waiting for him just beyond the Tigris River, in a plain near Gaugamela, about fifty miles northwest of Arbela. The number was reported to be 1,000,000 foot-soldiers and 40,000 horses, a formidable array to be attacked by a force that numbered in all only 47,000. Alexander approached, however, by night, and attained the crest of the hill, whence he could look down and see the enemy drawn up for battle. As a precaution, Alexander had the intervening ground searched for pits and concealed dangers. He himself rode over the plain, and found that the Persians had cleared it of bushes and other obstacles; and he rightly surmised that this meant that the enemy intended to make important use of their war chariots.

Alexander was advised to make a night attack, in view of the disproportion of forces; but he decided against this advice, believing that the greater skill, strength, and courage of his men and his own superior ability would compensate for his numerical inferiority. The result proved him to be right, as it usually did. The Persians probably expected a night attack the first night; for they remained under arms the entire time and were, therefore, comparatively weak and jaded when the

troops of Alexander, fresh after a good night's rest, advanced to the attack.

The Persians were drawn up in two lines, with war chariots and some elephants in front; and the Great King, with a large body-guard, was in the center, as he had been at Issus. Alexander's force was disposed in the usual manner, with the six regiments of the phalanx in the center, the light infantry and the heavy cavalry on the right, and the Thessalian cavalry on the left. His line was so short, however, compared with the Persian, and the consequent danger of having his wings enveloped by the Persian wings was so great, that he put behind each wing a second line, which by facing to the right or left could meet a flank attack. As he advanced, leading with the cavalry as usual, he was nearly opposite the center of the enemy's line. He, therefore, directed his attack obliquely toward the right. Darius noted that this movement was taking the Greek force away from the plain in front of his chariots, which he had smoothed for their operation; and therefore he directed the cavalry from his left flank to deliver a flank charge on the Macedonian right, to prevent a further movement in that direction. A brisk battle naturally followed.

Meanwhile the Persian scythe chariots charged forward. But the athletic Macedonian archers and spear-throwers attacked the chariot drivers, seizing the reins of the horses and pulling the drivers from their seats; while the light infantry, opening out quickly, let the chariots pass harmlessly through their ranks. The whole Persian line now advanced. It was a critical moment for Alexander, for he saw no weak point in their line on which he could deliver a blow with any reasonable hope of breaking through. But at this moment a number of Persian cavalry were despatched to the assistance of the Persian left flank, thereby leaving a gap. Into this gap Alexander charged at the head of his cavalry, and then turned to the left and charged the enemy's center near the post of the king and his body-guard. At the same time, the Greek phalanx

came into contact with the front of the Persian center, and—the Great King turned his chariot and fled!

The series of events that closed the battle of Issus were repeated in their essentials now, except that between the two regiments on the left of the Greek phalanx a gap was opened, through which the Persian and Indian cavalry rushed. This would have created a dangerous situation if the cavalry had done as it should have done, and attacked the rear of the Greek phalanx; but, instead of doing this, they galloped straight to the Macedonian camp and began to plunder. While engaged in this occupation they were attacked from the rear by the Greeks, and readily overcome. A desperate conflict was going on, meanwhile, on the left of Alexander's line; but the superior strength and skill of the Macedonians, and the destruction of the Persian morale caused by the cowardly flight of the Persian king, soon brought this conflict to a result that was favorable to the Greeks. Thus one of the critical battles of the world, usually called the battle of Arbela, came to the rescue of civilization.

Darius fled. Alexander did not pursue, but pressed forward to his objective, Babylon. To his surprise, when he approached the city prepared for battle, the gates opened, and the satrap surrendered the city and the citadel. Here Alexander followed the same policy as he had in Egypt, and as he did later in all the conquered provinces of Asia: he conciliated the people, posed as the protector of their customs and religion, and endeavored to win the people to his support. At Babylon he rebuilt the temples that had been destroyed by the Persians, and commanded especially the restoration of the magnificent temple of Bel, which the fire-worshiper Xerxes had partially demolished.

After resting his army in the most luxurious city of the world, Alexander advanced to Susa, and thence toward Persia. He soon encountered a tribe of hillsmen in the Uxian Pass, who effectually blocked his way through the defile, but whom he easily circumvented by a march night over a difficult



mountain pass, which enabled him to surprise them in the rear.

Alexander now entered a region unknown to the outside world, and began an expedition of discovery as well as a march of conquest. He had not gone far when he came to a narrow defile, called the Persian Gates, where he found opposed to him an army of 40,000 foot and 700 horse, guarding this pass, which was fortified with a wall. A slight tentative attack showed Alexander that the pass was impregnable. He learned from his intelligence department, however, that there were some paths leading through the forests that covered the mountains, but that these paths were very dangerous at any time, especially to men in armor, and still more so at this time, when snow was on the ground. Nothing daunted, Alexander started over the paths at nightfall, leaving part of his troops in front of the pass, with orders to attack as soon as they heard his trumpets sounding from the other side. With the rest of his force, including the cavalry, he succeeded in traversing the devious and perilous paths and reaching the point decided upon. Sounding the trumpets, he attacked the foe so ardently in their rear, while his troops in front attacked them at the same time there, that he put them to flight after little effective resistance, and with great slaughter.

This account and most of the other accounts of Alexander's amazing victories in Asia disclose an almost incredible difference between the forces engaged; and this difference is not in courage, is not to any great degree in strength, but is almost wholly in strategy. In fact, it is almost as easy for an ordinary man to gaze undazzled at the brilliant performances of Alexander as to gaze good-temperedly at the stupid performances of his enemies. Can anyone understand how a general in command of 40,000 men could have guarded the Persian Gates against an assailant, and yet failed to guard the by-roads over the mountains?

Alexander continued his path of conquest, unprecedented then and unequalled to this day, through Persia, and thence

north to Media and the city of Ectabana, in pursuit of Darius. Traveling at great speed, both day and night, he finally learned that Darius had been taken prisoner by Bessus, the satrap of Bactria. He finally overtook Darius just as he was breathing his last, having been stabbed by his captors. Alexander sent the corpse with all honor to the queen mother, and then started to capture and punish Bessus for the murder of his king.

Alexander was now carrying out, and in an increasing degree, his project, not of destroying or of merely conquering the nations and provinces of the East, but of forming a grand empire which should embrace the whole known world, and which should be divided into states, under efficient administrators, and directed by the spirit of the highest Greek civilization; each state, however, living under its own religion and adhering to its own national customs and institutions. In order to effect this, he deemed it wise to take on himself, in some measure, the characteristics of the Egyptians when in Egypt, of the Babylonians when in Babylon, and of the Persians when in Persia. This procedure succeeded admirably with the conquered peoples, but it aroused an increasing discontent and jealousy among his followers. Naturally, they did not take so comprehensive a view as he did, and it filled them with anger to see their king show so much respect to people whom they despised as low barbarians; and it especially angered them when the king put on an oriental dress and conferred with Persian lords and satraps, showing them marks of confidence and favor.


Alexander continued his progress through Persia, subduing provinces, founding cities, and establishing an empire. The court he took with him might be called a small moving city, so large was it, so filled with men of many callings, and so well organized for the purpose that Alexander had in mind and was accomplishing. One becomes dizzy in reading of how this young man not only carried all before him in a military way, but accomplished much more in the way of construction than

destruction; how he gave the people more efficient and honest government than they had had before; and how he performed the seemingly impossible task of super-imposing Greek civilization on Persian civilization to the advantage of both. And one becomes lost in admiration in noting that, although he continually increased his distance from his home base, he kept his communications secure, using both political and strategic methods, and playing skilfully on the jealousies of rival officials, both military and civil.

Although required to fight his way almost continually from one place to another, Alexander met no very serious check until he arrived in northwestern India, and crossed the Indus River. Shortly after doing this, he learned that King Porus had gathered an army from 30,000 or 40,000 strong, and was encamped on the eastern bank of the Hydaspes River to prevent his crossing. After a slow and toilsome march, Alexander arrived on the western bank of this river, and saw the army of Porus on the opposite shore, protected by a multitude of elephants. Alexander realized that it would be foolish to attempt to cross at that place, and that some stratagem had to be devised. He adopted various measures, one of which was to seem to make preparations to cross in the early night and thus rouse the enemy to prevent it. He made feints of this kind a number of times, each time with success, until he noted that the enemy were getting weary of the useless night watches and becoming consequently negligent. Then one night he moved up the west bank of the river about sixteen miles, to a place where the river made a sharp bend, and where there was a thickly wooded island in midstream and dense woods on the opposite shore. Here he determined to cross. He caused to be brought there the parts of the boats that had been used in crossing the Oxus River, and had those boats remade; and he also had skins prepared, such as he had often used before as floats, stuffed with straw. He left a sufficient force in the camp to prevent the suspicions of the enemy from being roused; and, when all was ready, began his

adventurous crossing, leading the way himself. (326 B.C.)

As usual in enterprises where preparations have been carefully made and all the conditions studied, Alexander was successful. Hardly had he landed on the eastern side, however, when his forces were discovered by scouts of Porus, who gal-



From Burg's "History of Greece."  
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loped away to warn him. Alexander at once prepared to advance to the last great battle of his life. He had no heavy infantry with him, only light infantry, cavalry, and archers. Following his wont, Alexander advanced toward the camp of Porus at the head of his cavalry. Soon he met a troop advancing against him. It was merely a heavy reconnoitering party under the son of Porus; and it turned and retreated at the first charge of the Macedonians.

Porus himself was soon seen advancing with his army. As soon as he reached ground suitable for the movements of his

cavalry and war chariots, he drew up his line of battle (indicated in the accompanying diagram). Alexander realized at once that it would be impossible to make a frontal attack successfully, because of the elephants. But he rarely made a frontal attack when he could make a flank attack; and so he promptly proceeded to make a flank attack with his cavalry (see the diagram), while the archers attacked the Indian cavalry on the left and the infantry maintained a position facing the left flank of the elephants and the main body. Against such an attack, delivered with all the force and speed that Alexander could give to it, the enemy were almost helpless. In a short time the utmost confusion reigned. The elephants got beyond control, and the army of Porus became little but a mob. Then Alexander ordered the infantry to advance shield to shield, while he, reforming his cavalry, dashed in again on the left flank. About this time, the forces that Alexander had left on the other side of the river crossed without resistance, and consummated the victory.

In this battle, as in so many of the battles of Alexander,—in fact, in so many of the battles of which we read in history,—we see on the defeated side such an utter absence of all strategic apprehension as to amaze us. If Porus, instead of having an army, had had a club, or a sword, or a spear, he would not calmly have stood in one place and let his opponent come on his left side and deliberately attack him there. He would have wheeled around toward the left, so that he could protect himself with his weapon. Yet, having an army, which was simply a weapon placed in his hands, he took no measures whatever to protect his left side! Porus failed to realize, what many commanders have failed to realize, that an army or a fleet is a weapon, like a club but bigger; and that a man's success depends upon the skill with which he strikes blows upon the enemy and parries the blows they deliver. The reason for the failure to realize this truth seems to lie in the fact that it has been necessary to concentrate so attentively on the details of constructing the weapon, keeping it in good order,

and wielding it that the object at which it should be directed has been overlooked! It is not only in strategy, but in every vocation and profession, and even in the daily lives of individuals, that we see people so engrossed with details, and so enmeshed in circumstances, as to forget the end in view.

Alexander restored to Porus his kingdom, but as a protected state under the suzerainty of Macedon; and near the site of the battle, on each side of the river, he founded a city, one named after his horse, Bucephala. Then Alexander took up his march to the eastward, his mind filled with no one knows what dreams and projects, when suddenly the long-restrained discontent and the utter weariness of his soldiers resulted in their refusal to go any farther. Alexander brought into play all the batteries of his eloquence and authority, but without avail. For twelve long and terrible years his army had toiled and fought, in cold and heat, and now they would not and could not go any farther. So Alexander was forced to yield and retrace his steps, although almost within arm's reach of the end of the world, as he thought.

It was a toilsome journey that he had to make, especially across the desert of Gedrosia. At its end he was joined by his fleet under Nearchus, whom now he sent to complete his voyage up the Persian Gulf. For by this time Alexander had projects of world dominion, to achieve which the conquest of the sea was necessary, and which undoubtedly he would have achieved if he had lived. But not long after reaching Babylon, and while building a fleet and cutting wood in the forests for it, he was taken ill of a fever and shortly afterward died. He was not at that time quite thirty-three years old. (June 13, 323 B.C.)

Thus passed from the stage of history the most picturesque figure that has ever appeared upon it. Doubtless one must make considerable allowance for enthusiasm and exaggeration in the accounts that one reads about him. But after all reasonable subtractions have been made, one is confronted with

the fact that Alexander, of his own initiative, under his own sole direction, and by his own force of character, led a small army through the greatest empire of the world, conquered it all, and created an empire larger and better than any that had ever before existed. It is true that this empire broke up almost immediately when he died; but it simply became divided into parts, and those parts did not die.

The two larger parts, the kingdom of the Seleucidæ, which occupied the same territory approximately as Persia, and the kingdom of the Ptolomies, or Egypt, continued for three brilliant centuries afterward. Of the two, the former was probably the better administered, as it certainly was the larger: but Egypt represented the higher civilization; for Alexandria, with its wonderful museum and library, became the seat of learning and civilization of the world. And after the fall of Rome at the latter end of the fifth century A.D., when civilization in Europe, even in Italy, was almost wholly blotted out, it was in the lands that were conquered by Alexander, and on which he had impressed Greek civilization, that civilization continued. And when the minds of men began again to turn in search of a better life than that which Europe in the Middle Ages gave them, it was to those lands that they had to go for the materials of literature and science and learning with which to start again on the upward path. If Alexander had not conquered Persia, where would Europe have obtained the start with which she began the Renaissance?

Had not Alexander conquered Persia and the East, we have reason for supposing that both Greece and Persia would have continued on the downward path on which they had already started, and that the lamp of civilization would gradually have flickered out. It was the impetus that Alexander gave to the sluggish spirits of the Greeks, and the opportunities he offered to them for enhancing their prestige and expanding their commerce, that carried Greek civilization into Asia and planted it there. Alexander's conquests not only give the best single

illustration of the overwhelming influence of strategy on military operations, but they were the greatest single factor in preserving ancient civilization, and thus supplying a basis for the civilization of to-day.



## CHAPTER VIII

### CÆSAR

**I**N order to appreciate Cæsar's campaigns in Gaul, and their effect in supporting civilization, we must remind ourselves that at the time when Cæsar went into Gaul the Roman Republic controlled not only Italy, but practically all the coast of the Mediterranean Sea; and that, within the territory that she controlled, law, order, and material prosperity reigned in greater degree than in any other part of the world.

Before the time of Cæsar, Rome's progress had been threatened seriously only once—when the great Carthaginian general Hannibal invaded Italy in the Second Punic War. Hannibal was the son of a great general named Hamilcar, and a brother of another great general named Hasdrubal; and it is one of the most curious facts of history that a people so wholly pacifistic and commercial as the Semitic Carthaginians should have brought forth such strategists. Of the three, Hannibal was the greatest.

Because of the events of the First Punic War, Hamilcar determined on revenge against Rome; and, in order to secure it, formed a Carthaginian province in Spain, intending to use it as a base of operations. After Hannibal became commander of the Carthaginian army, he captured Saguntum, a city of Spain allied with Rome. (218 B.C.) He then crossed the Pyrenees and invaded Gaul and then Italy. In an important battle on the Trebia River, he defeated a Roman army; and in a subsequent battle near Lake Trasimene he almost annihilated another. Later, at Cannæ (216 B.C.), he disastrously defeated another army and threatened Rome itself. Then the Roman general Fabius made a distinct contribution to strategy by instituting what are now called "Fabian tactics." These con-

sisted in continually avoiding actual battle, but perpetually harassing the enemy, and especially interfering with his getting supplies. These tactics were the best possible under the circumstances, and prevented Hannibal from achieving any more tactical victories. The crisis came when Hannibal's brother, Hasdrubal, marching from Spain, endeavored to form a junction with Hannibal, but was brought to battle and defeated on the Metaurus River, in Italy, shortly before he could accomplish it. Hannibal quitted Italy soon afterward and returned to Carthage. Near Carthage he suffered the only defeat of his life, in a decisive battle at Zama.


When Cæsar marched into Gaul, the lands of Asia and Africa to the east and southeast of Rome, on which Alexander had impressed the civilization of Greece, had a considerable degree of good government and prosperity; but outside of these territories only primitive civilization existed and barbarous customs prevailed. The territories that lay to the north and northwest of Italy were inhabited by tribes of a very warlike cast, and wars among them were continual. Of these tribes, the bravest and least civilized were the German tribes on the east bank of the Rhine, the Belgians in the northern part of Gaul, and the Aquitanians in the southwestern part. In the middle of Gaul the various tribes had been considerably influenced by Roman traders who had gone there with the products of the Roman civilization; with the result that, though those tribes were no less prone to war than before, they had become less hardy, and therefore less efficient.

It is easy for the people of to-day to decry the civilization of Rome, and to point out many particulars in which the Romans were cruel and militaristic; but let us remember that the Romans were no more cruel or militaristic than the savage tribes that comprised most of the rest of the world. It is absolutely essential to anyone who wishes to come to a just opinion about any nation, at any time, to realize that man was originally a savage, living a life little different from that of the beasts of the field; and that it has been only by means of what

we call civilization that man has been raised above that state. Furthermore, it is necessary to realize that the advance of civilization has been forced by a comparatively few men, that it has been steadily resisted by barbarians, and that the only way by which civilization overcame barbarism was by the use of military force. Finally, it is necessary to realize that military force alone could not have overcome the opposing military force of barbarism, if it had not been directed by superior intelligence. Now, the directing of force by intelligence is the province of strategy.

Cæsar marched from Italy into Gaul in the year 58 B.C. He had been Consul; and during his consulate the general condition of unrest in Gaul had been such as to arouse alarm in Italy. The proximity of the Gauls was so intimate, and the difference between them and the Romans was so great, as to incite and maintain the aggressive hatred of the barbarians, and the need for defensive measures against them by the Romans. Now, the Romans, being a military people, knew that purely defensive measures would, in the end, be broken down, and that the only way in which they could preserve security inside their borders was to take offensive measures on the outside against the Gauls. This was the procedure they had been carrying on for some centuries, first within the peninsula of Italy, and afterward outside, as the Roman state gradually expanded. This procedure the Roman Senate now commissioned Julius Cæsar to institute in Gaul. They, therefore, gave him command, not only in Cisalpine Gaul on the southern side of the Alps, but in Transalpine Gaul beyond the Alps; his commission to last five years.

At this time Cæsar was forty-three years old. His health, originally good, had been conserved by an abstemious and active life, and he was in the fullest vigor of mind and body. He had had little experience as a soldier; but he had been born and bred in a military atmosphere, and his habits of life and traits of character were of the military cast. He had the quickness of mind, the strength of nerve, and the natural cour-



age that enable a man to scent danger quickly but with equanimity, to separate important from unimportant facts, and to decide what course it is best to follow, unconfused by details. Finally, he had what is the most valuable single attribute in a great commander—that of foresight. This does not mean that Cæsar was a prophet, or that a strategist must be a prophet; but it does mean that Cæsar had the patience and the moral courage to study an actual situation with thoroughness, to look it in the face without quailing, and to arrive at an intelligent estimate of the course of events that the situation would bring forth. In addition, he had the persistency and industry to make preparations with the utmost care and thoroughness for doing whatever he decided to do; the self-control to refrain from overt action until he was quite ready; and the energy and ardor to strike with the utmost possible celerity and force when he was ready and the opportunity had arrived.

There were two events in particular that had aroused the Romans. These were disturbances produced in Gaul by the westward crossing of the Rhine by a German tribe, and a threatened westward exit from Switzerland into Gaul of the Swiss. The Germans had attacked and beaten a tribe called the *Æduans*, who were more or less under the protection of Rome. The Swiss had as yet committed no overt act; but for two years they had been making preparations showing that they contemplated a complete exodus from Switzerland and a long march to the westward. The danger of this action on the part of the Swiss was not only that they would drive before them the Gauls, who would overflow into Italy, but that they would leave Switzerland open to occupation by the Germans and a road for the Germans into the Roman province. The Germans then, as now, were the disturbing force in Central Europe. The Swiss, in fact were practically being driven out of Switzerland by pressure from the Germans.

Since the seven million barbarians of Gaul and Germany, regardless of how much they might fight among themselves,

were all hostile to the Romans, Cæsar realized that he faced a gigantic task. No mortal ever faced a greater.

In the midst of his preparations, Cæsar learned that the Swiss were about to set fire to their towns and villages, to burn up all the corn except what they were to carry with them, and to start on their expedition, taking a route that lay through the Roman Province in southern Gaul. He left Rome at once, and hastened through Gaul to the vicinity of Geneva, where there was a bridge across the Rhone River, over which the Swiss had to pass. He took with him the only legion in Gaul, though he made requisition on the Roman Province for as many troops as it could muster. When he arrived at Geneva he immediately destroyed the bridge. The Swiss evidently had not expected such rapid movements; and, being taken by surprise, had neglected to secure the bridge. They thereupon pleaded with Cæsar to permit them to cross. Cæsar replied that he would take a space of time for consideration, and told them to return in two weeks, on the 13th of April. He utilized the interval by taking obstructive measures of the most energetic and effective kind; so that, when the two weeks had elapsed, he had constructed walls and trenches and posted separate garrisons in newly constructed intrenched forts. The Swiss attempted by various operations to get across the river, but finally abandoned the attempt.

We see in this first operation of Cæsar, and throughout his campaigns in Gaul, a marked skill in the utilization of mechanical and engineering appliances. In some cases we see also a high order of invention. Froude says of him: "He was never greater than in unlooked-for difficulties. He never rested. He was always inventing some new contrivance."

The Swiss then started to the westward by another pass, though they had to secure the consent of the Sequani to do so. This having been secured, the whole multitude set out, in number about 368,000, of whom 92,000 were fighting men. And these fighting men were not like the Persians whom Alexander encountered, but hardy mountaineers, brave, determined, and

accustomed to war. Cæsar estimated the situation as so menacing that forthwith he hurried back to Italy, enrolled two legions, and brought out of winter quarters three more: then, with these five legions, he marched back with the greatest speed and by the shortest route, though it lay over the Alps.

At this time a Roman legion at its full strength seems to have been about 5000 men in number; but it was rarely at its full strength in Cæsar's campaigns. In a legion there were only about 300 cavalry, and their use was mainly for reconnoitering, scouting, and pursuit. The legion was made up of ten cohorts, each cohort being made up of three maniples, and each maniple being made up of two centuries. If a century had really been composed of 100 men, as its name would indicate, this would have made a legion 6000 strong. In battle formation a legion was drawn up in three lines. The infantry were trained to attack with javelins at short range, and to follow immediately with a charge and a hand-to-hand encounter with swords. A shield was carried on the left arm, and this, of course, protected the left side rather than the right.

The commander-in-chief (imperator) of an army that consisted of two or more legions had a staff that varied in numbers, according to the size of the army and the requirements of the situation; and at the head of this staff was a quæstor, who combined the duties of what we now call the chief of staff and the quartermaster general. He was also second in command and had his quarters next to those of the commander-in-chief. The commander-in-chief had a special body-guard (or prætorian guard), who were picked men; Cæsar's guard was the tenth legion. The prætorian guard, under the empire, acquired an enormous influence, in some cases making and unmaking emperors. Besides the fighting men strictly considered, Cæsar had a considerable number of engineers, expert workmen who built bridges, looked after siege material, and did mechanical work of all kinds. The skilful and frequent use that Cæsar made of these men was the most powerful single factor in contributing to his success. Cæsar's men were no

braver than the men of the Gallic tribes, the fighting instinct was no better developed, and even in discipline there was no overwhelming superiority; but the barbarians of Gaul had nothing with which to compete with the mechanical appliances that Cæsar provided in advance for his campaigns against them. In no other way did Cæsar show more clearly his genius as a strategist than in his careful and skilful preparation of mechanical appliances.

By the time that Cæsar reached their vicinity in the early summer, the Swiss had emerged from the defiles, gone through the territory of the Sequani, reached the borders of the Ædui, and begun to lay waste their lands, following the destructive instinct of barbarians. They had now reached the banks of the Saône River and were engaged in crossing it. Seeing his opportunity, Cæsar waited until his scouts informed him that three-quarters of the enemy had crossed, and then attacked the remaining quarter with the utmost suddenness and force, took them completely by surprise, and routed them utterly. This done, he built a bridge over the river and sent his army across. The Swiss were tremendously alarmed; for not only had Cæsar destroyed a large part of their force, but he had crossed the river in one day, whereas it had taken them twenty days. They thereupon sent a deputation to him, which made both pleas and threats, but without avail.

The Swiss thereupon moved their camp, and Cæsar followed, sending forward his cavalry to keep in touch with them and inform him of their doings. This cavalry was a very irregular force, which he had raised, and which he soon found to be entirely unreliable. In a short time Cæsar began to be in straits for corn; for he could not get any from the land, he had left his provision boats on the Saône River, and the Æduans (whom he was defending against the Swiss), though they continually promised to give him corn, failed to do so. He was finally compelled to cease following the Swiss and to march toward Bibracte, where the Æduans had stored a large supply. The Swiss construed this change of course as a re-



treat and turned on him in pursuit and annoyed his rear guard.

The situation came to a crisis with a battle, in which four veteran Roman legions drawn up in three lines, with the two new legions and the wagons and tent equipage behind them on a hill were attacked from directly in front by a close phalanx of the Swiss, who much exceeded them in numbers. The first few volleys of the long Roman javelins had great effect, piercing the ineffective shields of the barbarians, and sometimes binding two of them together. The Swiss were gradually forced back; but suddenly about 15,000 men of two other tribes attacked the Romans on their right flank. The situation was serious, but it was to meet serious situations that the Roman legions trained. The rear line of the Romans wheeled and advanced toward the new attack, while the first two lines again pressed back the enemy, who had advanced when their allies made the flank attack. A double conflict of the utmost fury followed, which continued far into the night; the Swiss finally fighting from behind a rampart of carts, that they had constructed, while some of them from underneath the carts hurled lances and javelins. Superior equipment and training prevailed in the end, however, and a wholesale retreat ensued.

It is said that for three days 130,000 marched away from the scene of battle. Cæsar did not pursue them, but he ordered the other tribes not to give them food. The result was that the Swiss were soon compelled by lack of provisions to ask for terms. These being arranged, the Swiss went back into their own province. Of those who reached home there were only 110,000, though 368,000 had left.

After the Swiss campaign, certain tribes of Gaul besought Cæsar to save them from the Germans, who had come across the Rhine to the number of about 120,000, and were gradually taking possession of their territory by sheer force of military strength, under their king, Ariovistus. Cæsar concluded finally to endeavor to treat with the German king; but, not being able to accomplish this, he decided to advance against

him. He had received word in time that the Germans were marching to seize the town of Vesontio, a place well fortified, well situated strategically, and well provisioned. With the celerity that characterized all his operations, Cæsar advanced to Vesontio, reached it before the Germans did, and captured it.

But the Roman soldiers, even their officers, were soon thrown into a virtual panic by the accounts they received of the enormous strength and courage of the Germans. It required all Cæsar's ability as an orator (and he stood second only to Cicero) to infuse heart into them; but this he did. He immediately set out on the march. On the seventh day his scouts informed him that the Germans were only twenty-four miles away; and he soon received emissaries from the German king suggesting a parley. At this parley Cæsar found himself confronted by a man whom he could neither threaten nor persuade into a peaceful line of conduct, with the result that the two forces soon found themselves in opposing camps, two miles apart.

For several days in succession Cæsar brought his forces out in front of his camp, to give the Germans opportunity for battle; but, ascertaining from prisoners that the reason why the Germans abstained from battle was that the German matrons had declared, after certain occult observances, that Heaven forbade that they should win a victory if they fought before the new moon, Cæsar realized his opportunity at once, and advanced his forces in triple line right up to the German camp, thereby forcing the Germans as valiant soldiers to come out and fight. This they did, and with the utmost valor and energy. In fact, they charged so quickly that a hand-to-hand conflict ensued at once, in which by sheer weight of numbers the Germans almost forced the Romans back. A tactical manœuver, however, by which the Romans brought their third line in to the support of their left flank, saved the day, and the Germans were soon in full retreat.

One notes in this battle, and in others between the Romans

and the barbarians, that, although the first onslaught of the barbarians was splendid, they seemed to be at a loss if anything unexpected occurred, or after any reverse had been sustained. In this case, after the German retreat began, it was conducted without even an attempt at preserving order. Now, one of the distinctive features of a well disciplined army is that, unless the circumstances are excessively unfavorable, it withdraws in good order instead of plunging into a headlong rout.

The defeat of the Swiss and the Germans removed the two menaces that Cæsar had been sent into Gaul to remove. He accomplished this in the first summer, and with that combination of deliberation, celerity, and force that distinguished everything he did. He then sent his army into winter quarters among the Sequani, north of the Roman Province.

In the early summer following, he learned that the Belgians were forming a conspiracy with the tribes of northern Gaul, and inciting them to unite against the Roman power. He, therefore, enrolled two more legions, sent them into Gaul, and followed them soon himself. Having arranged for his corn supply, he then marched north with his army, and, as usual, with the greatest possible speed. Arriving near the borders of the Belgians, he ascertained that the various tribes had got together about 300,000 men, and that they were already advancing against him. He thereupon marched his army across the Aisne River and pitched his camp; going over a bridge to the farther side, setting a guard on both ends of the bridge, and placing his lieutenant, Sabinus, on the nearer side of the river. He gave orders to Sabinus to construct and intrench a camp there with a rampart twelve feet high and a trench eighteen feet wide.

When the Belgians reached a point about eight miles distant from Cæsar, they stopped and attacked a town named Bribax with great violence. In accordance with their method, a host of men surrounded the ramparts, and formed a "tortoise," which was a formation in which the men in front and

on the sides held their shields in a sloping position, while the other men held their shields horizontally; so that all men were completely protected from missiles from behind the ramparts. At the same time, a storm of missiles was kept up against the defenders. When these were driven from the walls (as soon happened in this case), they undercut the walls and advanced to the gates. Receiving news of this, Cæsar sent archers and slingers, and these succeeded in driving off the Belgians.

The whole barbarian host then advanced toward Cæsar, and soon the two forces stood in front of each other. Cæsar had secured a very advantageous position, and protected his flanks by artificial means also. There being a swamp between the two forces, and neither venturing to put itself to a disadvantage while crossing the swamp, no action occurred except a minor cavalry engagement. Cæsar then withdrew his army toward the camp; whereupon the barbarians rushed past him and crossed the river by fords, evidently intending to capture the fort of Sabinus and get between the Romans and their base. Cæsar at once crossed the bridge which his guards still held and engaged the enemy while many of them were in the river and while the whole force was disorganized. The barbarians fought gallantly but unavailingly, and with tremendous loss. That night they decamped without order, each seeking for himself the shortest route home. Cæsar was cautious about pursuing, realizing the danger of ambush; but on the following morning his cavalry pursued the Belgians furiously, attacking the rear guard, and producing a confusion that spread increasingly through the horde.

Cæsar now proceeded to assault a town called Noviodunum. Though there were few there to defend it, because most of the men were absent in the war, he could not take it by storm. He, therefore, made ready his siege appliances and prepared to use them against the walls. But the mere sight of his appliances so impressed the barbarians that they at once sent deputies to make terms of surrender.

Cæsar soon received information that the water-drinking Nervii, the most hardy tribe in Gaul, were organized to oppose him, and that they were already in position on the farther side of the Sambre River. He at once sent scouts ahead to select a place for a camp, and moved his army north. It was his custom on ordinary marches to have each legion followed by its baggage train; but on this occasion, and usually when near the enemy, he directed that six legions should march at the head, with the army baggage behind them, followed by two legions as a rear guard. Not knowing of this later arrangement, certain Gauls informed the Nervii how Cæsar's army usually marched, and pointed out the ease with which the head of the column could be attacked. The result was that when the six legions reached the site of the camp and began to form it, and just as the first baggage detachment came in sight, the Nervii dashed out from the woods with full force upon the cavalry, which were ahead. The cavalry were quickly thrown back; and then with amazing swiftness the enemy attacked the camp itself before the legions could arm themselves. The surprise was complete and the crisis was one of the utmost urgency. It was impossible for Cæsar, or even for the subordinate commanders, to give all the directions that were necessary; and it was impossible even for the line to form in order. It was here that the admirable discipline of Cæsar's force showed itself; for almost automatically every officer and man seemed to realize what ought to be done, and to do it at once.

At one time the situation became extremely critical; but the personal magnetism of Cæsar, his calmness and courage, enabled him to rally his forces at the most dangerous point, and even to advance against the enemy. The barbarians, on the other hand, after their original plan had been put into operation, had no methods by which to adapt their operations to changed conditions; and the result was that, after fighting with the utmost possible courage and determination, their fighting was reduced to mere desperate struggles, and then to dying bravely. And, as has so often happened with sav-

ages, when disaster came it was complete. The name and the nation of the Nervii were almost annihilated.

A neighboring tribe had been advancing to the assistance of the Nervii. On hearing of their defeat, however, they returned home, abandoned all of their towns and forts, and gathered themselves with their belongings into one stronghold, which was admirably fortified by nature. On all sides save one it looked down on steep rocks, and on that one side the approach was very narrow. This approach they had fortified with a double wall of great height. Upon the arrival of the Romans, they made frequent sallies against them. But Cæsar made a fortified rampart around the town, pushed his mantlets (large shields on wheels, protected on the sides and on top) up toward the wall, and built a tower. The barbarians laughed at the tower, seeing it so far away, and judging that no darts could reach them from that distance. But when they saw the tower moving toward them, they were filled with terror, and sent deputies at once to treat for peace. Cæsar granted peace, but exacted that they give up their arms. The barbarians threw over a great quantity from the walls; but they did not throw them all, and in the middle of the night they made a sudden sally. Anticipating such a movement, Cæsar instantly gave the signal prepared beforehand, and a battle ensued, in which the superior equipment and discipline of the Romans had the usual effect.

These achievements brought peace in Gaul, and Cæsar departed to Italy, purposing to return in the following summer. During his absence the Veneti, a large tribe on the north-western coast, the most skilful seamen and navigators of Gaul, stirred up a revolt that quickly spread. This revolt was especially dangerous because, in case of a conflict, the superiority of skill and equipment would rest with the barbarians and not with the Romans; for the reason that the Veneti could not be subdued except upon the sea, and neither the Roman sailors nor the Roman vessels were as good for

navigating in the boisterous seas on the Veneti coast as were the Veneti themselves.

Nothing daunted, Cæsar ordered men-of-war to be built on the river Loire, and rowers and seamen to be drafted from the Roman Province. The Veneti, hearing these preparations, and having the barbarians' fear of the Roman power, made all possible preparations for defense. But with good reason they looked forward to victory: for what could the Romans, with their comparatively small vessels built for navigation on the Mediterranean, and navigated by men ignorant of the waters near their coast—what could they do against the very much stronger and larger Veneti ships, with their heavy sails of hides and skins, manned and officered by experienced seamen? The two fleets finally came together—the Veneti fleet being not only made up of the stronger vessels and manned by the more skilful seamen and navigators, but even superior in numbers. The Roman vessels could have no success in ramming them, and were at a great disadvantage in the matter of throwing missiles, because the decks of the Veneti ships were higher.

What happened? The Roman galleys were rowed rapidly against the Veneti ships, and Roman sailors raised long poles, on which were sharp hooks, which they put over the halyards that held up the sails. Then the Roman galleys rowed rapidly away. The halyards were cut or broken, and down came the sails. The Veneti ships at once became helpless, and were immediately boarded, with the result that, of all the number, very few made their escape. This engagement ended the campaign against the Veneti and the whole coast; for nearly every ship and every fighting man available had been in the battle.

The following winter, which ushered in the year 55 B.C., brought an invasion from a savage German tribe that was forced out of Germany by a tribe more powerful. This invasion seriously threatened the stability of Gaul, and Cæsar at

once advanced to drive it back. He was soon met by envoys, who said that the tribe had been driven from its own country, and had come to Gaul to seek a home. Cæsar replied that there were no unoccupied lands that could receive so great a multitude, and that they must go back across the Rhine at once. The envoys departed, begging Cæsar to advance no farther until he heard from them. Cæsar was too experienced a strategist to grant this request, knowing the Germans would utilize the time by concentrating their forces.

The two armies soon came in sight of each other, and Cæsar gave orders to his men not to meddle with the Germans. A body of the Germans, however, attacked the Roman advance guard during a period of truce, and killed and wounded several. Cæsar thereupon committed an act for which he has been more blamed than for any other of his life. On the following morning, when some German chiefs appeared to apologize, he detained them, and then flung his army upon the German tribe, which was entirely unprepared—the members of which were lying about, in fact, with women and children dispersed among them. The Roman legions, furious at the German treachery of the previous day, made wholesale slaughter of men, women, and children. The original number was stated by Cæsar as 430,000. Of these it is not known how many survived; but it is said that no clear record remains of any survivors except certain detachments which were absent from the battle, and the chiefs whom Cæsar had detained. For his act no justification can be urged according to modern standards. The nearest approximation to justification that one can make is to say that the Germans would probably have treated the Romans in a similar manner, had they been offered a similar opportunity.

The effect of his action was tremendous in impressing the Gauls and the Germans with fear of the Roman power, and thereby in pacifying the Gallic tribes. But, across the Rhine, the Suevi, the most savage of the German tribes, were threatening weaker tribes in the vicinity; and these begged Cæsar



to come and save them. Cæsar decided to cross the Rhine, not for conquest, but for the psychological effect; and, in order to make this effect as great as possible, to construct a bridge and send his army over it. This was done with the celerity, thoroughness, and success that distinguished Cæsar's acts; for in ten days after he had decided to make the bridge, at which time the material was still standing in the forest, a bridge forty feet wide had been constructed. Cæsar marched across with his legions, and remained in Germany eighteen days. His visit had an enormous effect, mainly by reason of the bridge; for the construction of such a bridge in ten days made the barbarians realize with awe and fear that the Romans were of a superior race.

## CHAPTER IX

### CÆSAR (*Continued*)

**I**T was now early August of the year 55 B.C. Gaul had been reduced to submission; but across a narrow strait was an island whose white cliffs could be seen sometimes, but of which the Romans knew little, save that on it the enemies of Rome had sometimes found shelter. Cæsar determined to visit it. He directed an officer to take a galley and make a survey of the island coast, sent the ships he had used in the Veneti war into the English Channel, and finally gathered about eighty ships at the point where Boulogne now is. After the surveying officer had returned, he started across, carrying two legions in the ships.

He found the white cliffs lined with warriors, and saw that the cliffs were so close to the water that landing there would be impossible, in face of the threatened resistance. He therefore moved up the coast until he found an open beach. The Britons followed him, some in chariots and some on horses, evidently intending fight. The Roman soldiers hesitated (for which we can scarcely blame them), but Cæsar did not. He at once sent his armed galleys ahead with archers and cross-bowmen to clear the approach, and then ordered the legionaries to spring overboard and advance toward the beach. The Britons rode their horses into the water to meet the Romans. A hand-to-hand struggle then ensued, which ended in the usual way.

Cæsar then formed a camp. All went well till the fourth day, when a storm arose that drove some of the ships ashore and some of them into the Channel. With his customary energy and resourcefulness, Cæsar collected all of his vessels

save twelve, and repaired such as were injured. Meanwhile the Britons, much heartened by the accident, made two sudden attacks on the Romans in their camp. They were defeated, however, and made to beg for peace, despite their skillful use of chariots, to which the Romans were not accustomed. Cæsar then returned to Gaul and put his army in winter quarters among the Belgians. He himself departed to Illyria.

In the following April of the year 54 B.C. Cæsar returned to Boulogne, where he found nearly ready 28 armed galleys, as well as 600 transports, constructed in accordance with his own design. On the 20th of July he set sail with five legions and considerable cavalry, embarked in 800 vessels; and at noon landed on the same beach as in the previous year, but without opposition, made his camp, and intrenched it. Cæsar then advanced inland, at the cost of overcoming considerable resistance; but suddenly he heard that his fleet had again been broken up by storm. He returned immediately to the coast, and set about the work of salvage and repair. His measures were so well directed and so efficiently executed that in ten days he was able to resume his march. He again met with considerable resistance from the Britons. They were as brave and warlike as any he had ever met; but, like all barbarian tribes, they had no plan of action after their first assault had been made, and quickly lapsed into a state of confusion, in which the highly disciplined Roman legions, under the resourceful Cæsar, were able to inflict tremendous damage, which increased their confusion and finally produced a rout.

*Of all the men in history, the man who seems to have been the most resourceful, to have been the best able to adapt measures to changed conditions and devise new methods and appliances in emergencies, was Julius Cæsar.*

The summer passed successfully for the Romans, and Cæsar led them back to Gaul about the middle of September. The harvest in northern Gaul that year was bad; and Cæsar was forced, for this reason, to disperse his troops over a wider area

than he otherwise would have done. The Gauls, noting this, saw an opportunity for attacking the garrisons in detail. The leader of the movement possessed the engaging name of Indutiomarus; and he persuaded a chief named Ambiorix to achieve the capture of the garrison at Tongres by treachery, as being easier than by force. Ambiorix, being personally known to Sabinus, the Roman general in command, told him, under the guise of friendship, that vast bodies of Germans had crossed the Rhine and were about to attack Tongres, while all over Gaul the other Roman garrisons would be attacked at the same time. He advised Sabinus to escape to another garrison while there was time. Against the advice of his second in command, against the orders of Cæsar, and with a stupidity that is surprising in a Roman general, Sabinus broke camp and marched to join Labienus, another Roman general. Ambiorix waited for him in a large valley two miles distant from camp, and at the appropriate time and place attacked him on all sides. The Romans fought with the utmost possible valor, the last of them dying like Romans on each other's swords. Only a few stragglers escaped. These took the news to Labienus.

Not far away from Tongres was Charleroi, in command of which was Quintus Cicero, a brother of the orator. As soon as it was known that Sabinus and his command had been destroyed, the tribes in the vicinity attacked Cicero, and with their usual violence and courage. Failing in their attack, they tried on Cicero the methods that had been successful with Sabinus, but without avail. The barbarians then, having learned many things from the Romans, made a high rampart and a deep ditch around the camp and constructed a tower, though they possessed no tools but their swords, and then threw red-hot clay balls, and darts carrying lighted straw, over the ramparts upon the thatched roofs of the soldiers' huts. The houses and stores took fire; whereupon the enemy redoubled their efforts with javelins and stones and arrows, but again unavailingly. Cæsar was one hundred and

twenty miles away; but no word could be got to him, until finally a slave was found willing to brave torture and death, and to carry a letter to Cæsar in the shaft of his javelin.

With that swiftness of decision and movement that distinguished him, Cæsar set out at once to the relief of Cicero, gathering such reinforcements as he could from the various garrisons. He was well served by spies, being a good strategist; but he had only 7000 men with which to oppose 60,000. Receiving information that Cicero was out of immediate danger, and that there was no reason for risking a battle at a disadvantage to relieve him, he formed a camp, making it as small as he could in order to lead the Gauls to underestimate the force he really did have. In various ways he affected weakness; then, seizing a favorable moment, when the enemy had evidently acquired an over-confidence and consequent carelessness, he suddenly flung open the gates of his camp and rushed upon the barbarians with his whole force, nearly cutting them to pieces.

It is evident from this incident and others, that the barbarians, like most untrained people, were unable to persist long in any state of watchfulness. Not long before, Cæsar had remarked that wise men anticipate possible difficulties and decide beforehand what they will do if certain possible occasions arise. Clearly, this was what the barbarians did not do, and what Cæsar did do habitually.

Cæsar at once relieved Tongres, entering Cicero's camp about nine o'clock in the evening. He then returned to Amiens, realizing that the whole country was in turmoil, and that imminent danger threatened the Roman power. Labienus was still intrenched in his camp, besieged, in fact, by Indutiomarus. Following the tactics of Cæsar, he affected timidity, permitting the barbarians to ride around the intrenchments, to call the Romans cowards, and to fling javelins over the wall, while he was apparently afraid to reply. Then, one afternoon, just as the Gauls had scattered after one of these

expeditions, he sent his cavalry out suddenly with special orders that, after they had put the enemy to flight, they should kill Indutiomarus, the chief. The sally was successful, and the result of it quieted in part the exultation of the Gauls over the destruction of the legions of Sabinus.

Cæsar did not go to Italy, as was his custom in the winter; and before spring arrived he advanced with four legions against the Nervii who had attacked Cicero. Without the slightest warning, he fell upon them, seized their cattle, and wasted their country. Returning to Amiens, he marched thence to Paris with his usual rapidity, and brought two other tribes to pray for pardon. He then turned on the tribes that had destroyed Sabinus, throwing bridges over the dykes and creeks in search for Ambiorix, who was hiding in Flanders. At the same time, Labienus, under orders from Cæsar, tempted the Treveri to engagement by feigned flight, and then turned on his pursuers with great success. Their German allies retreated again across the Rhine, and Cæsar again threw a bridge over that river and pursued them. But his pursuit was in vain; for his savage enemies simply fled to the forest, and they had no towns or fields or other property that could be destroyed. Cæsar therefore recrossed the Rhine to Gaul.

Shortly after, he came again to Tongres, which Sabinus had deserted. The intrenchments were still standing; and Cæsar, finding himself encumbered by his heavy baggage, left it there with Cicero and one legion; promising to return in seven days, and giving Cicero strict orders to keep his men within the lines. It happened on the seventh day of Cæsar's absence that 2000 German horsemen, coming into the vicinity, and hearing that Cæsar was away, attacked the place. Unfortunately, Cicero had not obeyed his orders, and had permitted his men to go foraging and leave some gates unguarded. Into the gates the enemy galloped. Here again they showed the inherent weakness of the barbarian, lack of

foresight; for they betook themselves merely to plundering, and then galloped away, after a brief engagement with the returning foragers.

The impression left on the Romans may easily be imagined. To make things worse for their own feelings, they inferred from the attack that the Germans must be in great force in the vicinity, and that Cæsar and his small force must have been destroyed. Cæsar, however, returned with his usual precision at the time that he had fixed. It is said that Cæsar was not pleased with what he heard.

Gaul was now seemingly quiet, but Rome was not. Political intrigues of great violence and complexity were going on there, of which one element was jealousy of Cæsar. Cæsar went to Rome. News of this arrived in Gaul, and encouraged the tribes to the belief that Cæsar's standing in Gaul was so uncertain that a sudden and simultaneous revolt would be successful, especially as he himself was now on the other side of the Alps. A day was fixed for a general rising; and on that day the revolt was ushered in by the massacre of a party of Roman civilians in the town of Gien on the river Loire. The massacre became known in a few hours to the tribes in the south; with the result that the Auvergne country, which had hitherto been peaceful, immediately revolted under their young chief, Vercingetorix. This chief soon developed an extraordinary ability and energy, raised an army of considerable size, and imbued it with his spirit.

Cæsar started at once toward Gaul, though to do so left his own interests in Rome in jeopardy. He realized that the task of joining his legions was one of enormous difficulty, the Roman garrisons in Gaul being scattered over a large area filled with the enemies of Rome. Cæsar overcame the difficulties confronting him largely by the method of moving more rapidly than his enemies expected, and surmounting obstacles that they thought he could not surmount. With a few levies added to some troops that he had left beyond the Alps, he marched through the passes of the Cevennes Mountains,

though the snow was six feet deep, and the roads were supposed to be impassable for even single travelers. By this means he was able to fall upon the rebels of Auvergne, and lay the country waste, before they had imagined that he could be anywhere in the vicinity. Cæsar made a strong intrenched camp there, and left Decimus Brutus in charge; while he, unknown to any one, dashed across the country with a handful of attendants. Riding day and night, he finally reached two legions that were quartered near Auxerre, and sent word for the other legions to join him there.

Meanwhile the Gauls were concentrating, and Cæsar's forces were confronted with an increasing shortage of supplies. He ordered the Æduans to furnish supplies, and then suddenly advanced on Gien, where the Romans had been murdered. There was a bridge over the river, and by this the barbarians tried to escape in the night; but Cæsar was quicker than they, and took all of them prisoners. Vercingetorix, who had not known that Cæsar was not still in the camp where he had left Decimus Brutus, now hastened to engage him in battle. This battle had the usual result; but it had another result—that of opening the eyes of Vercingetorix to the fact that the best way to destroy Cæsar was not to meet him in battle, but to prevent his soldiers from getting food. This he forthwith set out to accomplish, burning the fields in the vicinity, harassing Cæsar's communications, and resorting to many ingenious expedients like those of the Roman general Fabius.

Part of the young chief's plan was not to defend even the towns; but he was prevailed upon to permit the defense of Avaricum, a rich and strongly fortified city, protected by rivers on three sides, while on the fourth there were swamps and marshes that could be passed only along a single ridge. Cæsar found that the place could not be taken except by a regular siege; and it seemed doubtful whether the corn supply of the Romans would last as long as the necessary siege would. The situation culminated in an almost actual famine;



but, under the inspiration of Cæsar, the soldiers determined to persevere. The siege work was made peculiarly difficult by the fact that the inhabitants of that part of the country were skilled artisans, and had surrounded the town with walls forty feet thick, made of alternate layers of stone and timber. The weather was cold and wet; but in twenty-five days the Romans had built against the wall a bank of turf and fagots one hundred yards wide and eighty feet high, as high as the walls of the town. Then the ingenious Gauls managed to undermine it and set it on fire, while they threw torches and burning fagots from the walls. Finally, however, the fires were subdued. On the following morning the Romans dashed over the walls from the top of the bank, and killed every human being in the town.

The effect of this disaster was to heighten the prestige of Vercingetorix, who had opposed any attempt to defend the town; and it consequently caused his followers to redouble their exertions to shut off the food supply.

There was another town, called Gergovia, which Vercingetorix was persuaded to defend also. It was believed to be impregnable; and Cæsar himself realized that it could not be taken except by siege. He began an intrenched camp near it; but before he could proceed further with the work, he heard that Æduans, on whom he relied largely for his food, had become very unreliable; in fact, that 10,000 men, whom they had raised according to his orders, had murdered the Roman officers in charge of them, and were preparing to join Vercingetorix. Leaving two legions to guard his camp, Cæsar intercepted the Ædian revolvers and took them prisoners.

In his absence, Vercingetorix attacked his camp. Cæsar returned in time to save the camp; but the urgency of his food supply had now become so great that he was forced to give up the siege and accept the single military failure of his entire Gallic campaign. His position was indeed critical. To feed the army in his present position was no longer pos-

sible; to retreat into the Roman Province would be a confession of defeat, and rouse the barbarians to still greater efforts. He set out immediately for the territory of the Æduans, where he knew there would be an abundance of food; and by swift movements, which included crossing a ford over which the troops had to wade in water up to their armpits, he succeeded in getting his entire army to its destination.

At this time Labienus, with a separate command, was near a town that now is Paris. Hearing of Cæsar's retreat, and realizing the necessity of joining him, but being confronted by a large force of Gauls on the opposite side of the river, he saw the necessity of some stratagem. He thereupon sent a fleet of small barges to a bend in the river four miles below Paris, and directed them to wait for him. At nightfall he sent a small force up the river in boats, with orders to make a great noise as though they were retreating, while he with the major part of his force marched silently to the barges and crossed the river in them without being detected. The Gauls, judging by the noise made by the smaller force, concluded that the whole army was in flight, and started to follow them, but in disorder. Labienus fell upon them with the usual result, and then joined Cæsar.

Meanwhile Cæsar's failure at Gergovia inspired all Gaul with the hope of expelling the Roman invaders. They thereupon elected Vercingetorix their commander, and proceeded with redoubled vigor to cut off Cæsar from supplies of food. But Cæsar, by reason of his conquests across the Rhine and his wise treatment of the people there afterward, was enabled to get large supplies of food, and besides that a great number of German horsemen. These horsemen, however, he was compelled to mount on Roman horses, because of the inferiority of the German horses. When ready, Cæsar started out to punish the treacherous Æduans. On his way, he was attacked by a large force under Vercingetorix, who had the bad strategic judgment to attack him in the open field. The men under Vercingetorix were defeated with great loss, and

driven toward the fortress of Alesia. They were, in fact, driven within the fortress, and one of the most remarkable sieges in history—in many respects the most remarkable—resulted.

The fortress of Alesia stood on a hill that sloped steeply in all directions, and lay between two rivers that flowed virtually parallel to each other and emptied into the Brenne River, about two miles distant. In it 80,000 men had now taken refuge. The place was impregnable except to famine, and Cæsar knew enough of barbarians to feel sure that they had not had the foresight to supply a great amount of food. He soon learned from horsemen sent out by Vercingetorix that they had enough for thirty days, and that Vercingetorix was calling on all Gaul to come to his assistance before that time elapsed.

Cæsar realized (and so did the Gauls) that the final crisis in the conflict between the Gauls and the Romans was close at hand. Cæsar began at once the construction of intrenchments and appliances of various kinds, and so did the besieged; for by this time they had learned a good deal from the Romans. He cast up around the town siege works that had a length of eleven miles, placed camps at convenient spots, and constructed twenty-three forts. Scarcely had the work begun when a cavalry battle took place on the plain, which was fought with the utmost vigor, and which was lost by the barbarians chiefly because they managed affairs so badly that their great numbers caused interference of one man with another. The usual result occurred.

Cæsar dug around the fortress a trench twenty feet deep with vertical sides; and four hundred yards back of this he began his other siege works, the unoccupied space of four hundred yards acting to prevent a surprise by the enemy. Behind it he dug two trenches parallel to each other, fifteen feet broad and fifteen feet deep. Behind these he built a rampart with a palisade twelve feet high, and to this he added a breastwork of pointed stakes projecting horizontally. At in-

tervals of eighty feet he constructed turrets. In addition, he had branches cut from trees, and sharpened on the ends; and these he fastened at the bottom of trenches five feet deep, so that the points projected just above the ground. In front of these he dug shallower pits, into which tapering stakes as thick as a man's thigh, sharpened at the top and fire-hardened, were driven, so as to project about four inches above the ground; and at the same time the earth was trodden down strongly and firmly for a distance of a foot from the bottom. The pits were covered with twigs and brushwood to conceal them. Eight rows of these pits were dug, three feet apart; and in front of all, stakes with iron hooks were buried in the ground and scattered at brief intervals over the field. When all these things had been done, Cæsar constructed parallel intrenchments of the same kind, but facing in the other direction, for the reception of the enemy, whom he knew would come from the outside to the assistance of the town.

The expected reinforcements did not come within the thirty days; but a few days later they arrived, in number about 250,000, and filled the entire plain to the east of the town to a depth of three miles. Cæsar disposed of his whole army on both faces of the intrenchments, and then gave orders for the cavalry to go out and engage the enemy. The Gauls had placed archers and light-armed skirmishers among their horsemen, and these at first had some effect. Seeing this, Cæsar's German cavalry formed in mass and charged the enemy, and speedily put them to flight.

On the following day the enemy made a great number of hurdles, ladders, and grappling-hooks; and that night they left their camp silently, approached the intrenchments, and then raised a shout as a signal to the besieged inside. A combined assault then began against the Roman lines from two opposite directions, in the darkness. By dint of continual drill in their new posts, each Roman had learned what to do under every probable contingency; and in this respect they had their customary advantage over their foes. The

battle continued during most of the night, but ended without decisive result. After a council of war, and after having reconnoitered the locality by means of scouts, the barbarians decided upon an excellent plan, which was to send a picked force by a circuitous route to a hill north of the town, where the Roman line was weak, and from there to attack from behind a camp that the Romans had been obliged to lay out on the side of the hill that sloped toward the fortress.

About midday, when all was ready, this attack was made; and simultaneously Vercingetorix from the inside and the other barbarians from the outside precipitated a general assault. As the Roman force numbered only about 50,000, while the besieged inside numbered 80,000 and the Gauls outside numbered 250,000, the situation was critical for the Romans. The critical point was the hill north of the fortress. The battle was fought, of course, with the greatest courage by both sides. Cæsar sent a part of the cavalry around the outer intrenchments to the back of the hill with orders to attack the enemy in the rear. He himself then hurried to this critical part of the battlefield, attired in his scarlet cloak, and filled his troops with that ardor which he was always successful in inspiring. His coming being well timed, his cavalry was now seen advancing toward the rear of the enemy. The barbarians were seized with panic and turned to flee. The panic spread as panics always have among barbarians; and after that the battle became a merciless slaughter.

The fall of Alesia virtually completed the conquest of Gaul. Much had to be done to bring the various tribes into submission; but this was done without great difficulty, Cæsar by his sudden movements appearing in one district and then in another, and crushing each in turn, before any formidable resistance could be organized. The last part of Gaul to yield was the extreme southwest, where a single tribe, relying on the strength of a fortress, persisted in resistance. Cæsar realized that the last spark must be put out,

lest it spread. The fortress was taken by the stratagem of cutting a tunnel, by which the Roman engineers tapped the spring that gave the garrison water.

Before leaving Gaul, Cæsar reconciled the tribes to the new conditions, convincing them that they would be happier united as a province under the orderly government of Rome than divided up into little bands, perpetually fighting each other. He gave the chiefs magnificent presents, laid no impositions on either the leaders or the people, and left them resolved to maintain the peace that was now established.

In the spring of 50 B.C. he went to Italy, and met an atmosphere of animosity, especially in the Senate. The people received him with demonstrations of affection, but the politicians hated him. After a brief stay he went back to the army; for he had yet one more year of command in Gaul. But the politicians did not want him to remain in command. At this time the government was exceedingly corrupt, and the politicians were alarmed by the fact that Cæsar had been promised the Consulship at the end of his second five years in Gaul. They foresaw an end of their peculations if Cæsar should become Consul. They knew that he would carry out the same program of honest and efficient government that he had pursued when he had been Consul before, and had invented and put into operation the epochal "*Leges Juliae*."

After much debate and indecision, the Senate finally ordered him to give up his command in the following March. To carry out this order would force Cæsar to go to Rome as a private citizen, and expose himself helpless to all possible dangers, including murder. He therefore addressed the one legion he had with him with a statement of the case. In reply, the legion promised him their enthusiastic support for whatever he might do. Thereupon he sent orders over the Alps for two more legions to follow him, and then crossed the river Rubicon with his legion, thus leaving his province and going into Italy with an armed force. The Senate took

instant flight—a flight so precipitous that they left their wives, property, and children behind, even the money in the Treasury—and sought refuge with Pompey's army near Capua.

The greatest confusion reigned in their councils. The only man who took decisive action was Domitius, who had been appointed Cæsar's successor, and his action was very foolish, for he took a hostile position in Corfinium and defied Cæsar. Cæsar took Corfinium by his Gallic methods. Then, with his usual clemency, he gave Domitius and all his followers their liberty, and even their money, without even exacting a promise to refrain from further hostilities.

The fall of Corfinium so alarmed Pompey and the Senate that most of them fled from Italy into northern Greece. Pompey had a very considerable fleet, and with this he could almost bring starvation to Italy. Cæsar could not follow, because he could not get the necessary ships; but he utilized the time by sending expeditions to Sicily and Sardinia, on which Rome depended for its corn, and clearing them of enemies. Gaul remained true to Cæsar; except that Marseilles, a purely commercial city, revolted to Pompey, as a result largely of a visit from a squadron of Pompey's fleet under the command of Domitius. This was the same Domitius whom Cæsar had recently spared at Corfinium.

Cæsar could not afford to leave Marseilles hostile and effective, because he was about to dash into Spain to attack Pompey's legion there, and she would threaten his communications. How could Cæsar shut in Marseilles when he had no fleet? Cæsar made a fleet. He cut down trees in the forests, and in thirty days built, launched, and manned twelve strong ships. Leaving these ships to blockade Marseilles by sea, and three legions to blockade it by land, Cæsar hurried through the passes in the Pyrenees Mountains, which the enemy had not had the foresight to guard. In forty days all the enemy in northern Spain were his prisoners, while those in the south were begging for peace.

But the melting snow on the mountains in northern Spain carried away bridges, made the fords of the rivers impassable, and brought Cæsar's army to the point of starvation. What did he do? Remembering that in Britain the fishermen used boats made of frames of wicker covered with skins, Cæsar collected wicker from willows on the river-bank, secured hides from the carcasses of animals in the camp, constructed a number of light, buoyant vessels, and crossed the Segre River in them. Soon afterward he returned to Marseilles, just in time to receive its surrender. The siege had been a difficult one, and several engagements had been fought on the water, in which the extemporized vessels of Cæsar had gained the mastery.

Cæsar left two legions in Marseilles, and sent others back into Gaul, not thinking it wise to give the Gauls too much temptation to revolt. With the rest of his army he returned to Rome at the beginning of the winter, and was at once named Dictator. Civil affairs were in the wildest confusion; public credit was shaken; debts were long in arrears; and the whole nation was in terror of Pompey's fleet. Under these circumstances, Cæsar gave eleven days of work to Rome, and then (just a year after he had crossed the Rubicon) marched into southern Italy with an army not greater than 30,000 men. Pompey and his force, with the Senate, were now on the opposite shore of the Adriatic in western Greece, with nine legions and an abundance of money, stores, and auxiliaries of all kinds. Besides these, two more legions were coming from Syria, and great numbers of slingers and archers from the islands. In addition, Pompey had a fleet of one hundred and thirty ships, the principal purpose of which was to prevent Cæsar from crossing.

By great exertions Cæsar collected twelve fighting triremes and enough transports to carry half his army. To attempt to cross under such circumstances would seem a wild project; and for this reason Cæsar attempted it, and in bad weather, knowing that he would not be expected. As a result he got



across with 15,000 men and 500 horses, and landed on the eastern shore of the Strait of Otranto, which lies between Italy and Greece. As soon as he disembarked, Cæsar ordered the transports to start back in the darkness. But even Cæsar could not inspire the men with intelligence and energy while he was absent; and the result was that the transports lingered until daylight and were promptly overtaken.

Not knowing this and expecting that Mark Antony would follow shortly, Cæsar occupied Apollonia and intrenched himself on the left bank of the Apsus River. He had deprecated the civil war, though in a sense he had caused it; and he hoped still to persuade Pompey to come to terms with him. Pompey had been absent in Macedonia; but he hurried back to Durazzo, near Apollonia, and for some time the opposing forces confronted each other, divided only by a narrow river. Deputations from both sides were chosen to consult, with Cæsar's approval; but their consultations were ended when one of Cæsar's officers was assaulted with a shower of darts.

Months passed by, while Cæsar watched in vain for Mark Antony and the other legions: but Antony was blockaded in Brindisi by Pompey's ships. Antony drove these off, but did not start. Finally Cæsar wrote to Antony that the legions were true as steel, and ready to take any risks, rather than leave their commander in danger.

Spurred by this, Antony took advantage of a favoring wind, and sailed, though closely followed. In the darkness his ships were swept from their intended course; but finally they ran into a harbor which they were fortunate enough to enter safely, though hotly pursued.

In the position that Antony's army now took up, Pompey's army lay between his and Cæsar's. Cæsar surmounted this difficulty by swiftly marching around Pompey's army and joining Antony before Pompey knew that he had moved. Cæsar was still greatly outnumbered by Pompey, but Pompey would not fight. Cæsar then drew a line of fortified posts

around him and shut off many of the streams on which Pompey depended for water, so that horses and cattle died and fever set in. Cæsar's lines were several miles long; so one wonders why Pompey did not attack him, as Cæsar undoubtedly would have done, if the cases had been reversed. Cæsar's army had plenty of meat, but practically no wheat; but, having been used to hardships, and having an ingenious commander, they made cakes out of roots, which they ground into paste and mixed with milk.

In June, 48 B.C., the two legions from Syria approaching Pompey through Asia Minor and Macedonia, Cæsar sent a force eastward to get into touch with them and report their movements to him. While his force in the camp was thus reduced, two young Gauls, turning traitor to Cæsar, gave Pompey information of a certain weak point in Cæsar's line, and Pompey promptly attacked it. Cæsar's forces being surprised and distributed over great distances, nearly a thousand were killed, and the situation at once became so desperate that even Cæsar failed to restore confidence. If Pompey had possessed Cæsar's quick apprehension of situations, he would have seized the opportunity, and perhaps destroyed all of Cæsar's force. Some hundred of Cæsar's legionaries were taken prisoners; and these, despite Cæsar's clemency shown on so many occasions, were led into the midst of Pompey's camp and killed.

Cæsar realized the situation at once, and immediately fell back on Apollonia. Leaving his sick and wounded there, he endeavored to rejoin the force that he had sent to the eastward to watch the coming legions from Syria; a thing which he succeeded in accomplishing. He then marched into Thesaly, which was a fertile country, capable of feeding his army, and soon reached the vicinity of Pharsalia. Pompey was now following him to bring him to battle, not being guided by his own judgment, but bullied by the Senators who accompanied his army, and who by this time had almost taken his authority out of his hands. Not understanding the relative impor-

tance of the various factors of war, which can be learned only by experience, they were perfectly confident that Pompey's forces could defeat Cæsar's because they were superior in numbers. So confident of this were they that they arranged what was to be done with Cæsar and his followers, and even with those who remained neutral.

The long-expected battle finally was fought on the banks of the Enipeus River. It occurred at a place and a time not determined by Pompey, but forced on him by his Senators and politicians. Cæsar had only 22,000 men besides 1000 cavalry. Pompey had 47,000 Roman infantry and 7000 cavalry, besides his allies. Pompey's right was covered by the river, and his left spread out into the open plain, reaching, of course, beyond Cæsar's right flank. Pompey intended to send his cavalry outside, with archers and slingers, to attack Cæsar's cavalry on his right flank. Cæsar expected this, and trained about 1000 picked men to assist his own cavalry; and besides that he added a fourth line of cohorts of specially selected men, to engage the enemy's cavalry. He told these men that the result of the action would depend on them.

Pompey commanded on his own left flank. Cæsar, with his favorite Tenth Legion, commanded his own right flank. Mark Antony commanded the left flank, and Loginus the center. Cæsar made the attack, as usual, his front rank advancing on the run. Seeing that Pompey's men did not move, they halted until they had recovered breath, and then rushed on, flung their darts and closed with the sword. Then Pompey's cavalry charged on Cæsar's right flank, reinforced with their archers. Cæsar's cavalry gave way; whereupon Pompey's squadrons of cavalry came wheeling round, to attack from the rear. To their astonishment, Cæsar's fourth line suddenly wheeled into line against them. Surprised and bewildered by the firmness of the resistance of the infantry, which cavalry always fear, Pompey's cavalry broke in confusion and galloped away. As an explanation, it must be stated that these were not trained cavalrymen,

but "carpet knights" from home. Cæsar's fourth line now threw themselves on Pompey's exposed left wing, and were at once reinforced by Cæsar's third line. Suddenly Pompey's left flank yielded, and then the entire army turned and fled.

Only 200 of Cæsar's men were lost; of the opposite side 15,000 lay dead upon the ground. A tremendous victory had been gained. Nevertheless, Cæsar allowed his men no rest; but taking the freshest of them he set out by a rapid march to cut off the line of retreat of the defeated enemy. As a result, he succeeded in capturing 24,000, who came to him sobbing for mercy. With his usual clemency, Cæsar pardoned them all.

The battle of Pharsalia has been described as a battle between aristocracy and democracy. So it was, in effect. Certainly the result was a defeat for the corrupt aristocracy of Rome, and a triumph for the democracy of Italy, and for a cause which shortly made Rome the greatest nation that had ever lived, and the exemplar of efficient government for all the nations that were to follow.

Pompey fled to Egypt, but was murdered treacherously while he was attempting to land. Cæsar followed him; and on reaching Alexandria was presented, much to his disgust, with Pompey's head. The Alexandrians endeavored to propitiate Cæsar, and expected that they would have little difficulty, and that he would shortly return to Italy and give them their independence. But Cæsar soon dispelled all such expectations; and thereupon a revolt was started which soon assumed great proportions. Cæsar found himself blockaded in the palace, while the Egyptian fleet, which had come back from Greece, was in the inner basin, outnumbered his, and threatened his communications with Italy. Without hesitation, Cæsar set fire to the docks, burned and disabled most of the Egyptian ships at the docks, seized the Pharos and the mole that connected it with the town, and fortified the palace.

The Alexandrians pumped sea water into the conduits that

supplied the palace with drinking water; then Cæsar sank wells and got fresh water. The Alexandrians constructed a new fleet, and brought down others from the canals, and made oars and spars, even out of benches and tables. At one time they made a sudden attack on a ship on board which Cæsar happened to be, and from which he had to swim for his life. Finding at length that they seemed to be making no impression, the Alexandrians pretended to desire peace; but this move made no impression on the sapient Cæsar. Finally, reinforcements for Cæsar arrived, under the command of Mithridates; but a division of the Egyptian army lay between them and Cæsar. By his customary method of extraordinarily rapid movement, Cæsar joined Mithridates, despite the Alexandrians. Alexandria at once surrendered.

Cæsar now went to Syria, leaving two legions in Egypt. Pharnaces, son of King Mithridates the Great, hearing that Cæsar was shut up in Alexandria, had lain claim to his father's kingdom and was killing or otherwise maltreating every Roman there. Cæsar saw that he must punish Pharnaces before he returned to Rome, and set out at once to meet him. Pharnaces promised submission, and sent Cæsar a golden crown; but Cæsar took the ground that his submission must be made to the empire and not to himself, and that the provinces he had invaded must be evacuated at once. Pharnaces adopted dilatory tactics, knowing that Cæsar's presence was required in Rome; but Cæsar cut short negotiations, and, seizing a position at night on the brow of a hill near the Armenian camp, began to intrench. Pharnaces, seeing this, decided to attack at once, and was able to throw some confusion into the Roman legions before they could exchange their digging tools for their arms and armor. But, as soon as the exchange had taken place, the Armenians were hurled back with tremendous slaughter, and the insurrection brought to a sudden end.

When Cæsar returned to Italy, Spain was in confusion. Italy was disorganized, and a general lack of leadership per-

vaded the whole republic. The issue between the Senate and the people had not yet been decided finally; and, though Cæsar was consul now, the situation was most difficult, even for Cæsar. He soon restored quiet in the city and the country, but was then confronted with a difficulty he had not expected—one with his own legionaries. The trouble was that they had been led by foolish or ill-intentioned officers to expect extravagant rewards; and, these not having been received, they were on the point of mutiny. Even the favorite Tenth Legion demanded speech with Cæsar, and then asked for their discharge. Cæsar met them coldly, but granted them their discharge and certain lands that he had arranged to have allotted to them. He gave them money also, and told them to go.

But they would not go. Cæsar had shamed them by speaking to them as he had never spoken before, not as comrades, but as plain citizens, and had offered them land and money, but evidently with contempt. Not one soldier left him.

Cæsar now had to go into Africa, where a large force of Pompeians under Scipio were assembled with 60,000 Italians in addition, 120 elephants, and a multitude of African cavalry. He left with only a very small force, ordering the rest to follow as soon as they could; and on arriving fortified a suitable spot at Ruspinum on the coast. The other legions followed slowly. Finally, when all had arrived, an evident lack of suitable equipment showed how their officers had deteriorated.

Cæsar, noticing that his men feared elephants, delayed active operations until he got some elephants from Italy, so that his men might learn to handle them. He then tried to get into battle, but the enemy held aloof. In order to precipitate it, Cæsar blockaded the peninsula of Thapsus by sea and land, reasoning that this would force Scipio to come to its assistance. The issue showed him to be right, as usual. The enemy advanced toward Cæsar; whereupon Cæsar's legionaries showed such eagerness for battle that even Cæsar

was forced to advance sooner than he otherwise would have done. Then he sprang upon his horse and led the charge in person. The first thing that happened was that the elephants that had been placed in front of the enemy wheeled around and crashed, trumpeting and roaring, through the lines of their own men, precipitating a rout.

Cæsar then returned to Rome, to meet triumphal processions, rejoicings, and honors of all possible kinds. He was made Dictator for ten years, and received powers equal to those of a king. He used these powers more wisely and more energetically, and more in opposition to the efforts and desires of the ruling classes, than any other man in history. It would be out of place in a book of this kind to describe what they were, nor would it be necessary. We should remember, however, that the great reforms which Cæsar instituted were made by the greatest strategist the world has ever seen, that he could not have made them unless he had attained the position which he then held, and that he could not have attained that position except by means of strategy. We must realize, therefore, that the greatest single agency in producing that government of Rome, which has been the pattern of all good governments since, was strategy.

But Cæsar had yet one more campaign to carry through, though he was now fifty-five years old, and his splendid health had begun to fail, under the terrific strain of the preceding fourteen years. His presence was required in Spain, where the officers whom he had sent there had brought about a bad state of affairs—as the subordinate officers of great strategists have usually done when left to the guidance of their own intelligence and character only. Cæsar took with him his grand-nephew, Octavius, then a lad of seventeen, who was to follow him in power, and to bring to a climax of unsurpassed efficiency and glory the government he had founded.

Cæsar met his enemies on the 17th of March, 45 B.C., on the plain of Munda on the Guadalquivir River, not far from Cordova. The two armies were both composed mainly of highly

trained Roman soldiers. The enemy had the advantage in position, Cæsar's army in morale. The battle was a mere stand-up brutal fight; and for a long while the struggle was so equal that Cæsar himself saw the necessity of some signal act to strengthen his men. So he seized a standard, and, by the exercise of his rare powers of persuasion and command, rallied a legion that was beginning to waver. At that moment, Labienus, a traitor from Cæsar's Gallic army, and one of the important generals on the enemy's side, was seen to gallop across the field. A shout arose that he was fleeing. A panic thereon ensued, which Cæsar's legions took advantage of to break through the enemy's lines. The enemy then broke into two masses, one running to shelter at Munda, and the other to shelter at Cordova.

Cæsar returned shortly to Rome, and resumed the work of reforming the abuses of the government that is historical. The work was not favored by the Senate, for reasons that also are historical; and it was ended on the 15th of March, 44 B.C.

On that day, that man was murdered by Roman Senators who pretended to be his friend, who had done more than any other mortal who has ever lived for the establishment of good government and the reign of law.



## CHAPTER X

### CHARLEMAGNE, WILLIAM AND MARLBOROUGH

THE death of Cæsar had an effect contrary to the one intended, for it established in the hearts and convictions of the people a belief in the sincerity of his character and the wisdom of his policies. He was followed in power by his grand-nephew Octavius, one of the most fortunate facts in history, because Octavius possessed the character and the ability to build still higher the structure that Julius Cæsar had founded. Under succeeding emperors the Roman empire became greater and stronger, until the reign of Trajan in the early part of the second century, when it acquired its greatest territorial extent. After this the empire slowly but surely declined; and, if one analyzes the causes, he sees that the immediate cause was a decrease first in strategic ability and afterward in purely military ability; and that this decrease was due to the increase in wealth.

While the empire became weaker inside, the barbarians became stronger outside; and finally the city of Rome itself was sacked by Alaric, Chief of the Visigoths. Britain was then abandoned by the Romans; and not long after, Genseric, King of the Vandals, conquered the Roman Province in North Africa, and then captured and sacked the city of Rome itself. The Huns under Atilla, a natural military genius, after defeating the Goths and the armies of the Eastern Empire and receiving tribute from Constantinople, moved westward into Gaul, and finally were met in battle in the year 451 by the Roman legion under Aëtius near Chalons. One of the critical battles of the world then followed, in which Atilla was defeated by the same agency as that which has usually defeated

barbarians in their world-old war against civilization, that is, by superior strategy. But Rome was now too decadent to stand up long against the virile barbarians; and the Roman Empire of the West fell in 476.

The Eastern Empire continued, however, with Constantinople as its capital; and for almost a thousand years the empire kept at bay the barbarians and Mohammedans by the sheer power of superior strategy. Meanwhile, about 486 B.C., the Kingdoms of the Franks, a collection of the Teutonic tribes, was established in Gaul; and later Mohammedanism was spread in the Orient and Africa by the sword. By the year 732, just one hundred years after the death of Mohammed, it had been forced on the natives all along the shores of the southern Mediterranean, through Spain, and thence into France. In that year another critical battle was fought, usually called the battle of Tours, between the Saracen Mohammedans on one side and the Christian Franks under Duke Pippin, usually called Charles Martel, on the other side. The battle was fought with the utmost courage and energy on both sides, but with distinct lack of strategic ability on the Saracen side; with the result that the Christians forced the Mohammedans out of Gaul and back into Spain, and thereby stopped the advance of Mohammedanism into western Europe.

Charles Martel was succeeded by his son, also Duke Pippin, who was made King of the Franks with the approval of the Pope, and therefore with his assistance. This favor he later repaid by marching into Italy and expelling the Lombards and donating certain lands regained from them to the Pope. This laid the foundation of the Pope's temporal power.

Pippin was succeeded by his son, Charles, who became known later as Charlemagne, or Charles the Great. He reigned for forty-seven years. During his reign he made more than fifty campaigns, which resulted in his extending the boundaries of his kingdom beyond the Rhine, beyond Rome in Italy, and from the Mediterranean on the south to the North Sea on the North. His principal campaigns were

against the Lombards, the Mohammedan Moors in Spain, and (especially) the so-called Saxons, a collection of barbarous Teuton tribes, who seem to have come originally from the neighborhood of the Rhine, but who had spread to the westward.

Like Alexander and Cæsar, Charlemagne was a great statesman as well as a great strategist, and did not wage war for mere conquest, but in order to establish good government over a large area. In Charlemagne's time the civilization that Egypt, Greece, and Rome had produced had almost been extinguished, except in western Asia; and Gaul was in a condition not far above barbarism. While Charlemagne did not extend his boundaries over such large areas as did Alexander and Cæsar, he probably was nearly as great personally as either of them, both as a strategist and as a statesman; for he did not have the advantage that they had of commanding armies far superior in skill and discipline to the armies of the enemy. In one way he achieved a greater personal success than either; for he was crowned Emperor of the West (800 A.D.), and for fourteen years was the ruler of an empire he had himself created. His empire was divided after his death into three parts, which were made afterward into two; but it did not disappear, like the empire of Alexander. One-half of his empire became approximately the France of to-day, and the other half the late German Empire.

It was the stable government that Charlemagne established in his empire that made possible the civilization of the Europe of to-day; and it must not be overlooked that the uniting of so many mutually hostile barbarian tribes under one good government was due initially to Charlemagne's superior strategy, and would not have been possible without it.

After Charlemagne's death, civil wars of all kinds took place in his dominions, with the result that the government became so weak that the Norsemen did much as they pleased in the northern part of Gaul, and finally, in 912, forced the French king to cede the province of Neustria to their chief,

Hrolf, who later changed his name to Rollo. Later the name of the province was changed to Normandy. The Normans came to be the best combination of civilization, intelligence and character that Gaul contained.

In 1065 the name of the Duke of Normandy was William. He was a man of great ability, energy and ambition; and he took advantage of the wreck on the coast of Harold, who was the probable heir to the throne of England, to make Harold swear allegiance to himself and promise to assist him to attain the crown of England, after the death of Edward, the actual king. Harold was then permitted to return to England. King Edward dying soon afterward, Harold was declared to be the king, the late king having nominated him as his successor. Harold thereupon declared his oath to William to be void, because given under compulsion and had himself appointed king.

William at once organized an expedition of invasion, and in September, 1066, set out for England with 60,000 men. Fortunately for him, Harold was attacked in the same month by a Norwegian army, and compelled to fight a bloody battle at Stamford Bridge, in which he lost many men; for it was during Harold's absence with his army and fleet on this campaign that William appeared off the coast of England. He landed at once, on the 29th of September, 1066, without meeting any opposition whatever.

Harold came south to meet him; and, though his army was far inferior in number to William's, and though his fleet would be able seriously to threaten William's communication with Normandy, he committed the strategic blunder of precipitating a battle, when it would have been much better strategy to lay waste the country, keep out of William's way, and let his army starve. The two forces finally met near Hastings. Harold selected a very good position on a small eminence, in which both his flanks and rear were well protected, and threw up a barricade in front of his force, con-

structed of shields and wooden stakes so joined together as to make a sort of wall.

The Normans hurled themselves against the Saxons, but for several hours had no success. The Normans then resorted to the stratagem of pretending to flee in order to tempt the Saxons from the shelter of their little fortress. The Saxons fell into the trap, and followed the Normans, and finally broke into disorder in the eagerness of their pursuit. Seizing a favorable opportunity, the Normans turned around and renewed their attack. The Saxons, being inferior in numbers and deprived of the protection that the wall had given them, were finally defeated. On Christmas Day, William, Duke of Normandy, known in history as William the Conqueror, was crowned King of England.

It is the verdict of historians that the conquest of England by the Normans was one of the most fortunate events of history. Not only were the Normans superior in ability and character to the Saxons, but the combination that was eventually produced of Saxons and Normans made the splendid British race. If the invasion had not occurred, no reason warrants us to suppose that the interminable little strifes between tribes and provinces would have ceased until some other great occurrence had brought pressure against England from the outside, and compressed the English together into a single nation.

When William invaded England, the light of a renewal of civilization was dimly visible in Europe, and nations were beginning to form approximately along present lines, by the union in various sections of many tribes and clans. Especially clear were the nations of England, France, Germany and Spain. The crusades that were waged against the Turks, mainly in the twelfth century, assisted in this movement; while the institution of Chivalry, which sprang from the Crusades, operated in all countries, especially in France, to soften the manners of the people and alleviate the horrors of war.

The principal single epoch was that comprised in what is usually called the Hundred Years' War, which was a series of wars between 1338 and 1453, waged between France and England for the possession of the crown of France. The ultimate decision of this war, by which the English were finally forced out of France in 1453, had less influence on history than did the fact that the war united each nation by making it fight against an outside enemy. The war produced strong feelings of nationality in each country.

That this was a beneficent influence cannot reasonably be doubted; for history tells us in unmistakable language, and tells us many times, that every advance in civilization has been contributed by some country whose people were naturally coöperative because bound together by a strong feeling of nationality.

*Patriotic nations have always been the most useful to the world.*

In the same year that marked the expulsion of the English from France, 1453, Constantinople was finally taken by the Ottoman Turks, under Mohammed II, surnamed the Great. He must have been a remarkable strategist, for the difficulties he had to overcome were numerous and important. He became possessed of a gun, enormous for those days, that threw balls weighing one hundred pounds, made of hard black stone. He was not only energetic, brave, and determined, but very resourceful and inventive. One of his ingenious and successful accomplishments was to transport eighty galleys for a distance of eighty miles across the land and into the harbor, because he was unable to reach the harbor through the regular channels. He then captured or sank all the ships in the harbor, and built a bridge over it, by which the city was laid open to assault. The Ottoman Turks at this time were great warriors, and included among their number an organization called Janizaries, a special corps who were selected at first from Christian captives when they were boys, and trained to the profession of arms.

An extraordinary occurrence was the expedition of Jenghis Khan, which began in 1206 and lasted twenty-one years. Jenghis Khan was only the chief of some Mongolian tribe in the eastern part of Asia; but he collected an enormous horde of barbarians, and marched through Asia at their head, laying waste everything in his path. He conquered the northern part of China, overran Turkestan and Persia, and established a savage empire. He was succeeded by his son, Oktai, who continued his father's course, and during the interval between 1238 and 1241 ravaged nearly half of Europe. One of his successors was Kublai Khan, who made the present Peking his capital. Upon his death this curious empire fell apart. It was partially restored by Tamerlane. After his death his descendant Baber invaded India, and established the kingdom Great Moguls, which lasted two hundred years. These men cannot strictly be called strategists; yet one must admit that they possessed many of the qualities of great strategists, and achieved some of their successes. The first two seem to have been destroyers only, and to have carried their rage for destruction further than anybody else known. It is said that in some cities that they destroyed they killed every living thing, human and brute!

The reason for mentioning them in this book is to point out that their success was due almost entirely to the absence of real resistance. The lands over which they swept were inhabited for the most part by peaceful people, who had exactly the amount of skill and resourcefulness to defend themselves that might have been expected. The barbarians had that hatred of civilization which all barbarians have, and always will have; and they gained the success which barbarians always have gained and always will gain, against people who have become so persuaded of the permanence of peace, and so averse to war, as to have lost the power of self-protection. *Self-protection is the first law of nature; and any man and any nation that becomes so ultra-civilized as to lose that instinct will inevitably go down, if seriously attacked.*

The fate meted out by Jenghiz Khan to the pacifists of his day is respectfully called to the attention of the pacifists of the present day: for *barbarism is not dead, but only held in incomplete subjection*.

After the fall of Constantinople, the Mohammedans became increasingly aggressive, and threatened to spread to the westward over Europe. They were stopped by Don John of Austria in 1571, who, at the head of the Spanish fleet, aided by Venetian and Papal squadrons, defeated the Turkish fleet at the battle of Lepanto. Again civilization was saved from the wrath of barbarians by fighting.

The next incident of strategic importance was the expedition of the Spanish Invincible Armada, sent by Philip II of Spain in 1588 to invade England. The expedition was fitted out and organized with the most extraordinary energy and completeness; and the original plan was good. It was simply that the Armada was to sail into the English Channel in overpowering force and secure command of the sea there, in order to permit the Prince of Parma to sail across from Calais in France with a large force of infantry soldiers and cavalry, besides gun-carriages, siege machinery, and all requisites for building bridges and forming camps. The king made the strategic mistake at the start, however, of rejecting the advice of the admiral, Santa Cruz, to make sure of some harbor on the coast of Holland to be used as a base and harbor of refuge; and, after the death of this admiral, he made a mistake possibly greater, by appointing a man to the command of the fleet who, though a duke and a grandee of Spain, was wholly unqualified. After a number of mishaps, the Spanish fleet engaged the British fleet, and in overpowering force—not numerically, but in aggregate tonnage and in number and weight of guns. The result of the fight was such as might have been expected by anyone who knew of the superior skill of the British. The Armada was disastrously defeated, Parma's army could not get across the Channel, and the whole expedition was a failure.



This fight decided that England, and not Spain, should rule the seas; that free institutions, and not despotic governments, should prevail; that civilization was to advance and not recede. It was decided, not by superior courage, but by superior strategy. As in all the long battle between civilization and barbarism, or between a higher and a lower civilization, superior intelligence, as embodied in superior strategy, in superior leadership in fighting, decided the result.

Queen Elizabeth died in 1603. The throne then passed to the Stuart family, from whom it was wrested by the strategic genius of Cromwell in 1649, to whom it reverted in 1660, and from whom it was again wrested in 1688. There followed the accession of the Protestant William, Prince of Orange. Meanwhile, Henry IV of France had made the French into a strong nation; Philip II of Spain had died, leaving a ruined country; the Thirty Years' War had been fought in Germany, and ended by the establishment of Protestantism there; Richelieu had continued the advancement of the military and civil power of France; and Louis XIV had come to its throne.

Louis XIV is not usually classed among the great strategists of history; and yet it cannot truthfully be denied that in foresight, courage, initiative, knowledge of military matters, and ability to select and support subordinates, it would be absurd to deny him strategic and statesmanlike ability. Certain it is that during all his youth and middle life he advanced the prosperity of France by that policy of military and economic progressiveness which permanently prosperous countries have always followed. Skilful generals led his armies; wise statesmen administered his departments; and the greatest military engineer of history, Vauban, fortified his frontiers and directed the sieges of the fortresses of his enemies. In the latter part of the seventeenth century and until Marlborough defeated his armies and destroyed his prestige, France was the best governed country the world had seen since the days of Rome and Octavius Cæsar.

The death of the childless King of Spain in 1700, and the

fact that he bequeathed his kingdom, as if it were a piece of personal property, to the grandson of Louis XIV, menaced Europe with the danger that the Bourbon family would again dominate Europe, as Charles V had dominated it, but more arbitrarily and less wisely. A coalition was quickly formed, of which the main members were England, Holland, Prussia, and Austria. Their forces outnumbered those of Louis; but they were merely allies, unaccustomed to act together, separated by considerable distances, and with no leader of recognized ability; whereas the forces of Louis occupied a central position, were united under one government, and spoke one language. They were, besides, intimately allied with those of Spain. The death of William III, the natural leader of the coalition, was hailed with joy in France; but it would not have been hailed with joy if the French had known that it would result in placing in command of the allied troops the greatest strategist of the day, the Duke of Marlborough.

The Allies declared war against France in 1702. Marlborough was made commander-in-chief of the allied troops. In the first two years of the war he took some towns in Flanders, but accomplished nothing decisive. Louis XIV, however, obtained the alliance of Bavaria; and this gave him a powerful strategic advantage by virtue of the geographical position of Bavaria relatively to Austria, which was the most powerful member of the coalition against him. Louis then planned a campaign of the greatest strategic boldness and reasonableness. It was simply to assemble a grand army and march on Vienna. The army was to be made up from a large force under Marshal Villeroy taken from Flanders, the army under Marshal Tallard then near Strasbourg, the French troops under Marshal Marsin, then with the elector of Bavaria, and the French army of Italy, which was to advance through Tyrol into Austria. This plan had excellent prospects of success. Had it succeeded, the Bourbon family and the Roman Catholic Church would probably have dominated Europe for a long while thereafter.

As we know, it did not succeed.

What prevented it? The strategic genius of Marlborough.

Louis had not been accustomed to be opposed by any strategic genius. Marlborough immediately frustrated his plan by the simple and daring act of marching rapidly to the vicinity of the French main forces, near Strasbourg and operating against Bavaria. This extraordinary move *not having been expected*, the plans of Louis were at once thrown out of the orderly procedure he and the generals had arranged, and had to be modified at once. Villeroy, in the north, seems to have been utterly disconcerted and to have done nothing whatever. If he had followed close on the heels of Marlborough, the results that ultimately were obtained by Marlborough would probably not have been obtained; and this is one illustration out of many, that the triumphs of good strategy have often been gained because of being opposed by bad strategy. Marshal Tallard, fearing that Marlborough was about to attack Alsace, did not advance himself, but remained where he was. Marshal Marsin and the Elector of Bavaria forbore to press upon the Austrians opposed to them, fearing to divert their own attention from Marlborough. This left the Austrians free to oppose the inroad of the French from Italy into Austria, which, therefore, did not take place.

In this condition of affairs Marlborough was able to catch the Bavarians while they were unsupported, and to defeat them in the battle of Donauwert. This battle roused Marshal Tallard at last to the real state of affairs, and caused him to march at once to the eastward and unite his force with those of Marshal Marsin and the Elector of Bavaria. Their combined forces took up a position facing to the eastward, with their right under the command of Tallard, resting on the village of Blenheim on the Danube, while the left, under Marsin and the Elector, rested on the village of Lutzingen. Marlborough took up a position facing them, commanding the left wing in person, while Prince Eugene commanded the right wing, which consisted mostly of cavalry. Marlborough had

about 56,000 men and fifty-two guns, while Tallard had about 60,000 men and sixty-one guns.

The battle began at early morning on the 13th of August, 1704. As a result the French army was almost entirely destroyed. Yet they had not only been superior numerically to the allies, but had the advantage of position; their flanks being protected by the Danube on the right and high ground on the left, while the little river Nebel made a barrier that Marlborough's forces had to cross. Furthermore, the French were supposed to be as well commanded and to be as brave and skilful soldiers.

When one reads the accounts of the battle, he realizes that after it had begun it was purely a tactical fight; and he finds himself wondering why it resulted as successfully for Marlborough as it did. One reason undoubtedly was that Marlborough possessed in an extreme degree the ability to decide wisely and quickly under circumstances of the most extreme peril and urgency. This was evidenced by his brilliant manoeuvre of reforming his troops under fire, and changing the brunt of his attack from the village of Blenheim, where the French line was strong, to a point where he suddenly realized that their line was weak, breaking through the line, and dividing the French force. The absence of this kind of ability in savages, when opposed to white men, is notable in many battles in history. In an actual battle, this tactical ability in a commander-in-chief is the most important that a commander-in-chief can have.

Marlborough was assisted, of course, by a genius almost equal to his own, that of Prince Eugene; and it must have been the mutual and coöperating action of these two geniuses that brought about the actual result. No other cause seems assignable. What other cause can we assign, when a numerically inferior force beats a superior force that has great advantage of position? One may say that there was a better morale on the side of Marlborough than on the other side. There probably was, and it is indicated by the fact that Marl-

borough took the offensive. But, even if we grant this, must we not credit Marlborough and Eugene with having inspired this morale?

The war continued until 1713, when it was concluded by the Peace of Utrecht. It resulted to the advantage of the allies almost wholly; because of the military operations of Marlborough, and especially his victories at Blenheim, Ramillies, Oudenarde, and Malplaquet.

There is only one reasonably assignable cause for the victories of Marlborough, and the consequent liberation of Europe from the stifling conditions of Bourbon rule—superior strategy.

## CHAPTER XI

### FREDERICK

**I**N the year 1640 the Margravate of Brandenburg had little importance in the world; but a man who was to influence all future history came then to its throne, and started it on a career that no historian since has neglected to describe. His title was Margrave; but, as he was one of the men who elected the German Emperor, he had the title also of Elector. In history he is called the Great Elector. He ruled from 1640 to 1688. He found Brandenburg poor, unimportant, and disordered; he left it comparatively rich, with a recognized standing as an independent state, a good army, an excellent corps of administrators, and a very efficient government. He accomplished this by that combination of good statesmanship and good generalship by which all good governments have been established.


He was followed by his son, who was a painful contrast to his father, but who mainly because of the excellent condition in which his father had left Brandenburg and its sister Prussia, succeeded in being made the King of Prussia. He was followed in turn by his son, Frederick William I, who was in essentials like his grandfather, the Great Elector. He also was a great statesman, a great strategist, and a great patriot, though coarse and brutal, as many of the Prussians were—in fact, as the German peoples have ever been since the time of Cæsar and before. He continued the work of securing prosperity at home and security abroad, fighting against the opposition of nearly all of his own people, including his own family, including even his own son, who was later to reap such advantage from his father's work, and to do so much in addition, as to secure the name in history of Frederick the Great.

It must be said, however, in exculpation of Frederick, that his attitude toward his father was caused largely by the evil influence of his mother; and that he came later to realize that, while his father had done many coarse and brutal things, the number and the magnitude of the good things that he did, and the results they achieved, were such that in the end he accomplished much more good than harm.

Frederick II came to the throne of Prussia in 1740, at the age of twenty-eight. During most of his youth he was a diletante and a dreamer, playing the flute, writing poetry, and amusing himself in literature. Suddenly he became an autocratic king, and the commanding general of an army. One of his first acts was to abolish the tall grenadiers, who had been his father's only extravagance. He addressed himself especially to the improvement of the army, which had already been made the most efficient army in Europe; for he realized that the Emperor of Germany's death was not far distant, and that the opportunity would come then, if ever, to press those claims to Silesia that his father and grandfather had urged but had not been able to have recognized.

A few weeks after Frederick's accession, the Emperor died. Frederick resolved at once to invade Silesia. In fact, he took immediate steps actually to invade it; but he kept the fact a secret. On the very evening before his departure for the army, he gave a double entertainment that lasted far into the night; and then, on the following morning, he mounted his coach and drove off to carry out a project that has been unsparingly condemned by historians and others ever since, but has also been vigorously defended.

Whether or not Frederick was justified in invading Silesia, it is not within the province of strategy to discuss, any more than it is within the province of engineering to discuss questions of religion. It is within the province of strategy, however, to discuss the skill and energy with which Frederick carried out his invasion; and strategy has always declared that his conduct of the invasion was admirable. One of the



Central Europe, 1789



first requisites in a strategist is the capacity for making plans in advance, starting promptly to carry out the plans when the proper moment comes, and continuing thereafter to do everything with timeliness and force. That Frederick made certain claims concerning Silesia was well known; but no suspicion that he intended to press them seems to have been entertained; for, before Austria had taken any defensive measures of any kind, Frederick was in Silesia and had captured Breslau, its capital.

The Austrians having committed the capital strategic crime of being caught unprepared, were consequently slow in getting an army into Silesia, to oust Frederick; but, when they did start, they did it with so much secrecy and swiftness that Frederick himself was almost caught unprepared, for he had his troops scattered in many different camps. The Austrians, however, probably through lack of a good intelligence department, were unable to bring him to battle. They finally took up a defensive position near Mollwitz, and there Frederick determined to attack them, though there was two feet of snow on the ground. His infantry was greater in numbers than that of the Austrians, but the Austrian cavalry was the stronger.

The battle was bitterly contested on both sides. At one time, owing largely to the fact that Frederick's soldiers were unused to actual war, the second battle line fired into the rear of their own first line. Frederick was so overwhelmed with despair that he was induced to leave the field of battle by his general, Schwerin, who possibly wished to get rid of him. Schwerin then rallied his forces and advanced to the attack with his right wing upon the Austrian infantry. The Prussians had an enormous advantage in the fact that their muskets were better than those of the Austrians, and also that by the use of a novel iron ramrod they could be loaded and fired more quickly—Carlisle says in the ratio of five to two. This enormous advantage was not the result of accident, but of

superior strategic foresight, combined with prompt action in accordance with it. The Austrians were soon in retreat, and then Schwerin threw forward his whole left wing at double time, and struck the Austrians, not with an irregular, wavering line, but with a line that was moving with the absolute rigidity which the father of Frederick had had in view, and to attain which he had drilled the army so stubbornly and so long. As a result, the Austrian army was soon in full retreat.

Frederick shortly afterward made a treaty with France, whereby France guaranteed Lower Silesia to him and agreed to prosecute the war vigorously on her own account, but in coöperation with him. In accordance, an allied French and Bavarian army soon captured Linz, the capital of Upper Austria.

Frederick then showed a true conception of strategy by insisting that the allied forces should at once attack Vienna, which probably could have been easily taken then. He said: "This Austria must be struck to earth; incurable wounds must be inflicted upon her before she is in a condition to parry the blows." But this the French would not consent to. They gave various reasons; but the real reason was that a successful attack on Vienna would have been too greatly to the advantage of Charles Albert of Bavaria, who was their Emperor Elect of Germany, but whom they did not wish to encourage too much. A French diplomat is said to have remarked: "If we make the Elector master of Vienna, we shall no longer be the master of the Elector."

This incident is important because it illustrates the conflicts between strategy and statesmanship that often have taken place, especially when allies were coöperating, but which have also taken place in the service of one country when the statesman and the strategist were two different persons. Alexander suffered from no such difficulty; neither did Caesar; neither did Louis XIV; and neither did Frederick as long as his operations concerned his own army only. In fact, in

some of his later wars the strongest single factor in his favor was that both the statesman and the strategist wore the uniform of the King of Prussia.

Disgusted with the inefficient support of France, and withheld himself by no scruples of ethics or morality, Frederick now made a secret agreement with Austria, providing that there should be a sham siege of Neisse, which should surrender to him at the end of fifteen days, after which a truce would follow. This, he saw later, was not even wise, because it enabled the Austrians to use their entire army against the French. He therefore promptly repudiated his agreement with Austria and took possession of the Province of Glatz. The Austrians then advanced to attack him, but with such strategic unskilfulness that they allowed him to unite two separated forces. A battle ensued at Chotusitz, which, like most battles, was fought bravely by both sides. The Austrians were finally defeated, largely because of the poor discipline of the Austrian cavalry, who took advantage of a favorable opportunity to stop and do some plundering for their personal benefit.

By the Treaty of Breslau, signed soon after in July, 1742, Frederick secured the greater part of Silesia, a territory equal to one third of the entire former Prussian state.

The war continued between France and Austria, and was carried on by the French with the same lack of skill as characterized most of the French operations during the reign of Louis XV, conducted as they were by generals selected, not because they were brave and skilful, but because they were favorites of the king or of his mistresses. In 1743 a treaty between Austria and Sardinia, which was followed by a treaty between Austria and Saxony in January, 1744, decided Frederick to reënter the war in order to preserve what he had gained in Silesia, and to endeavor to get more. To this end he made a treaty with France, and then advanced at once and captured Prague.

At this time Maria Theresa's army, under command of

Prince Charles of Lorraine, was making a victorious advance into Alsace. On hearing of Frederick's advance, Charles immediately recrossed the Rhine. Of course, the French should have pursued him, and Frederick naturally expected that they would. They did not, however, and soon Frederick found himself not taking Vienna, as he had hoped, but retreating to Silesia. He was opposed by greatly superior numbers, and he could not bring them to battle, as the Austrian general followed the Fabian policy of letting Frederick's army wear itself away under the influence of hunger and discouragement, which it soon began to do. Then Frederick adopted the stratagem of leaving the passes in the Giant Mountains unguarded, hoping that the enemy would take his apparent failure as a sign of weakness and rush forward to attack him. This they did, but so quickly that Frederick himself was almost caught unprepared for their onslaught, and got his forces together in time only by dint of the utmost energy. Prince Charles of Lorraine was so confident of his own tactical ability, and so sure that he had Frederick in his grasp, that he took the actual command away from General Traun and assumed it himself, and then lay down to sleep without taking adequate measures for watching Frederick. As a result, Frederick moved out of his camp in the nighttime, leaving his fires burning and tents standing, and took up a more favorable position near Hohenfriedberg. From this position, at early dawn, he attacked the enemy so violently and so unexpectedly as to put them to ruinous flight.

Shortly afterward he himself was attacked at the village of Sohr by an Austrian army nearly twice as large as his own, which tried the same manœuver against him. Curiously enough, Frederick himself was caught; but he was able to reply with an attack on the enemy, and to conduct it with such courage and coolness as to win the day. Shortly afterward he sent an army into Saxony, in order to prevent the union of the Saxon and Austrian armies, and with peremptory orders to attack the Saxons before the union could be effected. The

expedition was successful, but by a very narrow margin, because when the old Prussian Field Marshal, with 22,000 men, finally stormed the heights at Kesseldorf, on which were 34,000 Saxons, the Austrian army of 46,000 men was only five miles away. Since Frederick was now ready to unite with his victorious general, the Austrians sued for peace. As a result, the Peace of Dresden, which confirmed the Peace of Breslau, was signed on Christmas, 1745.

The War of the Austrian Succession continued, mainly between Austria and France, for a little more than two years, and was ended in 1748 by the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. One clause in this treaty guaranteed to Frederick the possession of Silesia.

In 1756 the long-presaged Seven Years' War broke out. In the complicated situation that had gradually been forming, the various countries that took part in the war found themselves lined up in a way very different from the way in which they had been lined up in the previous war, England and Prussia being allied against France, Austria, and Russia.

Frederick, having a good intelligence department, soon learned that Austria and Russia were both secretly preparing enormous forces to take the field against him. He tried to get a declaration of intentions from Maria Theresa, but without success; whereupon he at once invaded Saxony, marched into Dresden, forced open the door of the room in the palace where the archives were kept, selected three bags full of compromising documents, and sent them to Berlin to be published. He then ordered the commanding general of the Saxon army to make his whole army take oath of allegiance to him. At this time an Austrian army was advancing to the relief of Saxony. A battle took place between them and Frederick at Lobositz, which ended to the advantage of the Prussians. Little was accomplished, however, except that Saxony was placed under Prussian administration, and the taxes of her subjects were diverted to the use of Prussia.

Louis XV of France was now induced to take the offensive

energetically, and to furnish an army of 115,000 men; whereupon he, Maria Theresa, and the Empress of Russia started a very effective plan of operations, even drawing Sweden into their alliance, with an agreement to furnish 20,000 men. In addition, Austria succeeded in drawing to her side sixty out of eighty-six of the estates of the German empire; the Diet voting "imperial execution" against Frederick for invading Saxony.

Frederick was now in a perilous situation. England was his only friend, and her hands were full, waging wars of her own with both America and India. Numerically, he was at a crushing disadvantage; but he had two enormous military advantages which ultimately made him victorious—that of superior strategic ability, and the fact that the statesman and the strategist were united in one person. These were of incalculable value to him in many ways, but especially in endowing him with that prime requisite in strategy—speed of action.

In those days in Europe, armies went into winter quarters in the winter-time. In the following winter of 1756–57, Frederick spent his time studying and pondering the campaigns of the great strategists, especially those who had fought in the vicinity in which he expected to fight when fighting weather came. As a result he made an early dash at the enemy's camp at Königgratz. He took the enemy so wholly by surprise that they retreated at once to the hills near Prague, and left behind them stores that were of great value to Frederick. They took up a strong position, but the Prussians followed them, though under great difficulties because of the nature of the ground, and finally put them to flight. Leaving the bulk of his army to coop up the Austrians in Prague, Frederick started to cut off General Daun, who was advancing to Prague's relief. At this time he made the strategic blunder of giving them battle at once, refusing to believe the reports given him of the strength of Daun's army. The result was a disaster that decided the whole campaign adversely to him, and for which nobody was to blame but Frederick. His situ-

ation was now almost desperate. To make it worse, an army of Hanoverians and Hessians, under the command of the Duke of Cumberland, was conducted with such strategic unskilfulness that it was forced to surrender to the French.

Frederick's next move was to march into Thuringia and try to get battle with the French army there. He failed to accomplish this, however, and meanwhile a small Austrian force entered Berlin and laid it under contribution. Frederick endeavored to intercept this force after it withdrew; and his movement appeared to the French and Austrian commanders as a retreat. They therefore advanced, and Frederick then took up a strong position at Rossbach. So confident were the French and Austrians that they, having 43,000 men, could capture Frederick and his army of 20,000 men, that they tried the dangerous manœuver of marching around Frederick's flank. Seizing a favorable moment, Frederick dashed down upon the enemy from the crest of the hill, and in the course of an hour routed them completely.

The victory was splendid and important, but not enough so to redeem the dangerous situation in which Frederick still was. To make the situation worse, an important new fortress in Silesia fell after a siege of seventeen days, and 5800 Prussians were made prisoners of war. When finally a battle did take place near Breslau, the capital of Silesia, the Prussians were defeated, and obliged to take refuge in the town. Soon afterward Breslau was captured, and Silesia seemed to be lost to Frederick. So confident were the Austrians now that Charles of Lorraine, commander of the Austrian army, was ordered to hasten and give the finishing blow to Frederick's disordered forces.

But Charles was a poor strategist, while Frederick was a great one; and the result was that Frederick got his army together and inspired in a very short time, and then hurled it like a living weapon against the inert and unskilful line of Charles. In this battle (Leuthen), Frederick is said to have

shown his genius as both a strategist and a tactician in a higher degree than at any other time, and to have handled his army as a skilful fencer handles his rapier. The result was that, though his forces were vastly inferior in numbers, he inflicted upon his enemy a defeat that was also a disaster.

This victory put nearly all of Silesia once more back into Frederick's hands. At the same time, a piece of great good fortune came to him when William Pitt was made Prime Minister of England, and induced Parliament to vote £4,000,000 to him, after having declared in Parliament: "I feel the most grateful sentiments of veneration and zeal for a prince who stands, the unshaken bulwark of Europe, against the most powerful and malignant confederacy that ever yet has threatened the independence of mankind."

But Frederick was nevertheless in a very dangerous position, and it was rapidly made worse by Russian operations in East Prussia. Frederick replied by marching against the fortress of Olmutz; but his engineers made some mistakes in calculations that occasioned considerable delay, during which 4000 transport wagons fell into the hands of the Austrians, and reduced dangerously Frederick's supply of ammunition. As usual with great strategists, the emergency stimulated Frederick; and, as usual also with great strategists, Frederick stimulated his army.

As a result, Frederick marched one hundred and fifty miles in ten hot days, joined forces with one of his generals, and forced the Russians to give up the siege of Kustrin. Immediately afterward he brought the Russians to battle at Zorndorf, and defeated them disastrously and completely. Then, without any rest whatever, he started off for Saxony, which the Austrians had invaded. At Hochkirch he committed the strategic blunder of despising his enemy and encamping in a position where he was virtually surrounded by a superior force that held the hills, despite the warning of some of his officers. He paid for it by being surprised at night and



driven back. The enemy then committed the strategic mistake of not following up the victory, but intrenching themselves. As a result, Frederick slipped away.

In the following summer the Russians again advanced. This time they took the important town of Frankfort on the Oder, while simultaneously a corps of Austrians was sent into Prussia. The armies were able to combine and to make a force twice as great as Frederick's. Nevertheless, he attacked them at Kunersdorf, routing the enemy's left wing and taking several thousand prisoners. Following this, he committed the strategic mistake of overworking his men in an endeavor to cut off the retreat of the Russians, and as a result he suffered one of the most disastrous reverses of his career. During the same month Ferdinand of Brunswick won the battle of Minden against the French; but shortly afterward one of Frederick's generals surrendered a garrison of 4000 men and a great accumulation of supplies in Dresden. Then came the surrender at Maxen of 12,000 Prussian soldiers under General Fink.

Frederick again seemed on the verge of ruin. In the following spring, that of 1760, he could oppose only 90,000 Prussians to 200,000 Austrians; and, for the first time, the campaign opened on Prussian territory. Frederick attempted to capture Dresden, but without success, and then marched to Silesia, where he found himself surrounded by three Austrian armies, while a Russian force also was advancing toward him. Day after day the enemy forces would make their dispositions for an attack the following morning; but night after night Frederick would change his camp. At last they felt sure of securing him; two of the forces got ready to fall upon him simultaneously, while the third prepared to cut off his retreat. But that night, Frederick caught the latter force while on the march to take up its appointed position, and defeated it with a loss of 11,000 men, while he himself only lost 3500.

Frederick then evaded the Russians, but they captured

Berlin. The Austrian General Lacy then took Potsdam and Charlottenburg; but on Frederick's approach the Russians withdrew to the Oder River, and Lacy to Torgau, where he joined another Austrian force under Daun. A battle soon was fought near Torgau, in which Frederick, with 44,000 men, was confronted with 60,000 Austrians, who furthermore had almost twice as many large guns as he had. When night came on, the battle had not been decided; but in the night-time a violent cavalry charge from the Prussians forced the Austrians to retreat. This victory was a Pyrrhic victory to Frederick, for it cost him more than it really was worth.

In the following spring he had only 96,000 men, while the Austrians and Russians had three times as many. For this reason, Frederick had to abandon the offensive during that year, 1761, and defend himself with intrenchments. During the year two important towns were lost and Frederick's forces shrank to 60,000. At this time, as if to put the final touch to Frederick's agony, Pitt fell, and Frederick's supplies from England consequently were shut off. Bute, who took Pitt's place, even went so far as to urge Russia to continued action, in order that Frederick might not have free play against Austria. Frederick was urged to make peace even at the price of some of his territory, but this advice he refused to follow.

Shortly afterward, in January, 1762, the Czarina of Russia died, and her successor, Peter III, who was an ardent admirer of Frederick, sent 18,000 men to fight for Frederick instead of against him! The Russian general commanding these forces joined Frederick just as he was preparing to fight a battle for the rescue of one of his towns that had been captured; but, before the attack was actually made, news came that Peter had been replaced by Catherine II, who refused to have her soldiers fight for Frederick. This news was kept secret, however, until after the battle—a fact that helped to decide it in his favor.

In 1762 a treaty of peace was signed between England and

France that left Austria and Prussia the only remaining belligerents. After various diplomatic manœuvres between the two, peace was signed in February, 1763.

Frederick had now reigned for twenty-three years, during which he had been engaged in continual war or preparation for war, and had made a reputation as a strategist that few have excelled. He reigned almost exactly the same length of time afterward in peace; and during that time he made a reputation as a statesman virtually equal to that which he had made as a strategist. Like Cæsar before him, and Washington after him, he devoted the same energy, foresight, patriotism, and wise management to the affairs of peace that he had devoted to the affairs of war.

It may not be inappropriate to point out here that, while many men without military training have been good statesmen, and while many strategists have also been good statesmen, no statesman without military training has ever been a good strategist; though many have thought that they were, and have consequently done great harm. It might further be pointed out that *the greatest statesmen have been the greatest strategists, and the greatest strategists have been the greatest statesmen*. It might be a little bold to suggest, though I myself believe it to be true, that *the men who have done the most to insure good government in the world have been men who were both strategists and statesmen*, like those whose names head certain chapters in this book.

## CHAPTER XII.

### WASHINGTON

**G**EORGE WASHINGTON, who had been a skilful and daring fighter in the seven years' French and Indian War, was appointed commander-in-chief of the army of the United Colonies on June 15, 1775. At this time the British forces occupied Boston and the skirmishes at Concord and Lexington had taken place. On June 17 the bloody battle of Bunker Hill was fought.

Washington arrived at Cambridge, just outside Boston, on July 3, and took command. He had about 17,200 men present for duty, whose only military training had been in shooting and whose terms of enlistment would expire within six months. Washington organized this motley group, expecting attack at almost any moment by the British under General Howe, who ought to have attacked him but did not. Finally, on March 4, after he had organized a new army, and brought heavy cannon through the snow from Ticonderoga, and some privateers had captured a considerable amount of gunpowder, and his fortifications were sufficiently complete to furnish rallying points in case of defeat, he took the offensive. He did this by seizing and fortifying Dorchester Heights, on the mainland of Massachusetts about two miles south of Boston, from which he could command by guns the whole of Boston and the channel south of it. General Howe, who was then in command of the British forces, should have prevented this, but he did not; but after the Heights had been fortified he endeavored to capture them. Being unsuccessful in this, he evacuated Boston, taking his army of about 11,000 soldiers and seamen to Halifax. He left behind a great amount of

supplies and military stores, without even endeavoring to destroy them. Washington occupied Boston at once, but in three weeks set out for New York, to which he had already sent a considerable part of his army.

The British Parliament now realized the necessity of sending a greater force to America, and provided for an additional 12,000 seamen and an army of 55,000 men. Many of these were mercenaries, of whom about sixty per cent. were hired from Hesse: from this circumstance the mercenaries were called Hessians.

The British realized the strategic value of New York, due mainly to the fact that the broad Hudson River separated New England from New York and the rest of the country, and they decided, therefore, to capture that city and seize and hold the Hudson. They did not follow this plan as closely as they should have done, however, but allowed themselves to be diverted to side issues, especially in South Carolina, which had the usual effect of accomplishing nothing important, and handicapping the main operations. Washington also realized the strategic importance of New York, and endeavored to defend it. He built a number of small batteries at salient points on the North and East rivers; but, because of the small number of his total force, he concentrated his main defense in an intrenched camp on Brooklyn Heights.

The first squadron of the British fleet, coming from Halifax and comprising about 32,000 troops, landed on Staten Island in July and early August. The menace was great, since the British commanded all the water and could land wherever they pleased; while Washington's force was too small, the distances too great, and his means of getting information too poor to enable him to oppose any effective resistance at any landing point. On August 22 Howe landed 20,000 men and forty pieces of artillery on the beach of Gravesend Bay, near the present Coney Island, about eight miles south of the American camp.

Washington reinforced the Americans as best he could.

Unwisely, the Americans, instead of remaining within the protection of their intrenchments or of retreating promptly, advanced into the open. Howe made a feint by advancing along the west shore line of Long Island, but sent a large flanking force by night to the eastward as far as Jamaica Pass, which then turned to westward on the morning of August 27, and advanced so rapidly that it got behind the American lines outside of their camp. Considerable fighting followed, which resulted in the retreat of the Americans. The British do not seem to have followed them very energetically, with the result that most of the Americans got back into their camp. Why Howe did not attack them at once is a matter for surprise; for it is difficult to see how a determined attack with the forces he had available could have failed to bring about disaster to the Americans. Instead, Howe prepared for a siege; with the result that Washington made a retreat, in the night of August 29 and 30, which for skill and daring and success has seldom been surpassed.

He landed his troops on the east side of Manhattan Island, near what is now Fulton Street, and disposed them as best he could, expecting that the British would attack, landing somewhere on the long water-front. They landed on September 15, near what is now East 34th Street, and rapidly drove the Americans back to the westward and thence to the northward, despite the passionate endeavors of Washington to make them stand. By dark that night, his forces had fled to positions on Harlem Heights north of the "Hollow Way," near the 129th Street of to-day, while the British confronted them on lines facing north in the neighborhood of what is now 100th Street. Washington wrote to Congress the next morning of the "disgraceful and dastardly retreat" of his men.

He occupied a position that was very strong against assault, but that could easily be surrounded by a large force. Howe endeavored to surround it. He did not succeed; but, in order to prevent it, Washington had to move to the northward. Because, however, of a foolish resolution of Congress, he did

not withdraw the garrison from Fort Washington. Howe then succeeded, on November 16, in surrounding and capturing the fort and its garrison—a terrible calamity to the Americans. Meanwhile Washington had gone to White Plains, and there received an assault from Howe, which was only partially successful on the first day, but which would undoubtedly have been successful the following day, after Howe had received a reinforcement that brought his strength up to 20,000 men, had not a storm delayed the attack. Under cover of the storm Washington withdrew five miles to a strong position at North Castle. Howe did not follow.

Washington joined General Greene at Fort Lee, which was on the west side of the Hudson, opposite Fort Washington, at the time when Fort Washington was attacked, and with him retreated to Newark. Thence he retreated to Brunswick, thence to Trenton on the Delaware River, and thence to a position on the opposite shore. He had ordered General Lee, then at White Plains, to cross the Hudson and join him; but Lee was excessively dilatory in doing this, and was finally taken prisoner. Washington's force was now reduced to 3000 men, whose enlistments would expire during that month (December), and Howe had 30,000 regular troops with which to capture and destroy him. Instead of attempting this at once, as any competent strategist would have done, he went into winter quarters in New York, and sent 6000 troops and a large part of the navy to Newport, to carry on eccentric operations in New England!

But Washington's day of ruin did not seem far away. It was averted by the same agency that contributed to the victories of Cæsar and Alexander, the personal genius of the man in command. Washington, with a discouraged, half ragged, underfed, and untrained handful of men, crossed the Delaware on Christmas night, forced his way through floating ice, fell on the camp of the Hessians at Trenton with a violence, a suddenness, and a success that are unsurpassed in history, and changed the aspect of the situation almost in a


moment. Cornwallis advanced at once against Washington; but again Washington displayed that amazing celerity and force which in supreme emergency marks the great commander. By dint of personal courage, ability to inspire, tremendous exertion, and wise direction, he succeeded in eluding the greatly superior force in the night-time, and, reaching the vicinity of Princeton in safety, defeating in a skirmish on the way a British force that intercepted him. He then went into winter quarters at Morristown.

Washington expected throughout the winter that Howe would attack him then or in the spring, which he certainly should have done, but did not do. In the month of July, 1777, Howe embarked his men in transports and sailed from New York for Delaware Bay. But, after remaining there a day, he sailed for the Chesapeake. On August 25 he landed at the northern end of the bay, and then moved northeast with the evident intention of attacking Philadelphia. Washington was at hand, and a battle took place on September 11, near the Brandywine, on Howe's line of march to Philadelphia, which seems to have been fought against Washington's better judgment as a military man, but which he feared to evade on account of the effect of such an act upon the people. The British had the superior force and defeated the Americans. After a few unsuccessful manœuvres, made with the intention of catching Washington at a disadvantage, Howe took possession of Philadelphia.

There have been several reasons given why Howe took such a roundabout method of getting to Philadelphia. One of them is that he had received information from General Charles Lee, whom he had taken prisoner and who had thereupon turned traitor, that there was such a strong Tory sentiment in Pennsylvania and Maryland that his best line of attack on Philadelphia would be by way of the Chesapeake. This reason does not seem very good, if one considers all the circumstances; but many of the reasons given for many of General Howe's actions do not seem very good from the point



of view of strategy. The fact probably is that General Howe was an exceedingly poor strategist, and that Washington was an exceedingly good one. No other reason seems sufficient to



### Washington's movements in 1776.

explain how the successes of Washington could possibly have been achieved, against troops so much superior in number, so much better equipped and so much more highly trained.

General Howe, after reducing some of the forts in the vicinity with the aid of his brother, Lord Howe, who was in command of the British fleet, went into comfortable winter quarters at Philadelphia. Washington and his soldiers went into winter quarters at Valley Forge, twenty-one miles away. There conditions were so bad that the army could not have sur-

vived as an army, unless led and inspired by a man like Washington.

Meanwhile, a campaign marked by amazing mismanagement by the British had been carried on in the middle of New York State. The British government, apparently without consulting with General Howe, and on the advice of one of his subordinates, General Burgoyne, then on leave in England, had directed a double expedition, one to go from Oswego down the Mohawk Valley, and the other from Montreal down Lake Champlain and the Hudson, the two forces to meet at Albany. General Howe was to join them, marching from New York; but no instructions were sent him to that effect. Few better illustrations are given in history of the folly of endeavoring to manage military campaigns from an office in a ministry.

Howe did not go up the Hudson to Albany. The force that went to Oswego, and thence started for Albany, was brought to battle and defeated, and never reached Albany. Burgoyne's force, which came down Lake Champlain and the Hudson, soon found itself in great difficulties for lack of supplies. Sir Henry Clinton, whom Howe had left in command at New York, went up the Hudson in October with about 3000 men, convoyed by several ships of war, in conformity with some rather vague instructions he had received from Howe. Instead of going at once to Burgoyne's assistance, however, he accomplished a few minor successes, and then returned to New York, although he knew that Burgoyne was in desperate straits. Burgoyne, after being defeated at Bennington and Saratoga, finally surrendered on October 17, 1777.

Burgoyne's expedition was strategically unwise. It was decided on by the king, in preference to another plan, which was the one that Washington naturally expected to be carried out—that of concentrating most of the British forces in New York and with them crushing Washington's forces. This campaign furnishes one illustration, out of many in history, of the tendency of poor strategists to devise complicated plans

instead of simple ones; of a forgetfulness of one of the elementary principles of strategy, which anyone can see being carried into practice in the next fist fight he witnesses, and colloquially expressed in the phrase "hit him first and hardest."

Washington's winter quarters at Valley Forge, which he occupied from December, 1777, till June, 1778, were only sixteen miles by road from Howe's outposts at Germantown. Washington had about 15,000 men, of whom about 12,000 were at Valley Forge, and Howe had 19,500 at Philadelphia and 10,400 at New York—about 30,000 available troops; and yet, Howe did not molest Washington during the entire six months! Washington improved the opportunity strenuously, devotedly, passionately. In spite of the almost criminal negligence of Congress, and the actually treasonable conduct of some Congressmen and others, despite difficulties of all possible kinds, which we need not enumerate here, Washington succeeded in putting into the field in June a well disciplined and efficient force. Possibly not even Washington could have accomplished this if he had not been assisted by the German General Steuben, who joined him as a volunteer and was later made Inspector General. Steuben was a thoroughly competent accountant, tactician, and drill-master, having learned those arts on the personal staff of Frederick the Great.

The surrender of Burgoyne and Washington's masterly battles near Philadelphia gave the French such confidence in the cause of the Americans that they made an alliance with them in the spring of 1778. This alliance proved to be of such value as to warrant the statement that without it the Americans would have failed.

Another important factor that contributed no less to their success was the very bad strategy of the British, who, after Burgoyne's surrender, abandoned the offensive in America, divided their forces, and even sent part of it out of the United States to the West Indies. To initiate the change in plan, Philadelphia was to be evacuated and the troops there sent to

New York. In pursuance of this plan, Clinton, who had relieved Howe, began to make preparations for evacuating Philadelphia at the beginning of June. Washington had organized an excellent intelligence department, and was thereby informed continually of the doings of the enemy. He therefore took measures to march out of Valley Forge when the appropriate moment should come, keep in touch with the enemy, and precipitate a battle as soon as a favorable opportunity could be found.

Clinton left Philadelphia on June 18, crossed the Delaware, and marched to the eastward about five miles. Early that afternoon, six American brigades marched out of Valley Forge, followed at five o'clock the following morning by Washington with the rest of his army. The weather was intensely hot. The two armies advanced in a direction approximately northeast. Clinton at the end of the sixth day had marched only thirty-four miles, while Washington had marched forty-seven miles and was almost directly ahead of him. So Clinton moved off to the right, putting all of his baggage train ahead. At this time and afterward he was forced to move his army on one road only, so that his total column was more than twelve miles long. His force arrived at Monmouth on June 26, and took up a strong position there and rested for a day. At the close of June 27, Lee and Lafayette (Lee in command), with the advance guard of 5000 men, were five miles westward, and Washington with 6000 was about five miles west of Lee.

Since Clinton was approaching broken country, where it would be easy for him to get defensible positions, Washington told Lee that evening to be ready to attack early the following morning. Clinton started early, whereupon Washington ordered Lee to attack. Lee moved forward toward Clinton's rear, but in a leisurely fashion, delivered a half-hearted attack, and then ordered a retreat. This had such a bad effect on his men that a disorderly rout ensued. At this time Washington was advancing with the main body behind Lee. Gal-

loping ahead, he met the fugitives, whose morale was utterly broken down. Then the Washington of history seized those terrified and wildly fleeing men, wheeled them about, and formed them in a line that stubbornly defied and successfully held back their late pursuers. No finer example of the power of a passionate and impetuous leader of men can be found in history. He established his line quickly, but with calm strategic judgment, between two swamps that protected both his flanks.

Clinton, meanwhile, had turned back with his main force. The so-called battle of Monmouth then ensued: This battle was fought in a terrible heat until nightfall; and then both sides took up positions confronting each other. At daybreak the British had disappeared in retreat, although they were superior in number. They retreated quickly to Sandy Hook, where Admiral Lord Howe embarked them, and whence he transported them to New York.

On July 8 (1778) Rear Admiral Comte d'Estaing arrived in command of a French fleet with 4000 soldiers at Delaware Bay; but he sailed almost immediately to the northward, and anchored in the ocean just outside of Sandy Hook. The British Admiral Lord Howe was behind the bar and inside the hook, with nine ships of the line to d'Estaing's twelve, and 534 guns to his 834. D'Estaing remained there eleven days, but could not pluck up courage to brave the perils of the bar and attack Lord Howe besides. As it had been arranged between Washington and d'Estaing that at a juncture like this a combined land and naval attack should be made against Newport, d'Estaing went there. Shortly afterward, the energetic Lord Howe appeared outside the bay. D'Estaing went out to give him battle; but a tremendous gale came up, which did such serious damage that Howe returned to New York and d'Estaing went to Boston for repairs.

For the next four years the military operations in the north were carried on in an excessively half-hearted manner by the

British, and so nothing occurred that influenced materially the outcome of the war. This was most fortunate for the Americans, because Washington could only with difficulty keep the army paid and fed, and was hardly able, therefore, to maintain it in any discipline whatever, even under the comparatively easy conditions that the inaction of the British permitted to exist.

The British abandoned Newport in October, 1779, and Cornwallis arrived later at New York with reinforcements; so that in December the British garrison numbered nearly 29,000. Washington had between 10,000 and 11,000, and yet Clinton did not attack him! Instead he sent a large part of his force away, to carry on operations that were strategically unimportant in Georgia and the Carolinas.

For a long while the French alliance seemed to be of little assistance. D'Estaing, after completing repairs on his ships at Boston, went to the West Indies; and then, instead of returning north, as Washington implored him, he became involved in a siege of Savannah in which he was repulsed, and after which (October, 1779) he sailed away to France. During the entire year 1779 Washington had been exerting himself to concentrate a large force at New York, insisting that if the French would secure the command of the sea there, and land a few troops, he could bring 25,000 effective men, capture New York, and end the war. Washington was right, of course; but during the entire war he, and next to him General Greene, seem to have been almost the only men who could be depended on to be right in strategic matters.

In July, 1780, another French fleet, consisting of seven ships of the line, arrived, bringing 6000 troops commanded by Rochambeau. This fleet anchored at Newport. Washington now thought he saw an opportunity for an attack on New York, and he pushed his preparations rapidly. But his hopes were killed almost immediately by the arrival of six British ships under Admiral Graves, which made the com-

bined British fleet under Admiral Arbuthnot superior to the French. The British fleet now blockaded the French forces in Newport.

At this time the Revolution almost came to a full stop from lack of money and supplies. A determined mutiny soon followed, caused mainly by the fact that the soldiers had not been paid for a year and were insufficiently fed and clothed. It was finally repressed, but only by dint of all the force and persuasion that Washington could exert. Colonel Laurens was now sent to France, under instructions from Washington to try to get some money. He succeeded not only in getting money, but in having the French fleet sent from the West Indies to Yorktown. It was this French fleet that finally enabled Washington to end the war with victory.

Meanwhile the British had been frittering away irretrievable time in operations in the South, under the mistaken strategic notion that their mission was to secure territory, whereas it really was to destroy Washington's armed force. These operations were in the main successful, though not important for victory in the war. The most important of the earlier expeditions resulted in the capture of Savannah in December, 1778, and the ensuing conquest of the State of Georgia.

A year later Clinton himself headed a large expedition to complete the conquest of the South. He arrived off Charleston in February, 1780, and received the surrender of the city on May 12. After some further operations, designed to secure the conquest of all South Carolina, Clinton returned to New York, leaving Cornwallis in command in the South with about 8400 men.

Cornwallis soon started on a march to the Northwest. On August 16 he fought at Camden, South Carolina, an American force under General Gates, and almost destroyed it. The main reason for the disaster was that Gates, while an adroit and unscrupulous politician, was a bad strategist.

Congress now allowed Washington to appoint a commander

in Gates's place. Washington showed his good judgment by appointing Greene. A long series of operations now ensued between Greene on one side and Cornwallis on the other, which were conducted by Greene with great skill and tremendous energy, and by Cornwallis with little skill and almost no energy whatever. Affairs came to a climax in a battle at Guilford, North Carolina, on March 15, 1781, in which Greene suffered a tactical defeat but won a strategic victory; because he forced Cornwallis to abandon the offensive and resort to the defensive. This Cornwallis did by retreating to Wilmington, North Carolina.

Cornwallis now found himself in an extremely embarrassing position, far from his base of supplies, and unable to get definite instructions from either Clinton or the Colonial Secretary in England, both of whom were writing to him letters that only embarrassed him. Finally, Cornwallis decided to march north into Virginia, to carry on operations there, where he thought he saw an opportunity to destroy Lafayette, who commanded a force much inferior to his own. This was probably a good plan; but he carried it out with such lack of celerity, while Lafayette carried on his own operations with such extreme celerity, that Cornwallis failed altogether to accomplish his intention. At last, in July, he received an order from Clinton, revoking a previous order and directing him to keep all his troops with him, and occupy Old Point Comfort, as a support for the fleet that was to be sent to Hampton Roads. Instead of occupying Old Point Comfort, Cornwallis occupied Yorktown, which was probably a more suitable locality.

Meanwhile Washington was bending every energy, with the small force he had after sending the necessary forces to Greene, to secure the coöperation of the French in the attack on New York on which he had set his heart. When he received the information that a French fleet was to be sent from the West Indies to the American coast, he went at once to Wethersfield, Connecticut, met Rochambeau, and perfected



with him the details of the attack. At the same time he sent most urgent requests to the New England Governors to fill up their regiments, if only for one season. He also wrote to de Grasse, urgently requesting him to bring troops as well as ships from the West Indies, and to come to New York, stopping on his way at the Chesapeake.

In accordance with his plan, the French army left Newport, and Washington met them with his army near Dobbs Ferry. He then made a careful reconnaissance of the fortifications of Manhattan Island, and came to the conclusion that they were too strong to be successfully attacked with the force he then commanded, being held as they were by about 14,000 effective troops. Like all good strategists, however, Washington had an alternative plan; and he held both plans in reserve until he got more definite information from de Grasse. In the middle of August he received word from de Grasse that he would sail north on August 13 with twenty-nine vessels of war, three regiments of 1000 men each, 100 dragoons, 100 artillerymen, ten field pieces, and several siege cannon and mortars; that he would go directly to the Chesapeake; and that he would sail from there for the West Indies on October 15.

There was no time to be lost. Washington did not lose a second. He resolved instantly to march to the Chesapeake and meet de Grasse with all of his available force, and crush Cornwallis. He gave orders to Lafayette to prevent Cornwallis from getting away; he directed General Heath to take command of a certain force that he would leave in the North; and he sent despatches to de Grasse, telling him what he wished to do, and requesting him to send suitable vessels to the northern end of Chesapeake Bay, to transport American troops to the vicinity of Yorktown. On August 21 he crossed the Hudson River, and began a march behind the Palisades to Newark and New Brunswick, and thence to the northern end of Chesapeake Bay. He carried out his movements so skilfully and rapidly that most of his troops had reached Phil-

adelphia before Clinton knew that he had left the vicinity of New York. Evidently Clinton had a very poor intelligence department.

Washington was taking a tremendous risk; but he knew Clinton, and knew that the risk was justified. Clinton had more than 16,000 men, and yet he let Washington get away. The fact that Clinton was so inactive does not in the least detract from the merit of Washington's brilliant and daring move; for every strategist makes his plans according to the situation as he estimates it, and the character of Clinton was the most important single factor in the situation of which Washington made his estimate. Washington estimated the situation correctly, as he usually did. He then made the correct decision, as he usually did. He then acted on his decision with energy, daring, and skill, as he usually did.

It was an essential part of Washington's plan, of course, that the French should have command of the sea for a time long enough to enable him to concentrate all his forces on Cornwallis. By this time he knew that de Grasse was a competent strategist instead of an incompetent one, like d'Estaing; and he included this factor in his estimate of the situation, his consequent decision, and his consequent action. He concluded that he could rely upon de Grasse, and, as usual, his conclusion was correct. De Grasse arrived at Chesapeake Bay on August 30, and at once sent the troops up the James River, where they joined Lafayette. On the same day that they landed, a British fleet came within sight of Cape Henry, and de Grasse went out to meet it. A battle was then fought which, while not decisive tactically, was decisive strategically; because the French fleet inflicted so much damage on the British as to force it to go to New York for repairs, and leave the French in command of the sea. The first result of this was that the French admiral, de Barras, with a small squadron, was able to bring into the Chesapeake some reinforcements from Newport and a large train of siege artillery.

Clinton realized, as soon as he heard that de Grasse was in

the Chesapeake, that Washington had outgeneraled him and would capture Cornwallis unless he, Clinton, could reinforce Cornwallis sufficiently and in time. He therefore embarked 4000 men on transports. But he could not send these safely, because the British fleet were under repairs and could not furnish a convoy. When this convoy was ready, on October 19, Clinton sailed with 7000 men; but, as often happened to Clinton, he was too late. The allied army, under Washington as commander-in-chief and Rochambeau under his orders, had arrived in the vicinity of Yorktown in the middle of September. They numbered in all about 16,600 men, while Cornwallis had less than 8000, and besides this, the allies were much superior in siege artillery. The natural result followed. Cornwallis surrendered on October 19, 1781. This act virtually ended the war, though the definitive treaty of peace was not signed until September 3, 1783.

This war, like most wars in which a force inferior in numbers and resources triumphs over a superior force, was marked with great energy and skill on one side, and great lack of energy and skill on the other side. It seemed almost impossible that the Colonies could triumph under the conditions, and yet they did. The fact that England was so threatened by war in Europe that she could not send to America as large a force as she otherwise would have done does not furnish an adequate explanation, because the force that she did send was enormously superior in numbers, training, and equipment to the American force. If one analyzes the reasons for the British failure, and traces events to their causes, he will see that the main cause was that the British operations in America were directed by the Colonial Secretary, who was in turn directed by the king,—both the Colonial Secretary and the king being exceedingly poor strategists,—while opposed to them was Washington, one of the greatest strategists of history.

Like Cæsar and Frederick, Washington devoted his declining years to the tasks of statesmanship. Like Cæsar and Frederick, he was as fine in statesmanship as he was in strat-

egy. It has been the fashion in America, in speaking of Washington, to concentrate the attention of the people on President Washington and to ignore General Washington. That this has been intentional there can be no doubt; and that it has been a part of the general pacifist movement there can also be no doubt. It and the whole pacifist movement seem to be because of a curious trait in human nature which leads successful people and successful nations to ignore the causes of their success; which leads rich families, for instance, to keep persistently in the background the means by which the family money was acquired.

The independence of the United States was gained by military force, guided by the strategy of George Washington. That the subsequent statesmanship of Washington was fine there can be no doubt. But there can also be no doubt that the task of Washington as President was immeasurably easier than his task as general. As President, he lived at ease in the absolute security and the comparative luxury of the presidential mansion, with assured rest at night, regular and sufficient meals, assisted by the organization of an established government and the resources of a prosperous nation. As general, he had to oppose treachery, negligence, and disaffection in Congress, and among great numbers of the people; and amid the continual dangers of war to direct and force to action a ragged, half fed, and half trained army, by day and by night, in heat and in cold, in mud and rain and storm and snow, for five destiny-deciding years. In comparison with this, Washington's career as President was like a vacation.

## CHAPTER XIII

### NELSON

ON February 14, 1797, a British fleet of fifteen ships of the line, commanded by Admiral Sir John Jervis, was sailing on a course a little west of south in column of battle (that is, one ship behind the other) on the starboard tack (that is, with the wind on the starboard side). Ahead and a little on their starboard side was a Spanish fleet of eighteen sail, heading toward the east with the wind astern, their destination being Cadiz, about one hundred and fifty miles away; while ahead and a little on the port side were nine Spanish ships that had become separated from the eighteen. The distance between the two parts of the Spanish fleet was about six miles.

Jervis headed his column between the two parts in order to keep them from assisting each other, and with the purpose of tacking and heading to the northward after he had passed between, and then of attacking the eighteen ships. These eighteen ships then headed to the north. Jervis headed his column to the north as soon as the head of his column had passed between the two separated parts of the Spanish fleet. The third ship from the end of his column was the *Captain*, which flew the broad pennant of Commodore Horatio Nelson.

When Nelson's ship came abreast of the last Spanish ships in the main body of eighteen ships, Nelson noticed that the leading ships of that body, which had previously headed to the northward, now suddenly headed again to the eastward, with the evident intention of crossing behind the British column and effecting a junction with the other nine ships. Without any orders (and therefore almost contrary to orders), Nelson

# BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VINCENT



FEBRUARY 14. 1797.

■ BRITISH, 15 SHIPS

◻ SPANISH, 27 ..

WIND

W. BY S.



From Mahan's "Life of Nelson." By permission of Little, Brown & Company.

directed the *Captain* to "wear," and thus get into position ahead of those Spanish ships and prevent them from making the junction.

By this time the head of the British column, which was now heading to the northward, was nearly abreast of Nelson; and so it came down before the wind at once, and joined him in the terribly unequal but successful combat that he was waging. About the same time, the rear ship of the British column, the *Excellent*, commanded by Collingwood (the great Collingwood that was to be), obeyed a signal to do the same. The other ships of the British column followed, and a general action ensued in which the eighteen Spanish ships were badly worsted. The other nine ships ultimately joined, however, raising the Spanish force to twenty-seven ships, nine of which were uninjured. Jervis thereupon withdrew. The victory was not decisive; but, considering the enormous inequality in force, and the fact that immeasurably more harm was done to the Spaniards than to the English, it was not only glorious but important. For it was absolutely essential to Great Britain then that she maintain her supremacy at sea.

The action of Nelson was one of those unexpectable and unique actions that stand out in history like a bright spark in the dark. Judged by some of his later deeds, and by many other deeds in history, it was not of commanding importance; but judged from the standpoint of strategy and tactics, or from the standpoint of individual merit, it was as great as any other single act we know of. For a British commodore to leave the column of battle was an act that could be justified by one thing only—success. For a captain to realize what Nelson realized, in the hurry and excitement of the coming battle, required extraordinary strategic insight. To possess this extraordinary insight, a clear and accurate mind was needed, and also an intense training of that mind by incessant thought for a long period on strategic and tactical questions. To act upon it required physical courage of a high order—to brave the physical dangers that Nelson real-

ized he was rushing into; and in an immeasurably higher degree it required moral courage to face the professional ruin it invited.

His justification was his success. His success was because of the fact that he estimated the situation correctly, decided correctly, and acted correctly. Similarly, the trained gymnast makes some daring leap. His justification depends on his success. His success depends on whether he estimates the situation correctly, decides correctly, and acts correctly.

In the early part of 1798 the French Directory decided to send an expedition to Egypt under Bonaparte; and, although they succeeded in keeping its destination a secret, they could not keep secret the fact that a large expedition was being prepared in Toulon and neighboring places on the southern coast of France. The commander-in-chief of the British fleet received orders to endeavor to thwart the expedition. With this end in view, he formed a squadron of thirteen ships and put Rear-Admiral Nelson in command.

Bonaparte sailed from Toulon on May 19. Nelson, after a variety of disappointments of many kinds, one of which was an inability to get scouts in the shape of fast sailing frigates to search the sea for Bonaparte's expedition, was finally able to start in search, but not until June 7. His estimate of the situation brought him to the conclusion that Bonaparte's expedition was bound for Egypt. He came to this conclusion by the same kind of mental process as that which a chess-player employs in divining the intentions of his opponent; but, in order to arrive at it, he had to take into consideration an immeasurably greater number of factors, and to evaluate each of these factors by the exercise of his professional judgment. *It is in this process of evaluation that the knowledge and experience of the professional man is valuable, in comparison with the knowledge and experience of the amateur.*

Nelson reached Alexandria in Egypt on June 28, and ascertained that the French had not appeared there, and that no knowledge of their whereabouts or destination could be ob-



tained. He at once started back to the westward. Bonaparte's expedition arrived at Alexandria three days after Nelson left, having purposely gone by an indirect route. For several days, while the two expeditions were proceeding to the eastward, they were not more than one hundred miles apart—a fact that Nelson's lack of frigates prevented him from ascertaining.

Nelson proceeded to Syracuse in Sicily, and arrived there on July 19. The only news he could get was that the French fleet was not west of Sicily or at Corfu. He therefore started again to the eastward, convinced that his first estimate of Napoleon's destination was correct, a conviction that was strengthened by further information received on July 28, that four weeks before the French expedition had been seen near Candia, steering southeast. In the afternoon of August 1 the masthead lookout of one of Nelson's ships discerned and reported thirteen French line-of-battle ships in Aboukir Bay, fifteen miles east of Alexandria. The French fleet was found later to be at anchor, in a single column, with both flanks exposed.

Throughout the voyage Nelson had occupied his mind continually with plans as to what he should do under all probable contingencies, and with laboriously instructing his captains in his plans; so that, as he gradually approached the enemy, and as their formation and position became gradually clear, he was prepared, and so were his captains, for the steps they should take. When the battle began, the task of strategy was ended and the task of tactics began; but they shaded one into the other without jar or hitch: the tactical execution was as good as the strategic preparation, both fitted into each other, and together they formed a perfect whole. The analogy may be here suggested among all performances that are first well planned and then well carried out.

Thus it happened that the British fleet went unhesitatingly around one exposed flank of the French fleet in the gathering darkness, and six British ships almost immediately concen-

trated on four French ships and destroyed them. Four other British ships impetuously attacked four other French ships anchored at the same end of the French line, where they could not get assistance from other French ships anchored near: and the battle was actually decided in favor of the British, before three British ships arrived on the scene, largely because five French ships did not and could not become engaged or render any service whatever. The result was that the French fleet was destroyed at once as a fighting force, though two line-of-battle ships out of thirteen succeeded in escaping.

This victory cut Napoleon's communications with France, prevented his carrying out his ultimate intention, and ruined his entire campaign. A few months later Napoleon was able to traverse the Mediterranean to France—but as a furtive passenger in a single ship, and not as the head of a grand naval force.

In 1780 the Baltic states, Russia, Denmark, and Sweden, combined in a League of Armed Neutrality, to assert by arms their rights as neutrals against certain practices of the British navy, especially in searching neutral ships at sea. The matter was smoothed over, but in 1799 it again assumed importance; and this importance increased in the following year, when Czar Paul seized three hundred British vessels then lying in Russian ports, in sudden hostility toward England, because of her refusal to surrender Malta after it had been captured from the French. On the 16th of December a treaty was signed by Russia and Sweden, to which Denmark and Prussia soon adhered, renewing the Armed Neutrality. This renewal was largely the work of Napoleon, who was using all means available to ruin the sea commerce of Great Britain.

The menace to Great Britain's supremacy on the sea, and especially in the Baltic, was so strong and clear, and the need to Great Britain for maintaining that supremacy in her war with Napoleon was so absolute, that she took immediate measures in her own defense. The first step was against Denmark, her nearest adversary in the coalition,

In the early days of March, 1801, Vice-Admiral Sir Hyde Parker received orders to proceed with his fleet to the vicinity of Copenhagen, and send an envoy to Copenhagen, to attempt to induce Denmark to withdraw from the coalition. His instructions, in case the envoy was not successful, were to bring force to bear. Nelson was made second in command of the fleet. The envoy was not successful, but Sir Hyde Parker adopted measures that seemed dilatory to Nelson. Nelson estimated the situation as one requiring the utmost promptness of action to prevent the Danes from strengthening their defenses at Copenhagen. He finally persuaded (almost bullied) his superior officer to allow him, Nelson, to take a part of the fleet into the actual harbor of Copenhagen and attack the floating defenses and land batteries that the Danes had got into position there. The attempt was most hazardous; because to the dangers from the fire of the vessels and the forts had to be added the dangers of navigation, which were great.

The main fleet anchored on March 30 about five miles from Copenhagen. Nelson's division, thirty-three vessels in all, of which the main part was twelve ships-of-the-line, advanced to the south on the afternoon of April 1 through a channel to the east of Copenhagen, and anchored at nightfall south of a large shoal called the Middle Ground, about two miles from the southern end of the Danish line of block-ships and floating batteries that ran nearly north and south. His plans having already been laid, the evening and night were spent in arranging the final details and sending out the final orders. His division was to start in the morning; but not a pilot could be found who would take charge of a ship! At length one of the officers of the fleet undertook the piloting of the column, and the signal to get under way was made. Of the twelve ships-of-the-line, two grounded on the west side of the Middle Ground shoal, and another did not succeed in getting around it. The other nine proceeded boldly, and anchored as nearly as they could in their designated stations, parallel to the line of Danish hulks that shielded Copenhagen.

A hotly contested battle followed, in which there were great losses on both sides, but which in the end resulted in the virtual destruction of all the Danish defenses, both fixed and floating. In the middle of the action Sir Hyde Parker signaled to Nelson to withdraw his ships. This order Nelson very properly disobeyed. It was on this occasion that Nelson put his telescope to his blind eye and said jokingly that he could not read the signal.

The result was a complete victory for the British. Its importance was increased and the results were hastened by the murder of the Czar of Russia, which had occurred on March 24, but news of which did not reach Copenhagen until several days after the battle. Not long afterward, in early May, Nelson relieved Parker as commander-in-chief, and thereupon promptly started for the Russian port of Revel, hoping to find the Russian fleet there and prevent its forming a junction with the Swedish. When he arrived in the outer bay, however, he found that the Russian fleet had gone. Receiving an intimation from the Czar that his coming with so large a fleet did not look like a friendly act, Nelson at once moved away, and wrote a diplomatic and conciliatory note to the Russian Minister. Shortly afterward he received an answer from the Minister, announcing that because of Nelson's prompt withdrawal, and the friendly character of his note, the Czar had ordered the immediate raising of the embargo that his predecessor had placed upon English merchant-ships in Russian ports.

Like most great warriors, Nelson was a statesman and a diplomat as well.

The League of the Armed Neutrality soon broke up, and what had been at the start a great menace to Great Britain disappeared. The main cause of its disappearance was the strategy of Nelson.

It was not until the year 1805 that Nelson was again able, in any preëminent degree, to contribute his unrivaled skill as a naval strategist to the service of his country. In the early

part of that year it was known that Napoleon had been collecting and drilling in Boulogne an army of 150,000 men, and that many flotillas suitable as transports had been constructed. It was suspected that his object was to invade England and Ireland; but it was realized that Napoleon could not accomplish this unless he could secure control of the English Channel by a French fleet during a period long enough to enable an expedition to get across. It was also realized that, by reason of the known superiority of the British fleet, Napoleon would not attempt an invasion unless by some means he could get the British fleet out of the way. It was also realized that a very natural thing for him to attempt would be to lure it to the West Indies, by sending a French fleet thither to threaten British possessions, which were of great importance to British commerce. At this time Napoleon had twenty ships-of-the-line in the naval port at Brest on the northwest coast of France, five at Rochefort on the west coast, and ten at Toulon on the south coast. For the full success of his expedition, it would be necessary that these ships should unite somewhere at sea and then return and enter the Channel. For this reason, a British fleet was kept on watch at each port.

The ten ships at Brest were successfully kept in by Admiral Cornwallis; the five ships at Rochefort got away and went to the West Indies, but came back without effecting anything. The ships at Toulon, under command of Vice-Admiral Villeneuve, got out on the 17th of January.

The officer in command of the British fleet watching Toulon was Nelson. He was informed by a frigate on January 19 of Villeneuve's departure. Not knowing Villeneuve's destination, and being in command in the Mediterranean, Nelson deemed it his first duty to prevent any descent on Egypt or on any place in the Mediterranean under the British flag or under British protection; and he therefore bestirred himself—a prey to the most agonizing doubts and conjectures—to patrol the sea, even to Alexandria in Egypt, in search of Villeneuve. On the 19th of February he received informa-

tion that Villeneuve's ships had been so badly disabled in a gale that he had had to go back to Toulon. On April 4 he learned from a frigate that Villeneuve had again sailed on March 30; but he heard nothing more until April 18, when he received chance information that Villeneuve had been seen on the 7th off the southern coast of Spain, steering toward the Strait of Gibraltar and the Atlantic Ocean. On April 19 he received certain information that the enemy fleet, consisting of twelve French ships-of-the-line, had passed out of the Straits into the Atlantic.

Nelson at once concluded that Villeneuve had gone to the West Indies. He had determined several months before that, in case he got information at any time that Villeneuve was going to the West Indies, he would pursue him. Therefore he now took immediate steps to follow; but, because of unfavorable winds and other causes that hampered so much the movements of vessels in those days, he did not start for the West Indies until the evening of May 11. He had only eleven ships-of-the-line. Villeneuve had eighteen, six Spanish ships having joined him at Cadiz.

Nelson arrived at Barbados on June 4, and received information, subsequently found to be erroneous, from the general commanding the British troops at Santa Lucia, that the enemy fleet had passed there, steering south, during the night of May 28 and 29. Nelson was amazed at this report, being unable to see what strategic plan could possibly justify Villeneuve in going south. As the information was authoritative, however, he started the next morning toward the south, only to find on June 7, by information from Trinidad, that no hostile fleet had appeared. He steered north at once, and reached Antigua, the northernmost of the Windward Islands save one, on June 12. There he received information that Villeneuve had reached Martinique on May 14, had left on June 4, and that he had then sailed northward. Nelson at once divined that for some reason, probably hearing of his (Nelson's) presence, he had abandoned all hostile operations

in the West Indies and was returning to Europe. Nelson immediately decided to go after Villeneuve, and to send a fast-sailing frigate to inform the British Admiralty of the entire situation. This frigate, the *Curieux*, fulfilled her mission perfectly, and was a vital factor in bringing about the success of the campaign.

On June 13 Nelson got away from Antigua, and on July 18 he sighted Cape Spartel on the northwest coast of Africa, just outside the Strait of Gibraltar. There he ascertained that no information had been received of Villeneuve. However, the *Curieux* had sighted Villeneuve's fleet on June 19, and had reached England on July 7; and on July 9 the First Lord of the Admiralty, a trained naval officer and strategist, issued orders for the British blockading squadrons off the ports of Rochefort and Ferrol to unite and take post one hundred miles off Cape Finisterre on the northwest coast of Spain. On July 19 the combined force was in this position, under command of Admiral Calder, and on the 22d Villeneuve rushed into his arms. Calder had fifteen ships and Villeneuve had twenty. The ensuing battle went to the advantage of the British; but Calder did not press his advantage and Villeneuve got away, for which Calder was bitterly blamed by the British public. Villeneuve sent three ships into Vigo, and sailed himself to the Spanish port of Ferrol, a few miles south of Cape Finisterre, which he reached on August 1 with fifteen ships. Calder, after sending five of his ships to resume the blockade of Rochefort on the west coast of France, joined Cornwallis's blockading force off Brest on August 14. The next day Nelson joined with his eleven ships, thus raising the force under Cornwallis's command to thirty-seven, and effectually preventing all possibility of Villeneuve's force uniting with the one in Brest.

By reason of poor health, Nelson now received leave to go home. On the 19th of August he hauled down his flag, expecting the rest that he much required. But news soon came

that Villeneuve had got away from Ferrol, and that on August 20 he had arrived at Cadiz with his fleet.

The Admiralty at once decided to force that fleet to come out and fight, and realized that Nelson was the best man to be charged with the undertaking. Accordingly, Nelson received orders to this effect. At half past eleven in the morning of September 14 he hoisted his flag on board the *Victory*, and on the following morning sailed.

Nelson arrived off the port of Cadiz with twenty-seven ships-of-the-line. Villeneuve was inside with thirty-three ships-of-the-line, of which eighteen were French and fifteen Spanish. Villeneuve came out on the 19th of October, possibly forced out by the difficulty of subsisting so large a force for a long time in a small blockaded port. In view of the known character of Nelson, both sides realized that a fight to a finish was in prospect.

Nelson's plans had now been carefully made, and all his captains had been not only fully informed as to those plans, but fully imbued with the spirit that inspired them. The result was that when the battle took place, on October 21, it was carried out with that combination of decision and flexibility, of deliberation and celerity, of caution and ardor, that characterized all of Nelson's operations.

The allied fleet was destroyed as a fighting force, and Great Britain was established even more firmly than before in her supremacy of the seas. This made it impossible for Napoleon to gain the world dominion, to obtain which he was bending all his powers.

It is interesting to note that, while the destruction of republicanism in Europe was prevented by the strategy of Napoleon, the undue aggrandizement of Napoleon was prevented by the strategy of Nelson.




## CHAPTER XIV

### NAPOLEON

ON October 15, 1793, a youthful and ill-clad captain of artillery vehemently opposed a plan for driving the British out of the French city and harbor of Toulon, which had been drawn up by a celebrated engineer and approved by the Committee on Fortifications. He proposed in place of it a plan which was much simpler. His plan was to mount some guns at a point which he specified on the shores of the harbor, and to drive out the British fleet. He pointed out that after the fleet had left the British army would have to leave also, and that the result could be secured without doing any harm to the town. His plan was eventually adopted and carried out. It was carried out largely by the captain of artillery who had originated and proposed it; for it was he who put the guns into place and afterward directed them. His name was Napoleon Bonaparte.

In none of his later campaigns did Napoleon show any clearer insight into the problem presented to him, or any greater energy and daring in carrying it out, than in his first essay at Toulon, when he was only twenty-four years old, poor, friendless, and inexperienced.

At Toulon he showed the same rare combination as he did later, of great imagination and intense ardor with mathematical correctness. He was a dreamer at Toulon and he was a dreamer ever afterward; but his dreams were not vague dreams, or about vague projects, or proceeding from vague knowledge. His dreams were sharply defined and based on accurate knowledge; and they were pointed as definitely toward the end in view as the calculations of an engineer or the diagrams of a draftsman.



Central Europe, 1810

His services at Toulon were so evident and so important that he was promoted to the rank of brigadier-general; and in the spring of 1794 he was sent to the army of Italy, to command the artillery. The army there was under the command of a general who was old and incapable; but Bonaparte was able to have some suggestions of his own adopted which brought about some successes of an important kind. During his stay in Italy he conceived a plan for a campaign there to drive out the Austrians, and submitted it to the Committee of Public Safety in Paris. It was rejected by them then, but adopted in its main features later.

About September of that year, 1794, Bonaparte went to Paris. At this time the government of the Republic was in a precarious position. In the early part of October it was threatened with actual ruin by the National Guard, 30,000 strong, which suddenly rose in revolt. In the emergency, Bonaparte was given command of all the troops, only 5000 in number, that the government had there under its control, with which to subdue 30,000. With these 5000 troops, and forty pieces of artillery which Bonaparte knew how to use so well, he dispersed the insurgents after a brief but violent attack with grape, and at the cost of only four hundred lives.

This was a small campaign compared with his later ones; but it was won in the same way that those campaigns were won—by a rapid but correct estimate of the situation, a prompt and correct decision, and an extraordinary celerity of action. It was won, also, by complete thoroughness—to use a colloquialism of the present day, “by making a complete job of it.” Napoleon realized, as every great strategist has realized, that mere operations, mere fighting, mere working, may be absolutely fruitless; that what must be done in order to get decisive results is to do a definite injury at a definite place at a definite time and for a definite purpose. He realized further, as every great strategist has realized, that his work was not finished until everything had been done that was necessary to be done and that could be done. By the time

Napoleon had finished with the mutinous National Guard, there was nothing further to be done, and the mutiny had been quelled thoroughly and completely. It has often been stated that Napoleon ruined France. It must not be forgotten that on this occasion Napoleon saved France, and also that he did so several times afterward.

As affairs in northern Italy were in very unsatisfactory condition because of the presence there of the allied forces of Austria and Piedmont, and the ineffective operations against them of the general commanding the French forces, Napoleon was sent to take his place, and to carry out the plan of operations that he had originally submitted to the government. By this plan, Jourdan and Moreau were to operate separately and yet coöperatively in Germany, while Napoleon was to separate the Austrians and Piedmontese in Italy, then drive the Austrians out of Italy, then advance through the Austrian Tyrol into Germany, and join Moreau and Jourdan in an attack on Vienna.

Napoleon reached Nice on March 27, 1796, and found the French army widely dispersed, thoroughly discouraged, almost destitute, and with their communications to France running along the coast of the Mediterranean, parallel to those of the enemy and therefore everywhere exposed. He at once made an eloquent appeal to his men, promising to lead them to victory immediately and to provide for all their wants. The soldiers of France at this time were ardent and patriotic, and willing to undergo all privations and to brave all dangers—provided they were competently led. They responded to Napoleon's appeal immediately and sincerely.

To meet this enthusiastic band, led and inspired by the ardent but exact genius of Napoleon, a half-hearted Austrian army under an old, inefficient, and lethargic general, advanced. The natural result followed. On April 12, two days after the Austrians descended from the Apennines, Napoleon defeated them in battle; and on the following day he defeated the Piedmontese. A few more decisive victories oc-

curred, after which the King of Sardinia withdrew altogether from the coalition against France, and left the Austrians alone to fight against Napoleon.

Napoleon instantly advanced against the Austrians. On May 10 he arrived before the town of Lodi, which was held by 10,000 Austrians. To reach the town, he had to cross a bridge that was defended by twenty pieces of artillery, and that could have been cut by the Austrians if they had been prompt enough. Napoleon was more prompt than the Austrian general, and advanced across the bridge before it had been cut, he himself at the head, animating his men by his example. As a result the column dashed along the bridge in the face of a terrible fire, overcame all opposition, and carried the enemies batteries at the point of the bayonet. The enemy retreated at once to the eastward, and Napoleon entered Milan at the head of his victorious army.

At Milan, Napoleon at once took upon himself the task of statesmanship, and sought to secure the fruits of the conquests he had made. But the news of his success excited the jealousy of the French government, and caused it to send him orders to divide his army into two parts: to give up the command of half of it to Kellerman, who was to remain in the north of Italy and observe the Austrians, and to advance himself with the remaining half upon Rome and then upon Naples. Napoleon, seeing the suicidal nature of this division of forces and diffusion of effort, resigned his command. Pending the receipt, however, of the reply of the government, he resolved to drive the Austrians out of Italy; and to that end he immediately advanced against them, after addressing to his soldiers one of the most eloquent military appeals in history. But on the day he quitted Milan, a revolt occurred in his rear, Pavia being seized and the garrison put to death. Without an instant's hesitation, and without stopping the march of his army, Napoleon hastened to Pavia with a small but sufficient force. At the head of this force he broke open the gates, advanced within the city, delivered it up to the

pillage of his troops, ordered the municipal officers to be shot, and immediately extinguished the insurrection. At two other places he carried out a similar policy, and secured similar results.

The Austrians, under Beaulieu, were now drawn up beyond the Mincio River in a line approximately north and south and facing west, flanked on the right by Lake Garda and on the left by the fortress of Mantua. The enemy's wings being thus protected, Napoleon attacked his center, but while making demonstrations against his line of retreat. The Austrians, remembering the terrible charge at Lodi, gave way very soon; and the Austrian general, fearful of the movement against his communications, retired beyond the Adige River. Part of his left wing, however, became dispersed, and the remainder took refuge in Mantua. Napoleon decided at once to besiege Mantua. So long as this city was held by the strong force of 13,000 men that now held it, Napoleon could not advance beyond it, to carry out his campaign against Vienna, because he would leave a military enemy in his rear. Furthermore, he could not rely on the support of any large number of Italians in the vicinity, because they realized the danger of taking the part of the side that might ultimately be defeated.

In July the Austrians sent to the relief of Mantua an army 60,000 strong and commanded by Wurmser. Against it Napoleon had only 30,000, 10,000 of whom were besieging 13,000 in Mantua. He instantly abandoned the siege and advanced against the Austrians. They were advancing in two columns. Napoleon attacked the weaker and repulsed it, and then attacked the stronger and threw it back with a loss of fifty guns and 12,000 men. He thus defeated completely the army of relief.

In the following month a second relieving army, under Wurmser, advanced again, this time also in two columns. Napoleon again (in September) defeated one column and then the other; but in this campaign the defeated column under Wurmser himself had to take refuge in Mantua, and

thus add to the garrison about 10,000 additional mouths to feed.

Napoleon now earnestly besought more troops and guns, for he saw that Austria realized the necessity of relieving Mantua. Six weeks later Austria's third and most determined attempt was made. In the six weeks' interval Napoleon exercised all his genius as a statesman in spreading a propaganda of liberty in Italy. He opposed the French government in its foolish project of embarking on a war with Rome and Naples, and forced it (though without convincing it) to continue a war of the utmost vigor against Austria, in which the first accomplishment must be the capture of Mantua.

The third army of relief also advanced in two columns; but it was under the command of a general, Alvinzi, who was far more wise and quick than Wurmser, and opposed to Napoleon a resistance so able and so stubborn that the powers of Napoleon and his ragged but enthusiastic army were taxed to the utmost. In the final battles near Arcole, however, he defeated Alvinzi and drove him back.

In January, 1797, the fourth and last army of relief was sent, again under Alvinzi. He made a determined attack on the plateau of Rivoli with a superior force, but under the disadvantage that in order to reach the plateau he had to disperse with both cavalry and artillery. In the battle that followed, the French infantry, though greatly outnumbered, were supported by artillery and cavalry, an advantage that outweighed the mere numerical inferiority, and in consequence were able to throw back the Austrians quickly and decisively. On February 2, the flag of the Republic was flying over Mantua, the north of Italy was clear of Austrians, and Napoleon was free to leave Italy and carry out his campaign against Vienna.

Napoleon then advanced to the northeastward, and won a succession of victories against easily defeated and demoralized enemies, and finally signed preliminaries of peace with Austria at Leoben, less than one hundred miles from Vienna. At

this time Napoleon knew when to exercise moderation, though later in life he did not. He showed it in the preliminaries of peace signed at Leoben, on April 18 and by his moderation brought about a condition in which Austria withdrew from the coalition against France and left Great Britain as her only enemy. The defeat of Austria, and the consequent abandonment of her hostile attitude toward France, saved the Republic, and therefore the cause of liberty in Europe. For this France was indebted wholly to the strategy of Napoleon.

The final treaty of peace was signed at Campo Formio on October 3, 1797. Of the original six enemies of the Republic only one now remained—Great Britain, the most powerful of all. Napoleon realized that there would be a fight to the death between her and France, and conceived the plan of attacking her by attacking Egypt, thus threatening the communications between England and India and menacing India herself. He presented his plan to the Directory and secured its approval, which suggests that neither Napoleon nor the Directory estimated correctly the importance of the fact that the British were superior at sea. Except for brief periods, the British navy had been superior to the French for several centuries, and it was overwhelmingly superior at this time. The effect of the Revolution had been subversive of that orderly discipline and that patient carefulness and skill that are needed to manage naval instruments and equipments, and in addition most of the competent officers, belonging as they did to well-born families, had been forced out of the service, while some had been beheaded. On the other hand, the British navy as a whole was in a condition of completeness and efficiency that had never been surpassed. Its Mediterranean fleet was under the command of Nelson.

Napoleon set sail from Toulon on May 19, 1798, with about 38,000 veteran troops, a large corps of mathematicians, geologists, antiquarians, chemists, etc., embarked in a fleet of transports, and guarded by thirteen ships-of-the-line. It is interesting to note that this expedition had a double pur-



pose,—conquest and exploration,—and that Napoleon, therefore, departed from his usual straight line of conduct and tried to do two things at one time. By good fortune, he succeeded in reaching Egypt without being caught by Nelson, and arrived at Alexandria on July 1. He immediately marched on Cairo, and soon met the Mamelukes, who charged on him with their customary impetuosity, but met the same fate as cavalry usually have when charging on infantry and artillery properly commanded and trained. Napoleon got to work at once on his project of seducing the Egyptians to the French Republican cause by false promises of many kinds, when he suddenly received information—which should not have surprised him—that the fleet he had left at Aboukir Bay had been attacked by Rear-Admiral Nelson and destroyed on August 1, 1798.

Napoleon was now in a position that was not only humiliating and dangerous, but ridiculous. He would not have pardoned any general for getting into such a position in land operations. His communications had been cut, and because of circumstances that were almost inevitable. This shows that, while Napoleon was one of the greatest military strategists that ever lived, he was an exceedingly poor naval strategist. It also shows something immeasurably more important, which is that no man can be a strategist in any department of strategy unless he understands thoroughly all the factors in the problem which one encounters in that department. Napoleon could apply to naval strategy as much mentality, energy, and ardor as he could to military strategy; but he understood accurately, clearly, and thoroughly every factor involved in military strategy, while he understood almost none of the factors employed in naval strategy. Napoleon doubtless took the advice of naval officers in naval matters; but, as he himself decided what was to be done, he was not very much more competent to act than a layman would be who tried to perform a surgical operation under the advice of a surgeon. *This throws light on the attempts of civilians to*

*direct naval and military operations, and explains the useless loss of life they have occasioned.*

Napoleon then conducted a campaign in Syria, which was made disastrous by the British fleet acting in conjunction with the Turks when Napoleon besieged Acre. After his failure at Acre he retreated precipitately into Egypt, and there succeeded in destroying a Turkish force that had landed at Aboukir.

Some time before this he had received word that war had broken out again on the Continent, and that Russia, Austria, Sardinia, and Naples had joined a coalition with Great Britain against the French Republic. Realizing the failure of his Egyptian campaign, and seeking an opportunity to retrieve his fortunes, he sailed for France on August 24, 1799, with a few of his best officers; deserting the soldiers to whom he had promised so much, and who, for his sake, had faced hunger and thirst and pestilence and wounds and death.

At this time the affairs of France were in a precarious condition. Military operations had not been successful; there was tremendous discontent throughout the country; and Napoleon was the only man who stood high in public favor. He was received with great enthusiasm and was shortly able to bring about a *coup d'état* whereby the Directory was abolished and a consular government established in its stead, with himself as First Consul. In discharging the duties of that office, which was practically that of Dictator, Napoleon showed the same grasp of the situation, the same talent for detail, the same energy, ardor, industry, and endurance, that he had shown in discharging the duties of general. He showed also the same arbitrary spirit and the same tremendous confidence in himself; and he achieved a success and accomplished a good for France of as high an order of importance.

He soon made overtures for peace to both Great Britain and Germany, but by both his overtures were repelled. Similar overtures to Russia, which was at that time irritated against Great Britain and Austria, were followed by Russia's aban-

donment of the coalition. This left Great Britain and Austria as France's only important enemies. There was a large French force now in Germany under Moreau, and another besieged at Genoa under Massena. The appearance of a British fleet in April, 1800, was a preconcerted signal for the Austrians to attack Genoa and thus cut off all communications with France.

Meanwhile, the campaign in Germany proceeded somewhat to the advantage of the French, largely because of a lack of coöperation among the Austrian forces; but no decisive results occurred. In this condition of affairs, Napoleon decided to take the field himself. To this end he concentrated a force of about 40,000 men near Dijon, from which position he could advance into either Austria or Italy. On the 6th of May he left Paris. On the 14th he began the passage of the Great St. Bernard at the head of this force, dragging cannon in hollowed trunks of trees through the snow. He forced his way by dint of courage and energy and ingenuity, and suddenly he emerged into northern Italy, bringing artillery—to the great astonishment of the Austrian general there. Napoleon arrived at Milan on the 2d of June, and on the 14th fought the battle of Marengo.

Napoleon took many risks with the disposition of his forces in the interval which might have proved fatal if the Austrian general had been as active as Napoleon was. But Napoleon would not have taken those risks had he not realized the inefficiency of the Austrian general. The Austrians fought the battle, of course, with all the bravery and determination that could be expected; and they did not break until they received a sudden and unexpected assault from cavalry supported by artillery. They then broke into a rout, and disaster and carnage followed. This battle compelled the Austrians again to retire to the eastward of the Mincio River.

Meanwhile, the naval domination of Great Britain, which ultimately was to prove the backbone of the resistance of Europe to Napoleon, had excited great jealousy among the

maritime powers of Europe, who had formed a League of Armed Neutrality to oppose her. The issue between Great Britain and these powers was finally decided by a naval battle off Copenhagen, in which Vice-Admiral Lord Nelson, on April 2, 1801, destroyed virtually all the defenses of the town, both fixed and floating. This victory caused an almost immediate dissolution of the League.

Affairs did not come to a crisis between the French and Austrian armies in Germany until the battle of Hohenlinden on December 3, 1800. An interesting feature of the campaign was the fact that Napoleon sent orders to the French General Moreau to follow a certain plan of operations; that Moreau protested, submitted another plan, and asked permission to take a lower rank if Napoleon insisted on his own plan; and that Napoleon, with true strategic judgment, yielded to Moreau. The battle of Hohenlinden was ended in disaster to the Austrians, mainly because of the extremely bad strategy of the Austrian commander. The battle was followed by the Treaty of Lunéville on February 9, 1801. This left Great Britain the only surviving member of the coalition. Bonaparte now realized that the victory of Nelson at Copenhagen, and the consequent dissolution of the Confederacy of Neutrals, made it impossible for him then to ruin British commerce. In consequence of all the conditions then prevailing, Great Britain and France signed the Treaty of Amiens in March, 1802.

By the treaties of Lunéville and Amiens the French Republic was acknowledged by all Europe. It is worthy of note that a feeble directory had been replaced by a strong Republic, and that *France had been saved against the combined assault of the greatest monarchies in Europe by one agency only—the strategy of Napoleon.*

The Treaty of Amiens contained the provision that England should surrender Malta. The British did not surrender Malta, and Napoleon made tremendous accusations against her for this reason. But the British can hardly be blamed

with reason; because it soon became apparent that Napoleon was still actively at work on his projects against Egypt and India, that he was not himself keeping faith in many matters, and that his enormous success in upbuilding French maritime and naval power threatened the naval supremacy of England. He even sent an expedition that captured San Domingo; and by securing from Spain a large tract, called Louisiana, and then selling it to the United States, he gave good grounds for the suspicion that he was projecting an aggressive maritime policy. When, finally, Napoleon sent an expedition to India, though apparently for mere exploration, when French papers spoke of the ease with which Egypt could be reconquered, and when the advance of French prestige through all of continental Europe had become apparent, the British Cabinet decided not to give up Malta. War was declared in May, 1803, between Great Britain and France. Then began a struggle which lasted until the battle of Waterloo, in which virtually all the powers of Europe, though not always at the same time, made war against Napoleon.

After the declaration of war, the invasion of England became the intense preoccupation of Napoleon; and to accomplish it he embarked on the greatest strategic enterprise that had ever been undertaken. He realized, of course, that he could not send an invading force across the Channel, unless it were supported by a French fleet superior to any British fleet that might be in the Channel at that time. He realized that he should have to create a great addition to the French fleet, therefore, and a large flotilla of transports. Of the two, the enlargement of the fleet was the more difficult. He finally collected near Boulogne about fifteen hundred transports and about 150,000 men. The British naturally got information of his preparations, and many of them were much alarmed; but the government itself, while it appreciated the danger, took such measures to counteract it that it never regarded the situation as really perilous. Napoleon finally adopted the plan of endeavoring to lure the principal part of the British

fleet away from the Channel by sending a large fleet westward to threaten British possessions in the West Indies. This was a plan similar to that of many strategic operations on land; but Napoleon understood all the factors in land campaigns, while he did not understand those in naval campaigns. For this reason, he hampered the operations of Admiral Villeneuve considerably by ill-advised instructions. Whether they hampered the admiral to such a degree as to be the main cause of the final failure, however, it is difficult to decide.

Villeneuve started for the West Indies, and Nelson started in pursuit. Meanwhile Napoleon was pressing his preparations near Boulogne, in order to be able to dash across the Channel as soon as the French fleet should return, having left Nelson in the West Indies. Villeneuve returned, but allowed himself to be brought to battle on July 22, 1805, with the result that he went for repairs to Cadiz, where he arrived on August 20. Napoleon realized at once that his scheme to invade England had been ruined. He realized also that it had been ruined by the same man Nelson, who had ruined his Egyptian campaign and had broken up the Confederacy of Neutrals, and that these three occurrences showed a British supremacy upon the sea that precluded any reasonable anticipation of conquering England. There is no reason to suppose, however, that he realized that this supremacy of Great Britain on the seas was to threaten seriously his success upon the Continent; and it is quite certain that he did not appreciate fully the importance of the predominant sea power of Great Britain.

Napoleon has been criticized by many for ever harboring seriously the idea of invading England. It has often been contended also that he did not really intend to do so, and that the collecting of large forces near Boulogne, and the manœuvring of his fleet, were simply parts of a feint to hide his real intentions—a march into Germany. But it must not be forgotten that, even if the project failed, he suffered no great harm; because his army could be used, and was used, for the

other purpose. In other words, Napoleon had two alternative plans, as he often had.

As soon as Napoleon heard that Villeneuve had gone to Cadiz, he started with the utmost possible promptness, and marched with the utmost possible speed against the Austrians, under General Mack, who was about to advance through the Black Forest toward the French frontier. So rapid was Napoleon's movement, so unsuspecting was Mack, and so little information did he get from his intelligence department, that he was taken by surprise near Ulm and his army enveloped. As a result he was forced to surrender his entire force on October 20.

The battle of Trafalgar, in which the British under Nelson defeated the French and Spanish fleets, occurred the following day, and, though it was not then realized, sounded the death-knell of the empire of Napoleon.

While marching to Ulm, Napoleon violated the neutrality of Prussia by marching over Prussian ground. This insolent act, combined with many other causes, one of which was the gradually rising wrath of the Prussians against the feeble neutrality of their king, forced the king to assert the rights of Prussia, to make an alliance with the Czar of Russia, and then to declare war against Napoleon. But the king's previous inaction had put the Prussian army and the country in such a condition that he was wholly unprepared; so that he now added to his crime of unpreparedness the crime of going to war before his unpreparedness had been overcome.

Russia and Austria now joined their forces, and soon collected an allied army of about 100,000 men near Austerlitz, while the French numbered about 80,000. The actions of the Allies at this time seem to have been marked by vague precipitancy rather than exact celerity; for a little waiting would have enabled their forces to be increased by those of the Archduke Charles, who was hurrying up from Italy, and by a certain Russian corps then marching to join them; and their forces would have been augmented vastly if the Allies

had avoided battle until such time as the Prussian army could have been got ready and sent to join them. The precipitancy seems to have been caused mainly by the Czar, who was determined to force a general engagement. This engagement took place on December 2, 1805, at Austerlitz.

The French had about 80,000 men and the Allies 100,000; but the French were commanded by Napoleon, and Napoleon had under him Lannes and Soult and Bernadotte and Murat. The battle was fought with the utmost courage on both sides, but with strategic and tactical skill by only one side. The result was that the Russian center was pushed off the plateau on which it had taken a stand; and the Russian left, which had charged down on the French right, was attacked on the flank and rear.

The Russians now retreated to the north. Austria signed an ignominious peace, and Napoleon became supreme in southern Germany and Italy. His prestige had now increased to such a point that he was able to marry several of his relatives to persons of royal or noble blood, to make his brother Louis, King of Holland and his brother Joseph, King of Naples, to form the Confederation of the Rhine, and to abolish the Holy Roman Empire. Against one nation, however, he was helpless, and that nation was the British; for Nelson had defeated Villeneuve disastrously at the battle of Trafalgar on October 21, and thus dispelled forever all hope of overcoming Great Britain's mastery of the sea, and consequent control of all its trade routes. Napoleon then resorted to various measures of declared blockade, which had little ultimate effect other than of inflicting great hardships on the people of England, and equal and in some cases greater hardships on the maritime countries of the Continent.

Finally the Prussian king started his ill-trained and ill-commanded army against the highly trained and superbly commanded army of Napoleon.

The result was that the Prussian king suddenly discovered, about October 12, that a French army corps was between him



and his base of supplies. He attempted to drive them from his line of communications, but Napoleon fell with overpowering numbers upon a large detachment of his force at Jena, while Davoust fell upon the main force at Auerstadt near by. Both battles took place on October 14, were decisive victories for the French, and forced the Prussians to sign terms of peace that were not only ignominious but almost ruinous. One of the most humiliating features of the situation, which soon developed, was that Napoleon entered Berlin, and that it was from Berlin that he issued on November 21, 1806, his first famous decree, the "Berlin Decree," proclaiming the British Isles in a state of blockade and prohibiting all commerce and correspondence with them.

The treaty of peace was not signed, however, until after the Russians had been brought to battle. The Russian army could not be brought to a decisive battle at once, but it was finally met and defeated, though not decisively, on February 8, at Eylau. This battle left Napoleon with an army demoralized by privation, surrounded by hostile forces in a hostile country in the winter, and under conditions that every day of suspended operations made more difficult. Fortunately for Napoleon, the Russian general committed a strategic blunder by which Napoleon was enabled to engage him at Friedland on June 14 with a greatly superior force. The victory was so complete as to discourage the Russian emperor completely, and to induce him to join with the King of Prussia in a treaty, which was signed with Napoleon on July 8, at Tilsit, on a raft in the Niemen River. By this treaty the Czar became practically an ally of Napoleon, and the King of Prussia lost nearly half of his dominions.

Preliminary to this treaty and other treaties, and during the discussions of all treaties, Napoleon showed that quickness of decision, that ability to cajole and threaten and persuade at the proper time, which mark the great diplomatist; and without that ability he could not, of course, have made the advantageous treaties that he did make. Napoleon's entire

success was due to the combination of all these qualities; and Napoleon Bonaparte would never have been the Napoleon of history had he not been a diplomatist and a statesman as well as a strategist. This fact must not blind us, however, to the more important fact that *his greatness did not rest at bottom upon his diplomacy or his statesmanship, but on his strategy*. In other words, the most important element in Napoleon's career—as in the career of Thutmose III, Alexander, Cæsar, and the others whose names head certain chapters in this book—was strategy. Now, *these men contributed more than any equal number of other men to the establishment of stable government in the world*.

Perhaps it would not be logical to deduce from this that the most important factor in the establishment of stable government has been strategy. But it would be logical to deduce that strategy has been an agency as important as to be immeasurable, and that there is no good ground for declaring that any other agency has been more important. The government of every civilized country was established originally by military force directed by strategy, and was maintained afterward by statesmanship and diplomacy supported by strategy. Which of the three has been the most important it would be useless to discuss; but it cannot be gainsaid with reason that of the three strategy was the first to act, and that the others followed.

Napoleon had now reached the culmination of his rapid and tremendous rise, and was about to start gradually upon that fall which ended with such abruptness at Waterloo. After the peace at Tilsit, France and Russia seemed the most important countries in the world, and England seemed to be threatened with disaster, because her assertiveness on the sea had roused against her the opposition of all the powers of continental Europe. Napoleon's first act in the long series that brought about his final downfall was his invasion of Spain and Portugal.

To complete his continental blockade of England, Napoleon

deemed it necessary that Portugal, on account of her large sea-front and her geographical position, should be brought under French control. He therefore took steps to invade Portugal; and in order to accomplish this he formed a plot whereby he obtained the actual coöperation of Spain, and with it, of course, her permission to march his invading army through her territory. At this time the government of Spain was excessively corrupt; the queen's favorite was the real ruler of the kingdom, and the queen's son, whom she declared on one occasion to be not the king's son, had acquired a popularity in Spain that was entirely undeserved. Napoleon sent an army under Junot that captured Lisbon on November 30, 1807, but too late to secure the royal family, for it had already embarked upon the British fleet.

Nominally as a support to this expedition, Napoleon had sent five armies into Spain; and it was not until they had seized the principal fortress in northern Spain, and Murat was found to be advancing toward Madrid, that the Spanish government realized the situation. Then the king and queen and Godoy, the actual ruler of Spain, resolved on flight; but they were stopped by an insurrection, and the king was compelled to abdicate in favor of his reputed son. Now, this son was not only a scoundrel, but a coward; and so, instead of rallying the nation to its own defense, which he could have done, he tried to make terms with Napoleon. The result of all this was that Napoleon in June put his own brother, Joseph, on the throne of Spain. The Spanish nation rose in revolt, and for some time with considerable success. Meanwhile, Austria, noting the menace to the Catholic religion and the Bourbon family in Napoleon's invasion of Spain and Portugal, and taking advantage of the large army that Napoleon was required to keep there, declared war against him in the spring of 1809.

Noting the gathering of the storm before it broke, foreseeing that he would have to go to war with Austria, and realizing the desirability of crushing all armed hostility in his rear, Napoleon himself went into Spain, and, by a series of masterly

and rapid movements of the Napoleonic kind, crushed out all rebellion, at least temporarily. He then hastened to Paris and prepared to turn his arms on Austria.

He was informed of Austria's declaration of war while in Paris in April, 1809, and left the following day to join his forces in Germany. At this time, Berthier, who had been an excellent chief of staff, but did not prove himself an excellent commander-in-chief, was in command of the French forces near Augsburg, and Davoust was at Ratisbon, about seventy-six miles distant. On April 16 the Austrian Archduke Charles, at the head of an army 126,000 strong, forced the passage of the Isar River. Had he possessed the strategic ability of Napoleon, he would instantly have crushed Davoust, who had only 60,000 men, before Berthier could have come to his assistance, and then he would have crushed Berthier. Instead of this, he did nothing decisive. Napoleon arrived on the scene at four o'clock on the following morning, the 17th of April. He instantly united the scattered forces of his army. In three victorious battles on three successive days, April 20, 21, and 22, he divided the Austrian forces, and then drove them back on the Danube. On the day following, April 23, at the end of an extraordinary five days' campaign, the Austrians withdrew across the Danube, having lost 50,000 prisoners. Three weeks later Napoleon slept in the palace of the Austrian emperor in Vienna.

But on May 21 and 22 he fought a battle with the Austrians near the villages of Aspern and Essling that gave him no victory, in which he sustained grave losses, and that not only weakened his material forces but greatly impaired his reputation and prestige. On the night of May 21, in the face of a strong force, he crossed the Danube River on temporary bridges where it is divided by the island of Lobau. For a whole day the French fought desperately against superior numbers, cut off from the possibility of retreat by the destruction of their bridges. In the night reinforcements were sent across, but not in adequate force; so that after another

day of fighting Napoleon had to withdraw from the left or northern side of the Danube to the island of Lobau. He retired defeated and with a knowledge in his own mind and in that of his officers that he had not planned the operation with his customary foresight, and that he personally had left the field of battle under circumstances that suggested flight.

The French and Austrian forces confronted each other for six weeks, separated only by the branch of the Danube, sixty yards wide, that runs north of the island of Lobau. The Austrians fortified their position and made preparations to oppose the French, supposing that they would cross by the original bridge opposite Essling, which Napoleon had ordered to be repaired. But Napoleon had the bridge repaired in order to deceive the Austrians, for he intended to cross lower down by temporary bridges that he had constructed. He crossed in the night of the 4th and 5th of July, took the Austrians at a disadvantage, and compelled them to change their plans and dispositions. The 5th was spent in manœuvering, but at daybreak of the 6th was begun a pitched battle that is known as the battle of Wagram. The Austrians succeeded in throwing back the French left wing, and almost in throwing back the right; but Napoleon realized that in order to accomplish this they must have weakened their center. So he attacked their center with artillery, then with infantry, and then with cavalry, and succeeded in breaking through their line. The Austrians then withdrew from the field; but the French had lost 35,000 in killed and wounded and were unable to pursue.

Though this battle, as well as the previous one, had been really indecisive, Napoleon and Austria determined to conclude the war. A treaty was signed on October 14, 1809, by which Austria agreed to discontinue all commercial relations with England, and to recognize all the changes that had taken place or might take place in Spain and Portugal. On March 10, 1810, a daughter of the Emperor of Austria became the wife of the Emperor of the French.

Meanwhile, the continental blockade of England was caus-

ing serious embarrassment not only in England but to certain continental powers, especially Russia. This fact, and certain others growing out of the treaty of Tilsit, brought about a gradual but distinct change for the worse in the feeling between Alexander and Napoleon. After two years of preparation a rupture occurred, preceded on March 24, 1812, by a treaty of alliance between Russia and Sweden. On the 9th of May Napoleon left Paris for Dresden, the rendezvous of the allies (France, Austria and Prussia), and opened negotiations with the Czar. These bearing no fruit, he declared war on the 22d of June and joined his army.

This army was the finest and largest that France had ever sent beyond her borders, and amounted to nearly half a million combatants and 1200 pieces of artillery. On the 24th the French army crossed the Niemen River without opposition. On the 28th it entered Wilna, the ancient capital of Lithuania. It continued to advance, still without meeting opposition, until the 28th of July, when it entered Witepsk. Most of Napoleon's generals now advised him to go no farther; but Napoleon could not be dissuaded. He spent the first two weeks of August here; and during this time the two Russian armies, which Napoleon had been able to disunite, had reunited at Smolensk, a large town on the Dnieper River surrounded with fortifications. In this strong position the Russian commander-in-chief resolved to make a stand. Napoleon had endeavored to get Smolensk before the enemy did, but for some reason (possibly because Napoleon himself had lost some of his youthful celerity) he had failed to do it, and it now became necessary to capture the place against a strong resistance. The Russians did resist for one day; but they retreated during the night-time, after setting fire to the city and to some immense magazines. Napoleon took possession of the town, his troops much disappointed at finding only a heap of ruins where they had expected to find good quarters.

It was now the middle of August, and nearly all of Napoleon's generals advised him to stop at Smolensk, reorganize his

army, bring up provisions and reinforcements, and wait until the spring before renewing the campaign. Knowing the Napoleon of previous campaigns, it seems incredible that Napoleon should have failed to estimate the situation correctly and to realize that the strategy of the Russians was Fabian, and that their intention was to lure him on farther and farther, in the hope that his army would eventually be reduced by sickness and discouragement and starvation. But it seems clear that by this time the originally almost perfect judgment of Napoleon had been spoiled by an excessive confidence in himself, and that the essential faculty of self-correction had been seriously impaired. Therefore he advanced toward Moscow. On the 7th of September he came to battle with the Russians who were posted on a series of hills near the village of Borodino, on the Moskwa River, a position covered by intrenchments and redoubts. The opposing forces were nearly evenly matched numerically, being perhaps 130,000 each; while the Russians had the advantage of position and the French had the advantage of superior leadership and experience. The battle was bitterly contested, but at the end the Russians were forced to abandon the field, beaten at all points.

On the 14th of September the French entered Moscow, and Napoleon took up his abode in the Kremlin, anciently the residence of the Czar. Suddenly fires appeared in different parts of the city. Great importance was not at first attached to them; and it was not until the following day that serious measures were taken to repress them. These were without avail, and by the 16th the fire had increased. On succeeding days it continued to increase, and by the evening of the 20th nine tenths of Moscow was in ashes.

It seems that Napoleon now realized the magnitude of his danger. His decision was Napoleonic—to advance at once on St. Petersburg. But his generals would not agree to this: on the contrary, they advised retreat. As a result, neither plan was adopted, and the French remained in Moscow for forty days, until the 19th of October! On that day Napoleon evac-

uated Moscow and started on his retreat, the horrors of which it is not necessary to detail. For the purpose of this book it is simply necessary for us to realize that only a small portion of Napoleon's army ever recrossed the Niemen River, that the whole expedition was a disastrous failure, and that the main cause was Napoleon's refusal (or possibly his inability) to estimate the situation with an unbiased mind. Even after he had been caught in Moscow, and almost up until the day he left it, he was continually expecting favorable replies to proposals of peace that he had forwarded to the Czar.

Napoleon arrived at Paris on December 18. He found that the war in Spain was still going on, not altogether unfavorably to the French, and that the Senate, the court and the capital, though dismayed by the disaster of the Russian campaign, seemed still loyal and obsequious. The conscription of 1813 had been called out, and a formidable army would soon be at his disposal to check any advance of the Russians.

But the disaster in Russia had awakened the hopes and stimulated the courage of all the cowed but resentful governments of the continent. The Emperor Alexander, in a proclamation of February 10, 1813, invited the members of the Confederation of the Rhine to throw off the yoke of France; and twelve days later, in another proclamation, he called on the people of Germany to rise *en masse* against Napoleon. Prussia responded almost at once, and Sweden followed. France immediately raised a large army for the coming campaign, and put forth the utmost energy of all kinds. The soldiers of the new army, however, were youthful and untrained.

Napoleon at once assumed the offensive, and on May 2 engaged the allies near Lutzen. In this battle, as in nearly all his previous ones, Napoleon's genius as a tactician, and his ability to perceive with absolute clearness and correctness, even in the excitement of the crisis of a battle, what the actual situation was, and what ought to be done, brought victory to his standards. The battle was gained principally by artillery, which was always Napoleon's favorite arm; but the victory



could not be pushed as far as would otherwise have been the case, because of lack of sufficient cavalry. Some military writers consider the victory of Lutzen as one of Napoleon's greatest achievements, because he gained it with an army most of whom were raw and half-disciplined conscripts, and many of whom were boys.

Napoleon then occupied Dresden, threw a bridge over the Elbe River, and marched across it to attack the Russians and Prussians at Bautzen, where they were drawn up on a range of hills. The whole of the 20th of May was spent in manœuvres and partial combats, and on the 21st the actual battle was fought. Napoleon began it by simultaneous attacks against both flanks of the enemy; but, owing to the great length of the line and the many intervening hills, he could not watch the movements, or order the troops under his own immediate command to advance, until he knew that the movements on the flanks were successful. While waiting, and being overcome by fatigue, he fell asleep. At length, hearing fresh sounds of artillery, his attendants woke him; whereupon Napoleon, noting the direction of movement of the sounds, realized that the attack was successful, and instantly ordered his center forward. This attack decided the fate of the battle; but the enemy retreated in order, leaving neither cannon nor prisoners in the hands of the French, an accomplishment they were able to effect partly because with their superiority in cavalry, and partly because of their position.

Napoleon had won two successes; but his army, even his generals were tired of war; all of Europe was at war against him, and it was apparent that he would have to get some important reinforcements or be defeated. Under these conditions, he agreed to an armistice on June 4, which was later extended until August 10. He received reinforcements, and reorganized his army; but so did his enemies, and to a greater degree. On August 12 Austria declared war, and announced her adhesion to the alliance of Russia and Prussia. Napoleon took his station at Dresden, and prepared to meet attacks which he

divined were to come from three directions, the south, the east, and the north: the main army of the allies, under Schwartzburg, from the south; the Prussians, under Blücher, from the east; and the Swedes, under Bernadotte, from the north. The allies had about half a million men, and Napoleon about half of that number.

The allies by this time had learned much about Napoleon's tactics, and their generals had become veterans in war. One thing they had learned was that it was much better to fight against Napoleon's lieutenants than against Napoleon. They could fight against his lieutenants on equal terms; but no one of their generals could equal Napoleon in that extraordinary rapidity and correctness of decision and action which enabled him to move large forces more rapidly than they, and concentrate them more quickly at given points.

Napoleon sent Oudinot and then Ney to meet the army of the north, but they were successively defeated. Napoleon himself advanced to the east against Blücher. The main army of the allies at once advanced from the south, expecting to get to Dresden before Napoleon could return; but Napoleon defeated Blücher, returned with incredible swiftness to Dresden, and on August 26 and 27 hurled them back. Unfortunately for Napoleon, he was taken suddenly ill at the end of August 28, and had to delegate the pursuit of the allies to Vandamme. Thereupon Vandamme was himself enveloped and destroyed, and the fugitives escaped.

Napoleon's army was now worn down to a dangerous degree, and he was threatened by three powerful enemies. Against these enemies he exercised all his marvelous tactical ability in a succession of endeavors to catch one force alone, but without success. Finally he ascertained that Schwartzburg was circling around from the south to get between him and Paris; and that Blücher was marching to join Bernadotte north of Napoleon, and with Bernadotte to join with Schwartzburg. Realizing his danger, Napoleon first sent Murat to Leipzig to hold Schwartzburg while he advanced

upon Blücher. But he could not catch Blücher. Therefore, on October 12, after some days of perplexity, he reversed his plan, and marched to Leipzig, hoping to catch Schwartzburg before he was joined by Bernadotte and Blücher. On October 15 he entered Leipzig, and on October 16 engaged Schwartzburg in battle. But he was too late, for during the battle Bernadotte and Blücher came up and made their junction, and Napoleon had to fight with all. He was not tactically defeated in the terrible battle of Leipzig that followed on the 18th; but, since he was not tactically successful, he was strategically defeated, because he needed a tactical victory to save him from a future defeat, surrounded as he was by enemies superior in force. On the 17th, instead of retreating, which he then might have done in safety, he sent a letter to the Austrian emperor, hinting at concessions. But it was too late: his enemies realized that they had him in their power. His overtures were spurned, and the allies, now reinforced, defeated him strategically on the 18th, and forced him to retreat toward Paris.

At this time all France except Napoleon was bent on peace. Had Napoleon not lost his ability to estimate a military situation with correctness, had he not become poisoned with success, and had he been really a patriot he could have saved his throne then by agreeing to the offers of the allies made in December, 1813, and February, 1814. In fact, when in Paris on February 4 he did give Caulaincourt *carte blanche* to treat with the allies; but unfortunately, he soon afterward heard that the allies had divided their forces, and he seized what he thought was an opportunity to destroy the force under Blücher, then marching on Paris. At first he was successful, for with incredible swiftness and force he gained three victories in three battles fought on February 10, 11, and 14, and stopped Blücher's advance. But the conditions were too unfavorable for even the genius of Napoleon to triumph over; and after seven weeks of wonderfully swift and skilful movements, directed with the strategic intention of cutting the

allies' communications behind them, he learned that the invaders were nearing Paris, and turned to fight a decisive battle before its walls. But the enemy had three days' start, and before Napoleon could reach Paris, Paris had surrendered. This she did on March 31.


Even then, this immeasurably strong and resolute man refused to admit that he was beaten, and tried to continue the struggle. But his marshals would no longer support him, and they induced him to accept terms of unconditional surrender which they had tried in vain to have made more gentle. On April 6 Napoleon renounced the thrones of France and Italy and five days later the treaty was signed awarding him the sovereignty of the little island of Elba, a body-guard, and an income. Napoleon drove south through France, through a bitterly resentful population and took up his residence in Elba.

The government of Louis XVIII started in with a policy that was so flavored with the surroundings and atmosphere of the old régime as to offend most of the people almost from the beginning, and to force on them the suspicion that all the evils which they had fought against in the Revolution were about to return, and that all the sacrifices of the nation had been made in vain. So great a spirit of antagonism to the government did this bring about that in less than a year Napoleon was able to leave Elba and make a triumphal journey through France, not only unopposed, but acclaimed, and to take up his residence in the Tuileries. This he did on the evening of March 20, 1815, borne in on the shoulders of the populace, the king and his court having that morning fled.

Napoleon proceeded with his customary energy, skill, and success, to establish himself anew upon the imperial throne. To make himself the more secure he assumed the rôle of lover of peace and liberty, caused a new constitution to be framed, secured an overwhelming vote in favor of its adoption, and on June 1 took the oath to obey it, in the presence of a great assembly.

But Europe rose in arms. Great Britain, Austria, Russia,

and Prussia bound themselves each to put 150,000 men in the field. Their forces soon began to gather. The first gathering was in Belgium, where in June the Duke of Wellington, commanding a mixed force of English, Dutch, Belgians, and Hanoverians, and Blucher, commanding a homogeneous Prussian



From Creasy's "Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World."  
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army, held a long and straggling line. Napoleon by this time had gathered an army of about 125,000 men, which was inferior to the combined forces of Wellington and Blucher, but which he nevertheless decided to attack. True to his strategic principles, he acted with the greatest promptness, realizing the necessity of beating Wellington and Blucher before the Russians and Austrians should get into the field, and also of defeating either Wellington or Blucher before they could unite.

With this end in view, he took his station near Charleroi on the northern side of the Sambre River, but on June 15, though he had hoped to be there on the 14th. He was ready to give battle on the 16th; but by this time, his approach had

become known, the English and Prussian armies were drawing together, and by noon Blucher had concentrated 90,000 men at Ligny, about fifteen miles northeast of Charleroi, while Wellington was hurrying troops to Quatre Bras, about fifteen miles northwest of Ligny and perhaps twenty miles north of Charleroi.

Brussels was about thirty miles north of Quatre Bras. Napoleon did not know that Blucher was so near and in such force, and supposed that the Prussians were widely dispersed. Accordingly, he split his army into two divisions, giving the left wing to Ney, with orders to push on toward Quatre Bras, and the right wing to Grouchy, with orders to advance toward Ligny; while he kept command of a large reserve, with which he could reinforce either Ney or Blucher, as circumstances might direct. His reckoning was upset when Grouchy found Blucher present in such force; but Napoleon immediately made up his mind to destroy Blucher, assisting his force and Grouchy's with additional troops, which he ordered Ney to send. Napoleon was successful in his battle with Blucher at Ligny on June 16, but not sufficiently so—largely because a detachment which he had ordered Ney to send, Ney called back before it had joined in the battle. Napoleon then overestimated the disaster to Blucher which he had inflicted, and so failed to exert as much promptness as otherwise he would have exerted in advancing toward Wellington, who had fallen back to a position at Waterloo about half way between Brussels and Quatre Bras, and about twelve miles west of Wavre, to which Blucher had retired. This was unfortunate for him under the circumstances; for Blucher had not retreated eastward in disorder, as Napoleon imagined, but northward and toward Wellington rather than away from him. The result was that during the battle of Waterloo, on June 18, Blucher reinforced Wellington, and turned the scale decisively and forever against Napoleon.

Napoleon saved republicanism in France, and therefore in Europe; and, though he left France smaller than he had

found her, and impoverished in every way, he left the French a great nation, and not a conquered nation, as they would have been if Napoleon had not lived. Many people blame Napoleon for all the Napoleonic wars. Those people forget that, although Napoleon was responsible for the later wars, the original wars were caused by the French Revolution, and that the Revolution was caused by the misgovernment of France and the intelligence and spirit of the French people, who rose in revolt against it.

The career of Napoleon furnishes perplexing illustrations of the facts that a man who is primarily a great strategist may leave no permanent monument to his strategy, but many imperishable monuments to his statecraft; that a man may practise strategy (or any art) with surpassing skill, and yet contribute nothing novel or useful to the art itself; that a man may gain all that the world can give, and yet close his life in prison, an exile from the world; that a man's life as a whole may be an ignominious failure regarded from a personal standpoint, and yet be successful in a high degree, regarded from the impersonal standpoint of achievement and the advancement of the human race; that a man may be almost destitute of morality of any kind, and yet do more good to the world than harm!

The ultimate influence of a man of genius does not depend so much on the personal character of the man himself as on the cause in which his genius is enlisted.

Fortunately for the world, the efforts of men of genius have generally been enlisted on the side of the establishment of good government and the attainment of the greatest good for the greatest number.

## CHAPTER XV

### FROM NAPOLEON TO MOLTKE

**A**FTER Napoleon, no great strategist appeared until the conflict between Prussia and Austria in 1866 showed that another genius had stepped upon the stage of war. The greatest writer on strategy, however, Clausewitz, lived in this interval of time.

During the years between there were several wars, but only two that, from the standpoint of strategy, can be called important. These were the Crimean War, between Russia on one side and Turkey, France, and England on the other, in 1854-55, and the Civil War in the United States, which was waged in 1861-65. Neither war was fruitful of great development in strategy, though both were marked with those instances of valor and endurance, and that persistence of effort of large bodies of men acting together in a common cause, that have marked most wars. Of the two, the Civil War was the more important historically, both in political results and strategical illustrations.

The Civil War broke out in the early part of 1861. From the dawn of history to the end of the Napoleonic wars, there had been a gradual and progressive change in the methods of warfare, due to the gradual increase in the number and the power of weapons of offense and the material adjuncts of defense. The spears and bows of the savage had been developed gradually, but only as bows and spears; for the cross-bow was only a bow, and the catapult and ballista did not differ greatly from it. The rude skins and hides used on shields and in protecting covering for the body had been gradually developed into armor and shields of steel; the use



of stone and bone and then of bronze in weapons had grown into the use of steel; battering-rams for occasional use had been devised and used, and horses had come into employment in the form that we call cavalry. The greatest single change that had taken place in warfare had been caused by the invention and employment of the gun.

That this had made a considerable change in warfare cannot be denied; nevertheless the change that it made in strategy or tactics was not so great as some imagine, because it merely increased the velocity and penetrative power of projectiles and the range over which they could be fired. The armies of Napoleon, like the armies of Thutmose, moved by means of the legs of men and horses; the men and horses in Napoleon's day could march no faster than those in the days of Thutmose, and both the men and horses were subject to identical limitations as to distances that could be traversed, and had identical requirements in the way of food. Almost the only radical difference in Napoleon's time lay in the use of the gun and the necessity for making and providing powder. There was far less difference between the conditions of warfare on land in the days of Thutmose and those in the days of Napoleon, than between the conditions in the days of Napoleon and the conditions now.

On the sea far greater changes had come about. There was greater difference between the vessels of war in Napoleon's day and the vessels of war in Thutmose's day than there was between the armies of those epochs. In Egypt's palmy days, though occasional trips were made from Egypt or Phœnicia even into the Atlantic, such trips were rare indeed; but in Napoleon's time large fleets of men-of-war cruised over all the world, showed the flags of their countries in the great naval and commercial harbors, and transported large armies over great ocean spaces.

Between the time of Napoleon and the breaking out of our Civil War in 1861, the use of the steamship, and of mechanism generally, had become established in all civilized countries

and incorporated in the daily life. The electric telegraph had also come into employment; iron and steel of excellent quality were produced in quantities; steamships traversed the ocean and railroad trains traversed the land. Muskets and cannon had increased in size and power, but otherwise had not changed materially.

Because of the progress occasioned by the development of mechanism, the Civil War was fought under conditions that were more different from the conditions in the days of Napoleon than were the conditions of Napoleon from those of Thutmose. In the days of Napoleon, and before, the speed of movement, and in almost an equal degree the speed of conveying information and giving instructions, were governed by the speed of movement of a man or a horse; but in the Civil War large masses of troops were transported by railroad trains, and information and instructions were transmitted instantaneously by the electric telegraph. These new conditions profoundly influenced the *tactical* movements of troops, and the *conditions* under which the strategical plans of each side were made and carried out. Nevertheless, we see the same strategical efforts to outflank the enemy; to threaten his communications, his supplies, and his way of retreat; to confuse him by feints; to ascertain his weak point, and to launch a powerful blow against that weak point, that we see in the operations of Napoleon and Thutmose, and in those of the other strategists who waged war in the intervening centuries.

The weakest point in the situation at the beginning of the Civil War was on the Southern side. It was in the line of communication between the Confederacy and Europe, by which the Confederacy could send cotton to Europe, and receive in return from Europe arms, munitions, and supplies. This point was made weaker by the fact that the Confederate Navy was inferior to the Union Navy. The Confederates endeavored to overcome this inferiority by rebuilding and arming the large steam frigate *Merrimac*, realizing that if they could produce a warship that could easily whip any

other, she and similar vessels could overcome the wooden vessels of the Union navy and prevent any blockade of the Southern coast. They realized also that the *Merrimac* might even shell such cities as New York and Boston, and even go up the Potomac River to Washington.

On the very day of her departure from the Norfolk Navy Yard, March 8, 1862, the *Merrimac* destroyed almost immediately two large Union men-of-war, the *Cumberland* and the *Congress*. This created a profound and justifiable alarm on the Union side, and a corresponding elation on the Confederate side; but on the following day the *Monitor* defeated the *Merrimac* and ruined the whole Confederate scheme. It did even more, because it made it possible for the North to do to the South just what the South had intended to do to the North. It did even more still; because it showed to the world that the United States had produced a warship that was superior to any other then existing in the world, and that could be reproduced in large numbers in a short time, and therefore prevent any foreign power from enforcing any inimical policy on our coast. The result was that Great Britain did not recognize the Confederacy, a fairly close blockade of the Southern coast was maintained, and the Confederate army was so enfeebled from lack of munitions and supplies, and the Confederate government was so embarrassed from lack of money, that the South had to give up the struggle.

The profound effect of the battle between the *Monitor* and the *Merrimac* was not realized at the time; with the result that the main effort on the Union side was devoted, not to breaking down the weakest part, the Confederate line of communication to Europe, but to breaking down the strongest part—the Confederate army. Both sides fought the war with splendid courage, energy, and devotion, and in the latter part of the war with great tactical and strategical skill. During the major part of the war, however, most of the participants, even among the higher officers, were so inexperienced and untrained (especially on the Northern side), and the generals

were so interfered with (especially on the Northern side) by the President and by an ignorant and impulsive public opinion, that they were somewhat in the position that a pugilist would be in, if some bystander or bystanders were continually interfering with the movements of his arms and legs.

The result was that a war which under proper strategical direction would have been decided in a very short time, and with a comparatively slight loss of blood and money, dragged along for four heart-rending years.

## CHAPTER XVI

### MOLTKE

**M**OLTKE was made chief of staff of the Prussian army in January, 1858. He was then nearly fifty-eight years old, but he was just beginning his career.

We have confined our attention thus far in this book to the great geniuses in strategy. It has been noticeable that the subordinate commanders under those great geniuses frequently suffered reverses when they acted on their own responsibility, and not under the immediate direction of their superiors. Napoleon said, in speaking of his generals: "They do not understand my system."

The reason doubtless was that those great geniuses saw something in war that their subordinates did not see: they saw something that they had not been trained to see, that nobody told them to see, and that they were able to see solely with that peculiar mental eye which is part of the make-up of—a genius.

The sole training of soldiers and sailors of all grades, up to the time of Moltke, had been in wielding the weapons, and in manœvering the organizations of men who wielded the weapons that existed at the time they lived. A soldier, for instance, had been taught and trained to handle his spear or bow or sword or musket; a colonel had been taught and trained (mostly by experience) to manœuver his regiment of soldiers; a captain in the navy to manœuver his ship; a general to manœuver his division, corps, or army; and an admiral to manœuver his squadron or fleet.

The training in armies and navies has always been better than the training in any other walks of life, for the reason

that they have been the only vocations for which a nation has selected boys and youths, and given them a system of training that began in the impressionable period of youth and lasted throughout their lives; and the result has been that when Alexander or Cæsar or Nelson or Napoleon has told a subordinate commander to take his command to a certain place, and to manœuver it in such and such a way against such and such an enemy, the duty has been skilfully performed.

Yet, if one of those subordinate commanders found himself in a situation in which he himself had to decide alone where to take his force, and when, and what to do with it when he got there, he found himself confronted with a situation that he had not been trained to meet. He was in a situation somewhat like that in which a soldier would be who had been trained to be merely a skilful and accurate marksman, and who could be relied upon to hit a target, provided that he was told what target to fire at and its distance, if he found himself on a battlefield and compelled to rely on himself to select the best target and ascertain its distance.

Moltke seems to have conceived the idea that this difficulty could be obviated by giving officers careful training in tactics and strategy as well as in drills, manœuvers, transportation, etc.; and that, though it was ordinarily supposed that the only means by which an officer could receive training in tactics and strategy was in actual war, that nevertheless a great deal could be accomplished by giving officers theoretical instruction, and imparting to them what Mahan so well calls "preparedness of mind."

To this end, he instituted schools of instruction in which officers were exercised at solving hypothetical problems. For instance, you are at such and such a place, commanding a force composed of so and so; the instructions you have received have been to accomplish so and so; you receive unexpected information that a force of the enemy, consisting of so and so, was seen at a certain place at a certain time, marching in such and such a direction. What do you do? Moltke

devoted himself, as Colonel Maude expresses it, to the "adaptation of strategical and tactical methods to changes in armament and the methods of communication, to the training of staff officers in accordance with the methods worked out, to the perfection of the arrangements for the mobilization of the army, and to the study of European politics in connection with the plans for campaign that might become necessary."

Moltke evidently realized in 1858 that the tremendous improvements produced in the civilized world by the progress of the physical and mechanical arts and sciences, especially in the matters of transportation, communication, and improved weapons, would have so enormous an influence in the next war that the nation that entered the war better prepared to utilize those improvements than her enemy would have a great advantage. He also realized that, though a savage tribe could get ready for war in a very short time, and though even Napoleon did not need a long time to get an army ready, yet that in order to prepare the more highly specialized weapons of 1858, in order to adapt railroad systems to the transportation of armies, in order to organize a military telegraph service, in order to do all the things necessary in so thorough a way that, when war should be declared, he would have an actual machine actually ready for his purpose, a long and laborious period of preparation in advance would be required.

It has often been said that Moltke cannot be compared favorably with strategists like Napoleon, for the reason that in the three wars in which he was the dominant figure he never found himself in situations such as Napoleon often found himself in, and from which Napoleon extricated himself by means of those brilliant and rapid combinations and manœuvres that made Napoleon Bonaparte the Napoleon of history. This doubtless is true; and, in fact, it can hardly be imagined that a man seventy years old, as Moltke was in the war between France and Prussia, would be capable of those feats of rapidity and endurance that characterized the youth-

ful Alexander and Napoleon. But it may be pointed out that the reason why Moltke never found himself in such situations was that *Moltke had prevented them from existing*. Moltke introduced into the art of war an element almost entirely new—the element of *peace strategy*, the element of utilizing in peace the strategic, tactical, and logistical skill of officers, in preparing plans of campaign for all probable situations or combinations of situations; so that, when war broke out, instant action was possible—and not only instant action, but orderly action; no part interfering with any other part, but all the parts working together, as in any other machine, to the attainment of one purpose.

The result was that, when war broke out with France in 1870, we do not see on Prussia's part any of that confused and disordered excitement, any of that hysterical enthusiasm, any of that wild rush, that had characterized all wars before, except possibly the wars of Julius Cæsar. On the contrary, we see a tremendous engine start smoothly when the button is pressed, and operate smoothly until all is over. Then we see it quietly come to rest again. There was a neatness, an artistic finish, in Prussia's wars with Austria and France that had never been seen before. There was also a promptness in finishing the wars that had never been seen before. Many wars of immeasurably less importance, and immeasurably inferior in the number and power of the forces engaged, have dragged along for years; like our Civil War, and in a greater degree the Thirty Years' War that made Germany almost a wilderness. But, in the war with Austria, the Prussian army defeated the Austrian decisively in seventeen days after war began; and, in the war with France, the Prussians defeated the French at Sedan and received the surrender of Napoleon III in forty-five days.

It must not be supposed that in either war Prussia was fighting a foe supposed to be inferior. Austria was a nation with a larger population, spread over a larger area, and with a greater historic past. France was governed by a nephew of



Napoleon the Great, and was esteemed by the world at large to be the greatest military country on the earth. Both countries had large armies, and these armies were supposed to be highly trained. But they had been trained under old methods, and Moltke's army had been trained under new methods. The soldiers of Austria and France were as brave and enduring as Moltke's, and the officers were as skilful in manœuvring the various units. The real difference lay where the real difference has always lain, when decisive victories have been gained over equal or superior forces: it lay at the top. *The difference lay in the mind that prepared Moltke's army and the minds that prepared the Austrian and French armies.*

The condition of the Austrian and French armies was like the condition in which most men get in middle life, a condition of approximate automaticity. By middle life most men have "learned their jobs," and proceed thereafter to act almost automatically. Most men leave school with a feeling of relief because they will not have to study any more. The greatest single difficulty that the Torpedo Station at Newport had to meet, and later the War College, was the reluctance of officers to "go to school." This reluctance is easily understood, for the reason that studying a new thing always requires a degree of mental effort that is very considerable; while the degree of mental effort required later in utilizing the knowledge gained is much less, because it is of an inferior order. The mental effort required of a learner at the piano is greater than the mental effort exercised afterward by even the most expert pianist. The difference between the two is related to the difference between the scientist and the artist. For, while it is true that the work of the artist is the only work that bears fruit that is apparent,—while it is true that it is the finished product, the beautiful painting, the perfected invention, the decisive battle, that appeals to men,—yet nevertheless the mental effort that originated each is the greatest mental effort involved in the entire performance, and underlies each one as its foundation.

Like most foundations, also, it is hidden from view and usually forgotten.

Moltke seems to have realized this; but, whether he did or not, he actually saved the minds of the officers of the Prussian army, or rather those of a certain selected group, from automaticity. He kept their minds in good working order, and along a line that he himself prescribed; with the result that all of these officers became strategists and tacticians (though, of course, in varying degrees), and could be relied upon to carry out a task, if simply told what the task was, and without the need of receiving detailed orders or of remaining under supervision. This permitted decentralization to a degree unknown before, and enabled each officer in high command to trust each subordinate to carry out the details of his individual task, and to devote his own time and attention to the great problem before him as an entirety.

The first war in which Moltke became engaged after assuming the duties of chief of staff was the one with Denmark, about the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. Into the merits and demerits of the Schleswig-Holstein controversy, out of which no country emerged with any honor, and only Prussia emerged with any material gain, it is not within the province of this book to enter. As a result of the controversy, Prussia and Austria combined against Denmark, and sent an army of 45,000 men into Holstein, which is south of Schleswig, as Schleswig is of Denmark. Moltke was a firm believer in the efficacy of enveloping operations, and an advocate of using them whenever a preponderance of force or of skill rendered them safe. He therefore recommended a plan that entailed a movement to cut off the retreat of the Danes, pointing out that a mere victory over them would enable them to retreat to the islands of Alsen and Funen, where they would be better fitted to resist, because they could receive the assistance of their fleet. He was not sent with the invading army, however, and his plan was mismanaged in execution, with the result that the Danes did retreat to the islands. Moltke was sent to

the front on April 30, as chief of staff to the commander-in-chief; and, on his advice, a system of operations was at once instituted, whereby the island of Alsen was attacked and captured. As a consequence, a treaty of peace was soon afterward signed, by which the King of Denmark ceded all his claims on Schleswig and Holstein, as well as Lauenberg, to the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia.

But the resulting situation was obviously only a temporary one, because it aggravated the already disturbed condition among the German states, and brought about additional causes of friction between Austria and Prussia. Austria had long regarded Prussia as a too aggressive minor state, and had resented her rapidly rising importance, with its threat against Austria as the dominant power of Germany; while Prussia regarded Austria as an enemy of the movement to unite Germany. During the two years that followed the peace with Denmark, actual enmity rapidly developed between Prussia and certain North German states on one side, and Austria and the South German states on the other side.

Even in Prussia, however, and even in Berlin, and even in the army, there was no enthusiasm for war with Austria, and little approval of the aggressive policy of the government. But the government, inspired by Bismarck, persisted even to the point of increasing the army and ordering supplies and munitions without authority from Parliament. On the Austrian side, on the contrary, while perhaps there was no enthusiasm, there was perfect unity of purpose: for both Austria and the people of South Germany were highly embittered against the Prussians. The fact, therefore, that Prussia triumphed in the war, while the forces on the two sides were virtually equal, was not because of national unity on the one side and lack of it on the other, but because of superior strategy—Moltke's strategy.

On June 15, 1866, Prussia demanded of Hanover, Hesse, and Saxony that they should restore their armies to a peace standard and remain neutral, under penalty of losing their

independence. These countries rejected this demand, and the next day Prussia invaded all of them. This act began the war. Moltke had acquired considerable prestige in the war with Denmark, with the result that his plan of operations against Austria was accepted. Like most great plans, it was simple in principle, but worked out carefully in detail; the details conforming to the general plan, and the general plan being of such a nature that practical details could be worked out successfully, and yet conform to the general plan.

By this general plan, the Prussians were to advance at once toward the south into Bohemia, on the northern edge of Austria, with the major part of their force, leaving only a comparatively small force of about 48,000 men to deal with the states of North and South Germany. To carry it out would be to violate what has been deemed by some to be a cardinal principle of strategy—that one must not leave an enemy in his rear. But Moltke's intimate knowledge of all the military and political conditions enabled him to perceive that, in the situation as it actually existed at the time, taking into account the inferior training, equipment, and unreadiness of the Austrian army, he could probably inflict a fatal blow on Austria in a very short time, and that then the hostile German states would be very glad to yield.

One feature of the campaign against Austria that strategists and writers on strategy are apt to ignore is the fact that the Prussians had had the foresight to adopt, some time before, a new invention—a breech-loading "needle-gun"; and that the Austrians had not had that foresight. Strategists and writers on strategy have, in most cases, shown a tendency to belittle the effect of mechanical and scientific improvements in weapons and appliances, and to give all the credit for victories to the manœuvring of the forces engaged, both in the strategical operations preceding battle and in the tactical operations during battle. This is natural, of course; but, at the same time, it may be pointed out that, inasmuch as the only effect of a gun in the hands of a soldier is to hit an

enemy with its bullet, a gun in the hands of a soldier which is twice as good as the gun in the hands of his opponent makes him almost as effective as two against that other soldier; and that, since to get a virtual preponderance in ability to hurt an enemy is the ultimate aim of strategy, the adoption of an improved weapon is just as much an effort of strategy as is the adoption of any line of march, or combination of marches, or other movements in actual operations. The adoption of a new weapon in time of peace is, of course, an operation of preparation strategy, rather than of war strategy; but the fruit of Moltke's life was to make preparation strategy more important than war strategy.

The Prussians invaded Saxony at once, occupying Dresden and Leipzig on June 18 and 19. They then advanced in five principal columns, which later combined in three, to form the Army of the Elbe on the west, the First Army under Prince Frederick Charles in the center, and the Second Army under the Crown Prince on the east. The armies advanced over difficult mountain paths, but were not molested until they emerged from them into the plains of Bohemia. The forces on both sides were about 250,000, the Prussian being somewhat more numerous, and much better armed, supplied, organized, and trained. A number of minor battles occurred in the latter part of June, caused by unsuccessful attempts of the Austrians to prevent the Army of the Elbe from uniting with the First Army, and to prevent the junction with them of the Second Army. But on June 30 the Army of the Elbe and the First Army, with the King of Prussia personally in command, appeared before the enemy, who were concentrated near the fortress of Koniggratz and the village of Sadowa; while the Second Army, under the Crown Prince, was close at hand to the eastward.

The Austrian army was drawn up with its back to the Elbe. Their position had been carefully strengthened, but its selection seems somewhat unwise, from the fact that the river was directly behind them and made retreat more diffi-

cult for the Austrians if they should be defeated. About midnight of July 2, the Prussian king resolved to attack early on the following day, and sent an order to the Crown Prince to assault the enemy's right flank as soon as practicable—about two o'clock in the afternoon, as estimated. In the early forenoon the Prussian main force, commanded by the king himself, consisting of the Army of the Elbe and the First Army, made a determined frontal attack, which continued without intermission until noon, by which time the supply of artillery ammunition was running low; and yet no ground had been gained. The situation of the Prussians was much like that of the English under Wellington at Waterloo, when Wellington exclaimed: "Oh, for night or Blucher!" And, as at Waterloo, the looked-for reinforcements did come in on the enemy's right flank, and turned a doubtful and terrible contest into a decisive victory.

The victory was so decisive that Austria, the acknowledged dominant power of Germany for many centuries, signed an armistice only nineteen days afterward, confirmed it on August 23 by the Treaty of Prague, consented to the dissolution of the South German Confederation and virtually accepted all the changes proposed by Prussia. Prussia forthwith formed the North German Confederation, which made all the North German states virtually her subject states, with their foreign affairs under her control and their military forces under her command.

The next war in which Moltke was concerned was one with France. Napoleon III was emperor, and maintained himself in power by his skilful and unscrupulous catering to the vanity and love of pleasure of the French people, especially the mob. The brilliant success of the French armies in the Crimean and Italian wars, the beauty of the empress, and the splendor of the Exposition held in Paris in 1867, at which the emperor entertained the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia as his guests, convinced the French (and almost the

whole civilized world) that France was the greatest nation in Europe and Napoleon III the greatest sovereign.

Outwardly France was a very great and highly civilized nation, and the French army the equal of the armies of Napoleon the Great. But the government was corrupt, the people kept in good humor by false pretenses, and the whole structure ready to fall at the first determined blow. The French people, believing the government strong and the army the best in the world, thirsted for glory and looked with jealousy on the rising power of Prussia. The emperor felt the same jealousy; but it is hardly conceivable that he did not know that the German army was superior to the French, both in numbers and training. It is certain that Moltke knew it.

Into the details of the quarrel that brought about the rupture it is not necessary to enter here. The only fact that need be stated is that on July 19, 1870, France, the entire nation enthusiastically concurring, declared war against Prussia.

Moltke had been making plans for a war with France ever since 1857, and had perfected arrangements for the mobilization and transport of the army to the frontier between France and Germany, which were revised annually to meet all the changing conditions that were continually taking place; with the result that when, on July 15, he received the secret order to mobilize the army, his plans were fully ready. They were followed afterward, with only such changes, from time to time, as the situations that arose demanded. But so well had Moltke been able to divine what the French opening movements would be, by reason of his intense study of the problem in all its phases, that the changes necessitated were few and easily made.

On the other hand, France, despite the military ardor of her people, their intense desire for glory, their hatred of Prussia, and their knowledge that a war must come some day, was wholly unprepared. The French Minister of War reported to the emperor that the army was ready "to the last button of

the gaiters." Subsequent events proved that the army was not ready, and that he did not even know that it was not ready; while the phrase he used showed that his thoughts had been more engaged by the material requirements of the army than by its strategic plans of operations.

The emperor assembled 150,000 men at Metz, 100,000 at Strasburg, and 50,000 at Chalons, the three places constituting points of a triangle on the frontier east of Paris; Metz being the northern point, Strasburg the southern or southeastern point, and Chalons the western point. Moltke concentrated nearly the entire German army in one locality south of Mayence. Napoleon's general plan was to go in person with the 150,000 from Metz to Strasburg, combine with the 100,000 there, and then, with the combined force of about 250,000, to invade Germany in the vicinity of Strasburg. The plan of Moltke was to resist the invasion that he expected would most probably be in that vicinity; and, in case he was ready to strike sooner, to advance into France, and then to wheel his entire force to the right and north, so as to drive the French north and break their communications with Paris. The Prussian army consisted of three armies, aggregating considerably more than 400,000 men, besides which were about 100,000 that were left behind in Prussia, in case Austria should seize the opportunity to attack.

The Prussian plans were so much the more complete, and the arrangements for carrying them into effect were so much the more thorough, that the result became apparent before a battle had been fought; for the Prussians advanced actually into France before the French had got their forces together. The first important battle was on August 6 at Worth, a few miles inside the frontier on the French side, in which the crown prince, in command of the Third Army, attacked the forces of Marshal MacMahon before MacMahon had collected them all in readiness, and defeated him so thoroughly that the retreat became a rout, and many French fled into Strasburg. This battle was brought on prematurely, and not ex-



actly according to Moltke's plans; for he had desired that MacMahon's retreat should be cut off, and MacMahon forced to surrender. On the same day, a battle was fought at Spicheren, farther to the north and west, which also resulted favorably to the Prussians, and which, with the battle of Worth, effectually prevented any junction between MacMahon and Bazaine. The emperor was then with Bazaine at Metz; but he left Metz on August 14, and joined MacMahon.

The Germans now made a general advance of all three armies into France. Bazaine endeavored to retire from Metz toward Paris; but the First Army overtook his rear guard, and brought on a battle which, though minor, destroyed Bazaine's last opportunity to retreat, without exposing his flank to attack. Meanwhile the Second Army had crossed the Moselle River, on which Metz was situated, and moved opposite Metz. A series of operations now took place, which culminated near Gravelotte, on August 18, in one of the most important battles of history. In this battle the armies had changed the directions in which they faced, the French facing westward and the Germans facing eastward; a change that made the prospect for the defeated party more difficult than it would otherwise have been. The French fought the battle with their accustomed and hereditary ardor and courage; but they were utterly routed nevertheless; their army being broken and defeated, and Bazaine forced to withdraw his army of nearly 200,000 men within the walls of Metz. It is to be noted that Moltke had manœvered his armies in such a way as to force Bazaine into Metz, in order that he might hold him securely there, and have the rest of his army free to march to Paris.

Moltke (or more exactly the king on Moltke's recommendation) detailed about 160,000 men to detain Bazaine in Metz, and, with the rest of the army, prepared to advance toward Paris. But the amazing news then came that MacMahon was marching by a northerly route to the relief of Metz, thus leaving the way to Paris entirely open: a plan devised by the

Prime Minister Palikao, indorsed by the Empress Eugénie, and opposed strongly by MacMahon! As soon as Moltke became convinced that the information, though incredible, was nevertheless correct, he determined to move to the north instead of on Paris, and attack MacMahon before he could unite with Bazaine. In this he was successful, with the result that MacMahon was brought to battle near Sedan on September 1, while virtually surrounded, and forced to surrender his entire command. The French, repulsed wherever they attempted to break through the ring around them, were driven into the little fortress of Sedan, the emperor among them. He surrendered with the rest on September 2.

On August 31 and September 1 Bazaine made a desperate effort to break the German line round Metz, in order to join MacMahon; but the sortie was unsuccessful, and he was compelled to withdraw again into what had become the prison of his army.

The war had now been decided, but the French people were not sufficiently versed in strategy to realize it; and an awful amount of useless loss of life resulted. The Germans marched on Paris and besieged it, meanwhile maintaining the siege of Metz, realizing that the fall of both cities was merely a question of time. The French showed an amount and a degree of skill and courage and devotion that would have been of the highest possible value, *if exercised during the years preceding the war*, but which now were worse than useless, and resulted merely in a series of disastrous minor battles, and in humiliation and suffering of all kinds.

Metz surrendered on October 27, the surrender including 173,000 men and three marshals. The people of Paris defended their city, and the other people of France harassed the besiegers until January 26, 1871, when hostilities were suspended. On January 28 an armistice was signed, and on February 26 a preliminary treaty of peace.

The extraordinary quickness and completeness of the German victory was due almost wholly to the superior training

in strategy of the German officers. Henderson says: "Even the French generals of divisions and brigades had had more actual experience [in war] than those who led the German army corps. Compared with the German rank and file, a great part of their non-commissioned officers and men were veterans, and veterans who had seen much service. Their chief officers were practically familiar with the methods of moving, supplying, and manœuvring large masses of troops; their marshals were valiant and successful soldiers. And yet, the history of modern warfare records no defeats so swift and complete as those of Koniggratz and Sedan. The great host of Austria was shattered in seven weeks; the French imperial army was destroyed in seven weeks and three days; and to all intents and purposes the resistance they had offered was not much more effective than that of a respectable militia. But both the Austrian and the French armies were organized and trained under the old system. Courage, experience, and professional pride they possessed in abundance. Man for man in all virile qualities, neither officers nor men were inferior to their foes. But one thing their generals lacked, and that was education for war. Strategy was almost a sealed book to them." Also: "Moltke committed no mistake. Long before war had been declared, every possible precaution had been made. And these included much more than arrangements for rapid mobilization, the assembly of superior numbers completely organized, and the establishment of magazines. The enemy's numbers, armaments, readiness, and efficiency had been submitted to a most searching examination. Every possible movement that might be made, however unlikely, had been foreseen; every possible danger that might arise, however remote, discussed and guarded against." Also: "That the Prussian system should be imitated, and her army deprived of its monopoly of high efficiency, was naturally inevitable. Every European state has to-day its college, its intelligence department, its schools of instruction, and its course of field manœuvres and field firing."

The unprecedented despatch with which this war and the war with Austria were settled, the long period of time during which the causes operated that brought on the wars, the facts that the armies had had nothing to do with bringing on the wars, and that the wars had been brought on by the people themselves, bring to our minds the analogy so often pointed out between the usefulness of surgery and the usefulness of war. In both cases, causes that are harmful to healthful living bring about an unhealthful condition, and in both cases this unhealthful condition is removed (or the attempt is made to remove it) by means that are very painful and very bloody, and that leave the patient in a weakened condition for a considerable time thereafter. If this analogy be at all correct, we are forced to admit that any means that can quicken the surgical operation in one case, or the progress of war in the other case, must be beneficial.

There seems no reasonable doubt that *Moltke did more to shorten wars than did any other man in history*. It is true that the shortening of the wars has been paid for by long and laborious and expensive periods of preparation. Whether the shortening of wars is worth the cost or not, we have no exact means of determining; but those people who inveigh against the "burden of militarism" should, in all fairness, realize that, without that burden, the world would be in the position that it was in when protracted wars like the Hundred Years' War and the Thirty Years' War cursed the human race.

## CHAPTER XVII

### FROM MOLTKE TO TOGO

SINCE Moltke, no genius in the art of strategy seems to have arisen, and no great contributor to its science has been recognized, though several wars have occurred. It is possible, however, that, after the records of the present war shall have been gone over carefully, it may be found that a strategist really great was on one side or the other.

The first important war, from the standpoint of strategy, was that between China and Japan, which was waged in the years 1894 and 1895. It is important mainly because it illustrates the fact that, if a nation has the military instinct and character, it can in a short while attain proficiency in the technical arts of modern war and become a great fighting force. Only forty years before, China and Japan had been on about the same plane in the elements of material civilization, but the Chinese nation was much the more numerous. The Japanese, however, not having gone through protracted periods of peace, had not lost their mental alertness, and had long realized the danger to their national existence that was indicated by the powerful men-of-war from Europe and America that visited the Orient.

The result was that immediately after Commodore Perry's visit and virtual ultimatum in July, 1853, the Japanese bestirred themselves to acquire education and training, especially in the mechanic arts. They bestirred themselves with an energy, a foresight, and a clearness of purpose that have no parallel in history; so that, when they finally came to war with China in 1894, they had an army and a navy that was much better in equipment and training than China's. The Chinese fought as bravely as the Japanese, but they suffered

a humiliating defeat, nevertheless. The most important battle was a naval battle off the Yalu River on September 17, 1894. This battle showed what several modern naval battles have shown—that, because of the superior concentration of power in ships as compared with armies, decisions are won more quickly, and with much smaller loss of life. Some Chinese vessels, escaping to the naval base at Wei-Hai-Wei, were followed by the Japanese. The forts there being taken soon by the Japanese troops, the Chinese vessels were all captured, and the issue of the war decided. The treaty of peace was signed at Shimonoseki on April 17, 1895.

The next important war was that between the United States and Spain, which broke out in 1898. The cause was the bad condition of affairs in Cuba, and the cause of this was the tyrannical misrule of Spain. Not only was the condition bad to such a degree as to make Cuba an international nuisance, especially to the United States, but it continued year after year, and without any reasonable hope of betterment. The reason why the conditions continued so long was the bad strategical handling of the Spanish troops on the island; for there were more than enough troops to keep the insurgents in subjection. But a good strategical handling of the troops could not be expected under a government so inefficient as that of Spain, for *inefficient government and inefficient strategy usually go together*. The war was precipitated by the explosion of the U. S. S. *Maine* in Havana harbor: another illustration of the fact that, *while the causes of most wars are powerful and profound, they often lie passive until some exciting occurrence acts like a spark to gunpowder*.

Few wars more unwise than this war, on the part of Spain, have ever occurred. Not only was Spain inferior to the United States in naval power, but she was at a great strategical disadvantage, because Cuba was nearer to the United States than to herself. It is inconceivable that the government of Spain had so little strategical knowledge and insight as not to know that a war with the United States would be

disastrous to Spain; but it is certain that the people of Spain were so ignorant of strategy that they did not know it. *It was fundamentally because of lack of strategical knowledge among the Spanish people that the nation went to war.*

The Spanish government itself endeavored to keep at peace; but, like many other governments, they were unable to do this because of the attitude of the people. The position of the Spanish government was somewhat like that of Napoleon III in 1870. These two illustrations and many others show the great danger to a country of ignorance of strategy among its people. A grasp of the elements of strategy by the people of a country is just as important to the safety of the country, as a whole, as is a knowledge of the elements of hygiene to the health of its individuals.

The first battle was a naval battle in Manila Bay on May 1. This battle, from the standpoint of strategy, was one of the most interesting in history; not because it illustrated good strategy, but because it illustrated bad strategy. I was present at the battle as navigator of the *Petrel*; and, as I had taken up my station aloft, I had a perfect view of all that happened. We had expected that the Spanish fleet would be found in such a position in the bay that it would be supported by the guns on the shores of the bay. We knew that there were four large guns, much more powerful than any in our fleet, mounted in elevated positions, supported by many other guns, and possessed of ideal facilities for quick and accurate aiming; and we knew also that the combined power of the shore batteries and the ship batteries was far in excess of the power of all we had. But, to our amazement and delight, we found that the Spanish fleet, which of itself was inferior to ours, had anchored in a part of the bay where the guns of the city could not help them in the slightest! The result was the destruction of the Spanish fleet and the consequent helplessness of Manila. This does not mean helplessness against our artillery fire, but helplessness against an effective blockade, which Dewey immediately instituted.

The ardent and methodical attack of Dewey was strategically and tactically correct. This, combined with our better gunnery and our superiority in force, was the cause of the result. That all the Spanish ships should have been sunk, while almost no damage was received by the American ships, has excited great astonishment; but it is not a matter for astonishment at all. As the tables in Chapter IV show, a force originally superior becomes increasingly superior, and to a degree depending on the degree of original superiority. At the battle of Manila, the principal part of our superiority in force was superiority in gunnery. Astonishment has often been expressed that we hit the Spanish ships so many times, while they hit us so seldom: astonishment has been expressed that it should have been possible to make so many misses as the Spanish did. But it should be remembered that a ship occupies but a small part of the field of view, and that the chance of hitting it is extremely small, unless a gun is pointed at it *correctly*; and also that there are thousands of ways in which to point a gun incorrectly, but only one way of pointing it correctly. This may seem a digression from the subject of strategy, but really it is giving an illustration; for the study of strategy, like the study of gunnery, is simply a study of how to find the only right path to pursue out of countless wrong paths.

Spain sent a fleet across the ocean to Cuba in response (it must be) to the feeling that "someone must do something"; for what that fleet could do effectively on the coast of the United States against a superior fleet is not clear now, and it could not have seemed clear even then to the Spanish government. On May 19 the Spanish fleet went into Santiago harbor, where it was blockaded for several weeks by an American fleet of superior power under Admiral Sampson. Finally it was ordered out by the Spanish government, though its only possible fate was complete destruction. Complete destruction it received—about an hour being sufficient to accomplish it. This was on July 3.



These two battles virtually decided the war, though subsequent small land operations in both the Philippines and Cuba were undertaken afterward, to give the *coup de grâce*.

The main results of the war, brief and comparatively bloodless as it was, were as important as those of any war in history, and much more important than the results of many wars that were long and bloody; and they supply an illustration of the important fact that, as a rule, the ultimate consequences of short and decisive wars have been the most important. The main single result of the Spanish war was that the United States emerged from the position of a second-rate power into the first rank among the nations of the earth. By reason of the facts that the United States was the richest country in the world (except Great Britain), that it had long stood in the first rank in the matter of individual intelligence of the people, and that its form of government was ideally higher than any other, it cannot truthfully be denied that the rise of the United States was an advantage, and a very great advantage, to mankind. Though there were several factors that led to our success in the war, it is obvious that the greatest single one was strategy.

An interesting fable was born shortly after the battle of Manila, to the effect that at the subsequent bombardment of the city, on August 13, the British fleet placed itself between the German and the American fleets in the harbor. The interesting part of the fable is not the fable itself, but the fact that belief in it exists broadcast to-day. No such occurrence happened; and yet, I am credibly informed that the story has been accepted by historians in general and incorporated permanently in history!

The war with Spain was followed, on the part of the United States, by a war with the Filipinos, who had been grievously oppressed by the Spaniards, and now seized the opportunity, as they thought, to get their independence. Because the United States government did not decide quickly whether or not to take the Philippines, the insurrection as-

sumed large proportions, and was consequently quelled with difficulty and considerable loss of life. The main argument against taking them was that mere conquest did not give us the right. Of course, we realized finally that, if we did not assume the government of the islands, the various savage tribes would fight against each other for it, and establish a condition of barbarism in place of the comparative civilization of the Spanish rule; whereas we would give them a government much more civilized than that of the Spaniards.

The next war (October, 1899, to May, 1902) was between Great Britain and the Boer Republic in South Africa—caused, as many wars have been, by a difference in opinion as to what was right and what was wrong. In this case, the difference was in regard to certain matters in dispute between the government of the Boer Republic and certain subjects of Great Britain who resided in the Boer Republic and owned property there. Since there was no other way to decide the question except the oldest way, that of resorting to force, force was resorted to.

It may be pointed out, in passing, that when any individual, in even the most enlightened nation, is compelled to do a thing that he thinks he ought not to be compelled to do, or to refrain from doing a thing that he thinks he has a right to do, force is resorted to just as much as when two nations go to war.

Great Britain had the advantage, of course, of immeasurably greater strength; but the Boer Republic had the strategic advantage in the fact that Great Britain had to send troops and supplies over the great ocean distance between her and South Africa. It was inevitable that Great Britain should triumph in the end; but the war lasted for more than two years and a half. The war is interesting from the fact that, in the early part of the war, the strategy of the Boers was better than that of the British, although the British forces were mostly those of the regular army and navy. The trouble with the British forces seems to have been that the officers in the higher commands were suffering from what I beg leave to

call automaticity; that is, they acted automatically along the line in which they had been trained, and used methods suitable to war with armies like themselves and in the closely populated districts of continental Europe, instead of devising methods suitable for fighting the rapidly moving and frequently dispersed guerrilla bands of the Boers. They manœvered in somewhat the same way as General Braddock did, in fighting the Indians in North America, during the Seven Years' War. The Boers, on the contrary, adopted methods that were efficacious under the conditions that actually existed.

This war is interesting strategically, therefore, as exemplifying a truth which is often overlooked—that each contestant in a war always has, or ought to have, a definite mission to accomplish, and that fighting is merely a means of accomplishing it. It is the task of strategy to ascertain definitely what is the actual mission; then to estimate the actual difficulties in the way of accomplishing it, and the actual facilities at hand for accomplishing it; then to make the decision as to what to do; and then (and not until then) to inaugurate operations.

The next war was the so-called Boxer War, one of the most peculiar wars of history. It began and ended in 1900, and was caused by a number of acts on the part of certain European powers, and the consequent revolt of a comparatively small number of Chinese against it. Russia had taken Port Arthur and much adjacent territory; Germany had leased Kiaochau, virtually by compulsion, and gained great concessions in the Province of Shantung; France was seeking increased privileges in parts of China near Tonquin; and Great Britain had obtained a lease from China of Wei-Hai-Wei on the south shore of the gulf of Pechili, and thus gained command of the water approach to Peking. Prince Tuan, an athlete, and the head of a large following in China who had taken up athletic exercises and called themselves Boxers, headed a revolt. Following customs of great antiquity, the Boxers committed a number of atrocities. Finally they made

an attack on the foreign legations at Peking, in which even the Chinese imperial troops eventually took part.

The civilized world rose in alarm, and fortunately took prompt action. Very considerable forces were sent to the vicinity of Peking; and in August the allied troops, consisting of Americans, British, Germans, French, Austrians, Italians, and Japanese, under the command of the German Field Marshal von Waldersee, marched on Peking. Peking was captured on the 14th, and a note agreeing to the demands of the powers was signed by the Chinese authorities in December.

From the standpoint of strategy, the most interesting single fact this war brought out was the admirable condition, training, and general effectiveness of the Japanese army. Before this war it had been known, in a general way, that the Japanese were bestirring themselves to acquire military and naval skill; but it was not at all realized that they had achieved success. It seemed to be the consensus of opinion that, of all the forces of the great civilized countries that marched together on Peking, the Japanese were better than any other except the German. This fact has peculiar interest when viewed in connection with the extraordinary lack of strategical foresight of the Russians when they engaged in their war with Japan, only four years later.

A very important provision of the treaty between China and Japan, which closed the war in 1895, was that the Liao-tung peninsula, including Port Arthur, should go into the possession of the Japanese. Russia, France, and Germany prevented this from being accomplished; and finally Russia herself secured possession of the Liao-tung peninsula, and established at Port Arthur, at its southern end, the most powerful fortress in the Orient, and one of the most powerful in the world. At the same time, the Russians gradually spread themselves through Manchuria, strengthened their naval base at Vladivostok, and completed a line of railway from St. Petersburg through Siberia and Manchuria to Vladivostok,

with a branch line running southwest from Harbin to Port Arthur.

Meanwhile, on January 30, 1902, an agreement was made between Great Britain and Japan, whereby it was mutually agreed that if either party became involved in a war in safeguarding the interests that both parties recognized in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of China and Korea, the other party should remain neutral, and endeavor to prevent any third party from joining in hostilities against its ally; but that, should a third party join in such hostilities, the other party would come to its ally's aid. This treaty evidently strengthened Japan's position in case of a war with Russia; and, as such a war was obviously coming, it possibly had that intention.

Negotiations were begun by Japan with Russia, in 1903, with a view to inducing Russia to cease her continuing encroachments in Korea; Korea being so close to Japan that Japan very properly considered that Russia's increasing influence there was a menace to her national security. Russia adopting the policy of polite evasion and delay, Japan instructed her ambassador at St. Petersburg, on February 6, 1904, to ask for his passports. This was not a declaration of war, but it was an announcement that friendly diplomatic relations had been broken, and it ought to have roused Russia to instant warlike preparation. It did not.

As the empire of Japan was contained within the Japanese islands, it is obvious that if the Russian government had correctly estimated the strategic situation, it would have realized, long before matters had come to this crisis, that the most effective attack against Japan would be a naval attack; because the Russian navy was much larger than the Japanese, and if it brought the Japanese navy to battle and defeated it, Russia would gain complete command of the sea between Japan and the mainland of Asia, and render Japan helpless against Russian aggressions in Manchuria and Korea, for the reason that

she would be unable to send any troops across the water. At this time the Russian naval force in Asia was approximately equal to that of the Japanese, consisting principally of seven battleships, seven protected cruisers and twenty-five destroyers in Port Arthur, three large armored cruisers and a smaller cruiser at Vladivostok, and one large protected cruiser, the *Variag*, with the gunboat *Koriets* at Chemulpo. Thus Russia had her main force divided into three parts, a highly inefficient arrangement, when war broke out. Japan had six battleships, eight armored cruisers, thirteen protected cruisers and nineteen destroyers, besides smaller craft, all grouped together.

The Japanese immediately took advantage of the situation, with correct strategic insight and promptness, for they despatched three expeditions almost immediately: a naval expedition against the Russian fleet anchored outside of Port Arthur; a naval expedition against the Russian ships at Chemulpo, and an accompanying convoy of troops, for landing there and initiating military operations. All three expeditions were successful.

On the night of February 8-9 ten Japanese destroyers made a determined torpedo attack on the unsuspecting Russian squadron at Port Arthur, with the result that the battleships *Retvisan* and *Csarevitch* and the cruiser *Pallada* were torpedoed and so seriously injured that a long time in port was needed to repair them. These battleships were the most powerful in the squadron, and the *Pallada* was a vessel of 6630 tons displacement. On the following day Admiral Togo engaged the other vessels of the Russian squadron at long range, and succeeded in inflicting considerable damage; but he wisely refrained from getting under fire of the Russian guns on shore. Meanwhile, a squadron of Japanese vessels, under Vice-Admiral Uriu, arrived at Chemulpo and sank the Russian protected cruiser *Variag* and the gunboat *Koriets* in a battle in the offing, while the transports landed their troops. These troops at once marched to Seoul, the capital of Corea, and captured it.

The war between Russia and Japan is one of the most in-

structive wars of history: because of the great distance separating one of the belligerent countries from its fighting forces, the large forces engaged on both sides, and the fact that land and naval forces coöperated to a degree and with an effectiveness never known before. It is one of the most important wars because it established on a firm basis, and for the first time in many thousands of years, the people of a non-Aryan race in the first rank of the nations of the world. From the standpoint of strategy, it is interesting for two reasons: the fact that the conditions, occasioned by the use of new weapons, methods, and appliances, were more different from the conditions of previous wars than had ever happened before; and because it is one of the best illustrations in history of the defeat of a superior force by the use of good strategy against bad strategy.

The fundamental strategic error of the Russian government was in underestimating, first, the military and naval power of the Japanese, and, second, the probability of war. These two errors even the most loyal friend of Russia must admit were wholly inexcusable, and caused wholly inexcusable loss of life, money, and prestige. It is impossible also to justify the continued aggressiveness of the Russians in Manchuria and Corea, especially when these aggressions were followed by a failure properly to support them after they had been challenged. Both the aggressions and the failure to support them show the same kind of overbearing and yet fundamentally weak character that Spain showed after the days of Charles V. A nation that is really strong, like a man who is really strong, is rarely brutal and aggressive. Where strong countries have been aggressive, they have always supported their aggressions with adequate force, as Rome did; and in virtually all cases they have established governments over the victims of their aggressions that were better in every way than the governments they had had before. Nations and men that are both brutal and weak are not only despicable but harmful.

Both Russia and Japan now began to rush troops to eastern Manchuria: Russia by way of the trans-Siberian railroad, Japan by way of the Sea of Japan and Corea. Having command of the sea, Japan landed troops on the western coast of Corea to the number of about 45,000, under General Kuroki, and marched them north unresisted to the Yalu River, which forms the northwestern boundary of Corea between it and Manchuria. This was the First Army. Across the Yalu River was a comparatively small force of Russians. Instead of withdrawing this small force, General Kuropatkin, the Russian commander-in-chief, ordered it to hold the line of the Yalu. The result was a bloody battle, in which the Japanese attacked the Russians both in front and on the left flank, inflicting a decisive defeat. This was the first land battle of the war. It did not have a great effect physically, but it did morally; because it proved to the world, and especially to the Russians, that it was possible for the Japanese pagans ("monkeys," the Russians called them) to defeat European Christians in a modern war. The battle occurred on the first of May, 1904.

Japan now went ahead with preparations for sending its Second Army to Manchuria, and meanwhile endeavored by naval operations to secure the immobility of the Russian fleet in the harbor of Port Arthur, and prevent any interference by it with Japanese transports carrying supplies and troops. To this end, three attempts were made to block the narrow exit from the harbor. These attempts were made under circumstances of the greatest difficulty and danger; and the first two were so disastrously unsuccessful that men other than men of great determination would have been deterred. On the night of May 2, however, the harbor was partially blocked by sinking five steamers in the channel.

During the following night the Second Japanese Army, under General Oku, began to land at Pitszewo, on the eastern side of the peninsula of Liao-tung. After landing, on May 5, the Second Army pushed westward, driving the Russians be-



fore them. Finally, on the 26th of May, a great battle was fought at Kinchou, and the town was captured. Just south of Kinchou is a narrow neck of land, a mile and three quarters broad, that connects the promontory with the mainland. It is low on each side; but near the center a high ridge rises that culminates in a point about 350 feet high, called Nanshan. An army holding this point blocks passage either way. The position was strongly fortified with all the most modern means to protect it against attack both night and day. It was finally taken by the Japanese, who then pressed forward and, on May 30, took possession of Dalny, a base of great value for prosecuting attack on Port Arthur, which lay southwest.

It being evident now to the Russians that the Japanese plan was to take Port Arthur, they sent a Russian army of about 35,000 men to recover Kinchou and Nanshan, and then go to its assistance. In consequence a battle took place at Telissu, on June 14, in which the Japanese, under Oku, out-flanked the Russians and drove them northward with great loss in personnel and material.

Meanwhile, the two Japanese battleships *Hatsuse* and *Yashima* struck mines off Port Arthur, and sank. Since the Japanese had only six first-class battleships, this was a terrible loss; and the strategic effect on both sides of knowledge that it had happened would have been so considerable that the Japanese determined to prevent that knowledge from spreading. This they succeeded in doing, though they could not prevent rumors from getting abroad. It was not known definitely until the end of the war that this disaster had occurred.

On August 10 Admiral Vitgeft left Port Arthur with his squadron, with the intention of forcing his way to a junction with the armored cruiser squadron at Vladivostok. A battle between him and Togo ensued that afternoon, which was brought to a crisis by the bursting of a Japanese shell against the conning-tower of the flagship *Csarevitch*. This killed the Russian admiral, jammed the steering-gear of the ship, and created such confusion in the squadron that it promptly re-

treated back to Port Arthur, leaving the Japanese in full command of the sea.

Meanwhile the Russian squadron at Vladivostok, consisting of three large armored cruisers, made a number of excursions unto the Sea of Japan, sinking and capturing Japanese merchantmen and successfully eluding Kamimura's squadron. Finally Admiral Kamimura caught them, on the 14th of August. A running fight ensued, in which the Russian ship *Rurik* was sunk, and the other two were so seriously injured that they were unable to take any part afterward in the war.

Immediately after the capture of Dalny, the Japanese had begun to pour troops into it, with the result that they soon had three divisions there, under the command of Nogi, and constituting the Third Army. They then landed the Fourth Army, under Nozu, at Takushan on the south coast of Manchuria, between the Liao-tung peninsula and the mouth of the Yalu River, and between the first and second armies. By the close of June the First, Second, and Fourth Armies, under Field Marshal Oyama, were fully deployed and ready to advance to the north, to clear the Russians from the littoral and force them into the mountains of Manchuria. Five heavy engagements soon resulted, fought between the 26th of June and the last day of July, in which the Japanese acted uniformly on the offensive and were uniformly victorious.

Then followed the great battle of Liao-yang, which lasted from August 25 to September 3, in which the Russians had about 220,000 engaged and the Japanese 200,000. The Russians being strongly intrenched, the Japanese made little impression on their front, and finally attempted to turn their left flank. Kuropatkin sent a strong counter-flanking force; but (mainly on account of incompetence on the part of the Russians) the operation was unsuccessful. The Japanese, in planning this campaign, had expected, it seems, that Nogi's army would have finished its task at Port Arthur before the campaign developed thus far, and would have been able to contribute a strong effort on the Japanese left flank, and pre-

vent any such counter-flanking operation as Kuropatkin had attempted. This shows the strategic importance of holding on to a position like that of Port Arthur, even though it may eventually fall, provided that the maintenance of the siege necessitates the employment of a sufficient force of the enemy.

After his unsuccessful counter-flanking attempt, Kuropatkin withdrew north to Mukden. On the 9th of October he started an offensive with about 250,000 men, attempting a flanking operation with his right flank in order to get possession of Liao-yang; but, after a week's fighting, he was driven back with enormous losses of all kinds. He set forth again on January 25, 1905, but was defeated at the battle of Heikautai and driven back.

Meanwhile the siege of Port Arthur was continued; but it was not until July 31, 1904, that the Japanese captured the positions commanding the fortress and advanced close enough to make a direct assault. Bombardment began on August 7; but the defense had now so strengthened their positions that the Japanese accomplished little, and were compelled to resort to stereotyped siege operations. Finally, on November 30, 203 Meter Hill was taken, and a post of observation thus secured from which the Japanese heavy artillery could be accurately directed against the Russian warships in the harbor. The Russians, in consequence, had to sink those warships. The surrender of Port Arthur followed, on January 2, 1905.

After the battle of Heikautai, Kuropatkin received continuous and enormous reinforcements from Russia, thanks to the skill and energy of the only Russian who emerged from the Russian war with great renown, Prince Khilkoff, the Minister of Ways and Communications. The Japanese realized, in consequence, the necessity of defeating Kuropatkin as decisively as possible and as quickly as possible; with the result that they finally brought him to battle at Mukden. Kuropatkin's force was probably in excess of 300,000, and protected by defenses of the most complete and effective character. The Japanese army probably numbered nearly

400,000; a new army, the Fifth, having been added, and Nogi's army having come up from Port Arthur. Nogi's army was put by Marshal Oyama, the commander-in-chief, into a position on the left flank, but well to the rear, in the desire to prevent knowledge of its presence coming to the Russians. The armies now advanced, the Fifth Army on the Japanese right attacking the Russian left flank, and the Third Army under Nogi awaiting the order to sweep around the Russian right flank. When the center and flank attacks had fully developed, Nogi swept around, and descended on Mukden from the northwest, seriously threatening the enemy's line of retreat. Meanwhile, Kuropatkin, not knowing of Nogi's presence, had sent a large force against the Japanese Fifth Army, and could not recall them to oppose Nogi until too late. The result was that Kuropatkin, after extricating his forces with great difficulty, retreated north of Mukden (March, 1905).

Meanwhile the Russian fleet, under Admiral Rozhdestvensky, was coming out to contest the command of the sea with the Japanese fleet under Togo. The Russian fleet consisted of about forty vessels, counting supply vessels, etc., and it seems doubtful whether the fleet could ever have got out to the Orient if the governments of all the countries in whose harbors the fleet anchored had strictly observed their obligations as neutrals. Togo took up a position of waiting near the island of Tsushima, at the southwestern entrance to the Japanese Sea, realizing that the Russian fleet must go by that position or else go through the straits of Tsuguru, which easily could be mined. Sending out his scouts, he received information of the enemy's fleet at 5 A.M. on the 27th of May. In the battle that resulted the Russians had eight battleships, the Japanese five, one of which was almost useless; the Russians had three coast-defense ships, the Japanese one; the Russians had nine destroyers, the Japanese twenty; the Russians nine cruisers and the Japanese eight armored cruisers and ten protected cruisers, etc. There is no recognized

standard by which to compare the two forces; but I personally am inclined to the opinion that the Japanese superiority in small vessels did not compensate for their inferiority in the matter of battleships.

The result of the battle was one of the most disastrous and speedy defeats in history, only two of the Russian vessels escaping. The fate of the battle was decided in not more than an hour, though the battle as a whole was not concluded until the following day. The obvious cause of the speedy defeat was the fact that the Japanese, by reason of superior gunnery, hit the Russians more often than the Russians hit them. While there are many reasons for the Japanese superiority in gunnery, the principal single reason was that the Japanese had had the foresight and energy to equip their guns with the new naval telescope sight, the invention of the author of this book, and to train the men in its use; while up to that time the Russians had not done so.

This is only one illustration among millions of the paramount advantage of always being prepared for every probable emergency.

## CHAPTER XVIII

### ANTE BELLUM


**A**FTER the war between Russia and Japan had ended, army and navy officers the world over began to speculate as to the nations between which the next war would be. As Germany had not been at war since 1871, while each of the other great nations had been at war since then, and as (very roughly speaking) nations have usually gone to war about once each generation, we felt quite sure that Germany would be one of the contestants. This conviction was increased by Germany's evident preparedness, and the fact that Great Britain, France and Russia were evidently trying, though not successfully, to keep pace with her. The armaments of all the great countries, including the United States and Japan, increased rapidly in magnitude, and still more rapidly in cost.

The reasons why they increased in cost even more than in magnitude were mainly that the use of highly scientific instruments and specialized weapons had become a requirement, largely because of the increase in the use of them by Germany; that both armies and navies needed many grades of enlisted men of higher technical education than they needed before, and these men demanded higher pay; and that the requirements in the way of efficient but complicated organizations necessary for handling fleets and armies with the speed and precision necessary to utilize them fully, brought into being much larger and more highly paid staffs, not only in the war offices and admiralties, but in the field and in the fleets. The press of all the great countries groaned with complaints about the increasing financial burden, and were filled with interrog-

stories as to what was the cause of the increasing rage for armament. The cause was perfectly plain: the evident preparations of Germany for war, the war lust of her population, which had not been to war for more than a generation, and the historically proved policy of aggression of the German people.

It became increasingly evident to army and navy officers that the next war in which Germany would become engaged would be one of a scope and a rate of destruction of life and property, per unit of time, such as had never been seen before. As the years went by it became increasingly evident also that, when the time came, Germany would be much better prepared than any other country, and that there was grave danger of Germany's playing the part of imperial Rome after the war, the rest of the world playing the part of vassal states. The principal single reason why the rest of the world remained so inert, in plain sight of Germany's preparations, was the spread of the pacifist movement. This movement was only a repetition of many in the past that had taken place in wealthy countries; but, by reason of the increased facilities for printing and mailing, it spread much more rapidly than any like movement had ever spread before. It constituted almost an invitation to Germany to take what she wanted; because it dangled Opportunity before her eyes and said to her in effect: "Though we are rich and you are poor, we will not even prepare to resist an aggression on your part, except in the wholly improbable case that you should forcibly attack us. If you actually do that, then we will defend ourselves bravely."

Germany's preparations increased at a speed and with a precision and effectiveness unprecedented in history. Of course, preparations for the kind of war that Germany intended could not proceed unless accompanied with governmental, commercial, industrial, and scientific developments of all sorts. In fact, the period from 1871 to 1914 was an era of tremendous progress in Germany in all fields of activity. William I remained Emperor until 1888, when he died and



Japan, Korea and Part of Manchuria



was succeeded by his son, Frederick III, who reigned for three months only, and was succeeded by his son, William II. Bismarck was made the first Imperial Chancellor by William I; and he remained in that position until 1890, when he was dismissed by William II.

The developments that took place in Germany have been the marvel of the world; and well they may be, for even Rome never introduced so many and so important reforms in so short a time. These reforms covered all departments of the national life, but most of them may be classed under the heading, utilitarian. This does not mean that there was not a great advance in Germany in music and science; but it does mean that even the advance in those activities had a utilitarian tinge.

We must remember that the Germans, and especially the Prussians, were virtually on the eastern edge of the civilization of Europe, and in closer contact with the Slavs and Turanians of eastern Europe than were the western nations; that they were of almost the pure Germanic stock, and were not a combination, like the French, who were a mixture of Gauls, Celts, and Italians; and we must remember especially that the original Germanic tribes, even in the time of Cæsar, were of a coarser fiber than even the Gauls of France. We must also remind ourselves that, from 1640 till 1871, the Germans and the Prussians had gone through a distinct career of increasing prosperity, which was built on the ideas and methods of the Great Elector, and continued without intermission, except possibly during the reigns of Frederick William III and Frederick William IV; and that, even in the reign of Frederick William III, the Prussians had achieved great glory by the conduct of Blucher and his troops at the battle of Waterloo. We must also remember that, while the immediate cause of the prosperity that each individual German enjoyed was the improvements made in the economic, industrial, and transportation systems, yet these were all made possible by the unification first of Prussia and then of Ger-

many; and that these unifications were due directly to successful war.

Books have been written about the many measures that the government of Germany adopted and carried through for the welfare of the people. If we read of these measures, we are apt to become confused by their multiplicity and complexity. There are two possible explanations, however, which suggest that the matter may not be so complicated as it seems.

One explanation is that the government adopted for solving its civil problems the "estimate of the situation" method, which the German general staff invented many years ago, for solving military problems. By this method each problem is divided into four parts:

1. The mission—that is, the distinct end that it is desired to attain.
2. The difficulties in the way.
3. The facilities on hand, or attainable, for accomplishing the mission.
4. The decision.

Looked at from a scientific standpoint, it will be seen that this method is divisible into two parts; the first part (the first three steps) being analytical and the second part synthetic, or constructive. It can be seen also that it is somewhat analogous to the feat of Professor Helmholtz, who analyzed a sound into its fundamental tone and its over-tones, and then, by means of appropriate apparatus, synthesized a number of different tones into that sound and into other sounds.

Another and more obvious explanation is suggested by the organization of an army or a battleship. For an army or a battleship is an integral part of a nation, composed of human beings, subjected to the same necessities and animated by the same desires as the human beings in the nation itself. Now, an army or a battleship in order to carry out its purposes, must be divided into various branches; each of these branches must be divided into divisions, and each of these divisions must be divided into sub-divisions; and every branch, division,

and sub-division must be placed under a responsible head or chief. Furthermore, all the branches and divisions and sub-divisions must be so coördinated that they can be combined together and made to form one coherent organization, under one man at its head. With these ideas in mind, it is easy to see how the analytical German mind analyzed the multitudinous problems into their component parts, and then synthesized or constructed the means whereby the problem would be solved. And we can see also that, being permeated, as the Germans hereditarily were, with the military instinct, it was not hard for them to make what might almost be called an army out of the whole German nation.

It may seem that the explanations just attempted are somewhat labored and far-fetched. Possibly they are; but we cannot deny that the whole structure of the German government, and the whole structure of the German nation, show the evidence of careful analysis and able synthesis, and that the structure of the German nation is essentially military. Possibly the most obvious sign of its military character is the training through which everyone is put for whatever vocation he is to fill, and the insistence that every man at the head of every organization, large or small, must be fitted by training to perform its duties well, and must have given evidence of his ability by previous work of the same character.

Possibly it may seem foolish to suggest that Germany is alone in having experts at the head of the departments of the government; and yet, the naked fact stands out, clear and plain, that Germany is the only great country that has ever accomplished or very seriously attempted it. Possibly ancient Rome and modern Japan have come the nearest to Germany in this particular. In the other great countries of the world, the army and the navy are the only organizations in which it is seriously attempted to restrict the leadership of the various branches and divisions of the government to men skilled in their duties; and in many countries political influences prevent this in even the army and navy.

The Germans came to pride themselves excessively on their "efficiency," and to believe themselves superior to all other people in the world. Feeling in this way, it did not take them long to proclaim their superiority, and their desire to prove it. In their own estimation, they did prove it by the records they made in increasing the productiveness of their soil, and improving nearly all their activities, especially their manufactures, exports, steamship lines, foreign trade, and in general all enterprises in which coöperation among many people was required. It was not a long step from this to feeling that, if they could surpass the other nations in these particulars, and if they could within a few years build up a navy from almost nothing to the position of the second navy in the world, they could literally beat all the world militarily; because their army was more superior to any other army than was any other activity in Germany to its corresponding activity in any other country.

With such a history as Germany had, and with the essentially barbarous characteristics of the German people, it is easy to see why Germany, during all the years between 1871 and 1914, should have prepared for war. Wonder has been expressed that she kept out of war so long. The explanation is that the favorable combination of events did not occur simultaneously with a plausible excuse until the Archduke Ferdinand was shot in Serbia on June 28, 1914.

War was declared on the 1st of August, and Germany was ready; not only in "the last button of the gaiters," but in everything; especially in the things most difficult to be ready in—that is, strategic plans, both general and detailed.

But the world was unprepared, except one organization—the British navy. Why the world was unprepared may be explained on the same grounds as can be explained the unpreparedness of many nations that in the past were forced to rush into war unprepared. The explanation is simply that the nations had not had the strategic insight necessary to discern the danger, and therefore lacked the wisdom to prepare. They

were like the five foolish virgins in the Bible. And yet Germany's preparations were perfectly plain; in fact, Germany made little effort to conceal them, though she was able, by means of paid agents in all the countries to do as the barbaric German tribes had done centuries before—to make her future antagonists believe in her peaceful intentions, or at least to close their eyes. Such methods had succeeded with possible antagonists in the time of Cæsar; and they succeeded with Great Britain, France, Russia, and the United States nineteen centuries later.

Meanwhile, in Great Britain much progress in all ways had been made. Perhaps the most important single steps were taken in 1900, when the Australian Federation was formed, and in 1909, when the South African Union was formed. In 1910 Great Britain had five self-governing colonies, Canada, New Zealand, Newfoundland, the Commonwealth of Australia, and the South African Union. Besides these self-governing colonies, Great Britain had many dependent colonies scattered over the world. In addition, she possessed India, the most important of all, inhabited by a population of three hundred millions.

It is noteworthy that this empire had been established by naval and military power, directed by strategy.

Queen Victoria died in 1901, and left Great Britain in a condition of prosperity that was considered then to be very secure, but that we now know was insecure.

Many causes contributed to the prosperity: the main causes being the character of the people, the climate, and (most important of all) the enormous improvements effected in the conditions of living by inventions in engineering and mechanics, notably those that increased the certainty and speed of transportation and communication.

It is a remarkable fact that most writers, except technical writers, show little appreciation of the tremendous assistance to the progress of civilization that very simple mechanical and electrical inventions have imparted, and seem to fail to

realize that the principal difference between modern civilization and ancient civilization is not any difference in the people but merely in the use of mechanical and electrical appliances. There is no evidence that the human machine is any better than it was in the days when the pyramids were built, or when the Greeks held their Olympian games. There is no evidence now of any brain better than that of Cæsar; we have no poet greater than Homer, no orator greater than Demosthenes, no sculptor greater than Praxiteles. But the ancient Egyptians had no electric railways; the Assyrians did not possess the wireless telegraph; Homer did not have the advantage of a typewriter; and Charles V lived a life of squalor compared with that of a moderately prosperous resident of any modern city.

Victoria was succeeded by Edward VII. He had always been popular with the people, though his private life had not been strictly puritanical, and he was supposed to have trod the primrose path of dalliance for some years. But when he came to the throne he was sixty years of age, and the fresh exuberance of early youth had passed. He had always been supposed to be a trifler; but as a king he showed that he was a trifler only in trifles. His career as king surprised both friends and enemies: because he proved to be the man that was required, the man needed to remedy, as far as he could, the feminine mistakes of his mother's reign—an excessive shrinking from war, a fatuous trust in the notion that war had passed away.

Edward received the unofficial title of Peacemaker from the people; and yet, he really was not a peacemaker in the sense in which they used the word. While not a man of exceptional ability, he was, like some other indolent and pleasure-loving men, able to see things from a distance, unconfused by details. Of course, he had had the advantage of long training in anticipation of his task, and had had all possible opportunities for getting correct information from all sources. But, after all allowances have been made, it can hardly be denied that Ed-

ward made a more correct estimate of the situation than did the professional statesman of his kingdom, who did little things well, but who failed so utterly on important things as almost to ruin the empire. His principal achievement was the establishment of the Triple Entente, which included Great Britain, France, and Russia. It cannot justly be claimed that he originated the idea, or was the only man concerned in it; and yet, there can be no question that the Triple Entente was largely brought about by him. Certain it is that he has always received the principal credit for it.

Unfortunately, he died before many things had been done that should have been done. Whether, if he had lived, he would have succeeded in rousing the country to a realization of her peril, we do not know. Two important occurrences in his reign were the Second Hague Conference in 1907 and the resulting Declaration of London.

The First Hague Peace Conference in 1899 had drawn up a comprehensive "International Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land," designed to check the severity of military belligerents, and it had been ratified by the great powers. One of the chief objects of the Second Conference, in 1907, was the preparation of a similar code, to apply to war on the sea. The first attempt to do this had been made in 1856 by the signers of the Treaty of Paris. In this treaty four important rules had been agreed to; but the vast increase in size, power, and complexity of both maritime commerce and of navies made more definite agreements necessary; and these the Second Hague Peace conference attempted to effect. The conference was unable to do this wholly; but it did provide for an international prize court to which were to be referred certain classes of questions.

It soon became apparent, however, that this prize court would have no basis of law or agreement to start from. To provide this Great Britain invited the representatives of seven other great powers to meet in conference, "in order to arrive at an agreement as to what are the generally recog-

nized practices of International Law, within the meaning of The Hague Convention."

The representatives deliberated in London between December, 1908, and February, 1909. The result was the Declaration of London. This declaration was divided into seventy-one articles, arranged in nine chapters, headed "Blockade in Time of War," "Contraband of War," "Unneutral Service," "Destruction of Neutral Prizes," "Transfer to a Neutral Flag," "Enemy Character," "Convoy," "Resistance to Search," "Compensation" and "Final Provisions."

Most of the Conventions of the Second Peace Conference concerning war contain a clause to the effect that they "are only applicable between the Contracting Powers, and only if all the belligerents are parties to the Convention," and the first sentence of Article 66 of the Final Provisions of the Declaration of London reads: "The signatory powers undertake to insure the mutual observance of the rules contained in the present Declaration in any war in which all the belligerents are parties thereto." This is noteworthy: for many people, not knowing it, not knowing that the declaration of London had not been ratified even by Great Britain, that some of the conventions of the Second Peace Conference had not been ratified by several countries, and that Convention XII, creating an international prize court, had not been ratified by any country when the World War broke out, have criticized certain acts as being contrary to the Declaration and the conventions of the Second Peace Conference.

The Declaration aroused great opposition in England, both from the Chambers of Commerce, which thought that the Declaration would operate unfavorably to British commerce in any war in which Great Britain would be a neutral, and also from the navy, which thought that the Declaration would operate unfavorably to the navy in any war in which Great Britain would be a belligerent. Since Great Britain had the greatest maritime commerce and the greatest navy; since it was apparent to army and navy men that the coming war with



Germany could not be delayed much longer; since the nation next to Great Britain in both naval power and maritime commerce was Germany; since Germany and Great Britain naturally viewed the subject from directly opposite points of view; and since the subject was absolutely vital to both nations, the interest aroused was intense.

The Declaration of London was not ratified, however, and therefore it accomplished nothing of a definite character; but the failure to ratify it brought into startling relief the fact that the governments of the eight great maritime and naval nations had found it impossible to agree on the most important and most controversial questions regarding maritime warfare, and that the whole international law situation in regard to war on the sea was therefore indefinite and vague! This meant that in case of any war between great maritime countries, questions of the utmost importance and involving possible war would almost certainly arise between belligerents and neutrals, and international law could provide no adequate basis of mutual understanding or of law, for reaching an agreement. This condition makes the inertness of the great maritime nations just before 1914, and even in the early part of that year, the more difficult to understand.

King George and Queen Mary were crowned on June 22, 1911, and six months later they went to India, where they were crowned Emperor and Empress of India at Delhi, amid pageants of great splendor. This circumstance, and the general state of affairs throughout the country, betokened a powerful empire and prophesied great longevity. It was reinforced in the following year, by an Imperial Conference at London, where the representatives of the five self-governing dominions, Australia, New Zealand, Newfoundland, Canada, and South Africa, met in consultation on imperial questions and the consideration of the military and naval defense of the empire. Nothing else on earth seemed so stable as the British Empire.

Yet the British Empire was on the brink of a crisis in which

it almost went down to ruin, and from which it was barely saved by an occurrence that nobody expected—the sudden interposition of the United States.

Throughout the reign of Victoria and afterward, the people of Great Britain, including their politicians, who competed with each other in trying to win popularity by prophesying smooth and pleasant things, had been concentrating their attention on internal matters, and neglecting the safety of national life; just as many a man has devoted himself to the making of money, or the pursuit of pleasure, until a physician has warned him that he was putting his life in danger. There were a few men, like Field Marshal Lord Roberts, Field Marshal Lord Kitchener, many army and navy officers, and a handful of thinkers and writers who pointed out that the national life was in grave peril. These men were not gifted with any special knowledge or with any special insight: they were merely men who were not so engrossed in their own private affairs as to be unable to think of other things, and who were not so lacking in courage as to be afraid to tell the people unpleasant facts.

These men, of whom Lord Roberts was the principal, told the people of England repeatedly, insistently, and emphatically that Germany was arming to attack Great Britain. They called the attention of the people of England to things printed, not only in German newspapers and magazines, but in carefully written books, which showed that the Germans had come to believe themselves a people far superior in ability, character, and courage to any other people in the world, and to feel that it was bad for the world that they should be kept in a position that they thought one of inferiority in comparison with that held by Great Britain. These men gave proofs that the Germans considered that the people of Russia, France, and England were decadent, mentally and morally, and yet held a standing in the world far higher than Germany's, and possessed much more in land and wealth. These men proved that Germany, having easily conquered France, and knowing

the corrupt condition of affairs in Russia, regarded France and Russia as almost negligible, except in so far as they might give assistance to Great Britain. They showed that Germany felt aggrieved that Great Britain held the sovereignty of one quarter of all the land in the world, and was mistress of the sea, while Germany (a much more noble country, according to their views) was hemmed in on all sides, and lacked "a place in the sun."

These men proved that Germany realized that all the national success she had ever got had been got by the sword; and that many Germans declared that if, at certain critical times, the Germans had devoted themselves to practical affairs, as Great Britain, France, and Holland had done, instead of to dreams in philosophy, poetry and religion, Germany would then occupy a place like England's. They showed that these ideas, under the inspiration of men like Treitschke, were not held as academic principles, but were becoming living realities, and spurring the people to revolt. They showed that the German army was very much better than any other army in the world, not only because it was larger, but also because it was more efficient; and that the German navy, which only twenty-five years before had been almost negligible, was now second in size to the British, and at least as efficient and possibly more so. They pointed out the unparalleled expansion of German commerce all over the world, and the superior efficiency of the German government, and expressed their opinion that if Germany should go to war with Russia, France, and Great Britain combined, she would have an excellent chance of victory. They also showed that victory would mean the ruin of the British Empire and the world dominance of the German.

The man who exerted himself the most to convince England of her danger was Lord Roberts. His arguments and appeals were received by the mob with jeers and insults, and by even the better classes with ill-disguised impatience. Many harsh remarks were made about him, the average of which might be expressed in the words, "He is an old fool." Yet Roberts was

right and the rest were wrong! The treatment of Lord Roberts by the British people, whom he had served so well, is one of the most deplorable facts in history. That Great Britain has made expiation for it is also one of the clearest facts of history. She has expiated it by the death of the best of her young manhood; by the impoverishment of the kingdom; by the untold suffering, physical, mental, and spiritual, of every man, woman, and child; by everything that is deplorable in national life, except national ruin itself.

That Great Britain should have gone on as she did, even to the day when she declared war on Germany, is a thing that cannot be explained. We know that Assyria fell before the barbarian Persian; that Persia fell before the barbarian Greek; and that Rome fell before the barbarian Alaric: but all those countries were decadent countries, and we accept the fact of their decadence as the explanation of their fall. But *was Great Britain decadent?* Germany said she was; and the fact that Great Britain so nearly fell, and was saved only by the unexpected interposition of the United States, gives importance to the question.

Yet Great Britain was not decadent in the sense that Assyria and Persia and Egypt were; for Great Britain was in the very flower of a civilization supposed to be the most beautiful the world had ever seen.

The answer to the question is dependent, of course, on the definition of the word decadent. In default of an agreement as to that definition, we cannot decide whether Great Britain was decadent or not; but we can easily decide whether, during the first fourteen years of the twentieth century, the British acted as worthy descendants of Harold and Alfred and the Black Prince, and Marlborough and Nelson and William Pitt.

Of all the departments of the British government, the only department ready was the navy. The army was not ready; and no one in England who had paid any attention to national matters expected that she would be ready, in case the thing happened that did happen. That the army did well after the

emergency had arisen, the applause of the whole world testifies. But the glory it achieved was at the cost of sacrifices that should not have been necessary, and that have made England endure unutterable remorse.

The navy was wonderfully ready, though not so ready as the German; and the officers and men of the navy covered themselves and the navy and the country with the greatest measure of glory that the country as a whole has a right to claim; for before the war the country had shown the foresight and the patriotic spirit necessary to build and maintain a navy adequate to her defense. As to her navy, Great Britain did not have to be driven into a corner before she made ready to protect her national life and the lives of her women and children.

Yet the navy itself was not all it should have been; not from any fault of the navy, but from the same fault as that mainly responsible for the unprepared condition of Great Britain in other departments.

The unreadiness of the British navy, as compared with the German, seems to have no other explanation than the fact that, somewhat less than a hundred years before the war, the politicians had become so strong in Great Britain, and had been able to impress the people so thoroughly with the idea that "the military should be subordinate to the civil authority," that they adopted the practice of putting untrained civilians at the head of the army and the navy. They made the people believe (and possibly made themselves believe) that it was not necessary to have men at the head of the army and the navy who were thoroughly acquainted with the army and the navy; giving out the idea that untrained ministers could direct the army and navy successfully, provided they were men of superior intelligence; and that whatever professional knowledge they might lack they could easily get from professional advisers.

They neglected to point out that the "professional advisers" could be ignored, that a minister untrained in technical matters would not be competent to make the best selection of professional advisers, and that the scheme actually promoted

irresponsibility. For the minister could always shift the blame for any miscarriage to his professional advisers; and these professional advisers would be perfectly safe, because they were responsible only to the minister himself! They also failed to point out that ministers, untrained in the profession of arms, might appoint assistants whose qualifications were the tact and suavity of the courtier, rather than the force and austerity of the warrior.

No evidence *that would be accepted in a court of law* has ever been given which would establish the reasonableness of the proposition that untrained men can manage great professional organizations with real success. Certain it is that managing an army or a navy is a business, in the sense as that in which managing a factory can be said to be a business, or keeping a shop or conducting a hotel, or administering a railroad; and virtually all of these businesses are conducted by men who knew them intimately. Certain it is, also, that in this war the head of the Admiralty made two bloody mistakes that a man knowing the naval business intimately would not have made.

Certain it is, also, that the mere fact of army and navy officers knowing that they would never be allowed to decide important strategic questions took away from them not only that interest in the higher part of their profession which they should have had, but also the strategic training they would otherwise have gained. Certain it is, also, that strategic training and the resulting strategic ability were lost to Great Britain; because nobody but army and navy officers could possibly attain it, and no other people did. Certain it is, therefore, that the government of Great Britain for nearly one hundred years lacked the kind of council it should have had. Almost certain it is that, if the government had not lacked that counsel, Great Britain would not have lapsed into unpreparedness, and would not have gone through the agony she has gone through.

It is noteworthy that this was the first great war in which

the British navy was not headed by a naval officer; that in each war in which it was headed by a naval officer it showed more dash, resourcefulness, and strategic ability than did any of its adversaries; that in this war it showed less dash and resourcefulness and strategic ability than the German navy; and that the German navy was headed by a naval officer.

It is a principle fundamental to the efficient handling of *every* organization that the man at its head should have been specially trained for his task.

Even more than Great Britain, in proportion to her danger from Germany, France became increasingly unprepared for war as war drew near. In 1889 the requirement for compulsory military service had been reduced from five to three years. In 1905 the period of service was reduced to two years. This fact, taken in connection with the increase in socialistic agitation, the absence of any commanding personality that could direct the energies of the people for more than a very short time, the lack of continuous interest in public affairs, the intense factionalism, and the ardent pursuit of pleasure by all classes, was of sinister importance; because Germany was meanwhile straining every faculty to acquire the military power wherewith to crush France. Finally, however, it was realized that, in view of the menace of Germany, it was important that France and England should come to a friendly understanding. In 1903 visits were interchanged between the rulers; then an Anglo-French Convention was signed in 1904. By this convention many long-standing disputes were amicably adjusted, and some new arrangements were agreed to.

In June, 1905, M. Delcassé retired from the Foreign Office, a post he had held for seven years. A few days before, the dismaying news had been received of the sudden and total destruction of the fleet of France's ally, Russia, by a Japanese fleet of equal size. Since Delcassé's retirement was supposed to be caused by German influence, because of his opposition to German interference in Morocco, the two incidents had a depressing effect on the people. For the fact was known

(though the people shut their eyes to realizing its importance) that Germany was exercising an enormous influence on France and in France; that she was utilizing all the resources of an astute, far-seeing, and ruthless diplomacy to weaken the nation; and that the people were too much occupied with small factional disputes and personal pleasures to take proper measures to avert the national danger that intelligent persons knew to be impending.

As both a cause and an effect of all the conditions, the politician in France had come into power which, though usually brief in the case of each individual, was tremendous and tremendously injurious. Ministries succeeded one another with bewildering rapidity; there being, for instance, fourteen Ministers of Foreign Affairs in the fifteen years between 1879 and 1894, and six in the following fifteen years. Furthermore, the ministers and their subordinates acquired and maintained their offices, not because they were capable experts, but because crowds of excitable people voted for them. The only agencies of the government that were even partially free from political influences were the army and the navy; the War and Navy Departments themselves being far from free. The navy suffered more than the army, mainly because of the pernicious activities of Camille Pelletan, Minister of Marine, who nullified the navy's work of many years and the expenditure of hundreds of millions of francs, and brought about a condition of inefficiency, disorganization, and discouragement which the succeeding years of extra effort have not yet been able to overcome. That one man should have been able to accomplish so much harm showed a deplorable national condition; because the fact that the mischief was being done was a matter of common knowledge.

The French people saw more clearly the necessity of keeping their army effective than their navy; for it was the French army to which France was indebted for her national security and the place she held in the forefront of the nations. Nevertheless they allowed even the army to fall far below the



standard of efficiency set by their only military rival, Germany. Nevertheless, they carelessly observed the Germans increase their army in size, and exercise it in war manœuvres of unprecedented magnitude, well knowing that that army was being increased in size and effectiveness for the sole purpose of fighting France and Russia and any allies they might secure. Nevertheless, they concentrated whatever of attention they gave to public matters on little factional disputes. Nevertheless, the individual Frenchman concerned himself almost wholly with his private affairs and his private pleasures. Nevertheless, the individual man and woman continued to dance on the very edge of the abyss of national disaster.

On August 1, 1914, Prussia repeated her performances of 1864, 1866, and 1870, by precipitating a war against nations whom she knew to be unprepared, at a time when she felt that she herself had become sufficiently prepared to overcome the disproportion against her in material resources.

That she did this was unjustifiable. But was it justifiable for the other nations to permit her to do it? It is unjustifiable for burglars to rob houses; but does this fact make it justifiable for municipal authorities to permit burglary? The record of Germany was perfectly well known, and so was her policy. Many writers, like Treitschke, had described it clearly; many declarations of Bismarck and the Kaiser had emphasized it; and many incidents like that of Agadir had shown that the policy was alive, and ready to be put into active operation as soon as a favorable opportunity should arrive.

But the Thomas Jeffersons and William J. Bryans of France had been doing their work successfully. The orators of France had told sweet stories to people who wished to have such stories told them. Suddenly the storm broke, and France plunged into the valley of the shadow of death. The story of France being led to war like a lamb to the slaughter would be incredible, had it not so often been told before; had it not been told so short a time before by Denmark and by Austria and by France herself; had it not been told many centuries

before by Egypt and Assyria and Babylon and Greece and Rome; by every great country which became decadent and then fell; by every tribe and town and nation, great or small, that failed to obey the law of self-protection.

The flash of a pistol in Serbia on June 28, 1914, started an explosion that statesmen and military and naval men all over the world recognized instantly as an explosion that must be followed by others; so intimately connected were the piles of national explosives, and so sensitive to shock was the explosive in each pile. The explosives first affected were those in Serbia and Austria; next, those in Germany and Russia; next, those in France; next, those in England. By August 5 all had exploded, and Germany and Austria were at war with Russia, France and England. Germany being fully prepared, Austria fairly prepared, and the others unprepared, the tremendous advantage of the initiative and the offensive went to Germany and Austria. Germany violated the neutrality of Belgium and took the easiest road to France. This was a crime, but it was not unexpected (or it should not have been); for violations of neutrality and of treaties were as old as history, and as much to be expected as burglaries and murders.

In the United States, during the period between 1870 and 1914, the progress in the development of commerce, industry, and invention had been greater than in any other country, and the spread of pacifism had also been greater. The great spread of pacifism was due mainly to two causes—the influence of the doctrines of Thomas Jefferson, and the absorption of the people in the pursuit of wealth, which the enormous development of the country facilitated and encouraged. The result was a condition of unpreparedness far in excess of that in any European country.

Many inventions of instruments and methods pertaining to war were made in the United States, of which the greatest was the airplane made by Professor Samuel Langley and the Wright Brothers. The next most important, probably, was an invention for using airplanes for discharging torpedoes,

which the author patented in July, 1912. The fact that every warlike operation is an endeavor to bring destructive forces to a certain point before the enemy bring their destructive forces there, combined with the fact that the airplane could carry destructive forces more quickly than any other means, showed strategists, when the first successful flight was made by the Wright Brothers in 1903, that a new instrument of war had been born. It also showed that it behooved each nation to develop the warlike capabilities of that instrument at once, in order to be ready for the next war.

When the Great War broke out on August 1, 1914, the degree of the unpreparedness of the United States was amazing, as I know from personal and intimate knowledge. For I was Aid for Operations, a position analogous to that of chief of staff in the army, and the principal adviser of the Secretary of the Navy. Naturally, I did all I could to get the navy ready. The fact that the two greatest naval and maritime countries in the world were at war, that the United States was the greatest neutral country, and that the manufacturers and merchants of the United States would endeavor to sell to both sides, combined with the chaotic condition of international law as applied to neutrals and belligerents at sea (as evidenced by the failure of the Declaration of London), made it plain that it would be impossible for the United States to keep out of the war. I had a meeting of the General Board called at half past nine in the forenoon of the first of August, 1914; and we drew up a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, urging certain measures. Accompanying the letter of the General Board, I sent a letter urging its careful consideration, signed by myself as Aid for Operations. This was the first measure for preparedness, I believe, that was taken in the United States.

On November 9, 1914, I wrote an official letter to the Secretary of the Navy, reporting that the navy was "unprepared for war," and showing that, in the actual condition of affairs, "if this country avoids war during the next five years,

it will be accomplished only by a happy combination of high diplomatic skill and rare good fortune." About the same time Representative Gardner introduced a resolution in Congress to investigate the condition of the army and navy; but, as the Congress was Democratic, his resolution failed. On December 17, 1914, I testified officially before the Naval Committee of the House of Representatives that it would take "at least five years" to get our navy ready to fight effectively against any great naval power.

The only immediate effect of my efforts was to bring about such a feeling against me, on the part of the Secretary of the Navy, that I had to resign my position and turn my duties over to an officer whose ideas and personality were more acceptable to him. But the report of my testimony to Congress, and the fact that I was forced to resign, caused considerable excitement throughout the country; because the position that I occupied made me the official expert in such matters. The appropriations that Congress made immediately afterward for the navy were larger than any ever made before in this country.

A condition of great restlessness ensued in certain sections of the country, in an endeavor to initiate measures for preparedness. The Navy League had been started many years before, and had done much to secure appropriations for the navy from Congress. The National Security League was formed in December, 1914, and the American Defense Society in August, 1915, by persons in private life, in order to rouse the country to the dangers that impended. These patriotic organizations and a few civilians, at the head of whom were Theodore Roosevelt, Elihu Root, Senator Lodge, and Representative Gardner, instituted a vigorous propaganda. This propaganda took on new energy when the *Lusitania* was sunk by a German submarine on May 7, 1915. On April 6, 1917, the United States declared war against Germany.

## CHAPTER XIX

### THE WORLD WAR

**I**T may seem absurd to omit from a book on strategy a detailed account of the operations of the World War that has just ended; but would it not be more absurd at the present time, when all the facts of the war are not yet known, to attempt to do this, or to draw any but the most general strategic deductions from it?

As the general trend of operations during the War is familiar to most people, it is not absurd to point out, however, that, while this war involved greater numbers of men on both sides than any previous war, weapons of greater destructive power and more rapid and sure means of transportation and communication, yet the general methods followed were like those of Thutmose III, Alexander, and the rest. We see the same endeavor to bring destructive forces to positions of strategic importance; the same endeavor to find the weak point, to make flank attacks, to feint at the line of communication or attack it, to feint at the line of retreat or attack it; the same endeavor to hold a force of the enemy with a part of one's own force while dealing an important blow with another part; the same endeavor to envelop and capture the enemy.

The distinctive peculiarity of this war was that it brought to a climax the use of new weapons and the resulting use of new methods for handling the organizations that used those weapons. It was a climax of the progress that had been going on since the days when primeval men fought with fists and clubs and stones. The World War was no more intense, for each individual employed in it, than were countless fights between individuals and small tribes in primeval days; and

the pain and fear and danger and anger were no greater. The Great War differed from a fight between two primeval savages, not in nature, but in degree; and, although the armies on each side were the outcome of five thousand years of development, those armies as fighting machines were not so efficient as were the two primeval savages. Great effort had been made to devise weapons and methods by which greater numbers of men and weapons could be handled as units, in the same way that the primeval savage handled himself as a unit, but, of course, no such result had been even approximately secured; and the greater the number of men whose handling as a unit was attempted in any case, the greater the difficulty, and the smaller the degree of success achieved.

Leaving aside the moral aspects of the question, there can be little doubt that the strategy of the Germans was better than that of the Allies. This was, of course, an inevitable result of the fact that the Germans had devoted more time and mental effort to the work of preparing for the war than the Allies had. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that what is sometimes called the military machine, or the naval machine, is in fact a real machine; and that in any war the most powerful machine must win. The Germans had designed and prepared the better machine, in the sense that it was the more efficient; but it was not the more powerful, because it was the smaller.

The clearest indication of a superior strategy on the part of the Germans is the fact that the Germans acted on the offensive for almost the whole war; and that, therefore, on the land the war was carried on in the territories of her enemies and not in her own; and that on the sea the territorial waters of Germany were not invaded, except for brief periods.

On the land the Germans had the advantage of what are sometimes called interior lines, while their enemies worked on exterior lines, and therefore had longer distances to traverse. In addition the Germans had unity of command throughout the war; whereas the Allies did not have unity of command for the forces of the different nations until its closing months.

In the matter of brave fighting, persistent effort, and heroic endurance, no good reason can be found for adjudging the men on either side to be superior to the men on the other side. As has often been noted in this book, it has been the history of most wars that in mere fighting, courage, and endurance, little difference among great bodies of men has been recorded.

On the sea the Germans showed their strategic insight by attacking the British navy in its most vulnerable part, that is, below the water line of the ships. They did this by means of torpedoes fired from submarines; and the skill displayed by the commanders of the submarines, together with the excellence of the submarines themselves, show that the scheme had been worked out most carefully in advance. Had the Germans confined the efforts of their submarines to sinking vessels of war, we have no means of knowing what would have been the outcome of the struggle; but we do know that the fact of their using submarines for sinking merchant-vessels without warning brought the United States into the war on the Allies' side, and produced a preponderance of material resources on their side, which resulted in defeating Germany.

Looking at the question from the standpoint of what has been called hindsight, it seems that the attack of submarines against unwarned merchant-vessels was a blunder. It does not seem, however, to have been a blunder of strategy so much as a blunder of statesmanship. From the standpoint of strategy alone, the use of the submarines against merchant-ships seems to have been not only justifiable but advantageous. Strategy, however, is not concerned with any questions except those connected intimately with fighting itself; and the mere fact that such use of the submarines was strategically advantageous does not relieve the statesman from the charge of blundering in employing it. Strategy is the servant of statesmanship, and its task is to do well what statesmanship demands that it do. The tasks of statesmanship and strategy, though they should be mutually assisting, are nevertheless

distinct, as will be pointed out more fully in another chapter. In order that they may assist each other with the maximum efficiency, the statesman and the strategist should work together in harmony; and in order that they may work together in harmony, each should thoroughly understand his own domain of effort, the domain of the other, and the borderland between them. To accomplish this, the statesman and the strategist should continually and intimately confer.

Possibly, in Germany, the statesmen and the naval strategists did not confer with a sufficient degree of intimacy and mutual understanding: in fact, the memoirs of von Tirpitz indicate that they did not. About this question we have little trustworthy information now; but one fact seems clear, and that is that the German statesmen underestimated the probability that the United States would enter into the war. The German statesmen seem to have been convinced that the people of the United States were so wholly engrossed in money-making, and so thoroughly under the influence of the doctrines of Jefferson, that they would endure any insults, and continue blind to any national danger from Germany. The German statesmen seem to have deceived themselves into the belief that the Secretary of State, Mr. Bryan, was a representative American, and that the inspiring teachings of George Washington and Theodore Roosevelt no longer had power to rouse the people.

The fact that the German strategy seems to have been exceedingly good, and the German statesmanship faulty, indicates that the strategists of Germany knew their task better than the statesmen knew their task. This has been the case in nearly all countries, and is explainable by the fact that in those countries naval and military men have been educated from childhood under careful government supervision for their tasks, while statesmen have not been similarly educated for their tasks.

Before the war the Germans had very cleverly designed their sea defense and offense, and the mutual coöperation of



their submarine mines, submarine vessels, and surface vessels of war. The submarine mines prevented the access of enemy vessels to the coast, and powerful surface vessels prevented counter-mining of the submarine mines by enemy small vessels of light enough draft to enter the mined waters; with the result that German submarines were able to pass unhindered through thickly sown mine areas from their bases out into deep water, and then return. The British navy found itself virtually helpless against this interlocking system, and was compelled to resort to operations on an enormous scale to offset the depredations of a small number of German submarines.

The author of this book pointed out publicly two months after the United States entered the war—that is, in June, 1917, and repeatedly afterwards until he was stopped by official orders—that the interlocking system could be beaten by flying over it with airplanes; that airplanes were not hampered by submarine mines or by submarine vessels; and that airplanes could attack the German naval bases with bombs and sink the German ships with torpedoes. The author is, of course, a biased witness in this case; but it seems to him that this plan was perfectly feasible, and that if it had been carried out promptly (as it could have been), the entire naval force of Germany (including her submarines) could have been destroyed, Germany crippled utterly, and the war brought to a sudden close. In fact, preparations to carry out this plan were under way when the armistice was signed in November, 1918. Too late.

Doubtless many lessons of strategic importance will be gathered when all the records of the war have been carefully gone over. But it is doubtful whether there will be much value in making the elaborate and detailed investigations that have been made after previous wars, for the reason that the next great war will probably be so different from the last one that it may be unwise to concentrate much attention on its detailed operations. *It will probably be wiser to try to discern*

*the character of the next war than the details of the last war.*

The most important factor in making a change between the two will probably be the airplane. In the last war it was used in a subordinate capacity only; but the probability seems to be that in the next war the airplane (including the torpedoplane), by reason of its enormous speed over great distances and the large amount of high explosives it can carry, will be one of the most important factors (if not the most important factor) in the war.

If so, the next war will be more different from the last war than any other war has ever been from the war preceding it.



**PART III**  
**STRATEGY**



## CHAPTER XX

### STRATEGY IN PEACE

**I**N what we have read thus far in these pages, nearly all of the interest and importance have lain in the actual movements of land and naval forces, and especially in the battles in which they were engaged. Little has been in evidence of preparations before the wars of which the battles formed the critical parts; but it is obvious that preparations must have been made. It is obvious also that those preparations had great influence on the results of the battles, and therefore of the wars. Even primeval savage tribes made preparations not only of a material kind in laying in supplies, securing weapons, and assuring the safety of the women and children, but also in stirring up the martial ardor of the warriors. When the Swiss in Cæsar's time decided to move west through Gaul, they instituted preparations that lasted a year, mainly in the matter of sowing large crops and in laying in supplies from them; and when Genghis Khan started west on his benevolent expedition, he also made preparations, part of which was leaving all the women and children behind.

Nevertheless, until the time of Moltke, the preparations of even the largest armies were of a simple kind. The greatest care and foresight that we see were in the preparations of Julius Cæsar for invading Gaul, and the outfitting of the Invincible Armada. When Moltke became chief of staff, the complexity of civilization had become so great, and the capabilities of modern mechanism for assisting the warrior had become so evident, that the value of making long and careful preparation was discerned by his intelligence. The awful magnitude of the task entailed would have appalled most men,

and Moltke seems to have been the only man, save one, who realized the occasion and rose to it. The exception was Roon, who was Minister of War and the immediate superior of Moltke.

But, great as were the complexity and difficulty of preparing for war in 1870, they rapidly became greater after Moltke died and the years went by. Railroads increased in number, speed, and carrying power; steamships did the same, but to a much greater degree; the wireless telegraph came into practical use; guns became not only more powerful and of greater range, but of greater difficulty to handle; the naval telescope sight gave a precision to naval gunnery, with consequent increase of destructive power to ships-of-war, that resulted in increasing their size and therefore their cost and complexity; the submarine torpedo became a weapon of such practical usefulness that destroyers had to be built in increasing numbers to carry them; the submarine vessel became practically useful, so that many submarines had to be built, and officers and men trained to handle them both singly and in flotillas; the musket of the soldier increased in range, penetrating power, and speed of fire, and so in a greater degree did machine-guns of various kinds; and large guns became so improved in rapidity of fire as to increase enormously the amount of ammunition needed for them, an increase that was even more pronounced with small arms and machine-guns. All this increase in the number and power of mechanisms was accompanied with an enormous increase in their complexity, and therefore in the skill required to operate them, and therefore in the number and the trained skill of the operators. Inasmuch as all the battleships, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, infantry regiments, artillery batteries, cavalry squadrons, scouts, engineers, etc., could not be handled effectively without drill, systems of drills had to be devised and afterward put into effect, whereby in every vessel, in every company, and in every organization of whatever kind, each individual, high or low, was continually exercised in the performance of his duties;

and whereby also, after all the various units and various groups of units had been trained and drilled, whole fleets and whole armies were trained and drilled in exercising as entireties.

Of course, all the exercises had to be carried on with the utmost possible seriousness, and after the most careful preparation in every case; in order not only that they should be carried on skilfully as matters of tactics, but that they should be of such a kind, and carried on in such a way, as to get the most beneficial results as matters of strategy.

It is obvious that, in order to exercise a ship, one must first procure the ship; that, in order to exercise a soldier with his rifle, one must first procure the soldier and his rifle. After the ship in the one case, and the soldier with his rifle in the other case, have been procured, they must then be drilled; that is, logistics having secured the material, tactics must handle it. But what agency is going to arrange that logistics shall get the material and that tactics shall handle it? Strategy.

It is apparent that, in order to arrange that logistics shall provide the material, and especially to arrange what material logistics shall provide, the task of strategy is difficult. And it is also apparent that, in order to arrange that tactics shall handle the material, and to direct the ways in which tactics shall handle the material, the task of strategy is difficult. It is apparent also that the first task of strategy is to decide what material logistics shall supply; second, to see that logistics does supply it; third, to decide in what ways tactics shall handle the various kinds of material; and, fourth, to see that tactics does so handle them. In dealing with both logistics and tactics, therefore, the first thing for strategy to do is to plan, and the second is to execute. Of these two tasks, only the first is distinctively the task of strategy; for the second, that of executing, is mainly left to the logistical officers in one case, and to the tactical officers in the other case.

This means that the planning of strategy is mainly the planning of the work that logistics and tactics are to do.



Strategy says, for instance, that it wants a battleship of a certain power, speed, and steaming distance, and tells logistics to provide it. Logistics tells the constructors to design and build the hull, the ordnance officers to design and construct the battery and armor, and the engineers to design and make the engines. Similar principles govern the relations between strategy and tactics, and they apply to all the preparations, great and small, whereby in time of peace strategy prepares for war.

It will be noted that, although we use the technical terms strategy, logistics, and tactics here, they are merely technical terms as applied to a special art, and indicate the same successive steps as follow each other in every undertaking in life: planning to do, securing the means wherewith to do, and doing.

We have seen how the progress of warfare, beginning with the warfare between two men who used their fists alone, has been gradually developed and complicated by the invention and use of means to assist and supplement the fists during more than five thousand years. The use of the human arms being not only to inflict blows with the fists, but also to parry blows from the antagonist's fists, they have always been employed, not only for striking, but also for parrying. To supplement the use of the arm in parrying, the shield was invented before the time when recorded history began; the shield differing from the arm in the sense that it was used to oppose resistance only, and not to inflict blows. So, in the development of armies and navies, the employment of troops and vessels to parry an attack by interposing themselves in the line of the attack, was supplemented by various kinds of shields; such as armor of hide and steel on the bodies of men and horses, defensive edifices, walls and ramparts, and heavy plates of specialized steel, secured on the outside of the structures of ships and forts.

It is plain, therefore, that the highly complicated armies and navies that fought the last Great War were merely the developments of primeval fighters, and differed from them

not in kind but in degree. In the same way, the modern city of New York differs from a savage village; for in both we see human beings essentially alike, living together in houses, divided into families, subsisting on food and water, and governed by such rules as are necessary, in order that those bodies of people may live together in comparative tranquillity. To render this possible, a highly complex condition of society has had to be developed. For some reason of which we are not apprised, certain tribes (only a few) achieved civilization and built cities, and a very few have developed into great nations. Those great nations have, both as a cause and an effect, developed highly complicated armies and highly complicated navies. We do not know why it should be, but it seems to be a fact that no nation has ever been able to attain a high degree of civilization, or to maintain it afterward, without developing a highly complicated army and navy. A nation seems to have natural enemies, as a man does, these enemies being both external and internal. In the case of a nation, the enemies are foreign nations and barbarians outside, and unruly elements, now comprised under the general name of "bolsheviki," inside. In the case of a man, his enemies are other men outside and noxious bacilli inside. *In all cases, strength is needed to overcome the external and internal enemies, and live in health.*

The simple club gave way to weapons that consisted of more than one part, and gradually to weapons and appliances consisting of many parts; that is, to what we call machines. Now, a fundamental characteristic of a machine is that the various parts are not mere aggregations of like parts, as are the straws bundled together in a broom, but complicated arrangement of dissimilar parts, having different functions, but acting together under a common directing head, for the accomplishment of a common purpose. Such a machine is the arm of a man, and such a machine is his entire body. The body of a man, however, is of so much higher an order of excellence than any machine ever devised by man that it is not to be described by the word machine so accurately as by the word

organism. No man has ever yet created an organism; but he has invented and developed many machines.

The ordinary conception of the word machine is of an apparatus, such as a steam engine, made mostly of iron and brass; but this is only one kind of machine. One of the definitions of machine in the Standard Dictionary is: "The organization of the powers of any complex body: as, the *machine* of government"; so that an organization of human beings is as much a machine as a steam engine is. And if this organization includes men who handle machines of iron and brass, and if those machines of iron and brass are essential to the attainment of the end in view of the organization, those men and those machines of iron and brass are parts of the complete machine, just as the engine of an automobile is part of the automobile, which itself is a machine. From this point of view, a navy is a machine; and so is an army.

We now see that *the work of peace strategy is to prepare war machines*: that the work of peace strategy in any nation is to prepare a naval machine and a military machine. And it is a little more than that: it is to prepare one great machine, of which the principal parts are a naval machine and a military machine, which will work together for the common purpose of the nation; just as the separate parts of the naval machine work together for the attainment of the task allotted to the navy, and as the separate parts of the military machine work together for the attainment of the task allotted to the army.

It is an obvious fact that there is in no country any other machine comparable in cost, complexity, and importance with its national defense machine. Therefore it is evident that in no other single work of the nation is there so much need for accurate and energetic work, and therefore for trained character and skill. For it may be pointed out that, *if two countries go to war, the result of the war will depend on the relative effectiveness of the two machines that they put forth, and upon nothing else whatever*; because the effectiveness of

each machine is a product of all the factors of strength and skill, of material and personnel, that go to make them up. When two pugilists meet in the arena, or when two great armies meet on the field of battle, or two great fleets meet on the ocean, the battle has already been decided. Mortals do not know how it has been decided; but this is because they do not know what are the relative degrees of efficiency and strength of the two machines.

We see, therefore, that the work of strategy in peace is to produce a national defense machine, and that the first stage in the production is to design it. As the machine consists primarily of two coöperating machines, a navy and an army, and as in every country the amount of money to be spent on national defense varies with the wealth and strategic position of the country, the first thing to decide in each country is whether the navy or the army shall be the major machine, and have the major part of the money expended on it. In Great Britain, the United States, Japan, Australia, and Argentine, it seems obvious that the navy should be the major part of the machine; and that in France and other European continental countries the army should be the major part. Because of the facts that three quarters of the earth is covered with water, and that the greatest countries will in the future be countries that border on the ocean, it seems probable that in every great country the navy will, in the future, be the major part of the machine. The coming of aëronautics will tend to make this probability the greater, because aëronautics will extend the power of navies much more than it will extend the power of armies. It is not improbable, however, that aëronautics may become such a powerful factor in war that it will become a separate branch and not an accessory to an army or a navy. If this should come to pass, the national defense machine will consist of three parts instead of two.

In designing the machine or any of its parts, the strategist will naturally follow a course such as any man follows in de-

signing an engine, planning a house, or embarking on any undertaking whatever; that is, he will consider carefully what the machine is intended to accomplish, what are the difficulties in the way, such as cost, etc., and what are the means that he has available, such as money, material on hand, etc. After considering these three factors, he will design the machine.

In naval and military affairs, this process, as has been frequently stated in this book, is gone through by following a method that was devised by the German general staff, called the estimate of the situation method. By it every military or naval problem—in fact, many problems in daily life—may be solved. It is perhaps the greatest single contribution to strategy ever made; and it is, furthermore, a great contribution to civilization in general, and one of which people might profitably avail themselves more often than they do. It is applicable strategically not only to any great problem, such as the designing of the military or naval machine, but also to each one of the great divisions and subdivisions into which every great problem becomes ultimately divided as we proceed with its solution. An essential beauty of it is that it enables one to solve any problem unconfused by details, leaving the details to be solved later as separate though similar problems. It enables one, for instance, to plan a navy as a whole, unconfused by the details of each kind of ship, or kind of base, or kind of organization; and then to make for each of these problems a separate estimate of the situation.

Of course, the United States navy was not designed in this way; but that is a misfortune, and it accounts for the haphazard way in which it grew, and the enormous amount of money that it cost. If an engineer should build an engine without making any plans for it beforehand, but by simply making a number of parts and then putting them together afterward, he would produce a result somewhat like that actually produced in our navy. In the last few years this state of affairs has been improved upon, largely through the teachings of our Naval War College. A better machine is the result.

As an aid to designing an army, and to a greater degree a navy, abundant use has been made in later years of war games. Moltke realized that in time of peace officers got no training for war except in manœuvering their companies, regiments, divisions, and corps, in what may be called "parade-ground tactics"; and that it was possible for an officer to handle his men with excellent skill, and yet have no clear idea in his mind as to why he was moving them about, or as to what he would do with them against an actual enemy. He realized that such an officer would be skilful in the way in which a swordsman would be skilful, who could brandish his sword with strength and quickness, but who had never met an actual opponent, even in the fencing-room. He therefore devised problems in which tactical situations and strategical situations were stated; and officers were required to solve them: that is, each officer was required to state in writing what he would do in each situation.

In this way, Moltke gave each officer a training comparable to the training that a fencer gets by being pitted against an antagonist in the fencing-room: for the mind of each officer was confronted with the necessity of overcoming an active enemy, and therefore of having to take into account his probable and possible moves, and his own facilities for meeting them. He was also compelled to come to a prompt decision as to what he would do. To aid in solving some of the problems, or parts of the problems, the *Kriegspiel*, or war-game, was invented, in which the actual forces engaged were represented in miniature, and made to fight against each other in mimic battles, under certain carefully prescribed rules that tried to take into account all the varying conditions and sequence of incidents that were probable.

The usefulness of the war-game in designing the naval or military machine, or parts of it, lies mainly in the fact that in any given game, different kinds of ships, or different kinds of military organizations, or weapons, can be introduced, and mimic battles fought out, or mimic operations conducted, with

the idea of ascertaining which kind of ship or organization or weapon is the best. The analogy is evident, of course, between this way of using the war-game and the experimental department of every large manufacturing institution; for it is the intention of most experiments, at least in their earliest stages, to try out large schemes, and parts of large schemes, with models that represent them in miniature.

In designing the national defense machine, or any of its parts, it is obvious that the persons who make the experiments, and afterward the design, should be experts; that is, they should be experts if the best results are to be obtained for the money allotted. That the designing has often been made by people with almost no knowledge of the subject, however, has been the history of all navies, except perhaps the German and Japanese. In designing our navy, for instance, the people who designed the navy as a whole have usually been members of Congress; though the people who have designed the individual ships, guns, etc., have been experts. For this reason, the individual ships and guns have been better than the navy as a whole. The Congressmen have designed the machine as a whole, and the experts the little parts.

The naval or military machine having been designed as a whole by Congressmen (that is, it having been decided, for instance, that the navy should consist of so many ships of such and such classes, and of so many officers and men of such and such classes), the actual building of the machine has been carried on by experts in the various departments. That is, ordnance officers have built the guns and gun-carriages; constructors have built the ships; engineer officers have constructed the forts in the army and the engines in the navy; electrical officers have made the electrical apparatus, etc. This part of the task, the actual mechanical work, and even the designing of the mechanisms, does not, of course, fall within the province of strategy, but of logistics.

But, while the purely logistical details of vessels, forts, guns, etc., may be decided by men skilled in designing such

details, we cannot too clearly hold it in our minds that the design of the machine as a whole must be made by experts who comprehend the mission of the machine as a whole, the difficulties in the way of accomplishing the mission, and the means available for accomplishing it—that is, by strategists. After the machine as a whole has been produced, there is a work that this machine as a whole can accomplish, and this work is, in its ultimate effect, strategic. The barbarians in all history have been defeated because civilized men brought against them machines that wrought ultimately their strategic defeat. It is true that these machines (for instance, battering-rams, ballista, and muskets) were not of themselves strategic machines, but rather mechanical machines. Nevertheless, they were brought into use to accomplish strategic purposes, and were designed in their basic features by men who understood their strategic usefulness. Had they been designed by men who did not have this understanding, they would have been ineffective strategically, no matter how excellent they were mechanically.

The climax of the development of war appliances occurred in the last Great War, when the Germans brought to bear against the Allies, on both the land and the sea, weapons and scientific mechanisms that were better than the Allies had. While this statement is true of both the armies and the navies, it is more strikingly true in regard to the navies, especially in regard to the German navy and the British navy. The British navy was the most powerful navy in the world, and it held the longest continuous record of success of any military or naval organization in the world; whereas the German navy was comparatively new—had, in fact, been considered a first-class navy for hardly ten years, and held no record of achievement whatever. Yet at the battle of Jutland, as shown conclusively by Admiral Jellicoe's book, "The Grand Fleet," the German naval machine proved itself to be better than the British, although it was not so large.

Even the German machine was defective, however, in that



there had not been incorporated in it (in any adequate degree) the greatest new agency in warfare invented since the gun—the flying-machine. In Germany this first appeared in the form of the Zeppelin dirigible balloon, and in the United States in the form of the airplane. Both had been developed to the point of practicability before August, 1914, the Zeppelin in the higher degree. The first serious development of the airplane by a government was in Italy, the next in Germany, and the next in England; so that when the war opened both types were available, but the Zeppelin the more so. The exigencies of the war developed the airplane more rapidly than they did the dirigible balloon, so that by the end of the war there was a tremendous aviation corps in each army and navy, and important results were gained by them. In fact, the results were so great that one is inclined to marvel that Germany had not used a greater degree of foresight in developing the airplane before the war began, for she had shown a foresight unprecedented since the time of Moltke in her preparations for the war.

With regard to countries other than Germany, one does not incline to marvel, because they showed little war foresight of any kind. As to Germany, the simplest explanation seems to be that her attention had been so wholly engrossed with the preparations she had already made, culminating in the production of a really practical submarine, her preparations had been so complete before the advent of the airplane, and the material at her disposal was so wholly obligated by the requirements of existing weapons and appliances, that she had hardly the time or the means for adequately developing the airplane in addition. Before the war had finished, however, it was clear that if the countries of either the Teuton or the Allied side had estimated correctly the possibilities of the airplane, and had developed it as energetically as they could have done, that side would have won the victory, and quickly; with great saving in lives and suffering and money.

Before the war there had been considerable discussion in

Great Britain as to the advisability of reorganizing the Admiralty, and making it more like the German Admiralty; but this was not done, except in a small degree. Judged by the results as shown in the battle of Jutland, by the success of the submarine, and by the fact that the British Admiralty later did adopt a system that is virtually a general staff system, the German system was the better. Now, by the German system the planning of the navy was done entirely by the general staff, that is, by strategists.

The result of the competitive test of the two systems in war was exactly what could have been expected, as Admiral Jellicoe's book and certain public statements of Admiral Beatty abundantly set forth. If the British navy had been as well designed strategically as the German navy, there would not have been that deficiency in destroyers, submarines, and aircraft, and that comparative inefficiency of armor-piercing shell, protective decks, and searchlights, that Jellicoe points out. It may be answered that strategy has nothing whatever to do with the kind of armor on the side of a ship or the kind of steel of which a shell is made. To this the answer may be that if, in any navy, strategy has no voice in these matters, the results will be such as were with the British navy at the battle of Jutland; but that if strategic experts do control in these matters, they will see to it that the logistical officers supply the strategically best material that can be supplied; and a Grand Fleet will not be handicapped by inadequacy in small craft and defective material, and made unable to achieve victory over a much smaller fleet.

It may be pointed out here that a logistical officer is not so immediately concerned with victory or defeat, does not so clearly apprehend the factors that secure it, and is not so much on edge as a strategical officer, whose whole life is spent in the endeavor to attain actual victory under the strategical conditions that the next war will bring forth.

. It is important for us to see clearly that, no matter how well designed the various parts of any machine may be (such as a

navy or an army, or a national defense machine comprising both), the ultimate value of the machine is what the machine as a whole can do. "The strength of a chain is the strength of the weakest link." This is an old saying, and it may be applied without much qualification to any machine, and even to any man when subjected to great strain. No matter how fine armor a ship may have, or how powerful her guns, or how magnificent her engines, she is very weak below the water-line, and will be disabled and perhaps sunk if penetrated there: no matter how perfect she is in other ways, a comparatively small disablement to her engines, boilers, pumps, or condensers will restrict and perhaps destroy her mobility: no matter how strong a man otherwise may be, a weak heart will reduce his strength, sometimes to zero, if ever his strength is sorely taxed. Therefore it is essential that a navy or an army shall be designed as a whole, and its parts designed afterward; as is the procedure in the case of a ship or a house, or any thing constructed in the usual line of business. For the same reason that nobody but an expert architect can design a house, that nobody but an expert constructor can design a ship, and that nobody but an expert engineer can design an engine, so nobody but an expert strategist can design that great strategic machine, an army or a navy.

In thinking of the designing of the military or naval machine, we must not forget that the men are the most important part of each machine; and that, therefore, the numerous questions that come up in regard to the men, not only the details of the organizations but the total numbers needed, should be decided by the requirements of strategy, as interpreted by experts in that art.

Apologies are hereby tendered for dilating at such length on what may seem an obvious proposition. The excuse is the paramount importance of the subject, the fact that the principle involved has never been recognized in this country, and the further fact that in consequence enormous sums of money have been wasted.

While the most important part of the work of designing the machine must be along the regular lines of planning, much attention (that will probably have to increase as time goes on) must be devoted to the production of *new* appliances, especially of *new* offensive weapons. It is obvious that if one side can bring into a war, ready for use and with men trained to use it, an absolutely new weapon, a tremendous advantage will be gained; because the other side will not know how to protect themselves against it. Examples of this dimly apprehended truth are numerous in history; but the most startling examples are the *Merrimac* and the *Monitor*. It is true that before the *Merrimac* appeared at Hampton Roads the Northerners knew that she was being prepared; but they did not know it long enough in advance to enable them to oppose any resistance worthy of the name; with the result that the *Merrimac* destroyed the *Cumberland* and the *Congress* on the very day that she left the Norfolk Navy Yard, and threatened to destroy the ships of the Union navy in succession, bombard our coast cities, and prevent any blockade of the Confederate coast. If she had accomplished this, victory in the war would have gone to the Southern side. But, fortunately, John Ericsson, many years before, had designed a type of vessel that he called a *Monitor*; and, not long after the war began, he had persuaded the Union government to make a contract with him for its construction, and to detail a crew to man her. The victory of the *Monitor* over the *Merrimac* on the day following the destruction of the *Cumberland* and *Congress* turned the scales the other way, and assured victory for the Union in the war.

Similar cases, which are next in order of importance, occurred during the war just ended, in which the Germans brought into use weapons that their antagonists did not know existed—such as the long-range mortars that dropped high explosives on top of the Belgian forts, and appliances for using noxious gases. In addition, they had improved the submarine and the art of mine-laying to a degree far beyond

that which they had permitted to be known; with the result that the magnificent British navy, almost in sight of its own coast, was comparatively helpless against them. The Germans had also developed their spy system to a degree unheard of before, and therefore new; so that during the early stages of the war the Allies, and especially the British, found themselves fighting against secret enemies within their own borders.

The fact that the Germans went down, finally, in disastrous defeat must not beguile us into making the illogical inference that we have nothing to learn in strategy from them. We must in honesty admit that the Germans have been preceptors in strategy to all the world since the time of Moltke, and that the fact that the German nation directed the strategy of the German army and navy to evil ends does not impugn the excellence of the strategy. Many bad men have had great talents and devoted those talents to evil ends; but this fact does not blind logical men to the fact that those bad men had talents. It is an axiom in strategy that one must learn all he can from his enemies, and that it is the height of folly to underestimate an enemy in any way. Exactly how many new things we shall be able to learn from the Germans in matters of strategy we shall not know until all the history of the war has been written and the campaigns analyzed; but we know now, and we have known for more than four years, that the Germans showed the world how enormous is the value of bringing new weapons and appliances suddenly and unexpectedly into use at the beginning of a war.

The Germans could not have done this except under the guidance and inspiration of strategists, whose vision took into account not only the operations of fleets and armies, but the scientific and the mechanical appliances which it was the effort of those operations to bring to bear against an enemy. This shows that at the present day *the strategist who completely fulfils his mission must be to a considerable degree an engineer, and must have enough of the inventor in his composition to be possessed of an imagination that will enable him to visual-*

*ize the possibilities of new methods and appliances that may be proposed.* If, like Cæsar, he can invent instruments and methods and original plans himself, let his country's enemies beware.

The machine having been designed and built, the next step is to prepare it for use. As far as the activities of strategy are concerned, this preparation is almost wholly of the personnel; because the preparing of the material engines and appliances is the task of logistics, though it must be performed to the satisfaction of strategy.

The task of preparation divides itself naturally into two parts—tactical preparation and strategical preparation.

The tactical preparation is that needed to insure that, in the day of battle, each gun's crew, each engine-room force, each signal force, each destroyer, each submarine, each vessel of every kind, each division of vessels, each squadron of vessels, and the fleet itself shall be manœvered skilfully; and that similarly each squad, each company, each regiment, each division, each corps, each army shall be manœvered skilfully; and that in the aeronautical branch each unit and each force, of whatever kind or whatever size, shall be manœvered as a unit skilfully. The principal single reason for the victories of Alexander, in fighting against enemies greatly superior in numbers, and possessed of similar weapons, was the splendid precision with which the Grecian phalanx could be manœvered. As an army is merely a machine, Alexander had a better machine than Darius; a machine that was better balanced, less clumsy to direct, and less easily broken to pieces.

The larger the forces that one handles, the greater the necessity for drill, because the greater difficulty is in the way. A man can be trained in a short time to handle a club or sword or spear: it takes a longer time to train him to handle a group of, say, ten men, armed with clubs and swords and spears. It takes him a longer time to learn to handle a hundred men so armed, or to handle ten men armed with more

complicated weapons, such as muskets. That is, it takes him a longer time to learn to handle them with the same degree of skill and consequent effectiveness. In fact, he can never learn to handle a large complex organization quite as efficiently, in proportion to its size, as a small and simple one, for the reason that his capacity as a man remains the same, whereas the difficulties of the task increase. Let anybody watch the lightning-like movements of the point of a skilled fencer's foil, and then observe the sluggish manœuvres of even the best drilled fleet, or army corps, and the truth of this remark will become apparent to him.

The distinctive difference between a club or sword and a fleet or army is that the club or sword is a rigid unit, whose parts coöperate with absolute perfection; whereas a fleet or army is a machine whose parts are held together loosely instead of rigidly, and with the handicap of great complexity and consequent liability to fail in some part at almost any moment. The whole endeavor of tactical drills, on land or sea or in the air, is to make all the various parts coöperate as well as possible. The father of Frederick the Great was hated because of his harsh persistency in the drill of his soldiers; but when his son hurled one of his divisions against one of the loosely tied divisions of his enemy, the blow was like the blow of a club against a bundle of fagots. Similarly, the dashing Mamelukes of the Egyptian desert threw themselves in vain against the sides of Napoleon's squares of thoroughly drilled though half-ragged troops.

The tactical drills of armed forces are within the domain of tactics rather than of strategy; nevertheless their nature must be prescribed by strategy, or they will serve no useful purpose. It is a well known fact in naval and military history that many tactical drills and many tactical formations and manœuvres were not devised under competent strategical direction, and that in consequence they were not strategically effective, and had to be discarded in the next war, and often after some great disaster. An analogous case is that of ad-

hering to methods that were tactically good at one time or under one set of conditions, but not good at a later time, after new weapons had been introduced, or when the conditions under which war was waged had considerably altered. *Strategy must see to it that tactics keeps its methods adapted to all the changing conditions of the times.*

After the various organizations have attained some degree of proficiency in manœuvering, tactical exercises are held, which differ from tactical drills in the sense that they have an object in view beyond mere successful manœuvering. These tactical exercises are usually so conducted that parts of a fleet or army are pitted against other parts, and manœuver for tactical advantage, and sometimes fire blank charges at each other. By this means, they not only simulate actual battles, but gain practice in handling the various weapons, ascertaining the range of the enemy under varying conditions, moving large masses of men or vessels, etc., and test out systems of fire-control, transmission of orders and information, etc., under circumstances as close to those of battle as can be got without using actual projectiles and killing men and injuring ships. These tactical exercises are sometimes very exciting indeed; and they are always interesting and always contain a very considerable element of danger. No fleet and no army can be prepared for war without such exercises, any more than a pugilist can be prepared for a prize fight without engaging in boxing bouts.

In order that tactical exercises may be of such a character as to convey the most valuable lessons and impart the best training to meet the probable circumstances of the next war, they have to be carefully planned beforehand, both in their general character and in the details; and this planning, of course, is the task of strategy. The planning is usually done by the general staff at the Admiralty or War Office, or by the staffs of the commanders of the forces that are exercising. In either case, the staff frequently assist themselves with the game-board, and play games beforehand that represent in



miniature the exercises they are planning. Occasionally an exercise as actually carried out is a selection made from many games that have been played on game-boards, or is a combination of several. The tactical exercises are sometimes at the end of strategical exercises, in which forces that have been separated from each other by great distances are brought together after a series of strategical operations more or less prolonged, and are then made to maneuver against each other; just as forces do after being brought together from a distance in real war.

Strategical exercises for both armies and fleets are the largest operations carried on on the surface of the earth, except strategic operations in actual war. Armies, consisting sometimes of hundreds of thousands of men, with mortars and cannon and supplies and munitions and engineering implements and hospital appliances, are moved over hundreds of miles, partly on railroad trains and partly on foot, and suddenly brought within sight of each other on a mimic field of battle. In the Continental armies, and in those of Japan and Argentine, the utmost possible importance is attached to these operations by the nation; great expense is incurred; and the undivided attention of all the forces engaged is concentrated on the operations, not only during their actual continuance, but during many weeks and sometimes months before. In fact, the whole period of time between one series of grand maneuvers and the next is one of preparation for the next. By this system, the training of an army and of its various parts becomes definite and forward-looking; it ceases to be perfunctory and becomes objective; automaticity is prevented; and the minds of all are kept in a continual state of activity and expectancy.

The strategic exercises of navies are, of course, on a much larger scale, because of the greater power of the units employed, the greater speed at which they move, and the greater distances that they traverse. A strategic exercise that would involve, for instance, an attack by the United States fleet on

the coast of Portugal would extend over the entire Atlantic Ocean; and a strategic exercise involving an attack on the coast of China would cover a great part of the Atlantic, the Isthmus of Panama, and most of the North Pacific Ocean. Over these large areas, dreadnoughts, costing more than \$20,000,000 each, would move, accompanied by hosts of cruisers, destroyers, submarines, aircraft, and auxiliaries of all kinds. As a matter of fact, however, such large strategic exercises as these have never been carried out, except in chart manœuvres, as distinguished from strategic exercises. Many strategic exercises have been held, however, in which fleets manœvered over the spaces between England and Gibraltar, and between Boston and the West Indies.

Strategic exercises, ending in tactical contacts, are the culmination of the work of strategy, in peace. They bring to a climax all the work of the strategist, the logistician, and the tactician, in designing the naval or the military machine, and in preparing it for war. In order that the exercises may be of the maximum value in simulating the conditions of war, and therefore in gaining the most valuable strategic, logistical, and tactical experience possible, the reserves must be called out, and the navy or army put on a war footing; for otherwise a condition quite untrue as a picture of war will be made, difficulties that would appear in war will not appear, and the whole performance will lack adequacy and completeness, and therefore truthfulness.

For this reason, the grand manœuvres in the Continental armies, and in the most important European navies, have been preceded by a mobilization of the entire military or naval forces, and all arrangements have been made to simulate war as accurately as possible. The strategists of the principal European armies and navies, ever since the day of Moltke, have realized that when a nation enters into war the preparations she has made before the war in designing, building, and preparing her national defense machine are the determining factors, and the only determining factors, as to the way in which

that machine will operate during the war. After a war has begun, the two contesting machines are like two pugilists who have started to fight. It is too late then to rectify any mistakes or supply any omissions.

This being the case, does it not seem a matter of the commonest kind of common sense to have the designing and preparing of an army and a navy made under the guidance of strategy, interpreted and carried out by experts? When hundreds of millions are spent on national defense, why not try to get the greatest amount of defense in return?

The prime necessity in any naval or military machine is, of course, that it shall be ready to start on war operations as soon as a war breaks out; for otherwise it may be defeated immediately by a machine that is ready, as the French army was in 1870 by the Prussian. In the days not long gone by, before the great industrial movement had filled navies and armies with almost an infinity of complicated apparatus of all kinds, a navy or an army could quickly and easily pass from a peace footing to a war footing. Moltke was the first man to realize adequately the additional requirements in the way of preparation entailed by the progress of civilization; and he met them by organizing and training a body of officers who should have charge of making the numerous and complicated preparations needed. To this body of men, which now exist in every considerable navy and army, the name general staff has been given in our language. The United States army had no such body of men until about the year 1902, when Elihu Root as Secretary of War succeeded in having a general staff established for the army, against strenuous opposition from politicians. Politicians naturally saw in a general staff a curb to their activities in managing such matters as the composition of the army, the selection of officers for high positions, the distribution of army posts throughout the country, etc.

But the navy was unable to secure a general staff because of political opposition; so that, when the probability of our

becoming involved in the World War became manifest, a situation highly dangerous arose. As Aid for Operations, I was responsible, under the Secretary, for the strategy of the navy. After the war broke out in August, 1914, the danger of our navy being dragged into war while unprepared became so alarming that I secretly induced Representative Hobson to introduce a provision into the Naval Appropriation Bill for a general staff. To avoid opposition, we agreed not to use the word general staff, and to use instead the words "Office of Naval Operations." The provision was eventually adopted and incorporated in the Naval Appropriation Bill and approved by the President, though in a somewhat emasculated form. In March, 1916, in the course of official testimony before the House Naval Committee, I made an argument in favor of putting into the pending appropriation bill those provisions pertaining to the Office of Naval Operations that had been left out of the previous bill, and at the same time informed the committee that I was the author of the provision which Mr. Hobson had introduced. My plea was heeded; and the bill, as eventually passed and approved by the President in August, 1916, contained virtually all the provisions originally suggested. This gave the navy a general staff, though it was not called by that name. The Navy Department, of course, obeyed the law; and the result was that when the United States navy entered the Great War in April, 1917, it entered fairly well prepared, and with an organization that could handle the navy effectively.

It may seem out of place in a book of this kind to recount a personal experience; it may seem an exhibition of mere vanity. Perhaps it is; but I have decided to narrate it for the following reasons:

(1) Personal experiences, when narrated in connection with an important matter, have great efficacy in bringing the main points of what might otherwise seem an academic question into clear relief.

(2) One of the objects of this book is to impress upon the

people of the country the importance of strategy, and the necessity of a comprehension of its elementary principles by the voters of the nation. Now, this personal experience is irrefutable proof that no such knowledge existed before the war; for, if it had existed, it would not have been necessary, in order to insure the national safety, for the officer who occupied the highest position in the navy to risk his commission and jeopardize his entire professional career by secretly influencing Congress, and thereby deliberately disobeying the United States navy regulations.

## CHAPTER XXI

### STRATEGY IN WAR

**W**E have seen that the effort of strategy in peace is to design, build, and prepare a national defense machine. When two nations go to war, therefore, they put forward two machines to operate against each other; in practice, two naval machines operate against each other, and two military machines operate against each other.

The simplest conception of two fleets or two armies operating against each other is that the two fleets range opposite each other in parallel columns, and shoot at each other across the space between; or that two armies line up against each other, face to face, and shoot across the space between. Actual battles of this kind have been fought; but, as a rule, fleets and armies have been brought into battles as a result of an attempt by one side or the other to begin the battle with a tactical advantage of some kind.

The tactical advantage desired has usually been of the nature of concentration upon an inferior force or part of the enemy, so placed that it could receive but little assistance from other parts of the force. If the enemy force has been divided into separated parts, the endeavor has usually taken the form of an attack on one of the separated parts by a force stronger than itself; if the enemy force has been concentrated, the endeavor has usually taken the form of an attack on one of his flanks or his line of communications, or an attempt to penetrate his line. In case the enemy is concentrated, but is inferior in numbers, skill, or otherwise, the endeavor has sometimes been to envelop or surround him. Obviously, if envelopment or surrounding can be effected, greater results can be obtained

than by any other form of attack, because the enemy is thereby immobilized. Obviously also, it is more difficult to achieve.

Attention may be here invited to Tables I and II (pages 58 and 60), which show why it is desirable to attack two separated parts of any enemy rather than both together; and why success may be achieved, even if the aggregate of those two forces is greater than the attacking force.

We can see this clearly if we consult Table I, and note that, if two forces each aggregating 1000 were in each other's vicinity, and if the entire force A was able to engage half of B, or 500, it would whip half of B, and have 841 remaining with which to engage the other half (500) of B. Reference to the end of the third period in this table shows also that if a force of 789 engages a force of 523, it will have 569 left after the other has been reduced to zero. Therefore, a force of 1000 that engages two forces of 500 separately will have more than 500 left, after those two forces have been reduced to zero; whereas, if it engages both when they are united, both sides will be gradually reduced to zero, remaining equal all the time.

It is interesting to note how this simple fact is the key to most of the operations of strategy and tactics; how (the mechanical tools in the way of men, ships, guns, torpedoes, and equipment having been supplied) the key to their successful use is simply to take advantage of all opportunities of isolating one part of the enemy's force from the rest, and then attacking one of the parts with a force superior to it. Opportunities lacking, one must, of course, try to create opportunities by inducing the enemy to detach some part of his force, under circumstances in which you can attack it, or the weakened main body, with a superior force. Naturally, one must try to prevent a similar procedure by the enemy.

This does not mean that the sole effort of operations is finesse in either strategy or tactics; sometimes the sole effort is to force a pitched battle by the side that feels superior, and to avoid a pitched battle by the side that feels inferior. Be-

fore the actual inferiority or superiority has been ascertained, however, the strategy of each commander is to bring about a situation in which his force shall have the advantage. The advantage having been gained and recognized (or an advantage existing and being recognized), strategy insists on forcing a battle, for the reason that *every contest weakens the loser more than it does the winner.*

This does not mean that it is always wise to engage a weaker force that is temporarily separated from its main body. It is readily understandable, for instance, that it would be unwise in two cases:

(1) A case in which the weaker force were so little weaker, and were part of a force so much larger than the total of the smaller force, that the gain as between the two forces actually engaged would not be great enough to compensate for the loss entailed. For instance, a reference to Table I shows that an A force of 1000 engaging a B force of 800 would have 569 left when B was reduced to zero. This is impressive; but if the B force of 800 were a part of a total B force of 2000—in other words, if there were another B force of 1200 near at hand—A would have 569 left with which to oppose 1200, a proportion little less advantageous than the proportion he started with—1000 to 2000.

(2) A case in which the B force may have divided with the express purpose of luring A to attack; arrangements having been made whereby an inferior B force would simply hold the A force until the rest of the B force could come to its assistance; arrangements having been also made that this should be accomplished before the detached part of B should get very badly damaged.

Attention is invited to Table II, which is a continuation of Table I. It represents what would happen if a force of 1000 should fight separately two forces, one of 800 and the other of 200. In column 1, A is supposed to have engaged the force of 200 first, and so to have become reduced to 970 (see Table I) and to engage 800 afterward. In column 2, A is sup-



posed to have engaged 800 first, thereby becoming reduced to 569 (see Table I), and then to engage the force of 200. The table indicates that it makes no practical difference whether A engages the stronger or the weaker force first.

Column 3 shows that a force of 841 (the part remaining after the force of 1000 had annihilated a force of 500) would have 653 left after annihilating a second force of 500.

Fig. 1





Fig. 2



Taken in connection with columns 1 and 2, this indicates that it is easier to defeat two separated equal forces than two separated unequal forces of the same aggregate value; that the weakest way in which to divide a force is into equal parts. This fact is mathematically demonstrated by Mr. F. W. Lanchester in a recent book called "Air craft in Warfare."

The act of engaging the separate parts of a force is usually spoken of as "concentration"; but the word "isolation" seems better, for the reason that the advantage results from the fact that the part attacked is *isolated* from and unsupported by the other parts. This case is represented by Fig. 1, in which A and A' fire on B, which is unsupported by B'. The case in which B is supported by B' is indicated in Fig. 2. That there is no advantage in merely "concentrating" on B is shown by Table III; for, while B is rapidly reduced in power by the concentrated fire of A and A', and A

and A' are more slowly reduced by the fire of B, B' is not reduced at all, and continues to fire at A and A', and therefore to reduce their power.

TABLE III

Value of offensive at beginning.....	$\left. \begin{array}{l} A = 500 \\ A^1 = 500 \\ B = 500 \\ B^1 = 500 \end{array} \right\} \begin{array}{l} \text{aggregate} \dots 1000 \\ \text{aggregate} \dots 1000 \end{array} \right\}$
Damage done in first period by.....	$\left. \begin{array}{l} A = 50 \\ A^1 = 50 \\ B = 50 \\ B^1 = 50 \end{array} \right\} \begin{array}{l} \text{aggregate} \dots 50 \\ \text{aggregate} \dots 50 \end{array} \right\}$
Valued offensive power at end of first period.....	$\left. \begin{array}{l} A = 450 \\ A^1 = 450 \\ B = 400 \\ B^1 = 500 \end{array} \right\} \begin{array}{l} \text{aggregate} \dots 900 \\ \text{aggregate} \dots 900 \end{array} \right\}$
Damage done in second period by.....	$\left. \begin{array}{l} A = 45 \\ A^1 = 45 \\ B = 40 \\ B^1 = 50 \end{array} \right\} \begin{array}{l} \text{aggregate} \dots 90 \\ \text{aggregate} \dots 90 \end{array} \right\}$ <div style="text-align: center;">&amp;c.</div>

In reading accounts of strategical and tactical operations we see three words used continually: force, quickness, and direction. The word force as here used is not force in the engineering or mathematical sense, but denotes material masses in the sense of numbers of soldiers and numbers and sizes of ships and guns. It is comparable to the weight of a club; while quickness means, of course, speed of movement. Therefore, the three words that we see used so constantly in military annals mean the same things as do the factors in any blows that are struck: mass, velocity, and direction.

The effect of any blow is overcoming resistance. It is measured in mechanics by the mass that delivers the blow and the square of the velocity with which it strikes. The mathematical formula is  $E = \frac{1}{2} M V^2$ . In this formula, M is the mass of the weapon that delivers the blow, and is proportional to the weight. Mathematically speaking,  $M = \frac{W}{2g}$ , where w is the weight and g is the acceleration of gravity. Whenever a blow overcomes the resistance of a body, it does it by virtue of the energy, or work, stored up in it, which is expended in doing work in overcoming the resistance of the resisting body. If a club breaks in the skull of a man, or an arrow pierces his flesh, or a rifle projectile penetrates the armor of a battle-

ship, the energy is expended in overcoming the resistance of the skull, the flesh, or the armor through a given distance. The office of the skull, flesh, or armor is to protect vital parts from such blows, and its duty is well performed in proportion to its strength; and this strength consists largely in such an arrangement of its molecules that parts contiguous to that which receives the blow can come to its assistance. If the strength is small, little resistance is offered; but if the resisting strength is great, as in the armor of a battleship, the parts adjacent to the part that receives the blow come quickly to its assistance, and resist the attempt of the projectile to break the part struck away from the contiguous parts, and force it to the rear.

We see here one phase of the so-called "contest between guns and armor" that began with the making of pointed weapons and the answering making of shields. The reason for making weapons pointed was a realization of the fact that the smaller the area attacked the less resistance could be opposed. It was realized that by concentrating the blow on a small area, the total resistance to penetration would be less than if a larger area were allowed to oppose resistance. The idea was exactly the same as that of concentrating attack upon a separated portion of the enemy before the other parts could come to its assistance. It was realized, at the same time, that by giving great speed to the weapon, say a spear, the parts surrounding the place attacked would have less time to come to its assistance, and penetration would be more surely effected. In other words, the effect of sharpening the point of a spear and giving the spear great speed were identical: to effect penetration by isolating the part struck from other parts that might assist it. If you will look at a pane of glass that has been hit by a stone, and another that has been hit by a rifle-ball which went through it at a great speed, you will see in the first case a number of cracks, as evidence of a partially successful endeavor on the part of the glass near to the part struck to come to the assistance of that part; and you will see a smooth hole

in the second case, as evidence of a less successful attempt at resistance, due to lack of time. And if you will examine the hole punched in armor by a rifle projectile, you will see convincing evidence of the tenacity with which the metal all around the hole tried to come to the assistance of the part struck.

These considerations show that, in making any attack, as in striking any blow, speed is necessary, to prevent neighboring parts from coming to the assistance of the part attacked; and equally that, in resisting any attack or blow, speed is necessary in order to bring up quickly all neighboring parts to the assistance of the part attacked.

In the operations between two hostile forces, the greater the concentration of any force, the greater its cohesive strength, and therefore the greater its ability both to give and to resist blows: on the other hand, the greater the dispersion of any force, the less its strength and therefore the less its striking and resisting power, because of the difficulty of attaining mutual assistance among the various parts. For this reason, strategists endeavor that military and naval forces shall enter battles in concentrated form; that is, with the various parts in supporting distance of each other. If two armies or two fleets could be concentrated in two points, they could be brought into collision with each other, with the result that the army or the fleet possessing the greater energy would instantly overcome the other. It is, of course, impracticable at the present day to concentrate them so perfectly; but it is the office of strategy, assisted by tactics, to approach this condition as closely as the practical limitations of logistics and tactics will permit.

The ideal concentration can be more readily approached in fleets than in armies; because greater destructive powers can be carried in individual units, and therefore (under the practical limitations of money expended) fewer units used; and for the further reason that these units, being made of steel, are much more rigid and coherent units than are the compar-

atively loosely tied organizations that compose armies. This enormous concentration gives enormous strength; but the very concentration, the very fact of putting so much into so few highly specialized units, makes injuries the more difficult to repair in time, and increases the importance of victory or defeat.

If there is so much value in concentration for both offense and defense, it may be asked why fleets and armies cannot be kept concentrated during war. The answer is that fleets and armies cannot be kept concentrated during time of peace, so that when the war starts they are already separated, and must remain so, until their commanders are able to concentrate them; and that, even after that, the various minor operations that have to be carried on, the necessity for sending out scouting expeditions, supported by fighting forces, to ascertain the position and movements of the enemy, and the logistical and tactical difficulties in the way of moving large forces, especially on land, necessitate a large force being divided a very great part of the time. The period immediately after the breaking out of a war is apt to be the most critical period of the war, because the force that concentrates the more quickly can gain great advantages by attacking portions of the enemy before they can be joined together. Important instances of this were the activities of the British fleet in Nelson's time in watching outside of the great French naval ports of Brest, Rochefort and Toulon, and preventing those forces from emerging and forming a great fleet, which might later get into the English Channel and convoy an invading army across. Another important instance occurred at the outbreak of the war in 1870, in which the Prussians, by concentrating more quickly than the French, were able to prevent MacMahon and Bazaine from uniting, and then to defeat each one while isolated from the other.

On the sea, after a fleet has once been concentrated, there is less difficulty in keeping it together while moving from one place to another than with an army, because the sea is not cut

up into roads, as the land is, and fleets are therefore not restricted to certain narrow lanes, as armies usually are. Furthermore, a fleet can carry its supplies with it, and mostly inside of the fighting ships themselves; whereas an army's supplies and munitions have to accompany it in separate wagons, which take up a great deal of space and need guards to protect them. Additional difficulties with armies are the fact that an army fights in the direction in which the men face and march, the accompanying fact that the lines in which they fight are now very long by reason of the numbers engaged, and the further fact that the columns in which they march are so very long that an army does not march in one long column but in several. If these columns can march on roads so close that the columns are within supporting distance of each other, and yet so far apart that, if need be, the columns may be deployed (that is, formed in line of battle), the danger from separation is not great. But if, as often happens, the positions and directions of the roads and the character of the land in between them are such as to occasion wide separation of the columns, then danger exists that one column may be attacked when the others cannot come to its assistance.

This same difference between the surface of the sea and the surface of the land concerns the line of retreat, which is always one of the many sources of anxiety of a commander. On the sea or in the air, a defeated fleet may retreat in almost any direction; but on the land a defeated army can retreat with order along certain definite roads only. Furthermore, the line of communication of an army with its base, and by which it receives its supplies, may run in an unfavorable direction from the center of the army, in which case the army may not be able to retreat along its lines of communications, if defeated. The line of communications may even run approximately parallel with the line in which the army faces to fight, and therefore approximately perpendicular to the line along which it may be forced to retreat. Unfavorable conditions may possibly occur on the sea during the day-time: for the

hostile and victorious fleet may even get between the defeated fleet and its base, as the British fleet seems almost to have done at the end of the battle of Jutland. But with the coming of night even a defeated fleet, if not too much injured, as *Rojensky's* was, may steam around the hostile ships and get back to its base, as the Germans did from Jutland.

One of the curious and interesting facts connected with warfare is the way in which the defensive and the offensive have been alternately favored by successive improvements in appliances and methods. There seems to have been a contest between the offensive and defensive in warfare, analogous to the contest between guns and armor. As a rule, improvements for defense followed improvements for offense, as the invention of the shield followed the invention of the club and the spear, and as the invention of armor for ships followed the production of guns that could pierce unarmored ships. That this should have been so is not surprising, and is merely one instance among thousands of the tendency of men not to take precautions until taught by harsh experience to do so.

We can hardly conceive of a war, or even of a fight between two men, in which during most of the time, one party is not taking the offensive and the other the defensive, even though the two parties alternate in their activities. When any improvement has been made in weapons, it has naturally first favored the offensive; and similarly, when any improvement has been made in such appliances as shields, armor or submarine mines, it has first favored the defensive. Nevertheless, every improvement in weapons, say in muskets, has given great advantage to the defense, because it has enabled the defensive to use a more powerful fire against an offensive attack; and every improvement in means and methods of defense has been utilized by the attacker. For instance, savages use shields while making attacks, and battleships, in even the most aggressive assault, wear thick armor on their sides.

The discussion as to which is the more powerful activity in war, the defensive or the offensive, is more than 5,000 years

old. Of course, there is much to say in favor of each. The most important considerations are that the defensive can select its own position, can protect itself by such things as ramparts and submarine mines, and (being in a state of comparative rest and protection) can use its weapons with more precision than can an attacking force, which must be most of the time advancing and exposed; while the offensive has the advantage that it can select its own time, method, and locality of attack, and can therefore make its plans beforehand and get ready to execute them. Added to this, the mere fact of movement, of pressing forward to attack, imparts a great moral and nerve stimulant to the men. One of the curious facts in the last war is that although both forces, especially the Germans, endeavored continually to take the offensive, the war had in one way a more defensive character on both sides than any war in recent history, because the greater part of both sides found themselves during the greater part of the war in trenches. A curious fact in connection with this is that in his book "On War To-day," Bernhardi had declared that in a Central European war such conditions would be "hardly likely" to prevail.

Another curious phase of the development of warfare is that, while new weapons have been produced, almost no weapons ever used before have ever wholly been discarded. In the World War, for instance, men fought against each other with not only the most highly specialized and scientific instruments that the intellects of all the world could devise, but with their fists and feet and clubs and bayonets; while many of the highly specialized means were merely revivals in improved forms of old contrivances: for instance, the highly specialized submarine was a development of submarine vessels moved by hand power in our Civil War; the mortars that attacked the tops of the Belgian forts were developments of the old ballista; and poison gas was an improvement on the ancient Chinese stink-pot.

While fleets and armies operate with the same end in view—



the destruction of the enemy's machine—and while the strategic principles under which both operate are identical, their methods of tactical operation and logistical preparation and supply, are of course, quite different. The main difference in the tactical handling lies in the fact that armies fire their guns in the direction in which they advance, whereas fleets fire theirs in a direction approximately perpendicular to it. The first important consequences of this difference is that hostile armies cannot both advance far after they begin to fire at each other, whereas fleets continue to advance. In fact, fleets continue to advance with as much speed as is practicable and safe; for the reason that, if one fleet can get a position in advance of the other, it will secure an advantage in using torpedoes; because the fleet that is to the rear will run into torpedoes, whereas the fleet that is ahead will run away from them.

Another important difference between the conduct of an army and that of a fleet, in actual operations, is that an army, being extended in a long line and liable to attacks at any points which the enemy may select, it is usually necessary to have behind the line large reserve forces that can be sent to any threatened points. In some operations, the reserve has been the main striking part, and in that sense the most important part of the whole force; as in prosecuting an offensive when the weak points of an enemy's force have been sought out by forces ahead, and the reserve held in readiness to be hurled against a selected spot when found. On the sea, however, the fact that a fleet must be kept in motion, and very rapid motion, added to the fact that no circumstances, such as mountains or rivers, prevent the extension of the column, makes it difficult and undesirable to station any reserve on the side opposite from the enemy. For this reason, and for the reason that a fleet is a much more highly organized machine than an army, a naval battle is usually much more decisive than a battle on land, and therefore a more important factor in deciding the ultimate defeat or victory of a nation. This has always been

the case; and it is becoming increasingly more so, as ships become more and more powerful, more and more complicated, and more and more difficult to repair when injured. This is analogous to the condition of affairs in the animal kingdom, in which the more highly organized the animal, the more easily it is killed or seriously injured.

When Cæsar was operating in Gaul, when Napoleon was operating in Egypt, and even when Dewey was operating in the Philippines, the actual operations of war were almost wholly under the control of the commander on the spot; but the advent of the wireless telegraph has made possible such rapidity and certainty of communication, even between moving vehicles on sea and land and in the air, that the general staff at home can keep in fairly constant touch with fleets and armies; and since by these means they can become informed of many important movements nearly as soon as the commander-in-chief himself, and may have more sources of information than he on some questions, the general staff at home can exercise much greater control than formerly.

This condition has its advantages, of course; but it has the extremely dangerous disadvantage, that superior authority at home is under the constant temptation of interfering unduly with the commander on the spot; with the consequent danger of giving him orders based on information that he may know to be erroneous or too old, and putting him in the dilemma of either disobeying orders or playing into the hands of the enemy. The danger exists not only between the authorities at home and the forces in the field or on the sea and in the air, but also between separate parts of the same force.

As the complexity and size of fighting forces has increased, and the difficulty of unity of action and purpose has in consequence increased, and as improved facility of communication has not sufficed wholly to overcome the difficulties, a method called indoctrination has come into use, whereby it is attempted to imbue all the members of a fighting force with such an understanding of the end in view, and such loyalty

to the cause, that the men will do what they ought to do in emergencies without receiving specific orders. Good examples of the working of indoctrination can be read of in Admiral Jellicoe's account of the battle of Jutland. In this battle it was impossible for him to direct all the various parts of his force, or even to know exactly what was happening. Nevertheless the cruiser squadrons and the destroyer and submarine flotillas, and even individual vessels took the initiative in many important emergencies, and did what their indoctrination led them to see that Admiral Jellicoe would want them to do.

A formal acceptance of the idea of indoctrination—in fact, the proposition itself—is fairly new; nevertheless we see admirable illustrations of its being carried out in practice under the inspiration of Nelson at the battles of Trafalgar and the Nile. Nelson spoke of his officers and himself as a "band of brothers." They were; and because of this, and because of Nelson's continuous and intimate communion with them, the increasing interest that naturally arose in the great events in which they were engaged, and the exact information of all as to Nelson's plans and aims, that "band of brothers" was actually indoctrinated, though none of them had ever heard of indoctrination.

A navy or army that is thoroughly prepared goes into war and starts on a war in accordance with certain general plans that have been prepared by the general staff long before. But a general plan is not a fixed thing made of steel, like a railroad track, but a flexible thing, capable of being adapted to emergencies as they arise; and it usually exists in connection with many alternate plans, devised in advance to meet different contingencies that have been foreseen. Nevertheless, the number of things that may happen in a campaign is, humanly speaking, infinite; so that new situations continually arise, that must be dealt with by means that must be mentally devised and cannot be automatically produced. In other words, situations arise that have to be dealt with strategically as new

situations; and problems are therefore presented which have to be solved as new problems. How are they solved?

By the estimate of the situation method, already explained. In each new situation, large or small, a clear mental conception of the mission must first be achieved; then a clear conception of the difficulties in the way of attaining the mission, and a clear conception of the facilities or means available for overcoming the difficulties. After these three steps have been taken, the fourth step is taken: the decision is made.

*Warfare of Positions.*—It has often happened, especially during long intervals of peace, that ideas about warfare have become crystallized, and strategy has come to be regarded like a game of chess, in that the numerical power and positions of forces have been considered to be the decisive factors in gaining a result. Foch, in his book "The Principles of War," quotes Marshal Saxe as saying of war: "I am sure that a clever general can wage it as long as he lives without being compelled to battle;" and Foch devotes most of a chapter to proving the erroneous nature of this declaration, and of like declarations, as well as of operations in accordance with them.

It is a fact, of course, that in such a theory, as in most theories, there is a considerable element of truth. It is a fact that a large force has an advantage over a small force, that a force on the top of a hill has an advantage over a force at the bottom of the hill, that a force on a flank of an enemy has an advantage, that a force well armed and equipped has an advantage over a force poorly armed and equipped, etc. In the latter part of the eighteenth century, in the interval between the wars of Frederick the Great and those of Napoleon, the warfare-of-positions theory secured great vogue, and this is one of the reasons for the early successes of Napoleon. For Napoleon demonstrated, as Thutmose III and Alexander and others had done before him, that strategy differs from chess in the fact that, while the factors on the chess-board are dead, the factors on the war-board are alive. On the chess-board, one king is as good as another, and so is any other piece as

good as a similar piece on the board, except in so far as position may favor it or the reverse. Napoleon showed that on the war-board the human "pieces" differed, though the chess pieces did not; and that, while positions were valuable, the ability to think correctly and act vigorously was also valuable.

It is true that many a force has compelled another force to retreat, and sometimes to surrender, by simply taking up positions with reference to the enemy that made the positions of the enemy untenable. It is true also that a commander, being caught in an untenable position, may very properly retreat without fighting, knowing that fighting would injure his force more than it would the enemy. It is true also that manœuvering to get good positions is a very important feature in strategical and tactical operations, and that ability to take up such positions quickly and with good judgment is a great quality in a commander. Nevertheless, the taking up of such positions, unless fighting is afterward done from these positions, is only a threat, and a threat that would have no value if military force were not available to back it up. It is a little like getting the judgment of a court against a man. In ordinary life we are apt to regard the judgment of a court as the real act that compels a man to do anything that the court directs; for instance, to pay a bill. But, in fact, the judgment of the court does not compel him to pay the bill or do anything else: it is the executive power of the government to put a man by force into jail, or to do other violence to him, that compels him to pay the bill.

Thus the introduction of the human element into warfare, as illustrated by the operations of Napoleon and others, has prevented strategy from becoming like a game of chess. Another thing that has prevented it in as great a degree, and probably in a greater degree, has been the continual change of weapons, especially the increase in their number and effectiveness; for some of the most disastrous defeats have been

caused by inactivity in not continually devising new methods to meet new weapons.

Until within the last few years, the most important single change in the circumstances and methods of warfare in recorded history was made by the invention of the gun; but now we see that even greater changes will certainly be caused by the invention of the airplane. For the gun was merely an improvement over the cross-bow, in propelling a projectile with greater velocity, and therefore over a greater range and with a greater penetrating power. Its principal effect was to increase the distances at which troops engaged. But the airplane introduces the third dimension into warfare, and compels forces to move not only backward and forward and to the right and left, but also up and down. It revolutionizes scouting by giving a means of observation and a speed of movement immeasurably greater than those of cavalry; a means of correcting gun-fire, especially distant gun-fire, very much better than any known before; and a means of sending instructions and information incomparably superior to the horse or even to motor-cars. But all these changes fade into insignificance beside the fact that the airplane, if armed, is of itself an offensive weapon in the first rank of power and excellence, though few people have yet realized it.

Let us not forget that the whole object of sending a division of troops, or a vessel, to a certain point is that when the division or vessel gets to that point, it may destroy something, or threaten to destroy it. Now, airplanes can do this very much more quickly than can a division, or even a ship. Furthermore, a division or a ship operates on the surface of the land or water, and its projectiles are practically restricted to a horizontal direction and an attack on vertical structures, such as walls and the bodies of men, for which very ancient methods of protection are in use. But the airplane attacks from above, from a direction against which little protection has been yet devised; or, in the case of the torpedoplane, from below and

on the under-water bodies of ships, their most vulnerable part. Furthermore, the cheapness of airplanes, in comparison with their speed and bomb-carrying power, and their extreme mobility, permit of their being constructed and manœvered in large numbers and with a facility and speed that the older agencies of warfare cannot even approximate.

It would be foolish, of course, at the present moment to predict what will be the future of *aéronautics* in warfare, and therefore its influence on strategy; but it is obvious that it will be so great as to compel the modification of all existing strategical and tactical methods on both land and sea. A peculiar element is that an airplane or airship can be converted almost instantly from a peaceful carrier of commercial commodities into a powerful instrument of war, by merely attaching a bomb for use on shore, or a torpedo for use on sea. It may be that this ease of conversion is due to the fact that specialized types of aircraft for naval and military use have not yet appeared, and that it will vanish later, when special types are developed, as ships-of-war were developed from ordinary ships on which guns had been placed. It is probable that specialized types will be developed; in fact, a specialized type was developed during the war, in the sense that light armor was built in certain airplanes to protect certain parts. The future usefulness of aircraft in warfare, however, is not dependent necessarily on specialization; for airplanes that exist to-day, and others that are being built, are of a power and speed and radius of action that compel the anxious attention of the strategist.

At the present moment it seems probable that the tactics of aircraft will be more like those of armies than of navies, for the reason that the greatest dimension of an airplane is perpendicular to its direction of movement, as in an army's; while a ship's greatest dimension is in the direction of its movement.

There are those who prophesy that warfare in the air will in time become more important than warfare on either land or sea or both together; by reason mainly of the great speed

that can be attained, the freedom of aircraft from hindrance by shoals or rivers or unfavorable elements of the ground, and the great vulnerability of cities and harbors and troops and ships to airplane and torpedoplane attack. This is an interesting prophecy; but whether it will be fulfilled or not, it is probably better to leave to prophets for decision. It does not need a prophet, however, to predict with confidence that, inasmuch as airplanes and other aircraft are merely weapons, their utilization in war will be directed by the same agency as directs and always has directed the utilization of weapons—strategy.

*Speed of Thought.*—In speaking of speed, one naturally thinks of the speed of the material units; that is, of the ships or the troops. But there is another kind of speed—the speed of thought. The victories of Cæsar, Frederick, and Napoleon are instances of the value of speed. This speed is mainly evidenced by the quickness with which their troops arrived at certain points. The reason usually given for the quickness of their arrival is the speed at which they marched; but let us not overlook the super-important fact that antedating the speed of their marching was the quickness of their starting, and that this was due wholly to the speed of thought of their great commanders.

*Strategy and Imagination.*—In the mutual coöperation of strategy with logistics and tactics, and although they merge one into another, with no precise dividing lines, it is apparent that if we visualize the functions of the three we will see that strategy differs from the other two mainly in the fact that it uses and requires imagination. Strategy looks ahead into the dim beyond, and pictures to itself, in every situation, what the situation can be made to bring forth. To do this requires, of course, a sufficient knowledge of the details, nature and scope of logistical factors and tactical factors, to get a true picture of the situation as it really exists, and a correct estimate of what must be done, logistically and tactically, to turn the situation to the best account. If guided properly by strategy,



the logistical or tactical officer does not require special foresight, and therefore does not need much imagination. A logistical officer needs mainly clear common sense, good judgment, exact knowledge, and great energy; a tactical officer needs these and besides great rapidity of decision, strong nerves, and high courage. A strategical officer needs all of these, but possibly in not so great a degree; but what he does require pre-eminently is foresight, and a clear and accurate imagination. The French have a proverb: "No imagination, no great general."

By the words "great general" the saying probably means great strategist; for it is not clear that much imagination is needed to make a great tactician; while it is inconceivable that a man could be a great strategist without having a great imagination. Certain it is that Alexander, Cæsar, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon had imaginations as great and as fine as can be found in history, even among the poets, in which class Frederick the Great and Napoleon certainly were, and even among the inventors, of whom one in the highest rank was Julius Cæsar.

The *sine quâ non* of the strategist is imagination. He must foresee the circumstances under which the next great conflict will be fought, and prepare plans and appliances of the highest order of completeness and novelty to meet them with success. It is well to study the campaigns of the great commanders of the past, but not exclusively.

*The war that the strategist must win is not the last war, but the next war.*

## CHAPTER XXII

### STRATEGY AS RELATED TO STATESMANSHIP

**S**TRATEGY is the servant of statesmanship. The great strategists, whose work has been briefly outlined in these pages, were statesmen also, and their ultimate aim seems to have been to accomplish achievements in the line of statesmanship rather than in the line of strategy, and to use strategy merely as a means to an end. Clearly, unless strategy does serve some end of statesmanship, it cannot serve any definite purpose. If this be true, it must also be true that some aim of policy or statesmanship must precede the aim of strategy in each case; in other words, the end to be fought for must precede the idea of fighting for it.

It is obvious of course, that man was originally a savage, that a great part of the population of the world have always been savages, or at the best barbarians or semi-barbarians, and that they are so to-day. A fraction of the population of the world have now advanced to a degree of civilization which we consider very high, and which may or may not be actually better than savagery. Whether it is or not we do not know; but we do know that there is some force that has impelled us to struggle out of a condition of savagery, and that it is the general opinion of the civilized world that a condition of civilization is better than one of savagery. The following remarks are based on the supposition that this opinion is correct.

The history of peoples whose doings are recorded shows a gradual rise in every case from a lower order of civilization that, in its turn, had risen from savagery. History is largely a record of conflicts between the forces that tended to civilization and the forces that resisted it. Before these conflicts began, however, another conflict had been waged: a conflict

between men and beasts. The men triumphed; not because of superior strength or courage, but because of a certain mental capacity that enabled them to make and use weapons.

The wild beasts having been subdued, the race was free to start on its upward course. But some men were antagonistic to this course. Only a small fraction desired civilization, or had the mental capacity to see its benefits and work for it. Savages, and later barbarians, resisted the progress of civilization with force. They had to be answered with force. The result was many wars.

If we look at history analytically, we see that, while there were many wars that seem to have been waged for no special reason and to have had no special result, yet many of the wars, especially the great wars, were a part, directly or indirectly, of the conflict between civilization and barbarism. This does not mean that, in each one of these cases, there was a civilized nation on one side and a savage or barbarian tribe on the other side, such as there were in the conflict between Rome and Alaric; but it does mean that on one side was a cause whose triumph would benefit the progress of civilization, while on the other side was a cause whose triumph would hinder or impair it. Such was the war between the North and the South in 1861-1865; such was the war between the United States and Spain; such was the World War just finished.

Civilization does not mean, of course, a condition in which there are merely great wealth and great material comfort; for it means also a condition in which the physical, moral, and spiritual well-being of the individual is intelligently cared for. History shows that all these things can be accomplished only when large communities live together under laws that not only are wise but are strictly observed. The instinct of the savage and the barbarian revolts at this. Bearing this in mind, we see a distinct connection between the barbarian outside of a nation and the anarchist inside; one is a barbarian outside, and the other is a barbarian inside. As both have the same feeling regarding civilization, they both resist it in the same man-

ner—with force; and it is only with force that the barbarian and the anarchist can be subdued.

We thus see that, up to the present time, the influence of war on history has been not only favorable to civilization, but essential to it. Of itself, war has not directly contributed to civilization, though it has done so indirectly in some ways. Its main accomplishments have been first to assist a healthy civilization to triumph over barbarism, and, second, to cause the destruction by healthy peoples of every nation that had become over-civilized and effete.

It may be argued that the world has at last reached such a height of civilization that war is no longer needed. But, as war has always existed, there are no data on which to base such an argument. If wars were to cease, the human race would find itself embarked on an unknown sea, for which the records of the past would furnish no chart or compass. Exactly what would happen to the race, we do not know. We have records, however, that extend over a period of more than five thousand years; and these records show that the combination of wealth and long-continued peace has been not only harmful but distinctly ruinous to every nation that has been subjected to its influence.

In judging whether or not civilization has now reached a stage in which the past may be ignored, let us remind ourselves that the number of individual human beings that are really civilized by education and character is, even now, only a small fraction of the people of the earth. *The majority are held in subjection by the minority.* But the barbarians were long held in subjection by Rome, and much more firmly than barbarians are held now. The barbarians ultimately triumphed over Rome; and as the antagonism between barbarism and civilization is as great as it ever was, and is increased by the ostentatious luxuriousness of the rich, the barbarians (or anarchists or bolshevists) may triumph again. The reason that the barbarians were able to triumph over Rome was that Rome became luxurious and neglected the military arts. If we

neglect the military arts, the barbarians (or anarchists or bolshevists) may triumph over us—and probably will.

If one takes a general view of the progress of development of the human race, he can hardly fail to come to the opinion that, although human beings seem to us to be the best things that the Almighty has created, and although the human mind seems to be the best part of the human being, nevertheless the human mind is an exceedingly imperfect contrivance. One becomes amazed in noting that the great body of mankind have been almost inert in the march of progress, that a very great number have forcibly resisted it, and that the progress of the world has really been initiated and forced through by a comparatively few. The benefactors who seem to have been the most powerful in this work have been those individual geniuses who have made the inventions, and written the poems, and painted the pictures, and carved the statues, and sung the songs, and said the things that stimulated men's intelligence and enabled them to triumph in a practical way over the harsh difficulties of their natural surroundings. The men who invented the wheel and the screw are unknown to history, and so are the men who sang the songs that inspired primeval tribes to rise. But it was those men and men like them that started and maintained the race on its upward march.

The men next in importance seem to have been the statesmen and the strategists. If all the men and women in the world could be made into one vast organism, like the human body, then all the parts would work together solely for the good of the organism. But this is not the actual condition. The actual condition is that each man and woman in the world is himself an organism, covered with a skin that isolates him from all the rest of the universe. It is only by sympathy, and by an intelligent appreciation of the good results of coöperation that any human organism comes into any touch, except hostile touch with other human organisms. But by means of sympathy, which the various religions, especially the Christian religions, have inculcated, a great deal of fellow feeling

has been engendered among people who come in contact with one another. Naturally, this fellow feeling is at its greatest among people whose interests are in common, especially when they are bound together by ties of affection, particularly family affection. Heredity has a curious and powerful effect; and so have natural surroundings.

From these causes it has resulted that tribal organizations came into existence even in the earliest times; and that in countries like Greece, in which small localities were separated from others by chains of mountains, or rivers, or other natural divisions, intense tribal feeling has been brought about. In most cases, and in most places, tribal organizations have continued without much change for long periods; but in some cases, such as those well known in Greece, Rome, France, etc., tribes possessing greater energy and ability than others have subdued them, and nations large and small have resulted. In virtually all nations that have lived long, the hereditary tie has been strong: empires that have consisted of many kinds of people, not having strong hereditary ties, have usually not lived long. The best example is the short-lived empire of Alexander.

Now, in the relations of all these tribes and nations to the rest of the world we see evidence of coöperation among the individuals of the tribe or nation, and of competition between each tribe or nation and the other tribes and nations with which it came into contact. The action and interaction of competition and coöperation seem to have been almost a necessity of progress, and even of efficiency.

Numberless illustrations may be cited, even in the affairs of every-day life. A simple one is that of baseball teams. We cannot even imagine an efficient baseball condition unless there be excellent coöperation among the individuals of a team, and intense competition among the teams. So, in the larger affairs of nations, and all through history, the progress of civilization has been accompanied with coöperation among the individuals of each nation, and competition among the nations

themselves. These two factors are not antagonistic to each other, but rather mutually stimulating. That is, the more intense the *esprit de corps* in any organization, the greater the coöperation of its members, the higher the efficiency of the organization and the greater its spirit of competition as regards other organizations; and, equally, the greater the spirit of competition among organizations, the greater the *esprit de corps*, and the consequent efficiency, of each organization.

It seems to be a fact, therefore, that, were it not for the existence of competing tribes and nations, the world would not have progressed as it has. It is true, of course, that this competition has often brought on wars that caused great misery and bloodshed. But *it must be plain that the misery and bloodshed have caused suffering to a comparatively small number of individuals, and that the whole human race has benefited.*

Now, in order that in the various tribes and nations the elements of coöperation and competition should be wisely directed, certain policies have had to be followed, and these have been under the direction of statesmanship. The wars that have resulted have (in wisely governed nations) been waged under the direction of strategy, not only in the actual fighting, but in the preparations beforehand. During the actual fighting strategy has been practically in full control, with statesmanship awaiting the issue; while in times of peace statesmanship has been in full control. Yet, if the statesmanship has been wise, it has always worked in coöperation with strategy, even in times of peace, in order to maintain a condition of national strength, sufficient to repel attack from outside or from inside.

The aims of statesmanship have sometimes been distinctly good and sometimes distinctly bad, sometimes wise and sometimes foolish; though, like all the other activities of men, they have usually been in the great middle ground between. But, whatever the goodness or badness or wisdom or folly of those aims, it has been the endeavor to carry out those aims that has

been the cause of virtually all the wars. The responsibility for wars, therefore, rests on statesmen and not on strategists; and this remark is true even in cases in which the statesman and the strategist have been the same man. In other words, it was Alexander the statesman who was responsible for Alexander's wars, and not Alexander the strategist.

Inasmuch as a most powerful factor in bringing the nations of the world into their present condition of civilization has been war, and inasmuch as the consensus of civilized opinion seems to be that this condition is better than our original condition of savagery, one is led to question the correctness of the assumption so generally held that war is an evil. The question involved is too profound to be reasonably entered into in a book of this kind; but in the interest of truth the fact must not be overlooked that, while peace is a much pleasanter phase of life than war is, yet the record of history for more than five thousand years shows, *with no exception whatever*, that long-continued periods of peace and prosperity have always brought about the physical, mental, and moral deterioration of the individual. It may also be pointed out that, while the Savior's teachings inculcated kindness and good will as among individuals, they never condemned war among nations or disparaged warriors. They seem to show a recognition of the fact, that, in a good cause, one ought to fight if necessary. In other words, they seem to preach that *neither right nor wrong exists in fighting itself; the right or the wrong is concerned in the cause fought for*. The Savior himself committed an act of violence when he overturned the tables of the money-changers in the temple.

As both statesmanship and strategy have been necessary to the advance of civilization, it would be as idle to discuss which is the more important as it would be to discuss which are the two most important links of a chain, or which is the more important of any two things that are absolutely essential. The curious fact may be pointed out, however, that in virtually every tribe and nation, from the earliest times to the



present day, men have been educated and trained from boyhood for the military and naval professions; but not in any tribe or nation in history do we see any record of men being trained in any equal degree for statesmanship. During the last half century, this condition of what may be called negligence has been aggravated in nations where representative governments exist, and especially in the United States. Why this should be so, it might be indelicate for a naval officer to discuss. The fact seems to be, however, that, while for the army and navy young men are selected in boyhood, after passing rigid physical examinations, are trained all their lives thereafter along a very strict system, and are not promoted from any grade to another until after passing rigid physical, moral, and mental examinations, yet for the most important civil positions under the government, including even those of ambassador and cabinet officer, no training whatever is undertaken, and men are appointed without examinations of any kind.

In the last few hundred years a number of nations, notably France, Great Britain, Germany, the United States, Italy and Japan, have reached a very great height in civilization, intelligence and wealth. Accompanying the advance in these matters, there has been an increase among the individuals of the nations of a desire for the individual to express himself as an individual, and a consequent diminution of the autocratic powers of the governments. In most of the nations, constitutions have been adopted that define the mutual rights and privileges of the government on one side and of the individual on the other. In time of peace the provisions of the various constitutions have been observed with considerable closeness; but in every war it has been found necessary to increase, at least temporarily, the powers of the governments, and to decrease correspondingly the right and privileges of the individual.

The movement toward constitutional government, which in most of the great nations carries with it the right of the people to be represented in the government, especially in the legisla-

tive part, is unquestionably a movement that is for the well-being of the people as a whole; for it cannot be questioned that all through history there can be plainly seen the tendency of men in power to oppress the people below them, often to the point of harshness and even cruelty. As the principal means of oppression by rulers has been military force, there has naturally come about an intense distrust of military force, and a desire in every nation to cut down the military force to as low a point as is consistent with the safety of the country from attack by foes outside and by lawless elements inside.

In other words, in every country there has been a contest around the question of how much military force the country should support, and how much importance should be given to the military element. In Great Britain, France, and the United States, the military and naval activities have been subordinated to the more peaceful activities of the nation; whereas in Germany and Japan the military has been in the ascendant, and the most vital factor in the national life has been held to be its ability to sustain itself against outside attack.

Previous to the World War, the greatest nations of the world were Great Britain, France, and the United States as exponents of representative government, and Germany as the exponent of hereditary autocratic government. In Germany the general system of government, especially the military part, was highly efficient; and the safety, health, and general well-being of the individual were more carefully guarded than in any other country, though his personal liberty was much restricted. In Great Britain, France, and the United States, on the other hand, the governments were not so efficient (especially the military part) and the personal health, safety, and well-being of the individual were not carefully looked out for; but, on the other hand, the personal liberty of the individual was great.

It has been said that in the World War the two systems were tried in competition; and that, as Germany was beaten

in the war, the systems of government of Great Britain, France, and the United States were proved to be better than the German.

Does the fact that Germany was beaten prove that her system was not so good as that of her opponents? Before we answer this, let us realize that the wealth and population of Great Britain, France, and the United States were greater than those of Germany, and that Germany seems to have lost mainly because of her comparative inferiority in material resources (logistics).

It is not, of course, the purpose of this book to try to prove the inferiority of the system of government of his own country to that of Germany; for it is his intense conviction that the system of government of the United States, and in a less degree the systems of Great Britain and France, are much better than that of Germany. It is his conviction, however, that in these three countries something occurred that ought not to have occurred, and that almost brought about their ruin at the hands of Germany.

The thing that occurred, according to his conviction, is that the idea of personal liberty, with its consequent fear of the military, was carried to an undue extreme; and that, like every other idea that has been carried to an undue extreme, it jeopardized the continuance of the idea itself. The distrust of the military was carried to such an extreme in Great Britain, France, and the United States, largely through the influence of the pacifists and German propagandists, that those countries got into a condition that a man is in when he has not enough iron in his blood. Those countries seem to have lost their national physical strength, by lapsing into a condition of comparative effeminacy. This was due probably to being beguiled into forgetfulness of the fact that no nation has ever yet maintained itself except by military force, and that the culminating disaster in every nation that has ever fallen has been a defeat in battle.

The distrust of the military in each of these three nations

has been shown most clearly by the fact that men without any military or naval training whatever have been placed at the head of the army and the navy, intermediate between the army and the navy and the ruler of the nation. In every nation, of course, the ruler (be he emperor, king, or president) is the commander-in-chief of the army and the navy. As commander-in-chief of the army and the navy, he is in a position toward them not different from his position toward all the other departments of the government; for, though he is the head of the army and the navy, he is equally the head of every other department of the government. He is the head, for instance, of the Finance Department, the Post Office Department, and the Department of Foreign Relations. The fact of being ruler makes him automatically the head of each department of the executive branch of the government, and makes the immediate heads of those departments merely his ministers; or, as they are called in the United States, secretaries.

Considerable confusion exists in the public mind on this matter, largely because of the expression "the military must be subordinate to the civil authority." Of course it must be; *every branch of the government must be subordinate to the civil authority.* The civil authority is the authority of the government, and all the branches of the government must necessarily be subordinate to the government as a whole. In this particular, the men who belong to the army and the navy are in a category no different from that in which are the officials of the Treasury Department, the State Department, or any other department of the government. The only difference between the men in the army and navy and the men in the other branches of the government is that those in the army and navy wear uniforms; and, in the case of commissioned officers, hold their positions during good behavior. They form no special class, are drawn from no special class, and have no special privileges.

Because, however, of a cautious distrust of the military (which is perfectly proper provided it be kept within reason-

able bounds), the people in Great Britain and the United States have insisted that civilians only be put in immediate charge of the army and navy, intermediate between them and the ruler. In France there has been no such absolute insistence, with the result that the head of the army or the navy has sometimes been a civilian and sometimes an army or a navy officer. That the civilian system can result in as great an efficiency in those services as in nations that exact that those services be managed solely by trained men, it would be idle to discuss; for the plain fact is that in every other branch of the government, and in virtually every other great organization of every kind in every country, the men at the head of those organizations are men trained to perfect familiarity with the work they have to do. Certain it is that the World War has proved beyond any possibility of doubt that *the German army and navy, managed by men trained in army and navy work, were more efficient than the armies and navies of Great Britain, France, and the United States, managed by men untrained in such work.*

The question seems to be, therefore, whether or not we should accept the necessary inefficiency resulting from untrained men guiding the affairs of the army and the navy, in exchange for the supposed immunity given us against undue encroachments by the military. Before we answer this, let us realize that the real head of the army or navy in any country is not the Minister of War or of Marine, the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy, but the ruler of the country—the king or president. Let us also realize that the cause of the distrust of the army and navy is really based on the use that rulers have sometimes made of the army and navy for the purpose of oppressing the people, or of aggrandizing or perpetuating their own power: so that the distrust should not be directed toward the army or the navy, but toward the ruler. History is full of the deeds of oppression of rulers, exercised through the medium of the military; though there are a very few cases in very effete countries:

such as in the Roman Empire in its days of degeneracy, when the prætorian guard could influence and sometimes dictate the choice of emperors, and even kill an emperor. The fact that prætorian guards have acquired and abused such power is a reason for not allowing prætorian guards to exist again, and an argument against excessive militarism in general. Nevertheless, let us guard ourselves against confusion of thought, and realize that the real trouble was not the power of the prætorian guard, or even of the military element, but the abominable corruption, profligacy, and effeminacy of the people themselves. In the bad condition in which the Roman Empire was when the prætorian guard was in full bloom, the great power of the military was not, in fact, an evil, but a benefit; because without it the government could not have held together at all, and Rome would have fallen before the sword and torch of the barbarian. In fact, it was the weakening of the military power of Rome that later caused the fall of Rome and the sacking of the city.

The intention of every nation in maintaining an army or a navy is that it shall protect the country; and the man who is charged with this responsibility is the emperor, king, or president. In Germany and Japan he controls the army and the navy no more absolutely than does the ruler of Great Britain, France, or the United States; but he deals directly with the trained experts at their heads, and handles the army and navy through the medium of those experts; whereas in Great Britain, France, and the United States he deals with non-experts, and handles the army and navy through the medium of those non-experts.

The result has been that in Germany and Japan the army and navy have been well handled, and a very great degree of effectiveness has been obtained in exchange for the money expended by the people; whereas in Great Britain, France, and the United States the army and navy have not been well handled, and great effectiveness has not been obtained in exchange for the money expended by the people.

Any man can manage an army or a navy; but, in the same sense, any man can manage a railroad company, or paint a picture, or sing a song, or fill a tooth. No man, however, can do any of these things well unless he is an expert in the art. The competition in all classes of endeavor in daily life assures that the men who manage the railroad companies, and paint the pictures, and sing the songs, and fill the teeth, are experts. But, during the long periods of peace that fortunately now prevail, there is no observable competition among the armies and navies of the various nations, and there is no means, therefore, of knowing their relative conditions of efficiency. It is possible, therefore, in Great Britain, France, and the United States (as has been proved) for the armies and navies to go on for many years without any real knowledge on the part of anybody, except the officers of each army or navy, as to what is its condition of efficiency or inefficiency. True, this is found out when war takes place; *but then it is too late.*

The British Army, for instance, continued for many years in a state of inefficiency that was thoroughly realized by the officers themselves, but by no one else, until the Boer War broke out in 1899; and then the awful slaughter of the British soldiers, and the terrible expenditures of money that followed, brought the real condition of affairs before the public. It is true that Great Britain finally whipped the Boers; but it is also true that it cost her an amount in lives and suffering and money that was wholly unnecessary, and that cannot be balanced by any advantage that is discernible. *It was caused by inefficiency solely;* and the inefficiency was due fundamentally to the fact that the British army was inefficient in the place where most inefficient organizations are inefficient—at the head.

But a condition that is more serious, if possible, than the inefficiency of an army and navy because of unskilled control is that the ruler and his ministers, and the public itself, cannot have the knowledge of its conditions and its needs that it ought

to have. It has been pointed out several times in these pages that, in order to secure good results, the statesmen and the strategist should frequently and intimately confer. But how can they do this, when the strategist is put off by himself, and the statesmen manage the affairs of the country without paying any attention to him? One of the main reasons, if not the main reason, why Germany forged ahead so rapidly from 1864 to 1870 was that King William, Bismarck, and Moltke were in continual conference with one another. Bismarck embodied the statesmanship of Germany, Moltke embodied the strategy, and the king, because he was the ruler, embodied both.

In Great Britain, France, and the United States, for many years previous to the World War, the strategist, while not exactly discredited, was, to use an expressive colloquialism, told to "go 'way back and sit down and keep quiet." In those countries the strategists—in fact, all navy and army officers—knew the dangerous condition of affairs, and did all they could to rouse their governments to a realization of the danger; but their own governments, instead of listening to them, ignored them in effect, and, when they tried to inform the people directly, ordered them to keep quiet.

If, now, at the head of each army and navy in those three countries there had been a trained man, immediately responsible to the king or president, and holding the same position relatively to the army or navy as the head of the Treasury or Post Office Department holds relatively to that Department, the king or president and his ministers, because of the frequent and intimate relationship that then would have existed, would have been fully informed of the whole military and naval situation, not only at home but in other nations; the public would have learned of it also, and the deplorable condition of unpreparedness in which Germany caught those three countries would have been entirely prevented. The reason why Germany went to war in 1914 was the same reason as that for which she went to war in 1864, 1866, and 1870—



the reason that she was thoroughly prepared and her enemies were unprepared. If the people of Great Britain, France, and the United States had been informed of the actual situation, and had prepared to a degree even approximating that in which every sensible man maintains himself in regard to the dangers of ordinary life, Germany would no more have attacked France than a thug would attack a man whom he saw to be adequately armed and ready.

*There seems to be no escape from the conviction that Great Britain, France, and the United States had allowed themselves to drift into a condition of unpreparedness to which the word "disgraceful" can be applied with perfect reasonableness and propriety, remembering how unnecessary it was, and what frightful suffering it caused.*

It is instructive to note in this connection that, of the twenty-eight presidents of the United States, nine have been men who had seen active service at the front in actual war. Of these, Washington, Jackson, Harrison, Taylor, and Grant were distinctly military men; Hayes and Garfield had served during nearly the entire Civil War of four years, and had risen to the rank of Brigadier-General; McKinley had reached the rank of Major in the Civil War, and Roosevelt had served with distinction as colonel in the Spanish War. It has been said on occasions that some of the purely military men did not make as good presidents as others whose training had not been mainly military; but, on the other hand, it has never been said that any of them ever made as inefficient presidents as some of the others did.

As the duties of President of the United States (or of ruler of any country) require expert direction of all the multitudinous affairs of the government, it is obvious that there are many and very reasonable objections against making a purely military man the President; but, inasmuch as nine of our presidents out of twenty-eight have been military men, and as the man who seems at the present moment to be approved of the most widely for our next President is Major-

General Leonard Wood, it is evident that no overwhelming popular sentiment condemns it. It is pertinent, therefore, to point out the unreasonableness of putting a military man in actual command of the army and the navy, as well as of all the other agencies of the government, and then balking at putting a military man as merely the assistant to the President in managing the army and the War Department, and a naval man as merely the assistant to the President in managing the navy and the Navy Department. It is an excellent illustration of "straining at a gnat and swallowing a camel."

Much confusion of thought has arisen from the fact that the people of the country fancy that the main task of the man at the head of an army or a navy is to provide the necessary material for it to use, in the way of munitions, supplies, etc. This confusion of thought is easily explainable by the fact that, in nearly all the daily life of an individual, and in nearly all the daily life of any nation, the question of material supplies, of the wherewithal to support life, of food and clothing and shelter, is the paramount consideration; and in every nation the duty of the government is so to administer affairs, by means of the various administrative departments, in obedience to financial and economic laws, that the individuals of the country shall have abundance of all material necessities. To employ a word used ordinarily only in armies and navies, one may say that the main factors in the life of every individual and every nation are "logistical." Nevertheless, it is obvious that when a national defense machine is to be designed, built, and operated as a machine to protect a nation, it must be designed, built, and operated to do a certain strategical work; and that therefore strategy, and not logistics, must control its design, building, and operation—if the best results are to be secured.

This means that, although in the conduct of ordinary business, even the business of government, logistics is the prime factor, yet in the conduct of an army or navy strategy is the prime factor and logistics the subordinate. If a War or a

Navy Department were merely an agency for handling money and securing supplies and materials of all sorts, then a man trained in the handling of large business interests would be the ideal man to put in charge of it. But a War Department or a Navy Department is not anything like that. It is an agency for designing and preparing an army machine or a navy machine in time of peace, and for operating it in time of war.

It is sometimes urged that even a man wholly untrained in naval and military matters, if he would follow the advice of the best professional experts, could design, prepare, and handle an army or a navy with perfect efficiency. Whether this could be done or not (supposing an indefinite amount of time to be available) it would be idle to conjecture. It may be declared with confidence, however, that no such achievement has ever yet been accomplished, or even approximated.

The reason is that a military machine, or a naval machine, is more complicated, powerful and rapidly moving than any other machine the world contains; that even a small and slowly moving machine requires knowledge and skill in its director; and that the more powerful and rapidly moving a machine is, the more urgently it needs knowledge and skill in its director.

The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, in peace as well as in war, must continually make decisions upon matters involving ultimately the lives of thousands of men, the expenditure of millions of dollars and the safety of the nation. It is my mature and profound conviction that no man untrained in the principles and the technique of strategy would dare to accept either position, if he really understood the responsibilities he was assuming and the dangers he was courting.

THE END







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